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1. Introduction:  
DARPA—The Innovation Icon
Patrick Windham and Richard Van Atta
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has become 
an “innovation icon,” widely recognized for playing an important 
role in the creation and demonstration of many new breakthrough 
(“disruptive”) technologies. Some of these technologies have strictly 
military applications, such as stealth and precision-guided munitions. 
Others are “dual-use technologies” that have benefited both the civilian 
world and the Department of Defense. Examples of these technologies 
include the Internet, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, 
voice recognition software, advanced semiconductor manufacturing 
processes, and un-manned aerial vehicles. It is a remarkable record.
This introductory chapter focuses on DARPA’s key features—its 
mission, organization, linkages to other organizations, and “political 
design”—and how those features have contributed to its success. Later 
chapters and the book’s Conclusion suggest some lessons that DARPA’s 
experience offers for those interested in how this organization has 
worked over nearly sixty years and for those seeking to create similar 
technology agencies.
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2 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
DARPA’s Historical Mission and Organization
DARPA’s Evolution
DARPA has existed for over sixty years and during that time it has 
evolved, changed, and, on a couple of occasions, come close to being 
dissolved. It has changed in its organizational structure and in some 
important operational mechanisms as well. There is no simple singular 
depiction of DARPA that is accurate because it has changed and adapted 
based on how the world around it has changed—especially on how the 
national security environment has changed, but also on what different 
Presidents and their Administrations have asked of it.
Importantly, even at a given point in time there are what might be 
termed several DARPAs, as different parts of the organization—as small 
as it is—have focused on very different things—both technologically 
and in terms of how they function. This is evident from its early history, 
as Richard Van Atta outlines:
Indeed DARPA has morphed several times. DARPA has “re-grouped” 
iteratively—often after its greatest “successes”. The first such occasion 
was soon after its establishment, with the spinning off of its space 
programs into NASA. This resulted in about half of the then ARPA 
personnel either leaving to form the new space agency, or returning to a 
military service organization to pursue military-specific space programs. 
A few years later, then DDR&E John S. Foster required ARPA to 
transition its second largest inaugural program—the DEFENDER missile 
defense program—to the Army, much to the consternation of some key 
managers within ARPA. Also early in its history ARPA was tasked to 
conduct a program of applied research in support of the military effort 
in Viet Nam.1
Thus, even by the early 1960s one could say there were three, perhaps 
four key DARPA thrusts—with the addition of its exploration of new, 
emerging technologies, such as materials, and the nascent information 
technologies. As the overview below shows, DARPA’s history has 
been perturbed by political dynamics as well as the dynamics of the 
technologies it has pursued. Perhaps the most important hallmark of 
1  Van Atta, R. (2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 50 Years 
of Bridging the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. Kalhikina, and M. J. 
Tully. Arlington, VA: DARPA. 20–29, at 25, https://issuu.com/faircountmedia/docs/
darpa50 (Chapter 2 in this volume).
 31. Introduction
DARPA has been its adaptability and flexibility to respond to changing 
circumstances—often extremely rapidly.
DARPA’s Origins: 1958–1970
In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first artificial satellite, 
Sputnik I, an accomplishment that shocked the United States. Many 
Americans worried that the country was losing technological leadership 
to its Cold War adversary.
After the launch of Sputnik, President Dwight Eisenhower followed 
the advice of Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy and leading scientists, 
including his science advisors, James Killian and then Dr. George 
Kistiakowsky, and proposed the creation of what became the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (ARPA). ARPA was formed just four months 
after Sputnik on 7 February 1958 through DOD Directive 5105.15 by 
Secretary McElroy.2 Herbert York, a Manhattan Project veteran and 
the first director of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, helped guide 
the early evolution of ARPA as its first Chief Scientist and then as the 
Defense Department’s first Director of Research and Engineering.
Initially, the agency focused on three key assignments from the 
President: space, missile defense, and the detection of nuclear weapons 
tests. Eisenhower subsequently made it clear that space was to be the 
realm of a civilian agency, and later, in 1958, Congress and the President 
created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), a 
civilian agency which took over the country’s principal space programs, 
absorbing much of DARPA’s Space Program. The two other Presidential 
assignments—missile defense and nuclear test detection—continued as 
the dominant foci for about fifteen years but eventually were moved to 
other parts of the Department of Defense (DOD).
Also, soon after its founding ARPA took on Project AGILE, as 
proposed by its Deputy Director, William Godel, which was a decade-
long classified program supporting U.S. combat efforts in Vietnam and 
beyond. In retrospect, much of AGILE was naive, poorly managed and 
2  Congress, through an amendment by Senator Mike Mansfield, renamed “ARPA” 
as “DARPA” in 1972, adding the word “Defense.” Congress, through Senator Jeff 
Bingaman, renamed it “ARPA” again in February 1993, because of its “dual-use” 
role in creating technologies with commercial as well as military applications. The 
name reverted to “DARPA” in March 1996.
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rife with amateurism. The ARPA Directors had little access or knowledge 
of what AGILE was doing as Godel “was running the AGILE office as his 
own covert operations shop”.3 There were important lessons learnt from 
AGILE (as a program run amok, with little oversight) on what not to do. 
It was hardly scientific and as an operational program it focused on near-
term solutions. It became a key element in defining what DARPA would 
not be in the battle over competing visions for the agency’s future.
With the quick transfer of the space program to NASA, ARPA spent 
the rest of the decade focused on missile defense, nuclear test detection 
and AGILE. However, in the early 1960s another role for ARPA emerged 
as it began to pursue a set of smaller, technically-focused programs 
under the general notion of “preventing technological surprise”. Areas 
initially pursued were materials science, information technology, and 
behavioral science. In fact, one can argue that ARPA in essence “invented” 
these as areas of technological pursuit. These began in 1961 under Jack 
Ruina, the first scientist to direct ARPA, who hired J. C. R. Licklider as 
the first director of the Information Processing Techniques Office. That 
office played a vital role in the creation of personal computing and the 
ARPANET—the basis for the future Internet.
Resuscitation in the 1970s
It is important to note that ARPA in the late 1960s to early 1970s was 
a troubled agency—a victim of the Vietnam malaise and resource 
cutbacks that affected all of DOD, and with the additional issue that its 
post-space program thrusts (missile defense (DEFENDER) and nuclear 
3  Weinberger, S. (2017). The Imagineers of War: The Untold Story of DARPA, The 
Pentagon Agency That Changed the World. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 81. 
Weinberger goes into considerable detail on Project AGILE and the role of 
Deputy Director Godel in shaping DARPA’s involvement in tactical technologies 
related to not only U.S. combat in Southeast Asia, but also a much broader focus 
on counterinsurgency-related activities in other parts of the world. While there 
were some modestly successful early technology developments under AGILE, 
such as tactical remotely-piloted vehicles, much of this program was egregiously 
unsuccessful with harmful repercussions, including Agent Orange and other 
defoliation efforts, poorly conceived and methodologically suspect social science 
forays, and the “strategic hamlets” concept of population relocation. Perhaps most 
damning was the inclination of those running and overseeing these programs, 
including DARPA’s director, to delude themselves that they were effective. Director 
Charles Herzfeld subsequently stated, “AGILE was an abysmal failure, a glorious 
failure” (Weinberger. (2017). The Imagineers of War, 185).
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test detection (VELA)) had essentially run their course. Indeed, as early 
as 1965, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, “came to advocate 
abolishing the Agency”.4 The 1965–1970 era was a crisis period. DARPA 
evolved both organizationally and programmatically from this crisis 
largely due to John S. Foster, who became Director of the Defense 
Research and Engineering (DDR&E)5 in 1965 and remained for eight 
years. By the mid-1970s DARPA had jettisoned the AGILE program 
and transitioned DEFENDER to the Army. DARPA was explicitly 
looking for new directions first under Director Eberhardt Rechtin, who 
created a Strategic Technologies Office, and then his successor Steven 
Lukasik, who saw AGILE as “an embarrassment” and closed it down, 
transitioning parts of it into a new Tactical Technology Office. Thus, 
by the mid-1970s DARPA had substantially refocused on technology 
offices and moved away from the original mission-focused assignments. 
Crucial to this rejuvenation was DARPA taking on a broad new focus 
aimed at finding technological alternatives to the use of nuclear weapons 
to respond to the Soviet Union. This was a key imperative stemming 
from the concerns of President Richard Nixon and his National Security 
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, and which continued with Secretary of 
Defense James R. Schlesinger as a leading proponent under President 
Gerald Ford. DARPA identified and developed new tactical capabilities 
based on then emerging technologies through programs on stealth, 
standoff precision strike, and tactical surveillance via unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs).
DARPA in the 1980s: Transformative Technology Development  
and Transition
With this refocusing DARPA survived the axe. Through years of 
persistent efforts, working with the DDR&E in the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), DARPA transitioned these capabilities to the military, 
4  Barber Associates, R. (1975). The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958–1974. 
Report Prepared for the Advanced Projects Research Agency, vii-3. Springfield, VA: 
Defense Technical Information Center.
5  The DDR&E was created in 1958 as the third ranking position in the Pentagon, 
below only the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, as essentially the Chief 
Technology Officer. DARPA reported to the DDR&E. Subsequently this position 
became the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(USD(AT&L)). 
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creating what Under Secretary of Defense William Perry and Secretary 
of Defense Harold Brown (under President Jimmy Carter) would call 
the “offset strategy”—ways to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional 
war capabilities and lowering the corresponding risk of nuclear war. 
These key DARPA programs are among the most important programs 
in terms of the agency’s impact on defense capabilities and are often 
touted as DARPA’s impact in ushering in a “revolution in military 
affairs” evidencing how DARPA helped to transform tactical warfare.
Parallel to DARPA’s transformational programs in military 
technologies in the 1970s-80s were its programs revolutionizing 
information technology, stemming from the early 1960s focus of IPTO 
(Information Processing Technology Office) Director Licklider. ARPA/
DARPA fundamentally affected what was to become computer science. 
President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
became very concerned about a “command and control” communication 
crisis during the Cuban Missile Crisis; ARPA Director Jack Ruina 
brought in Licklider to work on it, who saw the problem in a context 
of evolving computing systems. While one element of this was the 
ARPANET, this was part of a much broader and increasingly coherent 
program of research begun under Licklider. His concept of “man-
computer symbiosis” provided a multi-pronged development of the 
technologies underlying the transformation of information processing 
from clunky, room-filling, inaccessible mainframe machines to the 
ubiquitous network of interactive and personal computing capabilities.6 
This transformation continues today in DARPA’s pursuit of cognitive 
computing, artificial intelligence and robotics—key DARPA thrusts.
DARPA in the 1990s: End of the Cold War
Early in the 1990s, DARPA, as well as the rest of DOD, had to adapt 
to the fact that the main adversary, the USSR, had collapsed. Thus, 
the focus of its weapons research had disappeared. Moreover, the 
U.S. was in a budget crisis partly due to the vast defense spending of 
the 1980s. The Clinton Administration entered office with the rubric 
6  This transformation is detailed in Waldrop, M. M. (2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. 
R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing Personal. New York, NY: Viking 
Press.
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“dual-use”—technologies that would have both defense and civilian 
economy payoffs—as one way to make the economy more competitive. 
Under this approach, DOD could leverage off the civilian sector in 
cutting costs to develop new technologies. This era of dual-use programs 
was a major redirection of DARPA and it became highly contentious 
with elements in Congress. The Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP) 
was created to partner defense technology developers with commercial 
firms and universities.
OSD and DARPA worked with the White House to develop this 
program to continue DARPA’s exploration and development of 
“breakthrough” technologies in the mode of the information revolution, 
despite the lack of a peer security adversary. Secretary of Defense 
William Perry emphasized the dual-use concept. During this period 
emphasis was heavily on fostering new technologies in information 
and electronics including advanced sensing, while programs in 
unmanned systems and precision strike continued. Also, programs in 
biotechnology were started. At the end of the 1990s, DARPA took on a 
program in partnership with the Army seeking a radical approach for 
using robotics for ground combat—the Future Combat System—which 
ultimately proved to be hugely unsuccessful. It was overly ambitious 
and rushed into acquisition by the Army, and, after the expenditure of 
about $20 billion, was eventually cancelled by the Secretary of Defense.
DARPA in the 2000s: War on Terror
The 2000s is the period of DARPA Director Anthony Tether—the longest 
tenured DARPA Director. Within months of taking the role, the terror 
attacks of September 11 occurred and DARPA became enmeshed in 
the “War on Terror”. The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program 
became the most notable DARPA response. This became a controversial 
program as the use of information technologies to identify possible 
terrorists and terror attacks raised issues of privacy. Tether’s tendency to 
supervise program managers (PMs) also raised questions about whether 
DARPA should be inherently bottom-up, PM-driven or more director 
driven. DARPA also developed programs in sensors and sensor systems 
to support combat needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. During this period 
DARPA also developed programs in cognitive computing (artificial 
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intelligence) and autonomous systems with the “DARPA Challenge” 
contests for self-driving cars as highly visible examples initiating 
the implementation of these technologies. These Challenges were 
successful in creating interest and incentivizing teams of researchers to 
demonstrate integrated autonomous capabilities.
DARPA in the 2010s: Technology for Security in a Globalized World
Through the current decade DARPA has continued on a primarily 
technology focused agenda in which the emphasis is on pursuing 
technologies that can create technological surprise. However, it 
recognized that the world of technology has changed considerably with 
the advent of globalization. Where the U.S. and DOD led in technology 
development in the past, now there are global competitors pursuing 
many of the technologies that DARPA had pioneered. At the same time, 
there is a growing peer competition in the security arena while terrorism 
is an ongoing concern. Thus, DARPA’s mission of avoiding technological 
surprise and also creating technological surprise for our adversaries is 
even more daunting. Under Barack Obama Defense Secretaries Chuck 
Hagel and Ash Carter, DOD announced a new “Offsets” strategy to 
attempt to build a new U.S. technological lead as new peer competitors 
developed capabilities in areas DARPA had created in the previous 
offset strategy.
DARPA also responded to the era of major advances in life sciences, 
most visibly, the Human Genome initiatives led by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and their private sector competitor, J. Craig 
Venter. DARPA had long been conducting some biotechnology research 
but in 2013 created a new Biological Technologies Office to focus on 
this area. Fields like synthetic biology created new kinds of threats 
that needed counters, and DOD’s own massive health care system and 
injured soldiers from two Middle Eastern wars required new medical 
responses. While NIH’s research remained largely focused on biology, 
DARPA’s flexibility enabled it to pursue a “convergence” approach, 
creating unified research efforts combining engineering, physical and 
computational sciences with biology for a new research model pursuing 
new kinds of therapies. In the information domain, DARPA is focusing 
on artificial intelligence, cognitive computing, and approaches for 
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advancing microelectronics to advance quantum computing and neuro-
synaptic processors based on how the brain processes information. 
With a foundation on previous research in aeronautics and propulsion, 
DARPA is embarking on a major thrust in hypersonic systems. 
Meanwhile, growing cyber threats spurred several ambitious DARPA 
programs in cybersecurity.
Thus, the agency’s technical and security foci have changed with the 
times, although its mission has remained largely the same:
DARPA’s original mission, established in 1958, was to prevent 
technological surprise like the launch of Sputnik, which signaled that the 
Soviets had beaten the U.S. into space. The mission statement has evolved 
over time. Today, DARPA’s mission is still to prevent technological 
surprise to the U.S., but also to create technological surprise for our 
enemies.7
However, to carry out this mission today the agency must focus on 
creating and demonstrating breakthrough technologies for national 
security, in which there are many more highly capable players and 
where technologies quickly disseminate globally.
DARPA’s Organization and Budget
To achieve its mission of technology leadership DARPA has evolved a 
highly adaptive and responsive organization. The hallmark of DARPA 
is agility. At the heart of DARPA are its “technology offices”—the offices 
where program managers fund the development of new technologies. 
The agency also has a series of “support offices”, which provide services 
in areas such as contracting, human resources, legal matters, and 
accelerating the transition of new technologies to the military services. 
The number of technology offices and their specific roles change over 
time. Below are the DARPA’s current technical offices:
• Biological Technologies Office (BTO)
• Defense Sciences Office (DSO)
• Information Innovation Office (I2O)
7  DARPA. (2005). DARPA—Bridging the Gap, Powered by Ideas, 1. Arlington, VA: 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRD
oc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA433949.
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• Microsystems Technology Office (MTO)
• Strategic Technology Office (STO)
• Tactical Technology Office (TTO)
Sometimes DARPA officials and outside observers informally refer to 
some of these technology offices as “systems offices”. In the list above, 
the two systems offices are the Strategic Technology Office (STO) and 
the Tactical Technology Office (TTO). These offices create new “proof-
of-concept” engineering systems for DOD, such as new unmanned 
aerial vehicles or small GPS receivers. The goals here are to develop and 
demonstrate significantly new or improved capabilities and, DARPA 
hopes, to change people’s minds about what is technically possible. The 
work sponsored by these systems offices is often inspired by long-term 
national security challenges, needs, or opportunities.
The “systems offices” and the other technology offices typically fund 
different types of R&D (Research and Development) performers. In the 
non-systems offices, many of the R&D performers are in universities or 
component manufacturers. The systems offices usually fund engineering 
teams that may include defense companies and government laboratories. 
However, at times the systems offices encounter technical challenges that 
lead them to also support fundamental research, and the other technology 
offices sometimes work on military systems. In practice, the line between 
non-systems technology offices and systems offices is not rigid.
Each DARPA office has multiple “programs” (the term used to refer 
to R&D funding activities in specific areas of technology). Program 
managers propose these programs, get approval and funding from 
senior DARPA officials, write the funding solicitations, select the R&D 
performers (sometimes with help from other technical reviewers), and 
supervise and assist the performers. A program manager may supervise 
several programs. Typically, a program will have specific technical 
objectives, a budget of tens of millions of dollars, and will last for three 
to five years. In many cases, an individual program will fund multiple 
R&D projects run by different performers, so as to test different technical 
ideas. Having a good set of diverse technical approaches early on in a 
program is helpful.
Each DARPA technology office also can fund small “seed” programs, 
which provide a way for program managers to generate and test 
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new ideas. In recent years, each office also has run an annual “open” 
competition in which applicants can propose work in areas of technology 
not covered in the office’s programs. These “open” competitions help 
generate additional new ideas from the technical community.
DARPA therefore uses a “portfolio” approach: it funds a wide range 
of R&D programs and also often funds multiple projects within a single 
program. Its program managers are experts who make thoughtful 
decisions, but since the R&D focus is high-risk to achieve “high payoff” 
results, the outcomes are unpredictable and the agency and its program 
managers invest in a range of promising technologies. Some programs 
and projects will work while others will not. However, by investing in a 
number of options, the agency seeks to increase the chances of success 
while accepting the inherent risk that some research may not succeed.
DARPA itself does not build actual operational prototypes of new 
systems; it turns over “proof-of-concept” prototypes to other parts 
of the defense and commercial worlds—a process that DARPA calls 
“technology transition”.8
At the heart of DARPA are approximately one hundred program 
managers (“PMs”) and the office directors, deputy office directors, 
agency director and deputy director who supervise them. While these are 
all government employees, most are hired using special hiring authorities 
on a term basis—usually of three to five years. Importantly, none of 
these are permanent staff—all are in essence temporary, although some 
individuals’ tenure may get extended by becoming an office director 
or deputy director. The agency also has approximately one hundred 
other government employees who provide important services, such as 
contracting, legal services, human resources, and security, and at any one 
time it also has several military liaisons. Additionally, contractors support 
these government employees. Some of these contractors are highly-
trained PhD scientists and engineers who provide valuable technical 
assistance to program managers, and others are support staff. 
The agency’s budget for 2019 is $3.427 billion a year. DARPA has no 
laboratories of its own. It is a funding agency.
8  There was one significant exception. DARPA did develop operational technology 
for seismic detection of Soviet underground nuclear tests. DARPA was only able 
to transition this seismic detection network to the Air Force after running it for 
approximately twenty years.
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Important Features of the DARPA Model
DARPA’s Focus on Ambitious Goals
Ambitious goals 
DARPA focuses on ambitious technological goals, not on incremental 
improvements.
First, DARPA is a technology agency. It funds advanced research to 
develop or create new technologies, not just to explore science. Its 
mission is to create valuable new technologies. It can support basic 
scientific research, but as means toward new technology.
Second, DARPA focuses on ambitious, difficult (“DARPA Hard”), 
and potentially revolutionary projects. It does not focus on immediate 
or incremental improvements in technology.9 It focuses on trying to 
achieve significant changes or shifts in technical capabilities.
Third, DARPA seeks to create “breakthrough”, “transformative” 
or “disruptive technologies”—all terms that are popular today. 
This means something different than just the creation of novel new 
devices or tools. Rather, the objective is to create new possibilities 
and capabilities and particularly seek “change-state” technologies—
that is, technologies that significantly change existing capabilities. 
As a result, the focus is more on outcomes and results rather than 
the specific character of the technologies that they nurture. So, for 
example, sometimes an entirely new technology may dramatically 
improve capabilities. One could argue that the ARPANET was such an 
example and was a “breakthrough” or “transformative” technology. 
But at other times integrating existing technologies in new ways may 
significantly transform capabilities, perhaps by dramatically reducing 
costs or reducing the time it takes to perform tasks. For example, a 
new system that significantly reduces the cost and time involved 
in launching small satellites into orbit may not involve radically 
new “breakthrough” technologies but rather combine and upgrade 
existing technologies to create dramatically better capabilities. This 
9  There have been times, usually to meet a wartime need, when DARPA has 
focused on short term technologies, notably under project AGILE during the 
Vietnam conflict, but these have become exceptions. Under such circumstances, it 
is important to ask whether DARPA is the best place to pursue such near-term 
technology developments.
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type of improvement is also valuable. Moreover, projects that integrate 
existing technologies in new ways may carry as much technical risk 
and offer as much potential benefit as projects to create individual 
new technologies.
A Challenged-Based R&D Model
DARPA’s goals are not only ambitious; they are also focused on specific 
challenges and opportunities rather than on general discovery or 
invention. One of this book’s editors (William B. Bonvillian) has noted 
two important aspects of this model: it is “challenge-based”, and it is a 
“connected model” that connects scientific research to these technical 
challenges.10
By “challenge-based”, we mean that DARPA program managers 
identify specific technical capabilities that they think would be 
both valuable and achievable. Again, DARPA focuses on trying to 
reach ambitious technical goals but also it tries to demonstrate those 
capabilities as quickly as possible. It seeks to accelerate the creation of 
valuable new technologies.
It also uses a “connected model” of R&D—a deliberate process of 
connecting basic science and engineering to specific technical goals 
and challenges. This makes DARPA significantly different from some 
other U.S. R&D agencies. The National Science Foundation (NSF), 
for example, supports intellectually interesting basic research in 
universities that is often unconnected to any specific technical goals. 
NSF funds “pure” research. Practical results may eventually come out 
of that research, but NSF does not set ambitious technical goals and 
then create programs designed to achieve those goals. This is not a bad 
thing. NSF’s mission is to advance general knowledge, by drawing 
upon the talents and curiosity of brilliant researchers. While DARPA 
draws upon that new knowledge, as well as the skilled researchers 
that universities train, it nonetheless remains an agency focused on 
achieving specific technical goals.
10  Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). “The Connected Science Model for Innovation—The 
DARPA Model”, in 21st Century Innovation Systems for the U.S. and Japan, ed. 
S. Nagaoka, M. Kondo, K. Flamm, and C. Wessner. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press. 206–37, https://doi.org/10.17226/12194, http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=206 (Chapter 4 in this volume).
14 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
DARPA also sometimes funds basic scientific research itself, if that 
research is connected to important technical goals. The agency’s Defense 
Sciences Office, for example, funds research in fundamental physics, 
materials, and mathematics, but mainly for the purpose of helping to 
advance important capabilities. In this sense, DARPA connects science 
with technical challenges in ways that it hopes will lead to valuable new 
technical capabilities.
High-Risk/High-Payoff Projects 
DARPA focuses on “high-risk/high-payoff” projects and has developed 
a philosophy and set of procedures for managing this type of research.
First, the agency is willing to take big technical risks in order to try 
to get “change-state” results. DARPA is not interested in incremental 
improvements in technologies or weapons systems. While these 
improvements are important, especially to the military, they are the 
province of other R&D agencies. DARPA’s specific mission is to develop 
significant new or better technologies; to do so, it focuses on projects 
that involve high risk and the possibility of failure but that also will 
create high payoffs, if successful.
Second, however, there is nothing haphazard or nonchalant about 
the way in which DARPA takes risks. In fact, one could call its approach 
one of “thoughtful” or “rigorous” risk-taking. New program managers 
and office directors are encouraged and expected to fund programs 
that offer the possibility of significant advances. But they must also 
think rigorously about whether ambitious goals are achievable and 
what technical approaches are most promising. Agency leaders expect 
their program managers to consult widely with relevant technical 
communities, test and retest their ideas, and constantly learn.
This two-part emphasis on both ambitious goals and rigorous 
thinking is best seen in a set of questions originally written down by 
George Heilmeier, a noted inventor and DARPA director from 1975 to 
1977. These are questions (“The Heilmeier Catechism”) that program 
managers should ask themselves when designing new programs, and 
these are the questions that DARPA office directors and the agency 
director will ask when those program managers propose new initiatives, 
and when they review these programs:
 151. Introduction
• What are you trying to do? Articulate your objectives using 
absolutely no jargon.
• How is it done today, and what are the limits of current 
practice?
• What’s new in your approach and why do you think it will be 
successful?
• Who cares?
• If you’re successful, what difference will it make?
• What are the risks and the payoffs?
• How much will it cost?
• How long will it take?
• What are the midterm and final “exams” to check for success?
Third, in addition to this overall philosophy, the agency has evolved 
ways that can help optimize results in this high-risk environment. Here, 
again, the agency’s “portfolio” approach is important. The agency 
makes thoughtful decisions—which are possible because it recruits 
world-class experts—in full knowledge that R&D is unpredictable 
and some programs and projects will fail. Indeed, if none failed, the 
agency’s culture asserts that it would not be doing its job; it would not 
be bold enough. Investing in a wide range of programs and in a range 
of projects and technical approaches within those programs increases 
the chances that the agency’s investments will lead to some significant 
successes as well as some failures.
In addition, DARPA expects that programs and R&D projects within 
those programs often will not go as planned. These are research projects 
tackling unknowns and thus it is likely that promising R&D ideas will 
fail, that new opportunities will be discovered, and therefore that R&D 
plans need to be adjusted. So, DARPA program managers constantly 
evaluate projects and work with performers to identify obstacles 
and opportunities and to make adjustments; DARPA contracts allow 
them to do this. DARPA does not force its program managers or R&D 
performers to adhere to unrealistic or ineffective plans or milestones. 
Projects certainly have technical objectives, but it is expected that R&D 
projects will change as R&D performers learn what works and what does 
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not. Program managers and R&D performers themselves continuously 
evaluate and adapt.
Thus, at DARPA technical failures are expected, since these are 
high-risk projects and not all will succeed. DARPA and the overall 
technical community will learn from these dead ends, and the agency 
will terminate unsuccessful programs and shift funding to more 
promising ideas. Because the agency has no laboratories or researchers 
that it must fund year in and year out, it has the freedom to move away 
from unsuccessful projects to focus on promising ones. Some DARPA 
leaders state that the only “true failures” occur when R&D performers 
are unwilling or unable to be candid about the technical problems they 
are encountering, and therefore the learning process breaks down.11 
DARPA’s Organization and Management
Several of the articles in this compendium identify organizational and 
management features that have contributed to DARPA’s success. These 
include:
Independence
While DARPA is a DOD agency, under the Secretary of Defense, it has 
usually had a great deal of independence in determining its overall 
programs.
However, this does not mean that DARPA does not respond to the 
national security priorities and strategic directions set by the Secretary 
of Defense and the President. Recall that ARPA was initially focused on 
a set of three Presidential issues—areas of national security priority that 
were identified as being given insufficient focus by the military services. 
Importantly, these were broad overall research thrusts and ARPA was 
given wide latitude on how to conduct the research. Generally, this has 
been the case ever since. This is crucial to DARPA’s focus on change-
state, revolutionary capabilities: unless a DARPA-type organization is 
truly independent, then that organization will feel pressure to work 
on short-term, incremental projects rather than long-term, potentially 
11  We are grateful to Dr. Jane Alexander, a former deputy director of DARPA, for 
making this point.
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breakthrough technologies. A related point is that this type of 
organization can only maintain its independence and budget if it has 
support and protection from high-level officials.
A Flat, Non-Hierarchical Organization, with Empowered Program 
Managers
Hiring technically-accomplished program managers and letting them 
propose and then run R&D programs is a central feature of the DARPA 
model.12 Program managers have the authority and responsibility 
to prepare all the details of a new proposed program: its scope, its 
rationale (why should we fund it?), the science and engineering behind 
it, the specific technical objectives, the metrics for measuring technical 
progress, and the proposed budget and schedule.
Program managers need to be recruited and supervised. DARPA is 
able to do so using only two layers of management: office directors and 
their deputies and then the agency director and deputy director. Since 
these managers are themselves technically very well trained, they can 
make informed decisions quickly and competently—including which 
experts to hire as program managers, when to approve or not approve 
a proposed R&D program, and how to ensure that program managers 
operate their programs in a technically effective way.
A unique aspect of DARPA’s management is that it brings in its 
key assets—the program managers—on a temporary, short-term basis, 
usually for three to five years each. Thus, there is roughly a 25 percent 
turnover every year. Hiring new program managers allows for new 
ideas and capabilities. But hiring talented program managers can be a 
challenge, given that private-sector salaries are higher, that the DARPA 
job only lasts three to five years, and that program managers must move 
to the Washington, DC, area. However, DARPA also offers exciting 
opportunities to create new technology, so many people are interested 
in the possibility of working at the agency. The agency has been able 
12  Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation”, The Journal of Technology Transfer 36: 469–513 
(Chapter 13 in this volume); and Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2012). ARPA-E 
and DARPA: Applying the DARPA Model to Energy Innovation. Presentation at the 
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, Washington, DC, February, 
https://www.itif.org/files/2012-darpa-arpae-bonvillian-vanatta.pdf 
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to attract highly capable people who want to work on important and 
exciting ideas.
Outside Performers and Temporary Project Teams 
Research and development are performed entirely by outside 
performers. DARPA has no internal research laboratory that it must 
maintain and fund every year and the agency is free to hire whomever it 
thinks are the best people for specific projects. This emphasizes several 
key points about the DARPA model: it relies on technically-capable 
program managers, R&D teams include world-class experts, and the 
projects DARPA funds are limited in time and focused on specific 
scientific and technical objectives.
Multi-Generational Technology Investments
If a particular DARPA program is successful, then the agency may fund 
additional “generations” of three- to five-year programs in this technical 
area.13 By working on important technical ideas over longer periods 
of time, DARPA can create enduring new technologies (technology 
“motifs”) that truly change the technology landscape over time. Each 
generation of R&D may have different specific objectives and metrics 
but can be based on a common technical area. Usually each generation 
learns from prior experience. This may even include supporting a 
radically different approach to those tried previously, especially if the 
objective is seen as an enduring national security challenge.
This point about multi-generational investments is important and 
not always well understood. The fact that DARPA programs typically 
run from three to five years suggests that the agency funds relatively 
short-term engineering experiments. It is true that the agency funds 
many different technical ideas for limited periods of time, but when 
agency leaders find a new technology that they think offers significant 
new capabilities for the Defense Department and the country as a whole, 
they will make sustained investments over many years.
13  For a fuller discussion of DARPA technology thrust areas, see Van Atta, R., 
Deitchman, S., and Reed, S. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments. Volume III. 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses (chapter 4), https://apps.dtic.mil/
dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241680.pdf
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This is usually with a new program manager focused on achieving 
even more ambitious outcomes, or an entirely new approach, perhaps 
integrating prior results into a promising new technical idea and 
creating working prototypes. Technology examples include computing 
and networking investments, which led to the Internet, iterative 
advances in artificial intelligence, new concepts for quantum computing 
and spintronics. On military systems DARPA sponsored many years 
of investments in stealth, precision-guided munitions, and unmanned 
aerial vehicles.
Investments in Complementary Strategic Technologies
DARPA sometimes will fund work in additional technical areas 
relating to major new technology. These related (“complementary”) 
areas are important for the overall success of the new technology, and 
developing them also builds political support for commercialization 
and implementation by showing Defense Department leaders and 
others that the entire system around that new technology will work. 
For example, DARPA not only invested in early computer routers and 
the software to run them (the ARPANET) but also in applications of 
computer networking (file transfers, e-mail, etc.) and later in new 
computer communications protocols (TCP/IP) that would allow 
different computer networks to talk to each other. In short, DARPA and 
its R&D performers created and demonstrated a complete system.
Flexible Hiring and Contracting Authority 
The work of DARPA managers and their administrative staff is 
helped by special laws that apply to DARPA hiring and contracting. 
For example, DARPA has legal authority to hire program managers 
very quickly. In the case of program managers from universities 
or other government agencies, DARPA may use what is called 
“Intergovernmental Personnel Agreements” (IPAs). Under an IPA, the 
individual stays an employee of his or her university or laboratory, but 
he or she is temporarily assigned to DARPA and becomes a temporary 
government employee under a contract with DARPA. The National 
Science Foundation and other government R&D agencies also have 
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this authority. The IPA process allows DARPA to hire quickly and to 
pay the same salary people earned earlier.
In the case of people from industry, another provision of law (Section 
1101 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1999) allows DARPA to hire experts quickly, although people 
from industry must leave their companies while they are at DARPA. 
Congress provided these laws about hiring in part because DARPA 
program managers are temporary, not permanent federal employees.
All program managers and all senior DARPA managers must follow 
rules to prevent conflicts of interest—that is, to prevent them from 
making decisions about whether to award contracts to their current 
or former employers or to companies in which they own stock. But 
DARPA has a clear process in which other government employees can 
make these contract decisions, if the need arises.
In addition to flexible hiring authority, DARPA has legal permission 
to use a wide range of flexible contracting procedures, including “other 
transactions authority” (OTA).14 This OTA power releases DARPA from 
highly restrictive government procurement requirements. DARPA also 
has “prize authority”. For example, in the robotics field DARPA has 
sometimes used its legal authority to organize contests and provide 
prizes, in order to draw in groups that do not usually work with the 
government.
Creating New Technical Communities
By funding multi-disciplinary teams that both compete and cooperate with 
each other, DARPA often stimulated new technical communities and new 
academic fields. Examples over the years include materials science and 
engineering, computer science, and now synthetic biology/engineering 
biology. In fact, one can argue that DARPA actually makes two very 
14  DOD offers this explanation: “For DOD, ‘other transactions’ is a term commonly used 
to refer to the 10 U.S.C. 2371 [Title 10, United States Code, section 2371] authority to 
enter into transactions other than contracts, grants or cooperative agreements. OTA 
provides tremendous flexibility since instruments for prototype projects, awarded 
pursuant to this authority, generally are not subject to federal laws and regulations 
limited in applicability to procurement contracts.” This description is from Office of 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. (2001). 
“Other Transactions” (OT) Guide for Prototype Projects, www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/docs/
otguide.doc.
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important contributions: it not only helps create and demonstrate new 
technologies but also helps create important new technical communities.
These researchers then can perform additional R&D, teach students, 
and contribute further ideas to DARPA. In addition, DARPA-funded 
communities are a primary means for transitioning the newly-developed 
technologies to the military and to commercial companies
How DARPA Transfers Its Technologies
DARPA succeeds in large part because other organizations in government 
and the corporate world further develop and then commercialize and 
buy the new technologies. In other words, since DARPA itself does 
not usually build full prototypes or early operational systems, it must 
rely on other parts of the U.S. national innovation system to perform 
those tasks. What features of the DARPA model and the overall 
national innovation system help technology transfer (what DARPA calls 
“technology transition”)?15
DARPA’s Willingness to Challenge Incumbent Technologies 
DARPA is willing to challenge existing technologies and the organizations 
that produce and use them. Again, the agency sees its job as changing 
people’s minds about what is possible. So, for example, it showed that 
a computer network using open standards could replace proprietary 
networking systems. It created and then, with support from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, pushed for the adoption of stealth, unmanned 
aerial systems, precision strike, and night vision. It uses conferences, 
prize competitions, “technology insertion projects” (demonstrations 
of new technology in actual military systems), and other techniques to 
demonstrate and publicize new technical capabilities.
A Community of Technology Advocates 
As discussed earlier, DARPA and its performers create new technical 
communities. Besides helping DARPA undertake new research, 
15  This section draws largely from Bonvillian and Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and 
DARPA”.
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researchers in these new communities also often become knowledgeable, 
enthusiastic advocates for new technologies. 
Some of these experts work in the government, some in universities, 
some for large firms, and some start new entrepreneurial companies. 
They share an overall vision of what can be done, and they often 
become what Bonvillian and Van Atta call “communities of change-state 
advocates”—people who are willing and able to change the technology 
world. This is a very important reason why DARPA has been so 
influential.
Close Ties to DOD Leaders 
The agency’s close ties to Secretaries of Defense and other senior 
officials not only help DARPA maintain its independence; these ties 
also mean that these officials become “champions” who want to further 
develop and then use DARPA-created technologies. Their support 
is very important for technology transfer. For example, senior DOD 
officials pushed the U.S. Air Force to adopt both stealth aircraft and 
unmanned aerial vehicles. Bonvillian and Van Atta see DARPA and 
DOD using an “island/bridge” model of organization: DARPA is a type 
of organizational island, with a high degree of autonomy, but it also has 
a close link (“bridge”) to senior DOD officials, helping it to transfer its 
new technologies to the wider defense world.16
Connection to Technically-Sophisticated, Well-Funded Customers
The process of turning a radical new technology into actual products is 
usually risky, difficult, and expensive. DARPA and the overall Defense 
Department deal with this difficulty in two ways.
First, DARPA is fortunate that the Defense Department can be 
both willing and able to turn new prototype technologies into actual 
products. Its senior leaders may want advanced technologies, and 
its other laboratories, contractors, and large procurement system can 
enable the Department to refine and buy these new products. Even 
so, the “transition” of new technologies from DARPA to the military 
services is often difficult because DARPA-developed capabilities usually 
16  Bonvillian and Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA”, 486.
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challenge the current way of doing operations. Thus, DARPA spends 
considerable time and effort on the transition process, recognizing that 
it is often difficult.
Second, the agency also works directly with private sector 
companies that are interested in commercializing new DARPA-
demonstrated technologies. One example is DARPA’s long work with 
the semiconductor industry on advanced chip-making technologies 
which has led to better and less expensive computer chips for both 
military and civilian customers. Examples includes silicon-on-insulator 
technology and MMIC signal processing chips. The new commercial 
frontier of self-driving vehicles is another example of an industry 
adopting and building upon DARPA-funded research. Many firms 
and venture capitalists in the commercial world avidly follow DARPA 
programs.
U.S. intellectual property law helps facilitate this transfer of 
DARPA-funded technology to the corporate world. Under the Patent 
and Trademarks Act Amendments of 1980 (popularly known as the 
“Bayh-Dole Act”), universities and small companies may keep legal 
title to inventions developed with federal money. When DARPA 
projects create new technologies, universities may license inventions 
to companies and small firms can easily use their inventions to help 
create new products.
A Good Political Design
In addition to the points made above about the way DARPA is 
organized and how it operates to succeed it must also have a good 
“political design”.17 Senior government officials, members of the 
national legislature, and the larger technical community must support 
the agency or at least not fight its operations and budget. DARPA 
succeeds because its mission (national defense) is important, because 
it has a reputation for producing valuable and high-quality technology, 
and because it does not threaten the budgets of other agencies.
17  Bonvillian, W. B. (2013). Evolution of U.S. Government Innovation Organization: 
From the Pipeline Model, to the Connected Model, to the Problem of ‘Political Design. 
Presentation at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) GRIPS 
Innovation, Science, and Technology Seminar, Tokyo, April.
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The Remainder of this Book
The rest of this book is divided into four parts: Part I, “Perspectives 
on DARPA”; Part II, “The Roles of DARPA Program Managers”; 
Part III, “Applying the DARPA Model in Other Situations”; Part IV, 
“Conclusions”.
Part I, “Perspectives on DARPA”, has seven chapters. Chapter 2, by 
Richard Van Atta, is a history of DARPA’s first fifty years. Chapter 3, by 
Michael Piore, Phech Colatat and Elisabeth Beck Reynolds, compares 
DARPA’s culture with more traditional federal R&D agencies, including 
NSF. Chapter 4, by William B. Bonvillian, discusses the “DARPA 
Model”, and particularly how it follows an approach developed during 
World War II that connects cutting-edge science with the solution of 
specific technical challenges. Chapter 5, by Tamara Carleton, discusses 
the central role of technical vision in DARPA’s operations and results. 
Chapter 6, by Glenn R. Fong, is a history of how DARPA-funded 
inventions placed a central role in the development of personal 
computers and their software. Chapter 7, by Erica R. H. Fuchs, discusses 
DARPA’s governance approach as embodying an imbedded network. 
Chapter 8, by David W. Cheney and Richard Van Atta, explores the 
processes through which DARPA creates new programs, looking at 
the origins of several past DARPA programs. Chapter 9, by Patrick 
Windham, addresses a set of questions that have been raised concerning 
the DARPA model. 
Part II, “The Roles of DARPA Program Managers”, contains Chapters 
10 and 11, written by Jinendra Ranka and Larry Jackel, two former 
DARPA program managers.
Part III, “Applying the DARPA Model in Other Situations”, contains 
two chapters. Chapter 12, by William B. Bonvillian, examines the 
lessons that DARPA’s model of creating innovation provides for other, 
older, “legacy sector” parts of the Department of Defense. Chapter 13, 
by William B. Bonvillian and Richard Van Atta, discusses how leaders 
might effectively apply the DARPA model to the (then) relatively 
new Advanced Research Project Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) as well as 
organizational lessons from ARPA-E itself. Chapter 14, by William B. 
Bonvillian, discusses IARPA, another DARPA clone. Chapter 15, by 
Robert Cook-Deegan, explores the possible application of the DARPA 
model to the National Institutes of Health (NIH).
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Part IV, “Conclusions”, consists of Chapter 16, by Richard Van Atta, 
Patrick Windham and William B. Bonvillian, summarizing key lessons 
from DARPA’s experience on how to structure an organization to 
successfully create new, innovative technologies.
These various chapters overlap to some degree. However, the 
editors of this book hope that together they will provide readers with 
a comprehensive set of insights on how this remarkable government 
agency works and why it has succeeded as well as it has.
References
Barber Associates, R. (1975). The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958–74. 
Report prepared for the Advanced Projects Research Agency. Springfield, 
VA: Defense Technical Information Center.
Bonvillian, W. B. (2013). Evolution of U.S. Government Innovation Organization: 
From the Pipeline Model, to the Connected Model, to the Problem of Political 
Design. Presentation at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies 
(GRIPS) GRIPS Innovation, Science, and Technology Seminar, Tokyo, April.
Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). “The Connected Science Model for Innovation—The 
DARPA Model”, in 21st Century Innovation Systems for the U.S. and Japan, ed. S. 
Nagaoka, M. Kondo, K. Flamm, and C. Wessner. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press. 206–37, https://doi.org/10.17226/12194, http://books.nap.
edu/openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=206 (Chapter 4 in this volume).
Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2012). ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying 
the DARPA Model to Energy Innovation. Presentation at the Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation, Washington, DC, February, https://
www.itif.org/files/2012-darpa-arpae-bonvillian-vanatta.pdf
Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation”, The Journal of Technology Transfer, 
36: 469–513, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-011-9223-x (Chapter 13 in this 
volume).
Chesbrough, H. (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Christensen, C. M. (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
DARPA. (2005). DARPA—Bridging the Gap, Powered by Ideas. Arlington, VA: 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/
GetTRDoc?Loca- tion=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA433949
Dugan, R. E., and Gabriel, K. J. (2013). “‘Special Forces’ Innovation: How DARPA 
Attacks Problems”, Harvard Business Review 91/10: 74–84.
26 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
Heilmeier, G. (1992). “Some Reflections on Innovation and Invention”, Founders 
Award Lecture, National Academy of Engineering, Washington, DC.
National Research Council. (2013). 21st Century Manufacturing: The Role of the 
Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program. Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press, https://doi.org/10.17226/18448, https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/18448/21st-century-manufacturing-the-role-of-the-manufacturing-
extension-partnership 
National Research Council. (2012). Rising to the Challenge: U.S. Innovation Policy 
in the Global Economy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
https://doi.org/10.17226/13386, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/13386/rising-
to-the-challenge-us-innovation-policy-for-the-global 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics. (2001). “Other Transactions” (OT) Guide for Prototype Projects. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense, www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/docs/
otguide.doc
Shinohara, K. (2014), “High-Risk & High-Impact Program in Japan: ImPACT”, 
in Weekly Wire News from East Asia and Pacific, National Science Foundation 
Tokyo Regional Office, July 4, 2014.
Singer, P. L. (2014). Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major 
Technology Advances That Stem from Federal Research Support. Washington, 
DC: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, http://www2.itif.
org/2014-federally-supported-innovations.pdf 
Van Atta, R. (2013). Innovation and the DARPA Model in a World of Globalized 
Technology. Presentation at the National Institute of Science and Technology 
Policy and the Center for Research and Development Strategy, Tokyo, July.
Van Atta, R. (2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 
50 Years of Bridging the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. 
Kalhikina, and M. J. Tully. Arlington, VA: DARPA. 20–29, https://issuu.com/
faircountmedia/docs/darpa50 (Chapter 2 in this volume).




2. Fifty Years of Innovation  
and Discovery1
Richard Van Atta
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)—which came to 
be known as DARPA in 1972 when its name changed to the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency—emerged in 1958 as part of a 
broad reaction to a singular event: the launching by the Soviet Union 
of the Sputnik satellite on 4 October 1957. While in retrospect, Sputnik 
itself does not seem to be a particularly significant technological 
achievement, it had massive psychological and political impact. As 
recounted in Roger D. Launius’ “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space 
Age”, found on the website for NASA’s Office of History, “The only 
appropriate characterization that begins to capture the mood on 5 
October involves the use of the word hysteria”.2 Launius wrote in the 
same document that then Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, 
recollected, “Now, somehow, in some new way, the sky seemed almost 
alien. I also remember the profound shock of realizing that it might be 
possible for another nation to achieve technological superiority over 
this great country of ours.”
1  This contribution originally appeared as a chapter entitled “Fifty Years of 
Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 50 Years of Bridging the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, 
A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. Kalhikina, and M. J. Tully. Arlington, VA: DARPA. 
20–29, https://issuu.com/faircountmedia/docs/darpa50. This book was published in 
2008 to commemorate the agency’s fiftieth anniversary.
2 Launius, R. D. “Sputnik and the Origins of the Space Age”, NASA History, http://
history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html.
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For the United States to find itself behind the Soviet Union in entering 
space signified that something was seriously wrong not only with 
America’s space program but with its organization and management 
of advanced science and technology for national security. Sputnik 
evidenced that something was substantially wrong with U.S. defense 
science and technology and that a fundamental change was needed. 
Out of this ferment—in fact one of the first actions to emerge from 
it—was a bold new concept for organizing defense advanced research: 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency. This agency—renamed the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1972—
refocused and rejuvenated America’s defense technological capabilities. 
Moreover, DARPA has also instigated technological innovations that 
have fundamentally reshaped much of the technological landscape not 
only in defense capabilities but much more broadly with breakthrough 
advances in information technologies, sensors, and materials that have 
pervasive economic and societal benefits.
The “DARPA Model”
DARPA’s primary mission is to foster advanced technologies and 
systems that create “revolutionary” advantages for the U.S. military. 
Consistent with this mission, DARPA is independent from the 
military Services and pursues higher-risk research and development 
(R&D) projects with the aim of achieving higher-payoff results than 
those obtained from more incremental R&D. Thus, DARPA program 
managers are encouraged to challenge existing approaches and to seek 
results rather than just explore ideas. Hence, in addition to supporting 
technology and component development, DARPA has on funded the 
integration of large-scale “systems of systems” in order to demonstrate 
what we call today “disruptive capabilities”.
Underlying this “high-risk—high-payoff” motif of DARPA is a set 
of operational and organizational characteristics including: relatively 
small size; a lean, non-bureaucratic structure; a focus on potentially 
change-state technologies; a highly flexible and adaptive research 
program. We will return to these characteristics later. What is important 
to understand at the outset is that in contrast to the then existing Defense 
research environment, ARPA was designed to be manifestly different. It 
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did not have labs. It did not focus on existing military requirements. It 
was separate from any other operational or organizational elements. It 
was explicitly chartered to be different, so it could do fundamentally 
different things than had been done by the Military Service R&D 
organizations. 
The reason for this dramatic departure, as elaborated below, was that 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his key advisors had determined—
as evidenced by the Sputnik debacle—that the existing R&D system had 
failed to respond to the realities of the emerging national security threat 
embodied by the Soviet Union.
DARPA’s Origins: Strategic Challenges ~1958
Sputnik itself demonstrated that the USSR not only had ambitions in 
space, but also had developed the wherewithal to launch missiles with 
nuclear capabilities to strike the continental United States. Therefore, at 
the outset ARPA was focused initially on three key areas as Presidential 
Issues: space, missile defense and nuclear test detection.
The first issue, achieving a space presence, was a large element of 
the initial ARPA, but was spun off to become NASA, based on President 
Eisenhower’s determination that space research should not be directly 
under the Department of Defense (DOD). According to Herbert York’s 
book, Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima 
to Geneva, it was well understood in ARPA that its role in space programs 
was temporary and that the creation of NASA was already in the works 
both in the White House and in Congress.3
To address ballistic missile defense (BMD), ARPA established the 
DEFENDER program, which lasted until 1967, performing advanced 
research relating to BMD and offensive ballistic missile penetration. 
This program was ARPA’s largest over the decade and included 
pioneering research into large ground-based phased array radar, Over 
the Horizon (OTH) high-frequency radar, high-energy lasers, and a very 
high acceleration anti-ballistic missile interceptor, as well as extensive 
research into atmospheric phenomenology, measurement and imaging, 
and missile penetration aids.
3  York, H. (1987). Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist’s Odyssey from Hiroshima 
to Geneva. New York, NY: Basic Books, 143.
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ARPA’s nuclear test detection program, VELA, focused on sensing 
technologies and their implementation to detect Soviet weapons testing. 
VELA Hotel satellites successfully developed sensing technology and 
global background data to detect nuclear explosions taking place in 
space and the atmosphere, providing monitoring capability supporting 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. VELA also included seismic 
detection of under-ground explosions and ground-based methods to 
detect nuclear explosions in the atmosphere and in space.
By 1960, a counter-insurgency project (AGILE) was started as the 
Vietnam War heated up. This included diverse tactical systems ranging 
from field-testing experiments leading to the M-16 rifle to foliage-
penetrating radar capable of automatically detecting intruders, an 
acoustically stealthy aircraft for night surveillance, and initial work in 
night vision.
In 1962 ARPA initiated the Office of Information Processing 
Techniques and Behavioral Sciences to address information processing 
“techniques” with a focus on possible relevance to command and control. 
As is elaborated below, under the expansive vision of its first director, J. 
C. R. Licklider, this office went on to effect a fundamental revolution in 
computer technologies, of which the now-famous ARPANET was only 
one element.
What is DARPA?
DARPA was first established as a research and development organization 
immediately under the Secretary of Defense with the mission to assure 
that the U.S. maintains a lead in applying state-of-the-art technology 
for military capabilities and prevent technological surprise from her 
adversaries.
ARPA was created to fill a unique role, a role which by definition and 
in its inception put it into contention and competition with the existing 
Defense R&D establishment. As the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, ARPA was differentiated from other organizations by an 
explicit emphasis on “advanced” research, generally implying a degree 
of risk greater than more usual research endeavors. As former ARPA 
Director Dr. Eberhardt Rechtin emphasized, research, as opposed to 
development, implies unknowns, which in turn imply the possibility 
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of failure, in the sense that the advanced concept or idea that is being 
researched may not be achievable. Were the concept achievable with 
little or no risk of failure, the project would not be a research effort, but 
a development effort.
It is clear from DARPA’s history that within the scope of this mission 
the emphasis and interpretation of advanced research have varied, 
particularly in terms of the degree and type of risk and how far to go 
toward demonstration of application. Risk has several dimensions: (1) 
lack of knowledge regarding the phenomena or concept itself; (2) lack 
of knowledge about the applications that might result if the phenomena 
or concept were understood; (3) inability to gauge the cost of arriving 
at answers regarding either of these; and (4) difficulty of determining 
broader operational and cost impacts of adopting the concept. As 
answers about (1) become clearer through basic research, ideas regarding 
applications begin to proliferate, as do questions of whether and how 
to explore their prospects. DARPA is at the forefront of this question 
and has the difficult job of determining whether enough is known to 
move toward an application and, if so, how to do so. At times this can 
be very controversial, as researchers may feel they do not know enough 
to guarantee success and are concerned that “premature” efforts may in 
fact create doubts about the utility and feasibility of the area of research, 
resulting in less funding and (from their perspective) less progress. 
DARPA, however, has a different imperative than the researcher to 
strive to see what can be done with the concepts or knowledge, even if 
it risks exposing what is not known and what its flaws are. This tension 
is endemic in DARPA’s mission and at times has put it at odds with the 
very research communities that it sponsors.
During times of changing circumstances, the agency has had to 
reassess its project mix and emphasis due to determinations both 
internally and within the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding 
the appropriate level of risk and the need to demonstrate application 
potential. In a sense, these somewhat contradictory imperatives serve 
as the extreme points on a pendulum’s swing. As DARPA is pulled 
toward one of the extremes, often by forces beyond itself, including 
Congressional pressures, there are countervailing pressures stressing 
DARPA’s unique characteristics to do militarily relevant advanced 
research.
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At the other end of the spectrum, as projects demonstrate application 
potential, DARPA runs into another set of tensions, not with the 
researcher, but with the potential recipient of the research product. Given 
that the ideas pursued are innovative, perhaps revolutionary, they imply 
unknowns to the user in terms of how they will be implemented and how 
this implementation will affect the implementer’s overall operations. To 
this end, the potential military users seek to reduce their uncertainty in 
what is a highly risk-intolerant environment by encouraging DARPA, 
or some other development agency, to carry forward the concept until 
these risks are minimized, or by simply ignoring, delaying or stretching 
out its pursuit. While achieving transition can be increased by additional 
risk reducing research, this also entails substantial additional cost and 
raises the issue of mission boundaries. Perhaps one of the most critical 
and difficult aspects of the DARPA Director’s job is to decide that DARPA 
has concluded its part of a particular technology effort and while there is 
surely more work to be done, it is not DARPA’s job to do it.
There have been several occasions in DARPA’s history when its 
management has determined that it has done enough in an area to 
demonstrate the potential of a specific concept—such as Unmanned Air 
Vehicles (UAVs)—and that it is thus time for others to fund development 
of its application and acquisition. These decisions have at times meant 
that a potential concept becomes a victim of the “valley of death”, with 
the application either failing to be realized, or, as in the case of UAVs, 
taking over a decade with special high-level attention from the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to come to fruition 
Over the years DARPA has made considerable effort to develop 
mechanisms to engage potential “customers” in an emerging concept. 
Working with prospective developers and users as the ideas mature is 
a key aspect of DARPA project management. However, DARPA has 
to remain aware that over-extending its involvement in a particular 
technology development has costs as well—specifically, it means that 
resources and capabilities are not available to explore other potentially 
revolutionary ideas. Indeed, this lesson goes back to the very beginnings 
of DARPA, when it transferred the incipient space program to the newly 
created NASA. Herbert York, ARPA’s first Chief Scientist recalls, that 
the civilian space program being moved to NASA (and remainder back 
to the Services) was “what left room for all the other things that ARPA 
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has subsequently done… including the Internet. If ARPA had been left 
completely tied up with all these space programs, all kinds of other 
good things would never have happened”.4
DARPA’s Key Characteristics
It was recognized from the outset that DARPA’s unique mission 
required an organization with unique characteristics. Among the most 
salient of these are:
• It is independent from Service R&D organizations
DARPA neither supports a Service directly nor does it seek to implement 
solutions to identified Service requirements. Its purpose is to focus on 
capabilities that have not been identified in Service R&D and on meeting 
defense needs that are not defined explicitly as Service requirements. This 
does not mean that DARPA does not work with the Services, but it does 
mean that it does not work the requirements that drive Service R&D.
• It is a lean, agile organization with risk-taking culture
DARPA’s charter to focus on “high-risk/high-payoff” research 
requires that it be tolerant of failure and open to learning. It has had to 
learn to manage risk, not avoid it. Because of its charter, it has adopted 
organizational, management and personnel policies that encourage 
individual responsibility and initiative, and a high degree of flexibility 
in program definition. This is one reason that DARPA does not maintain 
any of its own labs.
A primary aspect of DARPA’s lean structure is that it centers on and 
facilitates the initiative of its program managers. The DARPA program 
manager is the technical champion who conceives and owns the 
program. As the program manager is the guiding intelligence behind 
the program, the most important decisions of DARPA’s few Office 
Directors are the selection of and support of risk-taking, idea-driven 
program managers dedicated to making the technology work.5
• It is idea-driven and outcome-oriented
4  York, H. (2007). Interview, 5 January.
5  Currently DARPA has Directors for six Offices: Defense Sciences; Information 
Processing Technology; Information Exploitation; Microsystems Technology; 
Strategic Technology; and Tactical Technology.
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The coin of the realm at DARPA is promising ideas. The Project Manager 
succeeds by convincing others—the Office Director and the DARPA 
Director—that he or she has identified a high potential new concept. 
The gating notion isn’t that the idea is well-proven, but that it has 
high prospects of making a difference. The DARPA program manager 
will seek out and fund researchers within U.S. defense contractors, 
private companies, and universities to bring the incipient concept into 
fruition. Thus, the research is outcome-driven to achieve results toward 
identified goals, not to pursue science per se. The goals may vary from 
demonstrating that an idea is technically feasible to providing proof-
of-concept for an operational capability. To achieve these results the 
program manager needs to be open to competing approaches, and be 
adroit and tough-minded in selecting among these.
Which DARPA?
While the concept of DARPA as a “high-risk—high pay-off” organization 
has been maintained, it also has been an intrinsically malleable and 
adaptive organization. Indeed, DARPA has morphed several times.
DARPA has “re-grouped” iteratively—often after its greatest 
“successes”. The first such occasion was soon after its establishment 
with the spinning off of its space programs into NASA. This resulted 
in about half of the then ARPA personnel either leaving to form the 
new space agency, or returning to a military service organization 
to pursue military-specific space programs. A few years later then 
DDR&E (Director of Defense Research and Engineering) John S. Foster 
required ARPA to transition its second largest inaugural program—
the DEFENDER missile defense program—to the Army, much to the 
consternation of some key managers within ARPA. Also, early in its 
history ARPA was tasked to conduct a program of applied research in 
support of the military effort in Vietnam.
More important than the variety of the programs is that they 
demonstrate the speed with which DARPA took on a new initiative 
and also how rapidly its programs can move—sometimes more rapidly 
than its supporters within DARPA may desire. However, particular 
programs or technologies have not become the identifier of what 
DARPA is. Rather, DARPA’s identity is defined by its ability to rapidly 
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take on and assess new ideas and concepts directed at daunting military 
challenges or overarching application prospects. While the dwell time 
on new ideas may vary and DARPA may return to the concept iteratively 
over its history—most notably with its return to missile defense in the 
1970s leading to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s—its 
hallmark is to explore and create new opportunities, not perfect the 
ideas that it has fostered. A crucial element of what has made DARPA a 
special, unique institution is its ability to re-invent itself, to adapt, and to 
avoid becoming wedded to the last problem it tried to solve.
DARPA Roles 
Emphasizing DARPA’s adaptability is not to say that there are not 
some underlying elements to what DARPA does. While there have been 
some additional ad hoc activities thrown in over time, DARPA has had 
significant roles in the following:
• Turning basic science into emerging technologies
• Exploring “disruptive” capabilities (military and more 
generic)
• Developing technology strategy into a Defense strategy
• Foster revolution or fundamental transformation in a domain 
of technology application (e.g., the Internet or standoff 
precision strike)
Key Elements of DARPA’s Success
There are several key elements in DARPA’s succeeding in its unique 
role as an instigator of radical innovation.
• Create surprise; don’t just seek to avoid it
DARPA mission is to investigate new emerging technological capabilities 
that have prospects to create disruptive capabilities. It is differentiated 
from other R&D organizations by a charter that explicitly emphasizes 
“high-risk, high payoff” research.
• Build communities of “change-state advocates”
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DARPA program managers may often themselves foster a specific 
concept or technological approach that they seek to explore and develop. 
But almost never are they the main, let alone sole, investigator of the 
concept/approach. Rather it is DARPA’s motif to instigate cooperation 
among a group of forward-looking researchers and operational experts. 
In this sense, DARPA’s success depends on it being a leader and catalyst 
in developing this community of interest. 
• Define challenges, develop solution concepts, and demonstrate 
them
One aspect of DARPA’s success has been efforts to define strategic 
challenges in detail. Since its inaugural Presidential Issues, DARPA has 
been problem focused, seeking breakthrough, change-state approaches 
to overcome daunting issues. This has been true in the military 
realm from the outset. DARPA-sponsored researchers under Project 
DEFENDER conducted detailed assessments of intercontinental missile 
phenomena for both defense and offense. For example, in the 1960s and 
1970s, DARPA funded studies at the then new Institute for Defense 
Analyses on missile offense and defense first under the STRAT-X 
project on ICBM offense-defense followed by then PEN-X study which 
assessed both U.S. and Soviet capabilities to penetrate missile defense 
systems. Subsequently, in the late 1970s, DARPA funded studies 
to understand how the Warsaw Pact was postured against Western 
Europe in order to determine how technology could provide a means 
to offset the Warsaw Pact’s numerical and geographic advantages. 
According to Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering 
an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs, a paper by the Institute for 
Defense Analyses, this planning led to DARPA research in both stealth 
and standoff precision strike, which provided the basis for Secretary 
of Defense Harold Brown’s and Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering William Perry’s “offset strategy”.6
Such detailed conceptual work also facilitated DARPA’s non-
military research—explicitly that in information technology. J. C. 
6  Van Atta, R., Lippitz, M., et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition, DARPA’s Role 
in Fostering a Revolution in Military Affairs. Volume 1. Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analyses, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada422835, https://fas.org/irp/agency/
dod/idarma.pdf
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R. Licklider came to DARPA as head of the Information Processing 
Techniques Office with a vision on man-computer symbiosis that grew 
in specificity as he collaborated with others, especially Robert Taylor, to 
present a perspective of internetted computers providing capabilities for 
collaboration and data interchange amongst researchers.7 Some of this 
work is described in Licklider’s article, “Man-Computer Symbiosis”, and 
Licklider and Taylor’s, “The Computer as a Communications Device”.
Tension Between DARPA Roles
DARPA has been a pursuer of new breakthrough technologies 
independent of defined needs. It also has been a developer of concept 
prototypes and demonstrations that address needs (but not defined 
requirements). While complementary, these are substantially different 
roles requiring different management approaches and different types 
of researchers. The first type of endeavor requires an exploratory, 
somewhat unstructured approach seeking out alternatives amongst 
competing ideas. The latter focuses on taking a specific set of emerging 
capabilities and combining them into a demonstration of proof-of-
concept. Such demonstrations are generally larger in scale and more 
resource intensive than exploratory research. Moreover, rather than 
exploratory, they are aimed at assessing the merit of a specific concept. 
Indeed, demonstration prototype efforts can be “resource sumps”, as 
they are both uncertain and costly. Therefore, the DARPA Director has 
needs to attentively oversee these while maintaining and protecting the 
more exploratory research efforts.
DARPA’s Successes
Over the fifty years since its inception DARPA has had several major 
accomplishments that distinguish it as an innovative organization.
7 Licklider, J. C. R. (1960). “Man-Computer Symbiosis”, IRE Transactions on Human 
Factors in Electronics 1: 4–11, https://doi.org/10.1109/thfe2.1960.4503259; Licklider, J. 
C. R., and Taylor, R. (1968). “The Computer as a Communications Device”, Science 
and Technology 76: 21–31. See Waldrop, M. M. (2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. R. 
Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing Personal. New York, NY: Viking 
Press.
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Third Generation Info Tech—the Creation Interactive 
Information
The singularly most notable technology accomplishment that DARPA 
is known for is the development of what is now known as modern 
computing, as embodied in the personal computer and the Internet. 
While this achievement had its origins in the remarkable vision of one 
man, J. C. R. Licklider, its coming to fruition speaks volumes for the nature 
of DARPA as an organization and the willingness of its management to 
support and nurture the pursuit of such an extraordinary perspective.8
The vision that Licklider brought to DARPA was one of a totally 
revolutionary concept of computers and how they could be used. 
He foresaw that rather than being fundamentally highly automated 
calculating ma- chines, computers could be employed as tools in 
supporting humans in creative processes which he discussed in the 
article “Man-Computer Symbiosis” in March 1960’s IRE Transactions 
on Human Factors in Electronics, volume HFE-1. However, to do so 
would require entirely new, yet non-existent computer capabilities that 
included interactive computers, internetted computing, virtual reality, 
and intelligent systems.
Licklider’s extraordinary notion of “man-computer symbiosis” was 
a fundamental vision that foresaw using new types of computational 
capabilities to first achieve augmented human capabilities, and then 
possibly artificial intelligence. Licklider brought these inchoate notions 
to DARPA when he was named Director of its Information Processing 
Techniques Office (IPTO). He brought a powerful vision of what 
could be and used this as the basis for sustained investment in the 
underlying technologies to achieve the vision. This concept became 
the gestation of a concerted effort that culminated in the ARPANET, 
as well as a number of technological innovations in the underlying 
computer graphics, computer processing, and other capabilities that led 
to DARPA’s fundamental impact on “making computers personal”: a 
truly change-state vision which had fundamental impact in fostering a 
transformational concept and the creation of an entire industry.
8  Waldrop, M. M. (2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution that 
Made Computing Personal. New York, NY: Viking Press, provides considerable detail 
on DARPA’s fundamental role in advancing computer technology.
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DARPA’s Role in Creating a Revolution  
in Military Affairs9
DARPA has been instrumental in developing a number of technologies, 
systems and concepts critical to what some have termed the Revolution 
in Military Affairs (RMA) that DOD implemented in the 1990s based on 
R&D conducted by DARPA over the prior fifteen years, according to 
the Institute for Defense Analyses paper Transformation and Transition: 
DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs. It did 
so by serving as a virtual DOD corporate laboratory: a central research 
activity, reporting to the top of the organization, with the flexibility to 
move rapidly into new areas and explore opportunities that held the 
potential of “changing the business”. DARPA acted as a catalyst for 
innovation by articulating thrust areas linked to overall DOD strategic 
needs, seeding and coordinating external research communities, and 
funding large-scale demonstrations of disruptive concepts. In doing 
so, the DARPA programs presented senior DOD leadership with 
opportunities to develop disruptive capabilities. When these programs 
received consistent senior leadership support, typically from the highest 
levels of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, they transitioned into 
acquisition and deployment. At other times, without this backing from 
the highest reaches of the department, only the less disruptive, less joint 
elements moved forward.
An example of one of the most successful DARPA programs is its 
championing of stealth. A radical and controversial concept, DARPA’s 
stealth R&D harnessed industry ideas. Low-observable aircraft had 
been built before, for reconnaissance and intelligence purposes, but not 
pursued for combat applications. The Air Force had little interest in a 
slow, not very maneuverable plane that could only fly at night. After 
considerable engineering work, the Have Blue proof-of-concept system 
enabled top OSD and Service leadership to proceed with confidence to 
fund and support a full-scale acquisition program. OSD leadership kept 
the subsequent F-117A program focused on a limited set of high priority 
missions that existing aircraft could not perform well. For example, the 
program focused on overcoming Soviet integrated air defenses, and 
9  This section draws upon Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition.
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worked with Congress to protect its budget, with a target completion 
date within the same administration. The result was a “secret weapon” 
capability—exactly what DARPA and top DOD leadership had 
envisioned.
Sustaining the DARPA Vision
DARPA’s higher-risk, longer-term R&D agenda distinguishes it from 
other sources of defense R&D funding. Perhaps the most important 
effect of DARPA’s work is to change people’s minds as to what is 
possible.
DARPA’s fifty-year history reveals a constant mission to create 
novel, high-payoff capabilities by aggressively pushing the frontiers of 
knowledge—indeed demanding that the frontiers be pushed back in 
order to explore the prospects of new capabilities. As an entity DARPA 
has many of the same features as its research.
DARPA began as a bold experiment aimed at overcoming the usual 
incremental, tried and true processes of technology development. Like 
the research it is chartered to develop, DARPA has consistently been 
purposively “disruptive” and “transformational” over its fifty years.
Sustaining this unique ethos has not always been easy. There have 
been several efforts over the years to “tone DARPA down;” make its 
research more compatible and integrated into the rest of DOD R&D; have 
it focus more heavily on nearer term, more incremental applications—in 
other words make it behave like a normal R&D organization. There have 
been efforts to broaden its charter into system prototyping well beyond 
the proof-of-concept demonstrations it has constructed on several 
breakthrough systems. However, with strong internal leadership, both 
within DARPA and in the OSD, as well as support from Congress, 
DARPA has been able to perform a truly unique role—it has been and 
continues to be DOD’s “Chief Innovation Agency”, pushing the frontiers 
of what is possible for the benefit of national security and the nation as 
a whole.
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3. NSF and DARPA as Models for 
Research Funding:  
An Institutional Analysis1
Michael J. Piore, Phech Colatat,  
and Elisabeth Beck Reynolds
The Federal government expends roughly $33 billion annually on 
scientific research and development in academic institutions, or 60 
percent of total academic R&D funding. The former figure represents 
roughly one percent of U.S. GDP. These funds are allocated through 
a number of different government agencies and organizations, each 
operating in a somewhat different way. This study is designed to 
identify different organizational models of the way in which these 
funds are allocated to academic research and make a very preliminary 
assessment of the impact of these different models on the way in which 
researchers behave and the products their work produces. This has 
important implications for national science policy and the emergent 
field of “the science of science policy”.
The study grew out of a much narrower project focused on the 
attempt to create an agency within the Department of Energy designed 
to foster radical innovation in energy technologies. The new agency, 
Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), was modeled 
1  This article was originally released as an MIT Industrial Performance Center 
Working Paper in July 2015.
© Chapter’s authors, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.03
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on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), an 
agency in the Department of Defense (DOD) that was credited with 
having generated a variety of new, discontinuous technologies and 
was generally contrasted with other agencies in the DOD, but more 
particularly, the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), which were considered more cautious and 
conservative, and which fostered more continuous or incremental 
technological developments.
It rapidly became apparent, however, that the critical characteristics 
of the DARPA model—if indeed there was such a model—were not 
obvious. The project was consequently restructured to focus on DARPA 
as an organization, and, subsequently, on the attempt to identify what 
was peculiar about DARPA, relative to NSF. Material on NIH and other 
funding provided by the Defense Department was also collected but it 
is more limited in scope.
From the very start, the project has been conceived in the context of 
the broader debate about the effectiveness of government, i.e., public 
sector, initiatives. DARPA attracted our attention in no small measure 
because of the reputation of the agency as a great success in a period 
when government has been generally disparaged and government 
initiatives, especially in the promotion of particular industries, 
enterprises or technologies, have been viewed with great skepticism. In 
recent years, there has been a revival of interest in active government. 
The NSF and DARPA have garnered new interest as countries—
particularly developing countries—look to the United States for models 
for the promotion of economic growth via what has become the new 
mantra of economic development: “innovation and entrepreneurship in 
the knowledge economy”.
DARPA attracted our attention for a third reason too: the central role 
the program managers play in its organization and operation and the 
power and discretion which is lodged in the hands of these agents at 
the base of the organizational pyramid. In this respect, it constitutes a 
“street-level” bureaucracy, a class of governmental organizations that 
we have been studying in other contexts and which appear to offer 
a model for public sector management that is alternative to both the 
classic Weberian bureaucracy, widely viewed as rule-bound and rigid, 
on the one hand, and the new public management, which uses the profit 
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maximizing firm in a competitive market as a template to construct a 
more flexible alternative, on the other hand.2 
This chapter is divided into sections as follows: the first section 
discusses the methodology and research approach. The second section 
presents the basic findings. It is divided into three subsections, focusing 
first on DARPA, then on the National Science Foundation (including 
some background material on NIH), and finally on the origination 
and motivation of the faculty researchers whose work these Federal 
organizations fund. The third section of the chapter then turns to an 
interpretation of the results. I conclude with a discussion of some of 
the broader implications of the study and the further research toward 
which they point.
I. Methodology and Research Approach
Our study is centered on MIT. It is based primarily upon data gathered 
at MIT itself and from outsiders with whom our contacts at MIT had 
worked directly or whom they recommended as particularly good 
informants The MIT focus creates a relatively well-defined universe, 
but obviously limits the generalizability of the results. We discuss those 
limits in the body of the text.
The focus was dictated by challenges of access. We talked early on 
with some of the top officials at DARPA, but the agency would not 
provide us with the data or the names of personnel that would have 
been required to draw a random sample of researchers or Agency 
personnel or even to select our informants in a more systematic way.
The study has both a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. The 
qualitative dimension is based on interviews with key informants. 
We sought out MIT faculty members who had previously worked on 
DARPA projects and were knowledgeable about the agency. All of 
them had also received funding from other sources as well, and hence 
were able to compare their experiences across Federal agencies, and 
to a limited extent, with non-Federal funding sources. Virtually all of 
2  Piore, M. (2011). “Beyond Markets: Sociology, Street-Level Bureaucracy, and 
the Management of the Public Sector”, Regulation & Governance Special Issue: 
Sociological Citizens: Practicing Pragmatic, Relational Regulation 5/1: 145–64, https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01098.x; Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: 
Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
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them had experience with the NSF. Some had also received funding, or 
considered applying for funding, directly from one or more of the military 
services, from NIH, and from private organizations (e.g., companies, 
foundations, and the like). We tried to interview the DARPA program 
managers of the projects on which our MIT respondents had worked, 
but we were limited to program managers who had left the agency. In 
total, we held formal, but open-ended, interviews with twenty-two MIT 
faculty members, and twelve current or former program managers and 
agency officials. Fourteen of these came from DARPA, eight from NSF, 
and five from NIH.
For the quantitative dimension of the study, we started with a data 
set of all research projects which received outside funding at MIT in the 
years 1997–2008. We then linked this data to data on patents, licenses, 
commercial ventures (startups) and citations in scholarly journals. The 
bulk of this data was provided directly by various offices at MIT, to whom 
we are greatly indebted for their cooperation. The citations, however, 
we collected ourselves with the help of a team of MIT undergraduate 
research assistants.
We focus here on the qualitative dimension of the study, but report 





To appreciate the nature of this Agency and its role in the debates 
surrounding Federal research policy, it is important to understand 
its history, and the nature of its success, particularly in the period of 
widespread skepticism and general depreciation and disparagement of 
government and its ability to create and maintain dynamic, innovative 
programs.
DARPA was created in 1958 in reaction to the launching of the 
Soviet space satellite Sputnik, and the universal surprise with which it 
was greeted by the U.S. military, the country’s scientific establishment 
and the political class. That surprise was widely attributed to the 
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conservative bias of scientific and engineering research, particularly 
the National Science Foundation that provided the major component 
of Federal research support and was the principle vector of research 
policy. The conservative bias was in turn attributed to the peer review 
process through which funding was allocated and the research effort 
more generally evaluated. A second component of military research 
was financed by the Offices of Research of the various branches of the 
armed services through grants but also through their own laboratories. 
The obligation of these offices to support the existing infrastructure 
was a second conservative force in the existing structure. A new 
agency was then conceived in large measure in reaction to these other 
organizations. Thus, DARPA was effectively given carte blanche to 
develop its research projects on its own, unconstrained by the existing 
research establishment. The institution that we set out to study 
was the result. It is partly the result of a mission and ethos defined 
in opposition to these other agencies and partly of organizational 
characteristics created to escape the constraints under which they 
operated. In this study, we use the NSF as a foil against which to 
define and understand the DARPA model, since for academic research 
it is by far the most important of the various institutions against which 
DARPA was conceived.
Evaluation of Success
The organization that has emerged over time is, as we shall see, distinctive 
and poses a challenge to the principles of organization that guide these 
other agencies. But it has proven to be very resistant to systematic 
evaluation. The resistance is in part conceptual—it is hard to know how 
the agency ought to be evaluated. But it is also institutional: DARPA 
has refused quite explicitly to help support an effort at evaluation, at 
least in connection with the present study. It rejected our request for 
data which would have enabled us to define a list of projects, trace the 
participants drawn into the agency’s orbit, and assess the impact upon 
conventional measures of scientific output such as patents and citations 
in scholarly journals. Their claim is that the agency has to be evaluated 
in terms of its contribution to the mission of the armed forces, a mission 
that is notoriously difficult to define.
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The most extensive evaluation effort of which we are aware is a three-
volume study by Van Atta, et al.33 The study reviews approximately 
forty projects and develops a narrative account both of DARPA’s 
contribution to the projects and the contribution of the technology 
which emerged in the process to the military mission and to civilian 
uses. A great strength of the study is that it includes most of the projects 
upon which the agency’s reputation in the general public or the science 
policy community rests, and in that sense it both reflects and sustains 
the esteem in which the agency is held. But the projects were selected 
largely on the basis of the data available to evaluate them in this way, 
and there is no effort to map them onto the larger universe of projects 
in which DARPA has been engaged, or might have been engaged in 
the period. Indeed, in the sense that the study purports to evaluate the 
agency’s success, the projects studied are selected on the dependent 
variable. The study does not include projects that were considered and 
never undertaken, or undertaken but abandoned or, as apparently is 
frequently the practice, folded into other very different projects. It is, 
moreover, difficult on the basis of this study to compare DARPA to 
other funding agencies with a different organizational structure and 
approach.
On the other hand, it is not clear how one would evaluate an agency 
of this kind. Conventionally, programs are evaluated in terms of 
benefits and costs. But in the case of research on new technologies the 
costs are the opportunity costs of research in domains whose pay-offs, 
since they were never actually undertaken, are impossible to know and 
the benefits of these projects accrue not only in military preparedness, 
which even when it is not classified is ill-defined, and some of the 
projects—the World Wide Web, for example—have so fundamentally 
altered the texture of everyday existence and have such widespread 
commercial ramifications that the benefits seem virtually infinite. The 
Agency is certainly right: Its mission cannot be reduced to the patents 
and citations in terms of which research results are conventionally 
measured in academic studies.
Nonetheless, in order to make any systematic comparison, it would 
be helpful to have some of these conventional measures of success. And 
3  Van Atta, R., Deitchman, S., and Reed, S. (1990–1). DARPA Technical Accomplishments. 
3 Volumes. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
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for this study, we have constructed such measures starting from data 
provided by our own institution: MIT maintains a roster of grants and 
contracts obtained by its faculty and researcher staff. We have linked that 
individual contract data to several outcomes which are conventionally 
used as indicators of success. The granting agencies include DARPA, NSF, 
and NIH as well as the various military research offices, and a number of 
nongovernmental funding sources (private companies, foundations).
The outcomes which we looked at are threefold: patents, citations, 
and technology licenses. In addition, we linked the technological 
licenses to data on new business ventures. The results of this project will 
be reported in a separate paper. Preliminary findings with respect to 
patents, technology licenses and new business ventures, are contained 
in Tables 3-1 and 3-2. As can be seen there, DARPA performs better than 
any of the other agencies on all of these measures, notwithstanding the 
fact that the agency explicitly rejects them as measures of its performance.
Table 3-1 Patents supported by sponsored research at MIT, 1997–2008. 

























Agency [a] [b] [c] [d] [d/a] [c/b] [a/c]
NSF 258 2988 90 1671 6.48 3.0% 2.87
NIH 181 2645 82 3955 21.85 3.1% 2.21
DARPA 153 519 67 1090 7.12 12.9% 2.28
Navy 94 1037 44 569 6.05 4.2% 2.14
Consortium 78 205 16 1518 19.46 7.8% 4.88
Army 52 471 22 692 13.31 4.7% 2.36
DOE 46 787 23 3683 80.07 2.9% 2.00
Air Force 38 856 28 470 12.37 3.3% 1.36
NASA 25 1586 18 1071 42.84 1.1% 1.39
MIT 
— Internal
24 128 4 1491 62.13 3.1% 6.00
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Table 3-2 Startups supported by sponsored research at MIT, 1997–2008. 
(Table prepared by the authors)















[a] [b] [c] [b/a] [c/a]
DARPA 20 (21) 519 1090 4.0% 54.5
NSF 20 (25) 2988 1671 0.8% 83.6
NIH 14 (23) 2645 3955 0.9% 282.5
Navy 6 (9) 471 692 1.9% 115.3
Army 6 (6) 1037 569 0.6% 94.8
DOE 5 (6) 787 3683 0.8% 736.6
Air Force 3 (4) 856 470 0.5% 156.7
Finally, our own work has been particularly influenced by the 
research of our colleague Erica R. H. Fuchs, who originally called 
our attention to the significance of DARPA as a possible model of 
government organization. Fuchs focuses specifically on the role of 
DARPA in one particular technology, the technology of computing, 
and places emphasis on the role of the program manager in creating 
and maintaining networks of researchers or research communities. We 
follow Fuchs in this last respect, but the broader range of projects which 
we examine (albeit much more superficially) and the contrast with the 
NSF complicates this picture.44
Qualitative Findings
Our findings are best understood against the backdrop of a standard 
peer-review model, which our respondents seemed to carry in the 
backs of their heads. Central to this model is an academic or scholarly 
discipline. The financing agency issues a call for proposals from such 
a discipline. Researchers from that discipline are invited to submit 
proposals. A panel from within the discipline is then recruited to 
4  Fuchs, E. R. H. (2010). “Rethinking the Role of the State in Technology Development: 
DARPA and the Case for Embedded Network Governance”, Research Policy 39/9: 
1133–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2010.07.003 (Chapter 7 in this volume).
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review these submissions. The panel ranks the proposal, and the agency 
awards its funds in order of rank, progressing from the highest ranked 
proposals down the list until the funds are exhausted. The funds are 
typically awarded in the form of a grant, generally with reporting 
requirements but with minimal reviews of the research results and no 
effort to ensure adherence to the original proposal. The model is actually 
very close to the way in which research funding is organized at the NSF 
and NIH, albeit, as we shall see, with important qualifications. But the 
DARPA model is very different. Which of the differences is important 
for the research outcomes is, of course, an open question, and given the 
number of dimensions along which practice departs from the standard 
model, not an easy question to answer.
The DARPA Model
The central figure in the DARPA model is the program manager 
(PM). The PMs typically comes into the agency with a very specific 
technological idea which they want to develop. They then spend some 
period of time—often a year or more—researching that technology and 
the domain (or domains) in which it lies through their own reading, 
visiting and talking to key figures who are thought to have something 
to contribute to the technology or to its development, and colloquia, 
conferences, small group meetings and other encounters, which he 
or she typically organizes, in which the technology is discussed and 
various approaches to its development are debated. After this initial 
exploratory period, the PM works up a plan for development of the 
technology and writes and issues RFP’s soliciting proposals for the 
various components of that plan. At DARPA, these are known as Broad 
Agency Announcements (BAA). The proposals are sent out for review to 
experts whom the PM selects, within the government (particularly the 
military) and outside. But the ultimate decision as to which proposals 
to fund rests with the PM alone. Proposals that are accepted then 
serve as the fulcrum for a research contract which is negotiated with 
would-be contractors. Contracts typically include specific performance 
requirements. Contractors are required to submit frequent progress 
reports and progress is continually monitored through these reports 
and through site visits. Contracts are subject to revision or cancellation 
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in the light of research experience. In addition to the review process, 
the organization holds regular seminars and conferences, comparable 
to those out of which the project initially emerged: contractors (who at 
DARPA are called performers) are required to attend these meetings, 
where they are expected to report their own progress and to listen and 
comment on the reports of others.
Given the central role of the PMs, the way the organization operates 
depends a lot on the way in which the PMs are recruited and managed. 
Hence key to the organizational model is the fact that the PMs come 
from the research community outside the organization, have relatively 
short tenure in the agency itself (an average of four to five years), 
and then leave the organization to pursue their careers elsewhere. 
We have not been able to follow these careers systematically, but it is 
significant that no obvious pattern emerged in the interviews. Most 
of the PMs whom we interviewed came from an academic or military 
background, and afterwards returned to their home institutions, often 
as a research administrator, but sometimes as rank-and-file professors 
and researchers, or, alternatively, joined the supporting consulting firms 
which surround DARPA (to which we will return shortly). Significantly, 
all of the PMs to whom we talked thought of their DARPA experience 
as a high point in their careers, one of the most exciting and stimulating 
periods in their professional lives (this point is stressed particularly by 
Fuchs).
The Agency operates outside of the civil service recruitment, hiring 
regulations and salary structure; and although it seems unable to pay 
exactly what the PMs would earn in the private sector, it is able to 
negotiate pay scales and contract terms significantly better than those 
that other government agencies can offer.
Emphasis was placed in virtually all of our interviews upon the 
fact that the PMs come to the agency with their own project, an idea 
which they essentially originate and to which they have a personal 
commitment (respondents talked of that commitment in fact as if it were 
an obsession—although that was not the term they actually used). In 
turn, it is obvious that the environment in which the agency operates and 
its structure determine who brings proposals to the agency and which 
of those proposals, i.e., which potential PMs, are actually recruited and 
hired.
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DARPA is a flat organization, a hierarchy with three levels: a 
director, a series of office managers, and the program managers. The 
director has an associate director who works with him or her but not 
as a separate level in the hierarchy. The director sets the broad outlines 
of the research agenda. The research itself is grouped into program 
areas, largely on the basis of technology and mission, and the office 
managers flesh out the agenda in their own areas. The PMs coming to 
the agency with their own ideas present them to the director and/or the 
office managers. DARPA cultivates a reputation for being open to new, 
radical ideas originating outside the organization (indeed, listening to 
people talk, one is led to believe that the ideas always originate from 
outside the organization) whether or not they fit the defined program. 
But the office managers and the director play an active role in recruiting 
ideas that fit into the program and in screening proposals to ensure that 
the program has some coherence and direction.
While the program itself originates with the director and is fleshed 
out by the office managers and the PMs whom they hire, it is conceived 
in consultation with the military services, with Congress and with the 
Administration. And it is clear in discussions with the agency that 
careful attention is paid to cultivating support within the political and 
administrative environment in which it operates. Particular emphasis is 
placed in virtually all discussions with people about the program upon 
the military mission of the agency and the way in which that operates 
to shape the programs.
Another significant factor shaping the programs is the agency’s 
mission in supporting radical, discontinuous technological change. That 
mission, as we have already mentioned, is rooted in DARPA’s origins 
in 1958 as a response to the Russian launching of Sputnik and the way 
in which Sputnik caught the U.S. military and scientific establishments 
by surprise.
These two factors—the military mission, and the focus on 
discontinuous technological development—surface repeatedly in 
interviews. The Agency is always looking at whether, on the one hand, 
the research would be undertaken elsewhere in the government or the 
society, or, on the other hand, whether there is a constituency—already 
existing or one which could be cultivated—in the military services 
which would adopt the new technologies and actually deploy them. To 
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the outside observer, the role of the military mission in the operation of 
the agency—and particularly in the ability of the organizational model 
to operate in other contexts—is difficult to understand. This is because 
the technologies under development are often so distant from actual 
military application that it is hard to imagine a technology for which no 
military application could be found, and much of what the agency does 
seems to have no obvious constituency within the military establishment. 
Nonetheless, reference to the critical role played by the military missions 
in the success of DARPA was stressed so repeatedly and by so many 
different informants, especially in discussions of transferring the DARPA 
model to the Department of Energy in the form of ARPA-E, that one had 
to believe it is indeed central to the organizational model.
In sum, the characteristics which distinguish DARPA as a funding 
organization are:5
1) The discretion and authority lodged in the PMs;
2) Awards in the form of contracts with specific deliverables 
and specified performance measures periodically monitored 
for specific performance. Typically, performance measures 
specified in contracts are set unrealistically high—targets 
which stimulate and focus debate about the characteristics of 
the technology;
3) PMs recruited and compensated outside of the regular civil 
service regulations;
4) Flat organization consisting of only three levels—PMs, the 
office managers, and the Director with an assistant director;
5) The tenure of the direct employees of the organization is very 
short—three to five years for the PMs, even less for many of 
Director (with the major exception of Tony Tether, who held 
the position for the full eight years of the Bush Administration 
2001–2009).
In addition, two characteristics, which have received little attention in 
the literature and which we have not discussed so far, stand out:
5  Bonvillian, W. B. (2006). “Power Play”, The American Interest 2/2, November/
December, 39–48, at 48.
 573. NSF and DARPA as Models for Research Funding
6) The very extensive use of support personnel hired from 
outside subcontractors, typically consulting firms, not 
independent contractors. These consulting firms—but often 
the particular personnel assigned by the firm to work with 
DARPA as well—have a long-term relationship with the 
agency. The tasks which they assume and the roles they 
play range from clerical and administrative support to high 
level professional functions. The latter include scientific and 
engineering research, but also key administrative, training 
and supervisory tasks. Contractors are used, for example, to 
“orient” (and in effect to train) new PMs and also to advise 
them in the development and execution of their programs 
throughout their careers in the agency. Given the short tenure 
of DARPA’s own personnel, the contractors provide the 
organizational continuity. And many of the subcontractors 
who work with DARPA have a long history with the agency, 
some having actually served as PMs or as performers.
This role of the outside contractors, and particularly the consulting firms, 
is a complete reversal of the usual relationship between temporary and 
permanent employees and, from the point of view of organizational 
studies, is probably the most interesting aspect of DARPA as an 
institution. Temporary employees typically have short tenure with the 
organization and are used to smooth out the variation in personnel 
requirements, a buffer against flux and uncertainty. The role of these 
outsiders suggests that a great deal of the much-vaunted flexibility 
(or malleability) of the organization, and the adaptability which it is 
supposed to confer on the agency’s program relative to other federal 
research agencies such as the National Laboratories or NSF, is illusory.
Parallel to the use of consultants, but somewhat different, is the 
way the agency draws on outsiders to audit and police its contracts 
with researchers. The outsiders in this case, however, are experienced 
government employees who are certified to perform this function. 
The Agency looks for the most qualified auditors within the military 
services, people who are able to use government contracting regulations 
in a creative way to accommodate the needs of the performers the PMs 
want to recruit—although the specific examples which were cited in the 
interviews related to the requirements of private industry, not academics. 
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The academics, however, reported that the auditors were surprisingly 
knowledgeable about the technical dimensions of the projects and helpful 
as the researchers tried to provide explanations for why they were unable 
to meet contract requirements—explanations that could then be used by 
the PM in defending his or her program within the agency.
7) The interaction which occurs in the process of contract 
administration should be understood as part of a final 
characteristic of the DARPA organizational model: the 
continual review and discussion which surrounds a program 
from its very inception until it is completed or phased out. That 
discussion takes place through a variety of vehicles, including 
small group meetings; larger and more formal seminars and 
conferences; formal meetings when seeking funding for new 
program proposals and on continuing or expanded funding 
for ongoing programs in meetings between the PMs, the office 
managers and the DARPA director; and reviews and auditing 
of contracts with outside auditors and with the PM. It involves 
continual questioning both of the ends of the program (why 
do we want to have this research in the first place? Why is 
DARPA, and not the private sector or some other government 
agency, financing it? How do you assess its success in doing 
so? What are the proper metrics? Etc.). We will come back to 
the significance of this review process shortly.
The NSF
The central thrust of NSF research support—and the focus in the present 
study—is its grants awards for discipline-based scientific research and 
education. The Agency also has a series of ancillary programs and 
activities which are organized around specific scientific and policy 
problems, and/or are explicitly interdisciplinary in character (among 
which is the program which supports our own research project). Other 
special programs support research institutions as opposed to individuals 
and sponsor special conferences.
In its disciplinary programs, NSF presents a sharp contrast to 
DARPA. Its organization and mode of operation resembles the model 
which faculty members carry in the back of their mind, as we noted 
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initially. It is basically organized around scholarly disciplines and is 
designed to support and sustain them. Funds are awarded in the form 
of grants through a competitive process organized and administered 
by a program manager. Competitions take place on a regular basis in 
a schedule announced and publicized in advance. The NSF does not 
actively solicit proposals. Applicants select the division to which they 
wish to apply, almost invariably the division corresponding to the 
discipline in which they were trained. Submissions are evaluated in a 
peer review process by a panel drawn from members of the discipline. 
The panel ranks the proposals relative to each other. Funds are allocated 
to the various divisions at higher levels of the organization (through 
a process which we did not investigate for the study). Within each 
division, funds are then generally awarded to proposals in the order in 
which they have been ranked by the review panel until they have been 
exhausted.
The role of the PM is, however, not as limited as this conventional 
picture seems to suggest. program managers at the NSF certainly do 
not have the wide latitude to define their program and to pick out the 
investigators who will participate in it that their analogues do at DARPA. 
However, they are not completely bound by the peer review process. 
They actually have the power and responsibility to fund proposals out 
of the order established in the peer review process if, for one reason or 
another, they believe it is desirable to do so. Furthermore, the attention 
devoted to the procedures for funding proposals out of rank order 
in the training and orientation of the PMs implies that this is not an 
incidental part of their job; that they are expected to continually review 
and evaluate the panels’ rankings, although they may not often actually 
act to contravene it. When they do fund a proposal out of order, the 
decision is usually justified by its importance to the health and progress 
of the discipline. In this, they do not act alone; they must first obtain 
the approval of their supervisor in the division. The procedures for 
obtaining that approval apparently vary somewhat across the agency, 
but, as it was described to us in interviews, it typically entails a written 
memorandum which is then discussed and evaluated by the division 
director. In at least some divisions, these “out of line” proposals are 
discussed formally and informally among the PMs as a group. Those 
discussions are part of an ongoing discussion within the division about 
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the direction of the discipline and the kind of research that would 
be required to sustain it and maintain a balance among its different 
components. These discussions, we will argue, play a role analogous 
to the continual discussion and debate which surrounds the research 
support process at DARPA.
The NSF has a reputation for being extremely conservative with an 
overwhelming bias in favor of proposals which hover very close to the 
center of the discipline, in terms of the hypotheses which they entertain 
and the methodology which they employ. As we have already noted, 
the surprise launching of the Russian Sputnik in 1958 was attributed 
to this conservative bias and DARPA was explicitly and deliberately 
designed to counter-balance it. NSF continues to have that reputation. 
It was reflected in comments of MIT faculty in virtually every interview 
we conducted, often spontaneously, but always when respondents were 
asked to compare NSF and DARPA funding. Many commented that so 
much emphasis was placed on feasibility at NSF that you actually had 
to have done the research (or a good part of it) before you submitted 
the proposal for funds to finance it. Several faculty members said their 
strategy was to submit proposals to fund research already underway 
and use the funds to initiate new projects, which then became the 
foundation for their next grant proposal.
The conservative bias is widely attributed to the peer review process 
through which funds are awarded. But it appears that the bias is not 
inherent in the process itself but rather in the way it is organized and 
administered. That in turn reflects the way in which the agency conceives 
of its mission, which is to sustain the country’s scientific capability 
through education and research, a capability which is in turn embedded 
in the academic disciplines. The PMs have an incentive to emphasize 
the awards as the outcome of the peer review process to avoid having 
to justify the outcome to rejected applicants. Their responsibilities, in 
contrast to those of DARPA managers, leave them very little time to give 
detailed feedback, a point which our faculty respondents emphasized 
repeatedly. But more fundamentally, if the PMs fail to intervene in the 
process it is because they share the biases of the review panels. They 
are very much a part of the scientific community which the discipline 
defines. Their backgrounds make it natural that they would think in these 
terms. Indeed, they are selected for that reason. In contrast to DARPA 
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PMs, the PMs at NSF are drawn from the disciplines whose research 
proposals they manage. About half of the PMs are career civil servants, 
the other half are on short-term contracts of one to three years, on leave 
from university research positions and are often actually paid through 
their universities at the levels they were receiving as faculty members.
This is not to say that the PMs add nothing to the process. The role 
of the NSF in reviewing a wide variety of research proposals and the 
PMs own position within that process gives them a broader vision than 
any particular review panel is likely to have. But it is still very much a 
vision of what Thomas Kuhn would call “normal science”,6 a vision in 
which progress occurs within the boundaries of the discipline, through 
adherence to the standards of the community that develops within 
those boundaries, and which the community promulgates and enforces 
through the control which it exercises over the careers of its members. 
The way in which the PMs represent the community was driven home in 
one of our interviews by one of the respondents who, when confronted 
with the criticism that the most important criteria in judging a research 
proposal at NSF was feasibility, gave us a long defense of feasibility as 
a cannon of “good science”.
One can see this as well in another area where the PMs act with 
power and discretion helping researchers whom they do not fund 
themselves find support through other government agencies, acting 
essentially as brokers and at times even putting together packages of 
funds from several different agencies. These efforts are facilitated by the 
extensive contacts which career PMs develop with the Federal research 
establishment. But they do not seem to see this activity as part of their 
regular responsibilities to oversee the health of the disciplines for which 
they are responsible, and they talk about it in very different terms, terms 
which make a sharp distinction between the discipline approach of NSF 
and other criteria which might justify a given research project (potential 
contribution to social welfare or to economic progress, for example).
A final piece of evidence suggesting that it is not the peer review 
process per se but the orientation of the organization which uses it is 
provided by the comment of one faculty member who had participated 
in NSF panels: he argued that the conservative bias in the research which 
6  Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press.
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the panels funded reflected the instructions which the panel members 
received. He and his colleagues, he insisted, were perfectly capable of 
evaluating and ranking the kind of high risk, original research which 
DARPA sought out and funded, if they were instructed to do so. It is to 
be noted that this comment calls into question the central role of the PM 
at DARPA as much as that of the peer review process at NSF.
We emphasize the dichotomy between the way in which the NSF 
actually operates and the way in which MIT faculty members perceive 
its operation, because in terms of the impact of the organization upon 
the research community, it is not clear which is more important. It is 
after all the faculty who must actually conceive the research program 
and carry it through. To appreciate how their perceptions influence the 
research process, it is important to understand how they think about 
their work and how they design their research programs. A second set 
of findings that emerged from this study relate directly to this question.
The NIH
It is perhaps worth adding at this point a few limited observations about 
what we learned about the NIH. It is virtually impossible to make broad 
generalizations about the NIH, given its $30 billion annual budget (fully 
half of all civilian R&D expenditures)7 across twenty-seven Institutes 
and Centers. But several interviews with MIT faculty and Program 
Officers (Pos, as opposed to PMs) at institutes within NIH provide 
some context for thinking about the role of the Program Officer at NIH 
relative to NSF and DARPA.
Program Officers have relatively little discretion is selecting proposals 
to receive funding. Proposals across the NIH first go to the Center for 
Scientific Review (CSR) that then categorizes the proposals and assigns 
them to the relevant institute. The proposals are reviewed by “study 
sections” (equivalent to a review panel) which score the proposals. The 
final scores and reports are sent to the Pos who then gather within each 
institute for a “Paylist” meeting within their division (one level below 
Institute level) to discuss the awards and decide which programs to 
fund at what level.
7  Cook-Deegan, R. (2015). “Has NIH Lost Its Halo?”, Issues in Science and Technology 
31/2: 36–47. (Chapter 15 in this volume).
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Like PMs in the NSF, Pos can challenge the scoring of a particular 
proposal, but instead of approaching their supervisor in their division 
like in the NSF, Pos approach the “Advisory Council”, a body that 
reviews the study section process, and ask for a special review of a 
proposal that they consider a “high program priority”. However, this 
seems to happen infrequently and internal research at the NIH shows 
that there is a fairly smooth curve demonstrating that as the scores get 
higher, the percentage of awards at that level gets lower. Going outside 
the payline doesn’t happen that often. As one PO stated, as much as they 
like to think they are finding the diamonds in the rough, they are not as 
aggressive in going beyond the payline as they like to think they are.
Where Pos seem to have more influence is in supporting the overall 
direction of the Institute’s agenda and new areas of science where they 
see a lack of investment. For areas of research that are new and where 
“you would never get something like that approved in a regular study 
section”, Pos can make the case within their Institute that there should 
be more attention and investment. This could come through “funding 
opportunity announcements” (FOAs) which indicate the Institute’s 
interest in a new area. The NIH may also encourage more research 
through the creation of new program areas that receive formal set-asides 
for funding. This currently represents approximately 15–20 percent of 
all NIH funding. Pos talked about the impact they felt they have had 
on the development of their field in important new areas of research. 
This might be in the form of a new program or through a process of 
“coaching and coaxing” applicants on their proposals for funding in 
these new areas of research.
As with the NSF, Pos have relatively limited contact with their 
grantees, usually connecting once a year when progress reports are due. 
They are also less engaged today in sponsoring conferences than in the 
past due to budgetary constraints. However, they seem to play an active 
role in supporting and encouraging next generation Pos to apply for 
NIH grants and help them navigate the system. This aligns with the 
NIH’s efforts to lower the average age of grant recipients (the average 
age is forty-two, with a median of fifty-two).8
8  Harris, A. (2014). “Young, Brilliant and Underfunded”, New York Times, 2 October, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/opinion/young-brilliant-and-underfunded.
html?_r=0 
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MIT Faculty
The funding agencies are only one side of the research equation. On 
the other side are the scientists and engineers whom the agencies need 
to attract if the work they want to support is actually to be carried out. 
At DARPA, these researchers are aptly referred to as performers. In this 
study, they are represented by those faculty whom we interviewed at 
MIT. The interviews suggested that they have a dual motivation. On 
the one hand they have a profound intellectual commitment to science 
and engineering, although not necessarily a well-fleshed out research 
agenda. On the other hand, their position at MIT requires them to raise 
substantial funds from agencies and organizations on the outside. 
These funds are not required to support their family. The wide range of 
opportunities open to the faculty at an elite school like MIT ensures that 
they will always be able to earn a comfortable living. But the Institute is 
only committed to paying the academic portion of their salary support. 
An additional two to three months is viewed as “summer support” and 
must be raised through research grants and contracts on the outside. In 
addition, faculty are expected to support a mini-research establishment 
consisting of overhead on lab space, equipment and administration 
and a team of graduate students who work with them over the course 
of three or four years on projects related to the faculty member’s own 
research. In many respects the research establishment is like a small 
business and the terms in which faculty members discuss it makes them 
sound like independent entrepreneurs.9
Evaluation of Experiences with Funding Agencies
All of the faculty members with whom we talked were very enthusiastic 
about the intellectual experience of working with DARPA. This is 
perhaps not surprising given the fact that we were talking primarily 
to faculty members who had received DARPA funding, although the 
unanimity of opinion on this score was striking. There were a number 
9  For a somewhat different view of the relationship between economic and 
intellectual motivation see Freeman, R. B. (2011). “The Economics of Science and 
Technology Policy”, in The Science of Science Policy: A Handbook, ed. K. Fealing, 
J. Lane, J. Marburger III, and S. Shipp. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
85–103, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2011.00523.x 
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of components to this experience. These included the opportunity to 
interact with other researchers in the various meetings and conferences 
which DARPA PMs organized in the process of putting together and 
then executing their programs.
Often these involved encounters with researchers from other 
disciplines or from outside the university, in private industry and/or in 
government labs. Several respondents reported that they had developed 
relationships in this way that fundamentally altered their research 
trajectories and/or created the foundations for long-term research 
collaborations. It is to be noted that several of the PMs suggested 
that this is exactly what they were trying to do in developing their 
program—although the MIT faculty did not seem to be simply echoing 
the comments they had picked up at DARPA.
Faculty members also emphasized their interactions with the 
PMs themselves whom they tended to talk about as colleagues and 
collaborators rather than merely as research funders or supervisors. 
These intellectual interactions with the PMs ranged from the initial 
discussions when the PM was preparing his or her research program 
to the extensive feedback which the DARPA PMs provided when a 
proposal was turned down. But they also mentioned the interaction 
with colleagues working on similar projects in seminars where they 
were required to present their research in progress as stimulating 
intellectually and important in the research process.
As noted earlier even the interactions with contract auditors were 
viewed as part of the intellectual experience, a feature of the way DARPA 
operates which is not accidental. The auditors are typically seconded 
from the military and recruited because of their ability to understand 
the substance of the research and its relevance for the agency’s mission. 
Since performance standards specified in the DARPA contracts are 
often deliberately set at levels that are virtually impossible to achieve, 
auditors spend considerable time trying to understand the obstacles to 
attaining the specified standards and identifying more realistic targets. 
Indeed, it is precisely to stimulate this type of discussion that targets are 
set above realistic expectations.
In addition to the intellectual experience of working with DARPA, 
two other features were mentioned in interviews. One is the size of the 
awards, which were, by and large, much larger than could be obtained 
66 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
through the NSF or NIH. The second was the ability to buy expensive 
lab equipment which could then be used for other projects.
On the downside was the threat that the agency would cut off 
funding in the middle of a project. Because funds are awarded in the 
form of contracts rather than grants, and because, as just noted, specified 
performance requirements were often unrealistic, the agency is in a 
position to cut off funding not just because of the research performance 
itself, but actually for any reason. This was a major threat under the 
administration of Tony Tether; he was believed by our MIT respondents 
to have cut contracts when budget cuts forced him to reorder the 
agency’s priorities in ways that were unrelated to the research which 
the contract initially covered. Funds were also cut when the research 
suggested that the project itself was not viable and the goals could not 
be achieved, or when a competing approach to the problem proved to be 
more successful. Whatever the actual reason, the sudden loss of funding 
was a particular problem for faculty members who are using the funds 
to finance graduate students working on doctoral dissertations, and 
several respondents reported that as a result of their DARPA experience, 
they had moved to a portfolio strategy for financing, in which they were 
careful to avoid excessive dependence on a single agency.
The other downside of DARPA funding is the frequent reporting 
requirements, in many cases every three months. This was particularly 
a problem for faculty doing basic science (as opposed to applied work), 
since they often did not have results at these reporting intervals.
The NSF
In contrast to DARPA, the intellectual experience of working with 
the NSF was universally characterized as dull, indeed pedestrian. It 
certainly involved none of the excitement or intellectual stimulation 
associated with DARPA. Proposal writing was seen as a chore. There 
was no thought of showcasing the intellectual excitement associated 
with the work. The widely expressed view that you had to have done 
much if not all of the work in advance of proposing it eliminated the 
element of surprise and discovery which the researcher might originally 
have felt and gave the process a slightly dishonest flavor (although the 
respondents did not put it in precisely those terms). Our respondents 
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generally view the NSF’s program managers as competent; they talked 
of them as colleagues and, although they were not asked to compare 
them directly to DARPA PMs, the comparison was not unfavorable 
to NSF. But there was little opportunity to interact with them in the 
way that they interacted with DARPA PMs; they provided little help 
in preparing proposals and little feedback when the proposals were 
rejected. NIH project managers incidentally were not respected as 
colleagues in the way that PMs at NSF and DARPA were; they also 
do not have the capacity to fund proposals outside of the rank order 
established by the peer review panels.
Most of our respondents who had received NSF grants had also 
participated in review panels, but this participation was seen as a 
chore: people felt obligated to participate to support the discipline 
and in return for funding they had received, but it was not viewed 
as a rewarding experience. One could imagine the discussions in the 
review panel meetings as comparable to the small group meeting which 
DARPA organized, but they were never discussed in those terms. The 
range of proposals that the panel members were required to read could 
have been seen as an opportunity to get an overview of the field but it 
was never discussed in these terms either.
In sum, the advantages of the NSF were on the “business side”. 
Here, the main advantage of NSF funding was that once a grant was 
awarded, the funding was secure, and one could count on it, especially 
in supporting graduate students. This contrasts with DARPA, where 
there was always the possibility that funding would be cut off in the 
midst of a thesis project. Also, NSF grants involved minimal reporting 
requirements; the major incentive to perform was to gather material to 
support the next grant proposal.
III. Interpretation
Economic and Sociological Perspective
The DARPA material lends itself to two quite different interpretative 
lenses. From the point of view of standard economic theory, with its 
preference for market mechanisms and individual incentives and its 
distrust of government bureaucracy, the salient feature of the DARPA 
68 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
organizational structure is the way in which it suspends the rules 
and regulations which normally constrain government officials. The 
mechanisms here include the freedom from the regulations governing 
hiring and salary scales, the use of contracts with requirements for 
specific performance (as opposed to grants), the way in which program 
managers are hired from outside the organization, their short and very 
limited tenure, and the very extensive use of outside contractors who 
can be replaced easily and at will. On the other hand, the standard 
theory which would emphasize the rules which normally constrain 
government actors rests upon a rational choice theory of individual 
behavior in which the actors are presumed to make a sharp separation 
between means and ends, and the technical relationships that determine 
the way in which the former affects the latter, and then to maximize the 
ends given the means at their disposal. The characteristic of the problems 
which DARPA, and NSF as well, are designed to address is that the 
ends are ill-defined and unclear, and the causal relationships between 
the means and the ends are exactly what the organization is supposed 
to be investigating. This entails what economists call “Knightian 
uncertainty”, i.e. uncertainty about what the possible outcomes actually 
are let alone what the probability of realizing any one of them.10 Neither 
the competitive market nor the rational choice model has much to say 
about how this should be addressed.
The standard rational choice theory has a second problem too. 
The theory attempts to understand and explain behavior in terms 
of individual self-interest. It has very little to say about the agent’s 
behavior when he or she has no particular interest in the choice among 
the alternatives we are attempting to understand. The choices of the 
faculty researchers are, up to a point at least, understandable in those 
terms, but the role of the PMs is not; or, at least, they do not yield an 
obvious interpretation of our findings. At both NSF and DARPA, the 
PMs seem to be motivated primarily by the intellectual interest and 
excitement of the work in which they are engaged. They seem to believe 
in the mission of the organization and see little difference between their 
own interests and that of the organization for which they worked. This 
was of course no accident. The agencies consciously recruited them with 
10  Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Boston, MA: Hart, Schaffner & 
Marx.
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this in mind. However, it called not for a theory of individual choice but 
rather a theory of how the agency’s mission was conveyed to the agents, 
and how it was understood by them.
The second interpretative lens through which the material gathered 
for this study might be addressed is organizational theory. We use this 
term very loosely here to refer to a range of theoretical ideas drawn from 
sociology, cognitive theory, language theory, and social psychology, all 
of which, however, suggest that human behavior must be understood 
in terms of the social context in which it occurs. Behavior in this view 
cannot be reduced to individual actions, coordinated indirectly and 
impersonally by a market (or market-like) mechanism, but rather 
must be understood in terms of the way in which people interact with 
each other. Applied to science studies, the basic idea is that scientific 
inquiry takes place within a community and is governed by a set of 
rules, habits and customs, partly explicit but with a substantial tacit or 
implicit component, which the community generates. These rules have 
both a social and an intellectual dimension. The funding agencies are 
then understood in terms of their impact upon such communities. The 
same basic conceptual apparatus can be applied to understanding the 
internal operation of the funding agencies themselves, for they are also 
communities of practice which arise and evolve over time.11 This is true 
of both DARPA and NSF. The major difference between them is that 
DARPA is creating new communities and NSF is managing scientific 
disciplines which are communities that already exist.
Our own understanding of this perspective derives from a series of 
case studies conducted by the Industrial Performance Center at MIT 
on the organization of product design and development in the private 
sector.12 Related understandings can be found in Fuchs and Phech 
Colatat,13 which are however not independent of the current project, and 
also in Donald Schön, and Kuhn.14 In the IPC study, we conceptualized 
11  Schön, D. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New 
York, NY: Basic Books
12  Lester, R., and Piore, M. (2004). Innovation—the Missing Dimension. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
13  Fuchs. (2010). “Rethinking the Role of the State”; Colatat, P. (2015). “An 
Organizational Perspective to Funding Science: Collaborator Novelty at DARPA”, 
Research Policy 44/4: 874–87. 
14  Schön. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner; Kuhn. (1962). The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.
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a research community as like a language community. Like language, 
it emerges and evolves through conversation, discussion and debate. 
We termed that conversational process interpretation. Particular product 
ideas, or in the present case, research projects, are drawn out of this 
conversation and pursued through a second process, analysis. Analysis 
proceeds very much as it does in engineering (and economics) textbooks: 
there is a clear statement of the end or ends which the product is designed 
to achieve, and one then organizes alternative resources, or means, so 
as to optimize (or maximize) the ends. But the interpretative process is 
under-theorized and requires some amplification. It is, we argued in 
the IPC study, like a conversation, a discussion or debate. It depends 
on who participates in that conversation, what they actually talk about, 
how the conversation proceeds from one subject to the next. The role of 
the manager in this process is to foster the conversation and to guide 
it. In this, he or she is like a host at a cocktail party, inviting the guests, 
introducing them to each other, suggesting topics of discussion that 
might be of common interest, introducing new topics or new people to 
the conversation group when the discussion flags and the participants 
begin to lose interest, breaking up groups when the discussion becomes 
too intense and threatens to collapse in mistrust and acrimony. 
Ultimately this discussion and debate leads not to agreement but to a 
common understanding that serves as the basis for further discourse. 
We think of that common understanding as like a language.
The interpretative process then essentially divides into two phases. In 
the first, or initial phase, the community is in formation. The participants 
are building a common understanding, generating a new language so to 
speak. In the second, or mature, phase they are using that language to 
discuss the technology in which they are interested and the products or 
research projects to which it might lead. In so doing, they do not make 
the clear distinction between means and ends that is central to analysis; 
indeed, they move back and forth between means and ends, revising 
(or reinterpreting) the ends in the light of the means and vice versa. 
Importantly, the common understanding that sustains the community, 
and, in a sense, defines it, continues to evolve through discussion and 
debate even in this mature phase.
Understood in these terms, what is distinctive about DARPA is 
that the PMs are essentially creating an interpretative community and 
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then driving it toward the generation of novel products. They bring 
together around a technological problem people who would not be in 
contact with each other without the PMs intercession, guiding them 
through a variety of different encounters, meetings, discussions and 
seminars to talk to each other, to enter into a conversation in a way that 
effectively develops a language of community and then sustaining that 
conversation and encouraging them to draw out of it specific research 
projects that they then “analyze”. But what is striking to the outside 
observer listening to the participants describe this experience is the 
priority accorded to interpretation even in the later stages of project 
development. This is most apparent in the administration of contracts 
when the performers fail to meet the specific goals. The failure triggers 
a discussion in which the first question is whether the goals were 
correctly specified and how they might be redefined in the light of the 
research that has already taken place. It is not, as it would normally be 
in the analytical phase of product development, focused solely on what 
means would be required to achieve these goals. The Agency refuses to 
estimate the success rate of the projects it undertakes precisely because 
rather than kill a project outright, it is redefined.
In contrast to DARPA, NIH and NSF are entering into research 
communities that already exist and seek to support and perpetuate 
them rather than either create them or direct them. These communities 
too are sustained by an internal conversation that evolves over time. 
The discussions that occur among the PMs at NIH and NSF or among 
the members of the review panels as they evaluate different proposals 
are a part of that conversation. However, the conversation is largely 
autonomous of the funding agencies and those conversations that occur 
in the funding process are more the expression of a set of values and 
criteria of judgment that have been developed elsewhere than a direct 
determinant of those values. In sharp contrast to DARPA, the project 
proposals cannot be revised in the light of the discussion within the 
agency, and in that sense the panel’s judgment tends to involve the 
analytical application of criteria that the panelists bring with them, 
rather than an interpretative conversation about those criteria.
On the other hand, the PMs are engaged in a discussion within the 
agency about the direction of the discipline. The discussion is largely 
undirected although the division director must exert some influence 
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over it. Unfortunately, we did not explore the nature of that discussion in 
our interviews. It is an area left for further research. That research could 
focus on the documents that are generated when the PMs intervene to 
fund a proposal that would not have received money on the basis of 
the peer review ranking. An understanding of this process is, in certain 
respects, more important than understanding DARPA, since a number 
of developing countries look to NSF as a model of how to support their 
own education and research establishments.
Conclusions
This study is part of an attempt to understand the structure and 
operation of Federal agencies supporting academic research in science 
and engineering. It centered on the contrast between DARPA and NSF, 
drawing on the experience of faculty members of MIT who have received 
funding from both organizations. The focus has been on the role of the 
program (or project) managers in the two agencies. In both agencies 
the program managers have substantial discretion in the selection of 
projects to fund and in the management of the funding process. That 
discretion was anticipated in the case of DARPA, and was one of 
the major reasons for selecting that agency for study. The degree of 
discretion at NSF, on the other hand, was surprising. It is much greater 
than the faculty whom we interviewed generally believed, and is one of 
the major findings of the study.
The program managers stand at the base of the organizational 
pyramid in both agencies, and given the discretion that is lodged 
there, both organizations are in effect street-level—as opposed to 
classic Weberian—bureaucracies. But the two agencies operate very 
differently.
At the NSF, proposals are evaluated and ranked through a peer 
review process, and the discretion of the program manager consists 
of his or her ability to fund proposals out of the order of peer review 
ranking. The process for doing so is carefully supervised and reviewed 
by higher levels of the organization. The procedures for the exercise of 
discretion are carefully laid out for new PMs in their initial orientation, 
along with the basic criteria upon which these decisions are supposed to 
be made. Written reports are required along the way.
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Moreover, there is an ongoing discussion among the PMs within the 
organization about the way in which the academic discipline they are 
funding is evolving, and about possible biases in the review process. It 
is in the context of that discussion that funding decisions by the staff are 
made. There is, however, very little direct interchange between the PMs 
and the researchers whom the agency funds. The process here is totally 
consistent with the literature on the management of discretion within 
street-level bureaucracies.
DARPA is managed very differently. The program managers receive 
very little orientation or training. While there is extensive interaction 
between the PMs and the research community they are seeking to 
draw into their project, there is very little interaction among the 
PMs themselves (the quip is that the only thing they share is a travel 
agent). There is a strong organizational culture and a high degree of 
organizational continuity, but, given the very high turnover and the 
short tenure of the PMs and, with a few exceptions (like that of Tony 
Tether) the agency’s directors as well, it is very hard to understand how 
that continuity is maintained and the strong organization culture is 
created and sustained. It appears that a critical factor here (possibly the 
critical factor) is the network of consultants and consulting firms that 
support the organization; many of these consultants have worked with 
DARPA over a long period of time and some of them have actually been 
PMs within the organization.
The existence of that network and the role it seems to play is the second 
major finding of this study. DARPA has a reputation for flexibility and 
is often contrasted to classic bureaucratic organizations. However, given 
the role of outside consultants in maintaining organizational continuity, 
it would appear that a good deal of the flexibility of the organization is 
illusory, and that to the extent that it exists, the flexibility must reside 
in the role assigned to the PMs and not the way they perform that role.
The findings of the study are incomplete. In focusing on the role of 
the PMs, we have neglected other aspects of the organizational models, 
and especially those levels of the organization where the basic budgetary 
decisions are made, allocating funds among competing disciplines in the 
case of NSF and broad project areas, in the case of DARPA. Moreover, 
while the contrast between the two organizations helps us to identify 
and highlight key aspects of each, it leaves the impression that they are 
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competitive with each other and that the choice between them is a key 
to national science policy, whereas in fact at the national level at least 
they are complementary. The NSF is responsible for maintaining the 
country’s basic scientific establishment, ensuring the supply of technical 
manpower and maintaining its basic research capabilities; DARPA is 
dependent upon that establishment for the raw material from which its 
projects are created.
But the most important implications of this project are not its 
substantive findings but the implications for how one thinks about 
science policy and the conceptual issues in the emergent field 
of “the science of science policy”.15 While the field is ostensibly 
interdisciplinary, it has been heavily influenced by the discipline of 
economics and what might be termed the conceptual biases of that 
discipline as a lens for understanding public policy. The influence is 
pervasive, and it would take a true outsider coming from some other 
discipline (which we are not) to identify what these are. But one 
perspective that seems particularly important is a view of government 
policy in which government intervention consists of imposing 
restrictions upon, and creating incentives for, action and that its 
impact can be understood in terms of the self-interest of individuals 
whose behavior is a response to the price incentive in the market. 
In science policy, this seems to imply that the budgetary allocations 
made in our cases at the peak of the organizational hierarchy are the 
critical policy decisions. But what this study emphasizes is that, in the 
United States at least, government institutions intervene at the very 
micro level in the way the projects are conceived and executed. The 
way that these interventions are conducted is the product of an active 
debate and discussion within the organization, and also between the 
organization and the scientific community. We have drawn here upon 
our own research to understand the nature of that debate, and how 
the way it is conducted and managed influences the outcome. But 
the more general point is that that understanding is critical to science 
policy, and that one has to reach far beyond the conceptual framework 
of economics to analyze it
15  Fealing, K. H., Lane, J., Marbuger, J. III, and Shipp, S., eds. (2011). The Science of 
Science Policy: A Handbook. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2011.00523.x 
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4. The Connected Science Model 




Fundamentals of Defense Technology Development3
The rise of the U.S. innovation system in the second half of the twentieth 
century was profoundly tied to U.S. World War II and Cold War defense 
science and technology investment.4 However, this late twentieth-century 
military technology evolution is only part of a much bigger picture of 
innovation transformation. Growth economist Carlotta Perez argues 
that an industrial—and therefore societal—transformation has occurred 
roughly every half century, starting with the beginning of the industrial 
1  This contribution  originally appeared as a chapter in 21st Century Innovation Systems 
for the U.S. and Japan, ed. S. Nagaoki, M. Kondo, K. Flamm and C. Wessner. (2009). 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 206–37, https://doi.org/10.17226/12194, 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=206 
2  This chapter was written in 2006 with updates added in May 2008, reflecting 
developments through that time. 
3  Major portions of this chapter appeared in Bonvillian, W. B. (2006). “Power Play, 
The DARPA Model and U.S. Energy Policy”, The American Interest 2/2, November/
December, 39–48, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2006/11/01/power-play/, 
and appear here by permission of that journal.
4  Ruttan, V. W. (2006). Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and 
Technology Development. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
© William B. Bonvillian, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.04
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revolution in Britain in 1770.5 These technology-based innovation cycles 
flow in long multi-decade waves. Arguably, not only do these waves 
transform economies and the way we organize societies around them, 
they transform military power as well; U.S. military leadership has 
paralleled its technological innovation leadership. Perez found that the 
U.S. led the last three innovation waves—the information technology 
revolution represents the latest. Will this leadership continue? At stake 
is not only economic leadership, but U.S. military leadership.
In other words, for the U.S. there has been a deep interaction 
between war and technology—war has greatly influenced technology 
evolution, and the converse is also true. While this has been the case 
for centuries, this interaction has been accelerating. Defense technology 
cannot be discussed as though it were separate from the technology that 
is driving the expansion of the economy—they are both part of the same 
technology paradigms. Military historian John Chambers has argued 
that few of the critical weapons that transformed twentieth century 
warfare came from a specific doctrinal need or request of the military;6 
instead, the availability of technology advances has driven doctrine. If 
technology innovation is a driving force in both U.S. economic progress 
and military superiority, and these elements have interacted, we need to 
understand the causal factors behind this innovation.
One factor involves critical institutions, which represent the space 
where research and talent combine, where the meeting between science 
and technology is best organized. Arguably, there are critical science 
and technology institutions that can introduce not simply inventions 
and applications, but significant elements of entire innovations 
systems. We will focus on aspects of the U.S. innovation system 
supported by the defense sector—particularly the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). An Eisenhower creation, DARPA 
was the primary inheritor of the World War II connected science model 
embodied in Los Alamos National Laboratory and MIT’s Radiation 
Laboratory (Rad Lab).
5  Perez, C. (2002). Technological Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of 
Bubbles and Golden Ages. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. See also Atkinson, R. D. 
(2004). The Past and Future of America’s Economy—Long Waves of Innovation that Power 
Cycles of Growth. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
6  Chambers, J., ed. (1999). The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 7.
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DARPA came to play a larger role than other U.S. R&D mission 
agencies in both the Cold War’s defense technology and the private 
sector economy that interacted with it.7 DARPA will be used as a tool 
to explore the deep interaction between U.S. military leadership and 
technology leadership. As we attempt to understand where DARPA 
came from, we will also ask where it goes next, particularly in IT, as a 
way of focusing on the continuing strength of the defense innovation 
system.
Role of Technology Innovation and Talent in Growth
Defense and civilian sector innovation in the U.S. are part of one 
economic system; that system includes not only sharing the same 
technology paradigms but sharing the societal wealth—economic 
growth—thrown off by that economic system, which funds both the 
military and the technology it increasingly depends on for leadership. 
Therefore, we need to understand the nature of innovation in economic 
transformation. Keeping in mind the argument that economic growth 
has dramatically affected military transformation, what are the causal 
factors in economic growth?
To briefly summarize more than three decades of work in growth 
economics: Robert Solow, a Professor of Economics at MIT, won the 
Nobel Prize in 1987. Solow was profoundly dissatisfied with the growth 
model of classical economics, where growth was understood in a static 
model of the interaction between capital supply and labor supply. 
Solow posited a dynamic model, arguing that while capital and labor 
supply remained significant, there was a much bigger factor. Studying 
five decades of U.S. economic growth he found that more than half 
of this growth flowed from technological and related innovation.8 He 
argued that growth rates are not in an equilibrium but can be altered 
through innovation advance, with societal well-being expanding 
7  Van Atta, R., et al. (1991). DARPA Technological Accomplishments, An Historical Review 
of DARPA Projects. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses; Goodwin, J. 
C., et al. (1999). DARPA, Technology Transition. Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency.
8  Solow, R. M. (2000). Growth Theory, An Exposition. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, ix–xxvi, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-
lecture.html
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correspondingly. The key factor behind his growth through innovation 
thesis, his work suggests, was the research and development system. 
However, because technology development is complex and not easy to 
measure, he treated it as “exogenous” to the economy. Economist Paul 
Romer of Stamford University (and later NYU) articulated what I will 
call a second direct growth factor.9 If the first is Solow’s technological 
innovation founded on R&D, Romer argued that technical knowledge 
drives economic growth, and that it is an “endogenous” element in the 
economy. The key factor standing behind this knowledge is science 
and technological talent, the “human capital engaged in research”. He 
suggested a prospector theory of innovation—the nation or region that 
fields the largest number of well-trained prospectors will find the most 
gold, i.e., the most innovative advances.10
These two direct factors—in shorthand, talent and R&D—don’t stand 
in isolation from each other, but rather are interacting parts of an intricate 
ecosystem of innovation. There are many other factors that are important 
parts of this system, elements that are more indirect, implicit, and 
peripheral to innovation advance than the two direct factors essential to 
economic growth posited above, but these indirect factors are nonetheless 
ones that a society must also get right for innovation advance.
The list of indirect innovation factors is long and, because growth 
economics is relatively new to the economics scene, the metrics for 
understanding the interaction of these factors are largely unexplored. 
On the government side they include fiscal, tax, and monetary policy; 
trade policy; technology standards; technology transfer policies; 
government procurement; intellectual property protection; the legal and 
liability systems; regulatory controls; accounting standards; and export 
controls. On the private sector side, which in a capitalist enterprise must 
dominate innovation, they include investment capital, including angel, 
venture, IPO’s, equity, and lending; markets; management principles 
and organization; talent compensation and reward; and quality of plant 
and equipment.
Keep in mind that that these direct and indirect innovation factors all 
interact, and that it is the interaction that is most important. Therefore, 
9  Romer, P. (1990). “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy 
98: 72–102, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~promer/Endogenous.pdf
10  See discussion of Solow and Romer in Warsh, D. (2006). Knowledge and the Wealth of 
Nations. New York, NY: W. W. Norton.
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they represent a common system for both economic and defense sector 
advance.11
Is There a Third Direct Innovation Factor?
What does innovation organization look like? This factor must be seen 
and understood at least at two levels, the institutional level and the 
personal, face-to-face level. We will explore these in succession.
U.S. Innovation Organization at the Institutional Level
In addition to the two direct and the numerous indirect innovation 
factors suggested above, arguably there is a third direct factor: the way 
that R&D and talent, in particular, come together to form an innovation 
system. In other words, if R&D is factor A, and talent is factor B, they 
form an interacting combination, AB, which in itself is a third factor: 
the meeting space for science and technology and the talent behind it. 
11  We have been discussing innovation in the context of economics. However, growth 
economics—because it is founded on a dynamic model of innovation—has begun 
to break down the focus of economics, since the late 1940’s (neoclassical economics), 
on the mathematical modeling suited to analysis of limited numbers of variables 
in a closed equilibrium. Instead, as growth economist Brian Arthur has argued, 
innovation can create increasing returns, not just diminishing returns, leading 
to transformational phase shifts in an economy. Growth economics requires not 
only the neo-classical economics of physics-like fundamental principles subject to 
formulaic proof, but an economics of complexity, where a rich array of interacting 
elements must be accounted for in systems that are not static but evolve. For 
example, if innovation organization is a key factor in innovation and therefore 
economic growth, this element pushes economics towards its original roots in the 
social sciences and away from neo-classical economic modeling, which cannot fully 
capture organizational elements. This concept puts an orange in what economics 
has viewed as a mix of apples. In other words, growth economics is gradually 
broadening economics’ explanatory depth and toolset to reach and understand 
complex systems, and the third innovation factor discussed below, innovation 
organization, arguably pushes it further in that direction. See, generally, Waldrop, 
M. M. (1992). Complexity, the Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos. New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 144–48, 250–55, 284–313, 325–27. Since the author drafted this 
article and footnote in 2006, another book has been published discussing some of 
these points: Beinhocker, E. D. (2007). Origin of Wealth-Evolution, Complexity and the 
Radical Remaking of Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School; see also, 
Tassey, G. (2016) “The Technology Element Model, Path-Dependent Growth and 
Innovation Policy”, Economics of Innovation and New Technology 26/6: 594–612, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2015.1100845; Bonvillian, W. B. and Singer, P. (2018). 
Advanced Manufacturing: The New American Innovation Policies. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press (chapter 4), https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262037037.001.0001
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It is not enough to have the ingredients of R&D and talent; they have 
to collaborate in an effective way for a highly productive innovation 
system. We’ll call this third factor innovation organization. Linking 
two factors together, AB, is shorthand in math for multiplying them; 
arguably, there is a multiplier factor here, too—the way R&D and 
talent join and are organized can be a multiplier for each. If innovation 
organization is a kind of multiplier for the two key direct innovation 
factors, then the way defense and civilian innovation systems organize 
R&D and talent, and the massive areas where the two systems overlap, 
will be profoundly determinative of innovation advance for the two 
systems, and therefore of economic and military leadership.
Governmental science and technology organization in the U.S. 
largely dates from World War II and the immediate post-war. As 
suggested earlier, technology evolution in this country comes from a 
kind of “PushMi-Pullyu” relationship between civilian economic and 
defense sectors, and World War II was a transformative period where 
the pressure for military technology advance later led to a dramatic 
economy-wide advance.
Vannevar Bush led this charge,12 acting as President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s personal science executive during the war. He was allied 
to a remarkable group of fellow science organizers, including Alfred 
Loomis, an investment banker and scientist, physicist Ernest Lawrence 
of Berkeley, and two university presidents, James Conant of Harvard 
and Karl Compton of MIT. Successively, Bush created and took charge 
of the two leading organizing entities for U.S. science and technology, 
the National Defense Research Council (NDRC) and then the Office 
of Science Research and Development (OSRD). These became the 
coordinating entities for U.S. wartime R&D, creating crash research 
projects in critical areas, such as the Rad Lab at MIT and Los Alamos, 
and they, in turn, insured interaction and coordination with a rich mix 
of research components. 
12  Zachary, G. P. (1999). Endless Frontier, Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American 
Century. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. See also, Conant, J. (2002). Tuxedo Park: 
A Wall Street Tycoon and the Secret Palace of Science that Changed the Course of World 
War II. New York, NY: Simon & Shuster (a biography of Alfred Loomis, founder of 
MIT’s Rad Lab). For a discussion of U.S. pre-WWII science organization see, Hart, 
D. (1998). Forged Consensus. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
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Influenced by the frustrations of his WW1 military research 
experience, where technology breakthrough could not transition past 
bureaucratic barriers into defense products, Bush kept civilian science 
control of critical elements of defense research, insisting that his science 
teams stay out of uniform and separate from military bureaucratic 
hierarchies, which he found unsuited to the close-knit interaction 
needed for technology progress.
To summarize, Bush brought all defense research efforts under 
one loose coordinating tent, NDRC then OSRD, and set up flat, non-
bureaucratic, interdisciplinary project teams oriented to major technology 
challenges, like radar and atomic weapons, as implementing task forces. 
He created “connected” science, where technology breakthroughs at 
the fundamental science stage were closely connected to the follow-on 
applied stages of development, prototyping and production, operating 
under what we will call a technological “challenge” model. Because 
Bush (and his ally Loomis) could go directly to the top for backing from 
Roosevelt, through Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Presidential 
Aide Harry Hopkins, Bush made his organizational model stick during 
the war, despite relentless military pressure, from the Navy in particular, 
to capture it.
Then, immediately after the war, he systematically dismantled his 
remarkable connected science creation.
Envisioning a period of world peace, convinced that the wartime levels 
of government science investment would be slashed, and probably wary 
of a permanent alliance between the military and science, Bush decided 
to try and salvage some residual level of federal science investment. He 
wrote the most influential polemic in U.S. science history, Science: The 
Endless Frontier, for Roosevelt, arguing that the federal government should 
fund basic research, which would deliver ongoing progress in economic 
well-being, national security and health to the country.13 In other words, 
he proposed ending his model of connected science, and dropping his 
challenge model, in favor of making the federal role one of funding one 
stage of technology advance: exploratory basic research. His approach 
would become known as the “pipeline” model for science investment. 
The federal government would dump basic science into one end of 
13  Bush, V. (1945). Science: The Endless Frontier. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1–11, https://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm.
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an innovation pipeline, and somehow early and late state technology 
development and prototyping would occur inside the pipeline, with 
new technology products emerging, genie-like, at the end. Because he 
assembled a connected science model during World War II, Bush no 
doubt realized the deep connection problems inherent in this pipeline 
model, but likely felt that salvaging federal basic research investment was 
the best he could achieve in a period of anticipated peace.
He did argue that this basic research approach should be organized 
and coordinated under “one tent” to direct all the nation’s research 
portfolios, proposing what would become the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). Because he wanted this entity controlled by a 
scientific elite separated from the nation’s political leadership, Bush got 
into a battle with Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman. In his typical, 
take-charge way, Truman insisted that the scientific buck would 
stop on his desk, not on some Brahmin scientist’s desk, and that NSF 
appointments would be controlled by the President. Bush disagreed.
Truman therefore vetoed Bush’s NSF legislation, stalling its creation 
for another five years.14 Meanwhile, science did not stand still. New 
agencies proliferated, and the outbreak of the Korean War led to a renewal 
of defense science efforts. By the time NSF was established and funded, 
its potential coordinating role had been bypassed. It also became a much 
smaller agency than Bush anticipated, only one among many. Despite 
Bush’s support for one tent where scientific disciplines and agencies 
could coordinate their work, as they did in World War II, the U.S. thus 
adopted a highly decentralized model for its science endeavor.15
Bush’s concept of federal funding focused on basic science did 
prevail, however, with most of the new science agencies adopting 
14  Blanpied, W. A. (1998). “Inventing U.S. Science Policy”, Physics Today 51/2: 34–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1063/1.882140 (an article examining the post-WWII evolution 
of U.S. science organization and NSF); Mazuzan, G. (1988). The National Science 
Foundation: A Brief History (1950–85). Arlington, VA: The National Science 
Foundation, 1–25, https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1994/nsf8816/nsf8816.txt (a 
history of NSF in the context of post-WWII science). 
15  It must be emphasized that there are major advantages to decentralized science. It 
creates a variety of pathways to science advance and a series of safety nets to ensure 
multiple routes can be explored. Since science success is largely unpredictable, the 
“science czar” approach risks major failures that a broad front of advance does 
not. Nonetheless, the U.S. largely lacks the ability to coordinate its science efforts 
across agencies particularly where advances that cut across disciplines require 
coordination and learning from networks.
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this model for the federal science role. These twin developments left 
U.S. science fragmented at the institutional level in two ways: overall 
science organization would be fragmented among numerous science 
agencies, and federal investment would be focused on only one stage of 
technological development: exploratory basic research.16 Remarkably, 
Bush left a legacy of two conflicting models for scientific organizational 
advance: the connected, challenge model of his World War II institutions, 
which he dismantled after the war,17 and the fundamental-science 
focused, disconnected, multi-headed model of post-war U.S. science 
institutional organization.
Summary of the Innovation Analytical Framework
To summarize the discussion thus far, innovation is not only about 
R&D investment levels, it’s about content and efficiency.18 U.S. 
post-war policy institutionally severed R from D, which had been 
connected in the wartime model, and posited a pipeline theory of 
innovation where the federal government dumped research funding 
into one end of the pipeline, then mysterious things occurred within 
the innovation pipeline, then remarkable products emerged at the 
other end. Neoclassical economics, through the work of Robert Solow, 
came to realize the central role of innovation in economic growth but 
was unable to apply existing economic models to the mystery inside 
the pipeline, and therefore treated innovation as “exogenous” to the 
economy. That response was ultimately unacceptable—it is as though 
16  See the discussion of these developments in Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur’s Quadrant, 
Basic Science and Technological Innovation. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press.
17  The term “dismantled” is used to indicate that the structure for science management 
in World War II was ended, and many wartime science entities were shut down, 
including MIT’s Rad Lab. Obviously, other existing science entities continued 
in operation, such as NACA, which Bush chaired before the war, and was an 
early example of a connected, challenge model approach. See Roland, R. (1985). 
Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915–1958. 
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 225–58 (chapter 10), https://history.
nasa.gov/SP-4103/. However, even within DOD, the Office of Naval Research was 
largely stood up after the war around a fundamental science model. Sapolsky, H. 
M. (1990). Science and the Navy—The History of the Office of Naval Research. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 9–81 (chapters 2–4).
18  Tassey, G. (2007). The Innovation Imperative. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 
(chapters 3, 7, 8).
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economics, after finally discovering the innovation monster in the 
economic growth room, then declined to look at it. A group of growth 
economists, initially led by Paul Romer, gradually began to whittle 
away at the monster, treating it as “endogenous”, slowly delineating 
its economic attributes. However, this delineation process still has 
barely begun.19 Economic institutions still collect extensive data on 
the two factors classical economics tied to economic growth—capital 
supply and labor supply, and data on R&D investment totals. We have 
little data on the monster, the content and efficiency of the innovation 
system.20 Few are searching for and analyzing the new factors and 
metrics for innovation evaluation. Interestingly, two decades after 
Solow won the Nobel Prize for identifying the innovation monster, 
the U.S. Department of Commerce has announced the need to begin 
an intensive data collection process around innovation.21 The National 
Science Foundation, which has long collected data on innovation 
investment levels and science education,22 has begun an effort to look 
at data and analysis around innovation with a program entitled the 
Science of Science and Innovation Policy.
But what is the framework for the innovation metrics and analysis? 
Although we track R&D investment, what about the composition 
and efficiency factors? This chapter attempts to identify some of the 
elements lurking inside the innovation pipeline. Following Solow and 
Romer, it argues, as noted, that R&D and talent (shorthand terms for 
19  For a critical view of the progress of endogenous growth theory in economics, see 
Solow, R. M. (2000). “Toward a Macroeconomics of the Medium Run”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14/1: 151–58.
20  Despite the emergence over two decades ago of growth economics and its doctrine 
that growth is predominantly innovation based, the two U.S. political parties are 
still largely organized around the old factors posited by classical economics as 
responsible for growth, capital supply and labor supply.
21  U.S. Department of Commerce. (2008). Innovation Measurement, Tracking the State 
of Innovation in the American Economy. Report to the Secretary of Commerce. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce, http://users.nber.org/~sewp/
SEWPdigestFeb08/InnovationMeasurement2001_08.pdf; Mandel, M. (2008). “A 
Better Way to Track the Economy, A Groundbreaking Commerce Dept. Report 
Could Lead to New Yardsticks for Measuring Growth”, Business Week, 28 January, 
p. 29.
22  National Science Board. (2006). Science and Engineering Indicators. Arlington, VA: The 
National Science Foundation, https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20160210153725/
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/ At the time this DARPA book was published, 
the latest version of Science and Engineering Indicators was from 2018: https://www.
nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/. 
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their extended ideas) can be considered two direct innovation factors, 
indispensable to innovation, and are surrounded by an ecosystem of 
indirect factors, less critical but nonetheless significant. This chapter 
further posits that there is a third direct innovation factor, innovation 
organization, the space where the talent and R&D converge. An 
essential aspect of innovation organization requires evaluation at 
the institutional level. Summarized above is the brilliant success the 
U.S. experienced at the institutional level during World War II with 
a connected science model built around technological challenges, 
formed under one organizational tent. 
The U.S., following the war, shifted to a highly decentralized model, 
scattering government-funded research among a series of mission 
agencies. It was predominantly a basic-science focused model, not 
connected science, and left what later became known as a “valley of 
death” between research and development stages. The handoff from 
publicly-funded research and to private sector development therefore 
lacked institutional bridging mechanisms. As we will see, the major 
exception to that U.S. institutional rule was DARPA.23
We turn now from a review of innovation at the institutional level to 
a second analytical perspective on innovation organization, innovation 
at the personal, face-to-face level. Following this review, we will 
examine how these twin perspectives on innovation organization have 
operated within an arguably critical U.S. innovation organization, 
DARPA, evaluating how it has worked at both levels, institutional and 
personal.
23  This is not to assert that the fundamental science mission agencies dating from 
the 1940’s have remained frozen in time. While the basic science mission remains 
paramount at agencies such as NSF, NIH and the DOE Office of Science, at the 
National Science Foundation, for example, there is funding not only for small 
individual investigator basic research but larger areas of interdisciplinary 
advance, such as nanotechnology, which can incorporate grand challenges. For 
example, NSF’s issue workshops and similar organizing mechanisms bring in 
ideas for coordinated science-engineering advance for initial buy-in and research 
program design by fundamental and applied communities. As another example, 
NSF’s engineering directorate supports engineering centers tying science 
advance to fundamental engineering advance. Somewhat similar efforts around 
interdisciplinary centers have evolved at NIH and DOE. The point remains that 
these functions supplement established fundamental science efforts.
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Innovation Systems at the Personal Level:  
Great Groups
Innovation organization should be analyzed at the institutional level, 
as discussed above. However, it also requires understanding at the 
ground level, from the personal, face-to-face point of view. Innovation 
is different from scientific discovery and invention, which can involve 
solo operators. Instead, innovation requires taking both scientific 
discovery and invention and piling applications on a breakthrough 
invention or group of inventions to create disruptive productivity gains 
that transform significant segments of an economy and/or defense 
system. So, innovation is a third phase built on phases of discovery and 
invention. Innovation requires not only a process of creating connected 
science at the institutional level, it also must operate at the personal level. 
People are innovators, not simply the overall institutions where talent 
and R&D come together. Warren Bennis and Patricia Biederman have 
argued that innovation, because it is much more complex than the 
earlier stages of discovery and invention, requires “great groups”, not 
simply individuals.24 Robert W. Rycroft and Don E. Kash make a similar 
argument but use a different term: innovation requires collaborative 
networks25 which can be less face-to-face and more virtual. As we look 
at innovation organization at the personal level, we will explore the rule 
sets for three sample “great groups” of innovators.
Edison’s “Invention Factory” at Menlo Park, New Jersey
Thomas Edison formed the prototype for innovator great groups.26 
Edison placed his famous Menlo Park laboratory in a simple 100-foot 
long wooden frame building, a lab, on his New Jersey farm. In it he 
placed a team of a dozen or so artisans, mixing a wide range of skills 
with a few trained scientists. They worked intensely, sometimes 24/7, 
and took midnight breaks together, eating pies, reciting poems and 
24  Bennis, W. and Biederman, P. W. (1997). Organizing Genius: The Secrets of Creative 
Collaboration. New York, NY: Basic Books.
25  Rycroft, R. W., and Kash, D. E. (1999). “Innovation Policy for Complex Technologies”, 
Issues in Science and Technology 16/1, https://issues.org/byline/robert-w-rycroft/
26  See discussion in Evans, H. (2005). They Made America. Sloan Foundation Project. 
New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 152–71.
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singing songs. They mixed a range of disciplines and organized their 
intense effort around the challenge of electric light. They were a great 
group, highly collaborative. Great groups also require collaboration 
leaders, and Edison was a remarkable team leader. They worked on the 
idea of filling the gap between electric poles with a filament placed in 
a vacuum tube. But that was only the breakthrough invention, not the 
innovation. To make their light usable, Edison and his team then had 
to invent much of the infrastructure for electricity—from generators 
to wiring to fire safety to the structure of a supporting electric utility 
industry. Edison and his team become inventors and innovators, 
visionaries and (as initiators of a network of companies with Wall Street 
backing) vision enablers.
Interestingly, as part of this process, Edison had to derive elements 
of electron theory to explain his results—his “Edison Effect” helped lead 
to atomic physics advances. There is a major lesson in this: science is 
not simply a linear pipeline going from basic to applied. Rather, it goes 
both ways: basic to applied and applied to basic. Menlo Park teaches us 
parts of the rule set for great groups. It is organized around a challenge 
model, with the group trying to solve a specific challenge or goal; it 
applies an interdisciplinary mix of both practical and basic science to 
get there; and it uses a connected science model, tying invention to 
innovation and incorporating all stages of innovation advance. While 
the group is under Edison’s clear leadership—and that leadership 
factor is vital—it is nonetheless a non-hierarchical, relatively flat, two-
level, highly collaborative effort. The team mixes experimentalists and 
theorists, artisans and trained scientists and engineers, for a blend of 
experimental and theoretical capability and disciplines.
Alfred Loomis and the Rad Lab at MIT, 1940–1945
Alfred Loomis loved science but family needs compelled him to 
become lawyer; he combined his science and legal skills to become a 
leading Wall Street financier for the emerging electric utility industry 
in the 1920’s.27 Anticipating the market crash, he sold out in 1928 with 
his great fortune intact. He used it to pursue science, setting up his 
own private lab at his Tuxedo Park, New York estate in the 1930’s and 
27  Details from Loomis’ biography, Conant. (2002). Tuxedo Park.
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assembling there a who’s who of pre-war physics. Loomis’ own field of 
study there was microwave physics. As World War II loomed, Vannevar 
Bush, respecting Loomis’ industrial organizing skills, asked him to join 
Roosevelt’s NDRC to mobilize science for the war.
Because the American military was initially uninterested, the British 
handed over to Loomis a suitcase with their secrets to microwave radar 
in his penthouse in the Shoreham Hotel in Washington in 1940. As the 
Battle of Britain raged, Loomis’ microwave expertise enabled him to grasp 
immediately that this was a war winning technology for air warfare. He 
promptly persuaded his cousin and mentor, Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson, that this technology must be developed and exploited without 
delay. With Bush’s and Roosevelt’s immediate approval, Loomis within 
two weeks established the Radiation Laboratory (Rad Lab) at MIT. 
Because he knew them from his Tuxedo Park lab, Loomis and his ally 
and friend Ernest Lawrence of Berkeley called in the whole talent base 
of U.S. physics to join the Rad Lab, and nearly all came. Because the 
government was not used to establishing major labs literally overnight, 
Loomis personally funded the startup while government approvals and 
procurement caught up.
The Rad Lab was non-hierarchical and flat, with only two levels, 
project managers and project teams, each devoted to a particular 
technology path. It was characterized by intense work, often around the 
clock, and by high spirits and morale. Loomis and Bush purposely kept 
it out of the military. The Rad Lab used a talent base with a mix of science 
disciplines and technology skills. It was highly collaborative, it was 
organized around the challenge model, and it used connected science, 
moving from fundamental breakthrough to development, prototyping 
and initial production. Interestingly, the Rad Lab organizational model 
was systematically adopted at Los Alamos, and ten leading Rad Lab 
scientists shifted to Los Alamos to implement it.28 The Rad lab developed 
great advances in microwave radar and the proximity fuse, technologies 
vital to success for the allies. Eight Nobel prizewinners came out of the 
Rad Lab and it ended up laying the foundations for important parts of 
modern electronics. It also embodied another feature key to successful 
28  See discussion of Los Alamos in Sherwin, M., and Bird, K. (2005). American 
Prometheus, The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer. New York, NY: Alfred 
A. Knopf; and Conant, J. (2005). 109 East Palace. New York, NY: Simon & Shuster.
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great groups—through Loomis and Bush, the Rad Lab had direct access 
to the top decision-makers able to mandate the execution and adaptation 
of its findings, Stimson and Roosevelt.
The Transistor Team at Bell Labs (1947)
Bell Labs’ Murray Hill facility was consciously set in the New Jersey 
countryside after Edison’s Menlo Park model and also drew from 
the great military labs of World War II, the Rad Lab and Los Alamos. 
AT&T’s R&D Vice President, Mervin Kelly, and his lead researcher, 
William Shockley, wanted a solid-state physics team of fifty scientists 
and technicians from various fields with capability for fundamental 
research leading to practical applications. Their task was to develop a 
solid-state physics-based replacement for vacuum tubes so that AT&T’s 
switching capability could continue to advance telephone speed and 
capacity. John Bardeen and Walter Brattain, two of the leading solid-state 
physics researchers who joined this team, developed a profoundly close 
collaboration, where the scientific and personal skills of one matched 
the other’s—one a theorist, the other an experimentalist, one outgoing, 
the other reflective. They were social friends and held a strong mutual 
respect. Backed-up by Bell Labs’ deep industrial technical support 
system, with the latest equipment and very strong technical staff, the 
two entered into a “magic month” from mid-November to 16 December 
1947, and developed the first transistor.
As Bardeen’s biographers put it, “The solid-state group divided up 
the tasks: Brattain studied surface properties such as contact potential; 
Pearson looked at bulk properties such as the mobility of holes and 
electrons; and Gibney contributed his knowledge of the physical 
chemistry of surfaces. Bardeen and Shockley followed the work of 
all members, offering suggestions and conceptualizing the work”.29 
Brattain later commented, “It was probably one of the greatest research 
teams ever pulled together on a problem… I cannot overemphasize the 
rapport of this group. We would meet together to discuss important 
29  Huddleson, L., and Daitch, V. (2002). True Genius—The Life and Science of John 
Bardeen. Washington, DC: Joseph Henry Press of the National Academies of 
Sciences, 127–28.
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steps almost on the spur of the moment of an afternoon. We would 
discuss things freely. I think many of us had ideas in these discussion 
groups, one person’s remarks suggesting an idea to another. We went 
to the heart of many things during the existence of this group, and 
always when we got to the place where something needed to be done, 
experimental or theoretical, there was never any question as to who was 
the appropriate man in the group to do it”.30
Unfortunately, Shockley’s reaction wrecked further working 
collaboration in the group. He attempted to garner credit for Bardeen’s 
and Brattain’s work, then worked secretly at his home designing a further 
break-through improvement, where a semiconductor “sandwich” 
replaced the transistor’s electrical contact point, without telling the rest 
of the group. Before distrust descended, however, the group followed 
many of the rules of the other groups cited above—it was highly talented, 
relatively non-hierarchical, organizationally flat with essentially two 
levels, highly collaborative, and brought to bear a range of expertise 
and disciplines, including theorists and experimentalists, with each 
participant working in his strongest skill area. It was organized on 
a challenge model and the connection to AT&T’s VP Mervin Kelly 
assured a tie to a decisionmaker who could enable development of 
breakthroughs. The group traded ideas on a continuous basis, meeting 
frequently with each providing thoughts to assist the others’ progress, 
and Bardeen and Shockley played a leadership role by continually 
moving conceptual ideas among the group.
Many of the organizational features of these three “great groups” are 
common to others, including the development of atomic weapons at Los 
Alamos, the integrated circuit and microchip at Fairchild Semiconductor 
and Intel, the aeronautics and stealth advances at Lockheed’s Skunk 
Works, the personal computer at Xerox PARC and Apple, biotech at 
Genentech and J. Craig Venter’s genomics projects.31 These projects are 
not unique. 
30  Ibid.
31  Sherwin and Bird. (2005). American Prometheus, 205–28, 255–59, 268–85, 293–97; 
Conant. (2005). 109 East Palace, 106, 108, 110, 255; Berlin, L. (2005). The Man Behind the 
Microchip, Robert Noyce and the Invention of Silicon Valley. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (chapters 3–8); Rich, B, and Janos, L. (1994). Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir 
of My Years of Lockheed. Boston: Little, Brown & Company; Evans. (2005). They 
Made America, 420–31 (on Boyer and Swanson founding Genetech and starting 
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A venture capitalist has commented that he looks for these same 
kinds of characteristics every time he funds a startup. To summarize, 
a common rule set seems to characterize successful innovation at the 
personal and face-to-face level. The rules include ensuring: a highly-
collaborative team or group of great talent; a non-hierarchical, flat and 
democratic structure where all can contribute; a cross-disciplinary talent 
mix, including experimental and theoretical skills sets networked to the 
best thinking in relevant areas; organization around a challenge model; 
using a connected science model able to move breakthroughs across 
fundamental, applied, development and prototype stages; cooperative, 
collaborative leaders able to promote intense, high morale; and direct 
access to top decisionmakers able to implement the group’s findings.32
DARPA as a Unique Model—Combining Institutional 
Connectedness and Great Groups
We have discussed the concept of innovation organization as a third 
direct innovation factor, and noted that it operates in macro and micro 
ways, at both the institutional level and the personal level. Our focus 
now shifts to the Defense Department’s Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency. Created in 1958 by Eisenhower as a unifying force 
for defense R&D in light of the stove-piped military services’ space 
programs that had helped lead to America’s Sputnik failure, DARPA 
became a unique entity. In many ways, DARPA directly inherited the 
connected science, challenge and great group organization models of the 
Rad Lab and Los Alamos stood up by Bush, Loomis and Oppenheimer. 
However, unlike the personal-level models discussed above, DARPA 
has operated at both the institutional and personal levels. DARPA 
became a bridge organization connecting these two institutional and 
personal organizational elements, unlike any other R&D entity stood 
up in government.
biotech); Bennis and Biederman. (1997). Organizing Genius, 63–86 (on Xerox PARC 
and Apple); Morrow, D. S. (2003). “Dr Craig Venter: Oral History”, Computerworld 
Honors Program, 3–53, 56–58; Venter, J. C. (2007). A Life Decoded: My Genome, My Life. 
New York, NY: Viking Press (chapter 12). 
32  For discussion of additional great groups and variations in this suggested rule set, 
see Bennis and Biederman. (1997). Organizing Genius.
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J. C. R. Licklider and the Beginnings of the DARPA Model
The DARPA model is perhaps best illustrated by one of its most 
successful practitioners, J. C. R. Licklider, who, as an office director at 
DARPA working with and founding a series of great technology teams, 
laid the foundations for two of the twentieth century’s technology 
revolutions, personal computing and the Internet.33 In 1960, Licklider, 
trained in psychology with a background in physics and mathematics, 
wrote about what he called the “Man-Machine Interface” and “Human-
Computer Symbiosis”: “The hope is that in not too many years, human 
brains and computing machines will be coupled together very tightly, 
and that the resulting partnership will think as no human brain has ever 
thought”.34 By 1960, Licklider envisioned timesharing as a path to real 
time personal computing (as opposed to the then-dominant main-frame 
computing), digital libraries, the Internet (the “Intergalactic Computer 
Network”), what we now call the World Wide Web, and most of the 
features—like computer graphing, simulations and modeling—that 
we are still evolving to implement those revolutions. Licklider was 
hired by DARPA35 to work on what was being called the “command 
and control” problem, and then that problem took off in importance. 
This was because John F. Kennedy and Robert McNamara had 
become deeply frustrated with a profound command and control 
problem, namely, their inability to obtain and analyze real time data 
and interact with on-scene military commanders during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. DARPA gave Licklider the major resources to tackle 
this problem. It was the rare case of the visionary being placed in the 
33  Discussion in this section drawn from Licklider’s biography by Waldrop, M. M 
(2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing 
Personal. New York, NY: Viking Press. For discussions of DARPA’s and DOD’s 
central role in fostering the many phases of the IT revolution, see, Ruttan. (2006). 
Is War Necessary, 91–129; Fong, G. R. (2001). “ARPA Does Windows; the Defense 
Underpinning of the PC Revolution”, Business and Politics 3/3: 213–37, https://doi.
org/10.2202/1469-3569.1025 (Chapter 6 in this volume); National Research Council, 
Science and Telecommunications Board. (1999). Funding a Revolution, Government 
Support for Computing Research. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 85–187, 
https://doi.org/10.17226/6323
34  Licklider, J. C. R. (1960). “Man-Computer Symbiosis”, IRE Transactions on Human 
Factors in Electronics 1: 4–11, https://doi.org/10.1109/thfe2.1960.4503259
35  DARPA Director Jack Ruina later concluded that hiring Licklider was his most 
significant act at DARPA. In seeking an office director, Ruina realized he had found 
a visionary. See Waldrop. (2001). The Dream Machine.
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position of vision-enabler. Strongly backed by noted early DARPA 
Directors Jack Ruina and Charles Herzfeld, Licklider found, selected, 
funded, organized and stood up a remarkable support network of 
early information technology researchers at universities and firms that 
over time built personal computing and the Internet. He served at two 
different periods in DARPA.
At the institutional organization level, DARPA and Licklider became 
a collaborative force among the Defense Department’s research agencies 
controlled by the services, using DARPA IT investments to leverage 
participation by the agencies to solve common problems under connected 
science and challenge models. DARPA and Licklider also kept their own 
research bureaucracy to a bare-bones minimum, using the service R&D 
agencies to carry out project management and administrative tasks, 
so that DARPA’s efforts created co-ownership with the service R&D 
stovepipes. Institutionally, although it certainly did not always succeed, 
DARPA attempted to become a research supporter and collaborator, not 
a rival competitor to the DOD service research establishment.36
At the personal level of innovation organization, Licklider created a 
remarkable base of information technology talent both within DARPA 
and in a collaborative network of great research groups around 
the country. This team of apostles, including Doug Engelbart, Ivan 
Sutherland, Robert Taylor, Larry Roberts, Vint Cerf, Robert Kahn, and 
their many comrades, are a who’s who of personal computing and 
internet history. Because of ongoing progress, DARPA was willing to 
be patient and able to look at the long term in these IT talent and R&D 
investments in a way that corporations and venture capital firms are 
not structured to undertake.37 Licklider’s DARPA model was also not 
36  The military service R&D organizations initially saw DARPA as a usurper and 
competitor for scarce research funds. DARPA’s efforts over the decades to link 
with the service R&D organizations and become their collaborator and banker for 
advanced projects they might not otherwise obtain approval for has helped defuse 
service hostility, and frequently the collaboration has been highly mutual and 
beneficial. But resentment remains of DARPA as a favored child, even after a half 
century. Licklider’s efforts mark an early success at cross-stovepipe collaboration, 
although such success is not uniform.
37  Licklider, as DARPA’s IPTO head, received strong backing from DARPA Directors 
Jack Ruina and Charles Herzfeld, who bet on his vision, which enabled Licklider to 
build a cadre of successors—Ivan Sutherland, Bob Taylor and Larry Roberts—who 
shared and enhanced his vision for a coherent program with ongoing technical 
process steps that led to the Internet and personal computing and a network of 
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a flash in the pan—internally it was able to institutionalize innovation 
so that successive generations of talent sustained and kept renewing 
the technology revolution over the long term. At the personal level 
of innovation, the great groups Licklider started, in turn, shared key 
features of the Menlo Park, Rad Lab and other groups previously 
discussed. Licklider’s Information Processing Techniques group was 
the first and greatest success of the DARPA model, but this success was 
not unique; DARPA was able to achieve similar accomplishments in a 
series of other technology areas.38
There is one further key point to consider: DARPA has been willing 
to spawn technology advances not only in the defense sector but also 
in the non-defense economy, recognizing that an economy-wide scale 
as opposed to a defense sector-only scale may be needed to speed the 
advance. DARPA has made specific choices to encourage and support 
technology advances with non-defense organizations, both academic 
and commercial, rather than defense-only organizations, as its best 
means of gestating new concepts into implementation.39 This enables 
the Department of Defense (DOD) at a later stage to take advantage 
of this technology evolution speed up, with corresponding shared and 
therefore reduced development and acquisition costs. This was exactly 
related advances. There was no special management doctrine at DARPA that enabled 
this successive effort but it was allowed by DARPA leaders to proceed full throttle 
for a decade, until scrutinized somewhat by DARPA Director George Heilmeier. 
Fluent with practical electronics, he imbedded the “Heilmeier Catechism” which 
insisted on more application relevance, to Licklider’s frustration during his second 
DARPA tour. See Waldrop. (2001). The Dream Machine.
38  Van Atta, R., Deitchman, S., and Reed, S., (1990–1991). DARPA Technical 
Accomplishments. 3 Volumes. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses. See, 
also, Van Atta, R. (2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 50 
Years of Bridging the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. Kalhikina, 
and M. J. Tully. Arlington, VA: DARPA. 20–29, https://issuu.com/faircountmedia/
docs/darpa50 (Chapter 2 in this volume). Dr. Van Atta has been generous to the 
author with his insights on DARPA, which are reflected at a number of points in 
this chapter. 
39  Licklider and his colleagues largely relied on universities for idea—creation and the 
subsequent spin-out of these ideas into new commercial firms (such as Digital or 
Sun) for their application. While existing smaller commercial firms, such as BB&N, 
which stood up the Internet for DARPA, also played a role, the larger commercial 
firms, defense contractors and defense R&D organizations were usually not 
the source of new concepts or their implementation. DARPA thus played a 
vital role in creating the highly productive pathway in the U.S.’s late twentieth-
century IT economy of academic research, start-up companies, venture funding, 
commercialization, and the institutions that grew up to line this pathway.
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the case with the IT revolution that Licklider and DARPA made crucial 
contributions to. Although IT has been in a thirty-year development 
process which is still ongoing, DARPA’s support for and reliance on a 
primarily civilian sector development process enabled DOD to obtain 
much more quickly and cheaply the tools it needed to solve its initial 
command and control problem.
Actually, DOD got many more benefits than just these tools for 
command and control. When Andy Marshall, DOD’s legendary in-house 
defense theorist and head of its Office of Net Assessment, argued in the 
late 1980’s that that U.S. forces were creating a “Revolution in Military 
Affairs”,40 this defense transformation was built around many of the 
IT breakthroughs DARPA initially sponsored.41 Admirals Bill Owens 
and Art Cebrowski, and others, in turn, translated this IT revolution 
into a working concept of “network centric warfare”42 which further 
40  Marshall, A. W. (1993). “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions—Second Version”, 
DOD Office of Net Assessment, Memorandum for the Record, 23 August; Lehman, 
N. (2001). “Dreaming about War”, The New Yorker, 16 July, http://www.comw.org/
qdr/0107lemann.html
41  William Perry and Harold Brown, Defense Department leaders during the Carter 
Administration, for example, developed what Perry later called an “offsets” theory 
of defense technology. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union held a roughly three 
to one advantage in numbers of troops, tanks, and aircraft. Perry has argued that 
the U.S. at first accepted that disparity because it held an advantage in nuclear 
weapons. When the Soviets achieved rough parity in nuclear weapons and the 
missiles to deliver them, U.S. deterrence theory was at risk, so Brown and Perry 
decided to achieve parity in conventional battle through systematic technological 
advance. They began a process of translating advances in computing, information 
technology, and sensors, which had been initiated and long-supported by defense 
research investments, including DARPA’s in particular, into precision weapons at 
the service level. First exhibited in the Gulf War, these became a massive “force 
multiplier” for U.S. conventional forces. See, generally Van Atta, R., Lippitz, M., et 
al. (2003). Transformation and Transition, DARPA’s Role in Fostering a Revolution in 
Military Affairs. Volume 1. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, https://
doi.org/10.21236/ada422835, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/idarma.pdf, which 
discusses fifteen years of DARPA research in areas such as stealth and precision 
strike that in turn enabled the implementation in the 1990’s of the offsets theory of 
Brown and Perry.
42  Owens, W., with Offley, E. (2000). Lifting the Fog of War. New York, NY: Farrar, 
Straus & Giroux (chapter 3); Alberts, D., Garska, J., and Stein, F. (1999). Network 
Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Technology. Washington, DC: 
CCRP Publication Series, Department of Defense, http://www.dodccrp.org/files/
Alberts_NCW.pdf; Cebrowski, A., and Garska, J. (1998). “Network Centric Warfare: 
Its Origin and Future”, US Naval Institute Proceedings, January. See, generally, 
Hundley, R. O. (1999). Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History 
of Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us About Transforming the U.S. Military. Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand.
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enabled the U.S. in the past decade to achieve unparalleled dominance 
in conventional warfare. And the foundation of this IT revolution, 
enabling this defense transformation, was a great innovation wave 
that swept into the U.S. economy in the 1990’s, creating strong 
productivity gains and new business models that led to new societal 
wealth creation43 which, in turn, provided the funding base for the 
defense transformation. To summarize, the DARPA model can support 
traditional technology development within the defense sector where 
that technology is primarily or overwhelmingly defense-relevant 
(like stealth). Alternatively, it can support joint defense-civilian sector 
technology development where the technology is relevant to both. This 
enables DOD potentially to take major advantage of academia’s openness 
to new ideas, the willingness of entrepreneurs to commercialize these 
innovations, and the corresponding scale of an economy-wide advance. 
Elements of the DARPA Model
At the Institutional level, DARPA undertakes connected science, rather 
than simply fundamental research. Its model focuses on revolutionary 
technology development, not simply incremental advance,44 moving 
a technology from fundamental science connected through the 
development up to prototyping stages, then encouraging and promoting 
its concepts with partners who move it into service procurement and/
or the civilian sector for initial production, enabling full innovation not 
simply invention.
43  See for example, Jorgenson, D. (2001). “U.S. Economic Growth in the Information 
Age”, Issues in Science and Technology 18/1: 42–50, http://www.issues.org/18.1/
jorgenson.html (on the role of IT drivers in growth in the 1990s).
44  Looked at in another way, DARPA historically has had two significant roles, 
breakthrough military applications and systems, such as stealth or precision 
strike, and broad generic emerging technologies, such as information processing, 
microsystems or advanced materials. Both roles interrelate and both have 
transformational effects. See Van Atta, R. (2005). Energy and Climate Change Research 
and the DARPA Model. Presentation at the Washington Roundtable on Science and 
Public Policy, November. DARPA has also developed concept prototypes and 
demonstrations to meet established military needs which have not yet been defined 
as military requirements, aside from its breakthrough technology role. Van Atta, R. 
(2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 50 Years of Bridging 
the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. Kalhikina, and M. J. Tully. 
Arlington, VA: DARPA. 20–29, https://issuu.com/faircountmedia/docs/darpa50 
(Chapter 2 in this volume).
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There are other ways DARPA assures connectedness, as suggested 
above. DARPA developed the ability to make technology development 
connections across the DOD R&D stove-pipes by using its funding to 
leverage contributions from other DOD military service technology 
development organizations, which in turn promotes service adaptation 
and procurement of its prototypes. DARPA also uses the other DOD 
R&D agencies as its administrative agents which, on those days when 
these stars get aligned, likewise promotes cross-institution collaboration 
and follow-on procurement.
Other DARPA characteristics enhance its ability to operate at both 
the Institutional and personal innovation organization levels. The 
following list, which we will call the twelve commandments, is largely 
drawn from DARPA’s own descriptions of its organizing elements:45
1) Small and flexible: DARPA consists of only 100–150 
professionals; one unknown commentator described DARPA 
as “100 geniuses connected by a travel agent”.
2) Flat organization: DARPA avoids military hierarchy, essentially 
operating at only two levels to ensure participation.
3) Autonomy and freedom from bureaucratic impediments: DARPA 
operates outside the civil-service hiring process and standard 
government contracting rules, which gives it unusual access 
to talent, plus speed and flexibility in organizing R&D efforts. 
Stated technically, DARPA has “IPA” hiring authoring 
authority, which gives it the ability to take personnel employed 
by industry or universities, and it invented “other transactions 
authority” in contracting which gives it great flexibility and 
speed in contracting outside the normally lengthy federal 
procurement process.
4) Eclectic, world-class technical staff: DARPA seeks great 
talent, drawn from industry, universities, and government 
laboratories and R&D centers, mixing disciplines and 
theoretical and experimental strengths. This talent has been 
hybridized through joint corporate-academic collaborations.
45  DARPA. (2008). DARPA—Bridging the Gap, Powered by Ideas. Arlington, VA: Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Loca-
tion=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA433949; DARPA. (2003). DARPA Over the 
Years. Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
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5) Teams and networks: At its very best, DARPA creates and 
sustains great teams of researchers that are networked to 
collaborate and share in the team’s advances, so that DARPA 
operates at the personal, face-to-face level of innovation. It 
isn’t simply about funding research; its program managers are 
dynamic playwrights and directors.
6) Hiring continuity and change: DARPA’s technical staff are 
hired or assigned for three- to five-years. Like any strong 
organization, DARPA mixes experience and change. It retains 
a base of experienced experts that know their way around 
DOD, but rotates most of its staff from the outside to ensure 
fresh thinking and perspectives.
7) Project-based assignments, organized around a challenge model: 
DARPA organizes a significant part of its portfolio around 
specific technology challenges. It works “right-to-left” in the 
R&D pipeline, foreseeing new innovation-based capabilities 
and then working back to the fundamental break-throughs 
that take them there. Although its projects typically last three 
to five years, major technological challenges may be addressed 
over much longer time periods, ensuring patient long-term 
investment on a series of focused steps and keeping teams 
together for ongoing collaboration.
8) Outsourced support personnel: DARPA uses technical, 
contracting and administrative services from other agencies 
on a temporary basis. This provides DARPA the flexibility to 
get into and out of a technology field area without the burden 
of sustaining staff, while building cooperative alliances with 
the line agencies it works with.
9) Outstanding program managers: In DARPA’s words, “The best 
DARPA program managers have always been freewheeling 
zealots in pursuit of their goals”. The DARPA director’s most 
important job historically has been to recruit highly talented 
program managers and then empower their creativity to put 
together great teams around great advances. In particularly 
fruitful areas, DARPA has created a succession of project 
 1014. The Connected Science Model for Innovation
leaders that share and build a common vision for progress 
over time, as in the case of Licklider and his successors.
10) Acceptance of failure: At its best, DARPA pursues a high-risk 
model for breakthrough opportunities and is very tolerant of 
failure if the payoff from potential success is great enough.
11) Orientation to revolutionary breakthroughs in a connected approach: 
DARPA historically has focused not on incremental but radical 
innovation. It emphasizes high-risk investment, moves from 
fundamental technological advances to development, and 
then encourages the prototyping and production stages in the 
armed services or the commercial sector. From an institutional 
innovation perspective, DARPA is a connected model, crossing 
the barriers between innovation stages.
12) Mix of connected collaborators: DARPA typically builds strong 
teams and networks of collaborators, bringing in a range of 
technical expertise and applicable disciplines and involving 
university researchers and technology firms that are often 
new and small and not significant defense contractors (which 
generally do not focus on radical innovation).46 The aim of 
DARPA’s “hybrid” approach, unique among American R&D 
agencies, is to ensure strong collaborative “mindshare” on the 
challenge and the capability to connect fundamentals with 
applications.
These DARPA “twelve commandments” provide important R&D 
organizing lessons for any innovation entity, whether in the private or 
public sectors.
DARPA Today—The Future of the Model
Economic innovation sectors are best described as ecosystems. Marco 
Iansati and Roy Levien have argued that within these systems frequently 
46  There are, of course, exceptions to this, particularly in projects involving systems 
engineering. Stealth, stand-off precision weapons, and night vision were projects 
contracted to major defense contractors. Lockheed’s Skunk Works has long worked 
with DARPA as well as the Air Force, and represents a radical innovation model 
operated within a more standard defense firm.
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are keystone firms that, like critical species, take on the task of sustaining 
the whole ecosystem by connecting participants and promoting the 
progress of the whole system.47 Iansati and Levien have also argued 
that these innovation systems start to decline or shift elsewhere when 
the keystone firms cease being thought of as leaders and instead shift 
to what they call “landlord” status. In this state, the “landlord” firm 
shifts to simply extracting value from the existing system rather than 
continuously attempting to renew and build the system. There have 
been concerns voiced in recent years and considered below, that DARPA 
could be moving away from its keystone role, particularly in IT.
Questions about the DARPA Role
DARPA since September 2001 has been increasingly focused on 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorism 
requiring different approaches from the symmetric nation state conflict 
technologies it evolved in the past. While DARPA had been concerned 
with asymmetric conflicts at least since the demise of the Soviet Union, 
many noted that the two wars created a significant shift in emphasis 
at DARPA toward shorter-term military issues and away from some 
longer-term technology support areas. Concerns about a change in 
DARPA’s role in IT areas, where it has played a keystone role, came 
up in a series of forums: in a 2005 House Science Committee hearing 
reviewing DARPA’s continuing role in its computer science mission, 
in a discussion in a Defense Science Board report over its shifting role 
in microprocessors, in concerns over DARPA’s role from PITAC (the 
President’s Information Technology Advisory Council, which was 
subsequently disbanded by the White House) in IT and cybersecurity, 
and in papers from a number of IT sector R&D leaders.48 DARPA has 
47  Iansati, M., and Levien, R. (2004). The Keystone Advantage: What the New Dynamics 
of Business Ecosystems Mean for Strategy, Innovation, and Sustainability. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
48  U.S. Congress. (2005). House Science Committee Hearing on the Future of Computer 
Science Research in the U.S., 12 May 2005 (Testimony by Wm. A. Wulf, Pres., 
National Academy of Engineering, Prof. Thomas F. Leighton, Chief Scientist 
Akamai Tech. Inc., Joint Statement of the Computing Research Community, and 
Letters in Response to Committee Questions from W. Wulf and T. Leighton), July, 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy20999.000/hsy20999_0.htm; 
Lazowska, E. D., and Patterson, D. (2005). “An Endless Frontier Postponed”, Science 
308: 757, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1113963; Markoff, M. (2005). “Clouds Over 
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long been famed as the most successful U.S. R&D agency, so these 
concerns appear worth weighing.
Let’s review some of the questions raised about DARPA’s future role. 
Most involve arguments that DARPA has been shifting out of the IT 
field it played an historic role in creating, even though this technology 
revolution is still in its youth—after all, we are still not even close to 
artificial intelligence. DOD’s Defense Science Board (DSB) of leading 
defense technologists issued a report that recognized the critical gains 
DOD achieved from DARPA’s historic role supporting university and 
industry-led R&D in microprocessor advances. But it concluded that 
DOD and DARPA were “no longer seriously involved in…research 
to enable the embedded processing proficiency on which its strategic 
advantage depends”.49 Since DOD’s strategic superiority in symmetric 
and potentially asymmetric warfare has become in significant part its 
network-centric capability, and secure semiconductor microprocessors 
are the base technology for this capability, DSB found that DOD faces 
a serious strategic problem as the newest generation of semiconductor 
production facilities is increasingly shifting to China and other Asian 
nations. In fact, the U.S. share of the world’s leading-edge semiconductor 
manufacturing capacity dropped from 36 percent to 11 percent in the 
past seven years.50 This problem may be compounded if semiconductor 
design and research, which historically have had to be collocated with 
production facilities, shift abroad as well. DARPA’s departure from its 
systematic support of U.S. technology leadership in this field appears to 
present a serious defense issue if other parts of the Department do not 
absorb some of this function. DARPA’s view in recent years has been 
that semiconductor advance should be led by industry, increasingly 
dominated in the U.S. by mature, large-scale firms that DARPA’s 
‘Blue Sky’ Research Agency”, New York Times, 4 May, p. 12. President’s Information 
Technology Advisory Committee (2005). Cybersecurity: A Crisis of Prioritization, 
Report to the President, February; Defense Science Board. (2005). High Performance 
Microchip Supply. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 87–88, https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=454591. Compare DARPA’s responses, in U.S. Congress 
(2005). House Science Committee. (DARPA Testimony with Appendices A-D). NB: 
the issues raised about DARPA in this section of the chapter concern policies in the 
George W. Bush Administration; subsequent DARPA leaders attempted to move 
DARPA back to more of its historic program manager-led model.
49  Defense Science Board. (2005). High Performance Microchip Supply.
50  Augustine, N. (2007). Is America Falling Off the Flat Earth? Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press, 17.
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leaders feel should manage their own problems. But if industry 
increasingly is being forced to shift abroad because of cost pressure 
from massive industrial subsidies available there,51 DOD has a long-
term problem with what still appears to be a foundation technology. It 
is serious enough that a 2005 Defense authorization bill directed DOD 
to implement DSB’s proposals to try to control the problem and retain 
U.S. technology leadership in this area.52 A DARPA chip strategy, some 
would argue, should be to try to secure leadership in a post-silicon, 
post-Moore’s Law world in bio-nano-quantum-molecular computing; 
DARPA would respond that it is working in a number of those fields. 
Others would dispute whether it is doing enough to nurture leadership 
in these emerging areas.
Status of the Hybrid Model
More broadly, DSB notes that one of DARPA’s critical roles was to 
fund through its applied research portfolio (known in DOD as “6.2”) 
“hybridized” university and industry efforts through a process that 
envisioned revolutionary new capabilities, identified barriers to their 
realization, focused the best minds in the field on new approaches to 
overcome those barriers, and fostered rapid commercialization and DOD 
adoption. The hybrid approach bridged the gaps between academic 
research and industry development, keeping each side knowledgeable 
about DOD’s needs, with each acting a practical prod to spur on the 
other. DSB expressed concern that this fundamental DARPA approach 
was breaking down as it cut back its 6.2 university computer science 
investments, and shifted more of its portfolio to classified “black” 
research, under pressure from the ongoing war, which cannot include 
51  Howell, T. (2003). “Competing Programs: Government Support for Microelectronics”, 
in Securing the Future—Regional and National Programs to Support the Semiconductor 
Industry, ed. C. W. Wessner. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 
https://doi.org/10.17226/10677; Howell, T., et al. (2003), https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/10677/securing-the-future-regional-and-national-programs-to-support-the. 
China’s Emerging Semiconductor Industry. San Jose, CA: Semiconductor Industry 
Association.
52  Defense Auth. Act for 2005, H.R. 1815 (Sen. Amend. 1361). DOD has established a 
“trusted foundry” program, initiated in cooperation with IBM, to try to protect its 
own access to a stable supply of secure semiconductor chips, a particular concern 
of intelligence agencies, but this does not assure it long term access to technology 
leadership in what many continue to argue remains a critical technology.
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most universities and non-defense tech firms, and, so DSB suggested, 
reduces DARPA’s intellectual mindshare on critical technology issues.53
Grid Security
PITAC’s report on cybersecurity54 noted that DARPA plans to terminate 
funding for its High Confidence Software and Systems development 
area, aiming to curtail cybersecurity funding except for classified work. 
Historically, one of Eisenhower’s key aims in establishing DARPA was 
to make sure the U.S. was never again subject to a major technological 
surprise like Sputnik, and it is widely acknowledged that defense and 
critical private sector IT systems remain vulnerable to cybersecurity 
attack. Defense theorists, noting the major economic consequences of the 
9/11 attack on financial markets and the insurance sector have argued 
that asymmetric cyber-attacks on fundamental financial infrastructure 
by largely unidentifiable state or non-state actors could be devastating to 
the developed world, potentially striking a powerful blow to the world 
economy. PITAC has noted that because IT is dominated by the private 
sector, and even DOD’s proposed secure high-speed Global Information 
Grid must interact with the Internet, shared solutions between defense 
and private sectors must be developed. Thus, classified research in 
many cases cannot be effectively implemented. PITAC identified ten 
defense-critical IT research areas, from authentication technologies to 
holistic security systems, it believes require future DARPA investment.
Altering the Ecosystem
Dr. Thomas Leighton, Chief Scientist of Akamai Corp., in response to 
questions from the House Science Committee, argued that DARPA’s 
most important contribution to IT has been “its unique approach 
53  Total DARPA university funding as a percentage of DARPA science and technology 
funding fell from 23.7 percent in FY2000 to 14.6 percent in FY2004 according to 2005 
DARPA data, supplied with hearing testimony, (see Footnote 48). A series of major 
university computer science research department underwent DARPA funding 
cutbacks of 50 percent and more in the past six years; some observers have argued 
that new generations of graduate students are no longer trained in DARPA Hard 
problems and tied to the agency, so that DARPA has reduced connections to its 
future talent base.
54  PITAC. (2005). Cybersecurity.
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(and commitment) to developing communities of researchers in 
both industry and academia” focused on “‘pushing the envelope’ of 
computer science”.55 Although DARPA continues to look at some IT 
problems, “its growing failure to support the university elements of 
that community is altering the innovation ecosystem” that it created 
“in an increasing negative way, with no other agency ready or able to 
pick up that role”. Some university computer science departments and 
labs report that although the DARPA cutbacks in funding have been at 
least partially made up by industry support, this is often short-term and 
not breakthrough-oriented, and often is from Asian firms that control 
the IP for technology developed and for obvious competitive reasons 
preclude it going into U.S. spinoffs. It should be noted that an increase 
in NSF computer science funding has offset some of the effects of the 
decline in DARPA university funding. DARPA’s leadership has argued, 
as justification for the cutback, that it was not seeing enough new ideas 
from this sector.
Dr. William Wulf, a computer scientist and, until recently, President 
of the National Academy of Engineering, told the House Science 
Committee that, “There is now no DOD organization like the ‘old 
DARPA’…that fills the role of discovery of breakthrough technologies”.56 
Although he acknowledged that DARPA was looking at cognitive 
computing, he argued that there were problems in the subjects DARPA 
was selecting for IT research because it was not confronting key security 
areas. For example, “our basic model of computer security (perimeter 
security) is fatally flawed” and will not be solved by the “short term, 
risk-adverse approach being currently taken by DARPA”. He argued 
that our “ability to produce reliable, effective software” is tottering on 
“the brink of disaster” but DARPA has not focused on solutions, and also 
is not reviewing the fact that our basic model for computing is not yet 
close to human brain capability, and requires a new model “of parallel 
computing” with “architectures and algorithms of immense power”. 
He also argued that the “use of computers in education has progressed 
little from the ‘automated drill’ model of the Plato system of the 1960’s.” 
55  Response of Dr. Tom Leighton to Questions from the House Science Committee 
Hearing (U.S. Congress. (2005)).
56  Dr. William A. Wulf, Response to Questions from the House Science Committee 
Hearing (U.S. Congress. (2005)).
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This is the case even though “we know much more about how people 
learn physiologically and psychologically,” including how “emotion 
interacts with learning.” Wulf argued that we could put this newer 
knowledge to good use in quickly training troops in urban combat and 
counterinsurgency, and DARPA should also be more involved in this 
area. DARPA spokesmen have noted in response to these arguments 
that DARPA has funded, as has the Army, soldier training simulation 
systems at USC’s center for this work, and that it was the primary 
initial funder of grid computing. Perhaps one part of the answer is that 
DARPA may lack a Licklider with the vision to see and evolve a new IT 
territory. Critics respond that because of a top-down management style 
in recent years at DARPA, office directors and program managers lack 
the authority to initiate in this way.
It is generally understood that DARPA has had to be increasingly 
focused on solving a problem it ran into at the end of the Cold War with 
its resulting cuts in defense procurement starting in 1986: the breakdown 
of technology transition from DARPA into services. DARPA, even 
during the Cold War, had a transition problem with the services as it 
focused on disruptive, change-state, radical innovation. It solved some 
of these problems in the past by transitioning technology, such as IT, 
into the civilian economy. In other areas, it had to rely on the clout of the 
Secretary of Defense and, when available, a strong Director of Defense 
Research & Engineering (DDR&E). DARPA typically did not enjoy a 
consensus with the military unless it was hammered out by the Office 
of the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries. Nonetheless, 
following the Cold War, technology transition declined. Unsuccessful 
in building a new consensus with the military services for transferring 
the results of revolutionary technology investment into service 
procurement, DARPA technology strategy has been moving from its 
history of radical innovation to more incremental innovation, shifting 
a larger part of its investment into later stage development efforts that 
the services are more ready to invest in. Defense budget analysts report 
that shorter term incremental work, space launch, and satellite “repair” 
are requiring growing parts of the DARPA budget. A new DARPA 
review process, mandated by improving transition to the services, of 
frequent “up or out” decisions with limited development time is placing 
more of its R&D on a shorter-term course. Congress may be playing a 
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role in this, as well, focusing more on DARPA’s record rather than its 
overall impact. The current emphasis on a pre-agreed transition plan 
may further limit disruptive work. Some believe that resulting more 
frequent policy reversals and turns may limit DARPA’s ability to mount 
enough creative, longer-term investment programs so important to past 
development. Although the heart of DARPA’s creativity in the past 
was in highly talented and empowered project managers, some believe 
that the role of project managers has been significantly limited by this 
short-term review approach. Although DARPA has always been able 
to pick among the brightest technologists in the nation, its larger focus 
on classified programs57 may limit its access to some of the university 
researchers it has relied on in the past, creating difficulty over time in 
attracting talent.
DARPA in the past has operated in both the civilian and defense 
economies, understanding they are the same economy. As noted, it has 
built “great groups” and spun off civilian-relevant technology, such as in 
computing, to the civilian sector where it evolved further, enabling DOD 
to buy it back at radically lower costs and to take advantage of civilian 
development advances. Alternatively, it has spun off to the defense 
sector defense-only technologies like stealth and unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV’s). DARPA’s need to focus on the current asymmetric 
conflict and corresponding classified work, as well as shorter term 
technology transition, may make it less able to spin off technology to 
the civilian economy, despite DOD’s growing capital plant cost crisis 
and its need to take better advantage of advances in that sector.58 Given 
DARPA’s historic role in successfully straddling both sectors, DARPA 
needs to protect its ability to play in both worlds.
Much of the above debate is driven by IT sector concerns. But there 
is a larger debate emerging over DARPA’s role in IT, because DARPA, 
starting with Licklider, played a profound role at the center of most 
aspects of the IT revolution. 
57  DARPA has always had, of course, a large classified program base separate from its 
academic research. The assertion here is that the balance has changed with more of 
a tilt toward classified work.
58  Research investment also affects defense capability. With defense R&D, nations 
generally “get what they pay for”, with weapon system capability and quality 
directly corresponding to intensity of research investment. Middleton, A., and 
Bown, S., with Hartley, K. and Reid, J. (2006). “The Effect of Defense R&D on 
Military Equipment Quality”, Defense and Peace Economics 17/2: 117–39.
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There is a question whether its current focus on shorter term and 
classified programs due to the war inevitably will signal a broader retreat 
from the IT sector,59 and whether the state of the sector can justify such a 
retreat?60 The first question that must be asked is where are we in the IT 
revolution? In the past, innovation waves fully matured in forty or fifty 
years and society moved on to the next innovation stage. Accordingly, 
some argue that the IT revolution is maturing and that we need to move 
on to the next big things.61 Where do we measure the IT wave from? 
If we measure it from the first post-World War II mainframe, ENIAC, 
the half-century mark for the revolution ran out in 1995. 1995, however, 
was the period when we were bringing on personal computing and 
internet access at levels that reached a major portion of our society. If 
we measure the IT innovation wave from around 1995, when real time 
and networked computing took off with the public, then we are still a 
decade into an IT revolution wave. Perhaps DARPA should be moving 
on to another innovation wave?
On the other hand, the IT revolution may be different from steam 
engines or electricity. The four- or five-decade model for past innovation 
waves may not be fully relevant to the IT revolution. When we work 
with the information domain, we have to keep in mind that we are 
working with a fundamental force that Norbert Wiener suggested in 
1948 was a coequal to mass and energy.62 We have already been through a 
succession of unfolding and sometimes parallel IT waves, from business 
(and military) computational capability, to data retrieval, processing 
and display, to advanced digital communications, to data mining and 
using mass data as a predictive tool, and we are beginning to make 
progress on symbolic manipulation and computer theorem proving and 
are thinking about quantum computing. The grail quest of computing 
is true artificial intelligence. This is not a technology pursuit similar to 
59  Vernon Ruttan has raised the concern that with the post-Cold War decline in 
defense innovation, the U.S. innovation system may not now be strong enough to 
launch new breakthrough technologies in either the public or the private sector. 
Ruttan, V. W. (2006). “Will Government Programs Spur the Next Breakthrough?”, 
Issues in Science and Technology 22/2: 55–61.
60  Ibid.
61  Atkinson, R. (2006). “Is the Next Economy Taking Shape?”, Issues in Science and 
Technology 22/2: 62–67 at 62, https://issues.org/atkinson-3/
62  Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
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past efforts because it is ultimately a quest to take on a god-like power.63 
We have a long, long way to go in achieving this stage. Progress on the 
Turing Test—can a computer’s thinking be mistaken for a human’s—has 
been limited.64 Although computers now play chess at the highest level 
and drive SUVs through DARPA’s desert and urban obstacle courses, 
computing isn’t even close yet to the intuitive powers of the human 
brain. Although an artificial intelligence quest may ultimately be futile 
or only partially achievable, even if we have to settle for Licklider’s 
“Man-Computer Symbiosis” we have a long way to go before this more 
limited vision is close to being played out. In other words, there may 
be decades of radical, breakthrough innovation to go in IT, not simply 
incremental advances. If this is right then DARPA, given its historic 
breakthrough technology mission and responsibility to avoid Sputnik-
like technological surprises, continues to have a future in IT.
Even setting aside the ultimate artificial intelligence challenge, Victor 
Zue has argued that the next generation of computing challenges are 
more profound than ever.65 While yesterday’s problem was computation 
of static functions in a static environment within well-understood 
specification, today, adaptive systems are needed that operate in 
environments that are dynamic and uncertain. While computation was 
the main past goal, communication, sensing and control are also now 
critical. While computing used to focus on the single operating agent, it 
must now focus on multiple agents that may be cooperative, neutral or 
adversarial. While batch processing of text and homogeneous data used 
to be the task, stream processing of massive heterogeneous data now is. 
While stand-alone applications once prevailed, deep interaction with 
humans is now key. 
While there was a binary notion of correctness in computing, now 
there is a trade-off between multiple criteria. In today’s computing 
world these opportunities arise in a far more complex environment of 
cheap communication, ubiquitous communication, overwhelming data, 
and limited human resources. Major IT tasks for the military become, for 
example, much deeper human computer interface, social and cultural 
63  Foerst, A. (2005). God in the Machine. New York, NY: Penguin Books.
64  Halpern, M. (2006). “The Trouble with the Turing Test”, The New Atlantis 11: 42–63.
65  Zue, V. (2008). Introduction to CSAIL. MIT. 15 April, 6, 14. (Details about Professor 
Zue and MIT’s Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL) are 
available at: https://www.csail.mit.edu/person/victor-zue).
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modeling; far more robust and secure computation; smart, self-directed 
autonomous surveillance; and robots ready for human interaction.
DARPA strongly maintains it is funding IT, even though an increasing 
amount of its work must be classified. It is also funding what it believes 
is a critical breakthrough area in computing, cognitive computing, and 
supports biocomputing and robotics. The ongoing wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan appropriately force DARPA toward shorter term solutions 
for the military; it went through a similar evolution during the Vietnam 
War. DARPA has had, as noted, a profound problem with technology 
transition with the military services and, to solve it, must focus on better 
meeting service needs. Still, the question must be asked whether there 
is a danger that DARPA may be, over time, retreating into Iansati’s 
and Levien’s “landlordism”—not continuously renewing but living off 
incremental improvements on past advances. For example, it is felt by 
some observers that DARPA lacks a tactical technology vision as that 
program has become increasingly smaller-scale, less coherent and non-
tactical. DARPA should also evaluate the emerging new dimensions 
of whether it has a coherent IT vision for approaching some of the 
challenges Zue and others suggest. Given DARPA’s unique historical 
role in U.S. technology advance, this is a significant issue. Because even 
great technology advances take a decade or two to produce, the pipeline 
of advance is hard to see, but problems we may have now in filling that 
pipeline will have a profound effect on our future a decade or more out.66
DARPA is not the only aspect of DOD technology leadership facing 
difficulties. DOD depends on a strong fundamental physical science 
research to support its breakthrough potential, but these programs and 
funding levels are in decline.67 Boomer generation scientists have been 
the mainstay of DOD science talent in its labs and research centers, but 
are now retiring in droves, and are not being adequately replaced. DOD 
faces a very serious science talent supply problem and needs hiring and 
retention flexibility beyond civil service limits, but a rigid position in 
the past by DOD personnel staff that there must be only one personnel 
66  Van Atta et al. (1990–1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments. 3 Volumes.
67  Lewis, J. A. (2006). Waiting for Sputnik. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/waiting-sputnik; See, also, 
Young, J. (2007). “Info Memo for Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates”, DOD 
Science and Technology Program, 24 August. (on the need and corresponding 
proposal for increased DOD S&T funding, listing potential high pay-off research 
areas).
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system for all at DOD has thwarted Congressional reform efforts to 
create more flexibility for scientists. The pressure of the tempo of ongoing 
military operations is, in turn, putting pressure on funding for science 
in the military services. The pattern of technology leadership in DOD 
may not be as strong as in the past. DDR&E leaders of the caliber of John 
Foster, Malcolm Currie and William Perry have been infrequent, and the 
overall depth of technical competence in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense to backup DARPA and push for technology implementation has 
declined. Overall, the picture for DOD science is not getting prettier, and 
this is against a backdrop of serious problems in U.S. physical science in 
general, as explored in recent major reports by the National Academies.68 
Yet, our security challenges are growing. The emergence of the 
terrorist model, of non-state actors relatively immune to state-to-state 
pressure, represents a profound asymmetric challenge to a Western 
military model that has been world-dominant since the fifteenth 
century. In parallel is the emergence of other peer competitors, working 
on both symmetric and asymmetric approaches, pursuing a technology 
innovation model for economic development which, as discussed, has 
significant military implications. 
This raises a fundamental concern: can U.S. technological superiority 
be the continuing basis of U.S. security in an increasingly globalized 
technological and economic world? Since U.S. economic and military 
success, as argued at the outset, has relied on profound integration 
between defense and civilian elements of its innovation system for 
technological superiority both military and economic, consequences on 
one side of this equation, such as long-term DARPA capability, have 
major effects on the other side.
Summary
Arguably innovation organization—the way in which the direct 
innovation factors of R&D and talent come together, how R&D and 
68  National Academy of Sciences. (2007). Rising above the Gathering Storm: Energizing 
and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future. Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press, https://doi.org/10.17226/12537, https://www.nap.
edu/catalog/11463/rising-above-the-gathering-storm-energizing-and-employing-
america-for#toc; Augustine. (2007). Is America Falling Off the Flat Earth.
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talent are joined in an innovation system—is a third direct innovation 
factor.
DARPA emerged as a unique model—operating at both the 
institutional and personal level of science organization. Building on 
the Rad Lab example, it built a deeply collaborative, flat, close-knit, 
talented, participatory, flexible system, oriented to breakthrough radical 
innovation. It has used a challenge model for R&D, focusing on trying 
to meet a particular technical challenge, then moving from fundamental 
research to applied research. Then it would link this research with the 
follow-on stages of development, prototyping, and access to initial 
production. In other words, it followed an innovation path, not simply 
a discovery or invention path. We call this approach the connected 
science model.
Like all human institutions, these organizational models are 
transitory. The DARPA model has been one of the longest lasting, 
unique in the federal government, and seemed to be the most capable 
of ongoing renewal.
But that DARPA model now may be shifting under pressure of 
ongoing operations, particularly regarding DARPA’s role in the IT 
sector, with potential long-term effects on U.S. defense as well as civilian 
sector technology superiority. This shift occurs against a backdrop of 
overall problems in U.S. physical science strength. DARPA has long 
served a keystone function in the U.S. innovation system and it is in 
the nation’s national security and economic interest that it continues to 
avoid “landlord” status.
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5. The Value of Vision in Radical 
Technological Innovation1
Tamara L. Carleton
The Value of Vision in  
Radical Technological Innovation
This study provides empirical evidence of the role of vision in fostering 
technological invention, adding to the existing literature about radical 
innovation.2 DARPA provides a long history of examples of technical 
program visions and how these visions are formed and communicated 
time after time. In this section, the four main findings of the study are 
discussed in detail and in context of the literature.
First, this study shows a relationship between the formation of a 
technological vision and the sustained creation of radical innovation, 
providing new knowledge about the role of vision in radical innovation. 
Since its inception in 1958, new programs at DARPA have required a vision 
to be started, which then guides subsequent work and development. 
Several dimensions arise regarding the role of vision, which entail 
functioning primarily at the program level, characterized as “DARPA 
1  This chapter is an excerpt from Tamara L. Carleton’s PhD thesis: Carleton, T. L. 
(2010). “The Value of Vision in Radical Technological Innovation”, PhD thesis, 
Stanford University, Palo Alto.
2  E.g., Roberts, E. B., ed. (1987). Generating Technological Innovation. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press; Tornatzky, L. G., Fleischer, M., and Chakrabarti, A. K. 
(1990). The Processes of Technological Innovation. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books; 
O’Connor, G. C., Leifer, R., Paulson, A. S., and Peters, L. S. (2008). Grabbing Lightning: 
Building a Capability for Breakthrough Innovation. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
© Tamara L. Carleton, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.05
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Hard”, and relying on the program manager as a vision champion. 
Second, this study describes the use of expert workshops and proof-of-
concepts, used steadily by DARPA to shape partial visions into complete 
visions, which demonstrates critical efforts occurring prevision. Third, 
this study describes the importance of socialization in order to prepare 
and instruct program managers in their envisioning skills. Immersed in 
the culture at DARPA, new program managers learn from each other and 
their network connections. Fourth, this study provides new evidence 
about radical innovation governance models. DARPA relies on small 
group decisions by organizational leadership to approve promising new 
visions, running counter to the dominant literature about stage-gate 
reviews, peer reviews, and extended consensus-seeking processes.
A Process Model of Radical Innovation
As described in the previous chapter, DARPA follows certain high-level 
steps in its quest for radical innovation, and this process is reproduced 
in Figure 5-1. By documenting the process at DARPA, this study helps 
other researchers and practitioners to understand one organization’s 
formula for sustained radical innovation. Documented processes are 
the basis for repetition and become the springboard for continuous and 
measurable performance.
Fig. 5-1  Comparison between DARPA’s process model and the stage-gate model. 
Although DARPA’s process model of innovation looks similar to the 
typical stage-gate model for new product development,3 the two models 
differ in terms of objectives, activity, and evaluation mechanics. (Figure 
prepared by the author.)
3  Cooper, R. G. (2001). Winning at New Products: Accelerating the Process from Idea to 
Launch. 3rd ed. Cambridge, MA: Basic Books.
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In addition, some scholars may see a similarity between the 
depiction of DARPA’s process model and the typical stage-gate model 
for new product development,4 depicted in Figure 5-1. Both models are 
comprised of five stages that sequence categories of cross-functional 
activities, which help to invite a comparison. However, there are at least 
three key differences between the two models. First, the two models 
differ in objectives. DARPA’s goal is radical innovation, which is 
intended to produce new technologies that ultimately may lead to new 
products. In contrast, the stage-gate process is designed to build and 
launch new products.
Second, the two models differ in their activity timing. DARPA’s 
model is focused on the early stages that precede project scope. The 
stage-gate model is missing the preliminary or ideation phase, often 
called Discovery, which occurs before the start of the first stage of 
scoping.
Third, the two models differ in evaluation mechanisms. DARPA’s 
process is fluid, and although transition arrows are noted between 
stages, formal decision points are not necessarily required before 
proceeding onto the next set of activities. In comparison, the stage-
gate model is predicated on predefined deliverables and checkpoints 
with go/no go criteria at the end of each stage (these checkpoints are 
called gates).
New Dimensions of Vision
Vision plays a central role in DARPA’s process of innovation; indeed, 
DARPA starts its process with vision. It matters where and how a vision 
is started, as does who starts and maintains the vision. DARPA program 
managers are hired deliberately for their visions of technology, even if 
partially formed. Then, program managers codify their visions at the 
start of each new program in a specialized document called a Broad 
Agency Announcement (BAA), which are used to generate interest in 
the broader R&D community. Thus, the vision is formulated before 
groups are funded because DARPA’s funding recipients rely on these 
BAAs to determine potential solutions.
4  Ibid.
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Visions at the Program Level
By studying the role of vision within DARPA, this study reveals several 
new dimensions of vision as related to innovation. One dimension is 
the level at which a vision operates. The dominant business literature 
has largely studied vision at the organizational level;5 at the other end 
of the literature, several studies have investigated technological visions 
at the product or project level.6 Within DARPA, work is broken down at 
three levels: organizational, program, and project, and the data shows 
that vision is introduced and functions primarily at the program level. 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the multiple levels of visions that could exist 
within an organization, and shows how visions at DARPA address the 
gap between the organizational and project/product levels.
Fig. 5-2  Visions at DARPA operate at the program level. The literature on 
innovation predominantly discusses technological visions at the 
organizational level, and several studies have investigated technological 
visions at the project level. The literature fails to discuss vision at the 
program level, which is equivalent to the business unit or market level. 
At DARPA, technological visions function at the program level. (Figure 
prepared by the author.)
In fact, DARPA lacks a traditional corporate vision, which identifies a 
set of organizational values and direction for the enterprise. Since its 
inception in 1958, the agency has not defined (or even reinvented) its 
long-term goals, aspirations, and values at the organizational level. 
Instead, DARPA emphasizes visions at the program level, which 
correlates with a traditional business unit or market focus. Multiple 
5  Collins, J. C., and Porras, J. I. (1991). “Organizational Vision and Visionary 
Organizations”, California Management Review 34/1: 30–52.
6  Lynn, G. S., and Akgün, A. E. (2001). “Project Visioning: its Components and Impact 
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visions—often totaling over a hundred, depending on the number of 
program managers actively serving at DARPA—exist in parallel at a 
given time. Programs serve as new, broad-scale technical initiatives 
that typically encompass multiple projects, and projects are equivalent 
to product teams in industry. Again, a DARPA program could be 
considered equivalent to a business unit or new market category. At 
DARPA, a program is more of an open-ended question or challenge 
posed to the R&D community, which might have multiple solutions 
and product possibilities, and scholars have documented the benefit of 
a challenge model within an R&D setting.7
In addition, visions at the program level allow DARPA program 
managers to direct multiple projects, multiple teams, and even multiple 
products over multiple years. Through visions at the program level, 
DARPA can excite and rally interest across several different technical 
areas, helping to distribute resources more effectively. Program visions 
provide a way to organize multiple projects and smaller-scale efforts 
across a range of funding recipients, who each may interpret the 
vision differently in application. This approach, in turn, increases the 
likelihood of a greater diversity of solutions. A program structure also 
allows for greater flexibility in engendering commitment.
Vision Quality
A second dimension is the quality of the vision. In the literature, few 
studies focus on technological visions, and most scholars draw on 
studies of corporate vision. For example, Gary S. Lynn and Ali Akgün 
describe product visions as a combination of clarity, support, and 
stability, which are determined relative to the larger organization.8 
While these attributes offer a sense of an ideal vision, they do not 
provide meaningful guidelines on how to develop a vision, including 
7  Bonvillian, W. B. (2006). “Power Play, The DARPA Model and U.S. Energy Policy”, 
The American Interest 2/2, November/December, 39–48, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2006/11/01/power-play/; Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). “The Connected 
Science Model for Innovation—The DARPA Model”, in 21st Century Innovation 
Systems for the U.S. and Japan, ed. S. Nagaoka, M. Kondo, K. Flamm, and C. Wessner. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 206–37, https://doi.org/10.17226/12194, 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=206 (Chapter 4 in this 
volume).
8  Lynn and Akgün. (2001). “Project Visioning”.
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the type of vision to create in the technology space. This study shows 
that technological visions at DARPA have several attributes that are 
essential to the creation of its visions.
Since its inception, DARPA has socialized a catchphrase known as 
DARPA Hard. Drawn from the data, a DARPA Hard program vision is 
characterized as technically challenging, actionable, multidisciplinary, 
and far-reaching. Taken apart, these attributes can be found discussed 
in prior studies.
The first attribute—technically challenging—is understood within 
the operations research and engineering design community as a “wicked 
problem”.9 A wicked problem is a technically difficult problem that is 
nearly impossible to solve due to complex interdependencies, a high 
level of ambiguity, and conflicting interests from stakeholders. Wicked 
problems cannot be solved through classic experimentation and logic, 
instead requiring a different and more creative strategy of reasoning. By 
focusing on these types of problems at DARPA, program managers have 
ensured that they push the limits of innovation sought, what might be 
interpreted as “highly radical” innovation according to Abetti’s scale.10 
When most definitions of radical innovation argue for market changes, 
DARPA is pushing for a radical technology shift, which then may lead to 
a radical market shift. Each attempt at creating a new technical solution 
changes the understanding of the problem in two fundamental ways. 
First, more information helps to reformulate the initial requirements, 
and second, every prototype and implementation built advances the 
state of knowledge overall in the world. In other words, there is no 
turning back or reverting to the former understanding of the problem. 
The vision for a DARPA program provides the high-level guidelines 
to inspire potential funding recipients, and by engaging both more 
and different groups to respond, DARPA is able to cast a wider net for 
solutions and likewise accelerate the experimentation process.
This approach helps to drive toward action, and actionable is the 
second attribute of DARPA Hard. Program visions are intentionally 
9  Buchanan, R. (2009). “Thinking about Design: An Historical Perspective”, in Philosophy 
of Technology and Engineering Sciences, ed. A. Meijers. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: 
Elsevier B.V. 409–53, https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-51667-1.50020-3
10  Abetti, P. A. (2000). “Critical Success Factors for Radical Technological Innovations: 
A Five Case Study”, Creativity and Innovation Management Journal 9/4: 208–21, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8691.00194 
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grounded in reality because they are expected to improve and extend 
the limits of existing technologies. Visions cannot exist as science-
fiction fantasy, political rhetoric, or policy scenarios. This attribute is 
partly captured in earlier research about the reflective practitioner, in 
which Donald Schön describes how professionals, such as engineers, 
address problematic situations that are fraught with uncertainty, 
disorder, and indeterminacy by taking action through real-time cycles 
of feedback and learning.11 In DARPA’s case, program managers rely 
on their visions as a way to simulate broader learning in their research 
networks.
A growing body of research about learning in inter-organizational 
networks shows that networks facilitate rapid responses. Powell states 
that, “Whether it is the case that one firm’s technological competence 
has outdistanced the others, or that innovations would be hard to 
replicate internally, as suggested by the growing reliance on external 
sources of research and development, network forms of organization 
represent a fast means of gaining access to know-how that cannot be 
produced internally”.12
The third attribute—multidisciplinary—is equally critical to forming 
the right program visions at DARPA. As many DARPA program 
managers interviewed for this study noted, they needed to redefine 
problems outside of usual boundaries, and complex situations required 
drawing from more than one discipline. Multidisciplinary efforts are 
not new to government-sponsored R&D and can be evidenced in the 
rise of systems engineering in the 1950s that supported large scale 
efforts, such as the Atlas missile program and ARPANET.13 This type of 
approach encourages less hierarchical control and more network-based 
management techniques.
The fourth attribute—far-reaching—is important when creating 
program visions at DARPA. One part of far-reaching is about having 
a broad impact in society. Subjects spoke about making a difference in 
magnitude.
11  Schön, D. (1983). The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
12  Powell, W. W. (1990). “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of 
Organization”, Organizational Behavior 12: 295–336, at 316.
13  Hughes, T. P. (1998). Rescuing Prometheus: Four Monumental Projects that Changed the 
Modern World. New York, NY: Pantheon Books. 
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DARPA program managers stated that they need to think big in 
order to have big results. Another aspect of far-reaching is the ability to 
plan long-term. The importance of planning long-term has its roots in 
World War II, notably the founding of RAND.14 This idea of planning for 
the long term made its way into today’s management science through 
thinkers such as Peter F. Drucker.15
The real test of a good vision in R&D is whether others will commit 
resources to action, which will bring results in the future. DARPA 
deliberately couples action with future intent. However, the conundrum 
is that traditional R&D results may not be produced or easy to measure 
because the extent of far-reaching effects take time and are broadly 
distributed across society. The attribute of far-reaching is consistent 
with recent work in foresight engineering, which focuses on long-
range technology cycles as part of an organization’s ongoing search for 
innovation opportunities.16
Together, these four attributes—technically challenging, actionable, 
multidisciplinary, and far-reaching—that make up a DARPA Hard 
program provide a metric that can be instrumented and tested. Based 
on pioneering work in taxonomies,17 Figure 5-3 presents a sample 
classification using a 7-point scale that was used for the quantification 
of human performance variables, specifically describing human ability 
for side-to-side equilibrium.18 This type of scale could be adapted in 
order to classify each of the four attributes characterizing DARPA Hard. 
Follow-on studies can further define and test the scale values as related 
to radical innovation. Ultimately, if other organizations seek to recreate 
14  Campbell, V. (2004). “How RAND Invented the Postwar World”, Invention & 
Technology 20/1: 50–59.
15  Drucker, P. F. (1959). “Long-Range Planning: Challenge to Management Science”, 
Management Science 5/3: 238–49; Drucker, P. F. (1973). Management: Tasks, 
Responsibilities, Practice. New York, NY: Harper Colophon.
16  Carleton, T. and Cockayne, W. (2009). “The Power of Prototypes in Foresight 
Engineering”, in Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Engineering Design 
(ICED’09), ed. M. Norell Bergendahl, M. Grimheden, L. Leifer, P. Skogstad, and U. 
Lindemann. Stanford, CA: The Design Society. 267–76.
17  Bloom, B. S., ed. (1956). Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of 
Educational Goals: Handbook I, Cognitive Domain. New York, NY: Green; Fleishman, 
E., and Quaintance, M. (1984). Taxonomies of Human Performance: The Description of 
Human Tasks. Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
18  Cockayne W., and Darken, R. (2004). “The Application of Human Ability 
Requirements to Virtual Environment Interface Design and Evaluation”, in The 
Handbook of Task Analysis for Human-Computer Interaction, ed. D. Diaper, and N. 
Stanton. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 401–21.
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Fig. 5-3  A sample 7-point scale for quantification of human performance 
variables. A sample 7-point scale, drawn from another study, could be 
adapted to classify and evaluate each of the four attributes characterizing 
DARPA Hard. Follow-on studies can define and test the scale values 
as related to radical innovation. (Figure from William R. Cockayne. 
(1998). “Two-Handed, Whole-Hand Interaction”, Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Used here with permission 
from the author.)
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a variant of DARPA Hard, they will benefit from defining and using a 
clear classification of technological visions.
Visionaries of Technology
A third dimension of vision is the person responsible for fostering it. 
Visions cannot exist without creators, who must imagine and invent 
them. Within DARPA, the work on innovation is driven as much by ideas 
as by individuals. Program managers are hired as technical visionaries, 
and they are solely responsible for shaping, spearheading, and 
promoting their respective visions of technology. The project champion 
is a critically recognized role in innovation, and findings from this study 
are consistent with literature on this topic.19 At DARPA, a new program 
is not confounded with multiple organizational champions; instead, 
there is a clear relationship in that each program manager builds one 
vision per program. Figure 5-4 depicts this relationship. However, the 
DARPA program manager does not operate in isolation. He (or she) is 
part of a broader ecosystem and network, in which multiple players—
both internally and externally to the agency—are engaged to support 
the formation and execution of a program vision.
19  Howell, J. M., and Higgins, C. A. (1990). “Champions of Technological Innovation”, 
Administratively Science Quarterly 35: 317–41.
Fig. 5-4  A radical technological vision relies on one big idea and one visionary. At 
DARPA, a program vision relies on a program manager, who serves as 
the vision’s primary champion internally and externally. Moreover, there 
is a clear relationship in that each program managers builds one vision 
per program. (Figure prepared by the author.)
DARPA program managers serve in other innovation roles that have 
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some characteristics with business innovators because DARPA program 
managers provide substantial funding, as well as some organizational 
credibility and access to other resources.20 Although DARPA program 
managers do not build and develop their own visions, instead relying on 
the various funding recipients, they do act as technical innovators in other 
ways.21 More informed than the usual project champion, DARPA program 
managers are nearly all technically educated and bring deep expertise 
from various fields of engineering and science. This background allows 
them to more effectively understand the given technical problem, as well 
as advise and guide the technical teams that they sponsor. A growing 
number of studies discuss the special role of a technical visionary, who 
combines technical knowledge with project oversight.22 
DARPA program managers also play the role of technology licenser 
or technology transfer manager. They are directly responsible for 
finding potential user groups, typically in the U.S. military services, 
who might test and ultimately adopt a functional prototype. The final 
success of DARPA program visions hinges on user adoption.
At DARPA, potential program managers—the champions of new 
technological visions—are found and recruited through the extended 
research network. Studies show that as networks mature, they tend to 
petrify.23 People prefer to work with familiar connections, which limits 
network access to new connections. Current program managers will find 
new program managers based on similar qualities and will continue 
funding the same relationships. When this happens, an innovation 
network does not diversify, and the development of new ideas can be 
potentially severely limited. DARPA has addressed this limitation by 
deliberately hiring program managers new to the network, who, in 
turn, bring new visions of technology. Subsequently, the new-to-the-
network program manager finds and funds research groups that bring 
additional new ideas to the network, which helps to refresh institutional 
thinking and challenge engrained assumptions.
20  Howell and Higgins. (1990). “Champions of Technological Innovation”.
21  Ibid.
22  Hebda, J. M., Vojak, B. A., Griffin, A., and Price, R. L. (2007). “Motivating Technical 
Visionaries in Large American Companies”, IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management 54/3: 433–44; Deschamps, J. (2008). Innovation Leaders: How Senior 
Executives Stimulate, Steer and Sustain Innovation. Hoboken, NJ: Jossey-Bass. 
23  Powell. (1990). “Neither Market nor Hierarchy”.
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Lastly, DARPA is now over fifty years old as an organization, 
and, historically, the agency has relied on its network for internal job 
referrals. As the people in DARPA’s network have aged, they may not 
be cultivating as many new relationships with other research groups or 
also with junior engineers and scientists. Age plays a substantial role 
in creating new fields, and research shows that younger scientists are 
more likely to be drawn to a new field than older scientists.24
Some scholars have studied how large mature organizations must 
continually reconfigure their systems of power in order to sustain 
innovation.25 Recently, DARPA leadership has recognized the need to 
recruit younger program managers into its mix. For example, the press 
observed former agency director Tony Tether “has managed to draw 
younger researchers into an agency whose stalwart backers are growing 
greyer every year”.26 However, more research is needed to understand 
the effects of age on DARPA’s ability to foster radical innovation.
The Development of Partial Visions
In the key texts that mention vision, few descriptions are provided 
about how to generate a vision or develop a partial vision into a 
complete technological vision.27 Scholars underscore the importance 
of having a vision, yet they assume a complete vision. Findings from 
this study demonstrate that multiple steps are consistently taken by 
DARPA program managers in order to advance their early ideas and 
thinking before the complete vision is formed. Figure 5-5 illustrates 
the actions that must occur before a complete vision is achieved. In 
addition, while the technological idea drives action, the path to the 
vision itself is emergent.
This study describes the formation of partial visions via two primary 
mechanisms, specifically expert workshops and proof-of-concepts, 
which are used consistently throughout DARPA’s history to develop 
partial visions into clear visions. While details may differ, the objective 
24  Rappa, M., and Debackere, K. (1993). “Youth and Scientific Innovation: The Role of 
Young Scientists in the Development of a New Field”, Minerva 31/1: 1–20. 
25  Dougherty, D., and Hardy, C. (1996). “Sustained Product Innovation in Large, 
Mature Organizations: Overcoming Innovation-to-Organization Problems”, 
Academy of Management Journal 39/5: 1120–53.
26  “A Little Less Disneyland”, Nature 451: 374 (2008), https://doi.org/10.1038/451374a 
27  Roberts. (1987). Generating Technological Innovation.
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is the same between the two mechanisms: to gain more insight into 
a promising yet incomplete vision. Expert workshops and proof-of-
concepts address the people and the idea, respectively. Through expert 
workshops, each program manager engages his or her network, and 
the network serves as a way to gain perspective through dialogue 
among trusted colleagues. In studies about knowledge networks and 
communities of practice, network members regularly share information 
through both formal and informal channels,28 and the DARPA 
workshops positively exploit the broader knowledge network for the 
agency. The DARPA workshops are effective because they draw on the 
collective wisdom for a field, helping DARPA program managers to 
gain access to the latest knowledge about a particular topic.
If the workshops rely on people, the proof-of-concepts depend on 
the idea. The objective of the proof-of-concepts is to explore and test 
the feasibility of an emerging idea. Each proof-of-concept serves as a 
directed demonstration. Proof-of-concepts are regularly discussed 
in engineering design research and business studies as a form of 
prototyping,29 and specifically, Carleton and Cockayne discuss the 
28  Hildreth, P. M., and Kimble, C., eds. (2004). Knowledge Networks: Innovation Through 
Communities of Practice. Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing; Powell, W. W., and 
Grodal, S. (2005). “Networks of Innovators”, in The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, 
ed. J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery, and R. R. Nelson. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 56–85.
29  Schrage, M. (1999). Serious Play: How the World’s Best Companies Simulate to Innovate. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press; Betz, F. (2003). Managing Technological 
Fig. 5-5  Efforts preceding a complete vision of technology. Earlier actions 
occur before a complete vision is achieved at DARPA. (Figure 
prepared by the author.)
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It is important to note that this combination of expert workshops and 
proof-of-concepts has provided the primary mechanisms for converting 
partial visions into full visions at DARPA; no other mechanisms 
were pursued as long or as reliably, as reported by DARPA program 
managers and funding recipients. This approach has implications for 
organizations pursuing radical or disruptive innovation. O’Connor and 
her colleagues discuss the different experiments that big companies 
have attempted in order to scout for and generate radical ideas.31 Some 
of these experiments resemble the expert workshops at DARPA. IBM has 
held a large annual R&D event to order to stimulate new ideas internally 
and identify potential emerging business opportunities. This event has 
been denoted using multiple names—including idea jams, idea cafes, 
and deep dives—and while the organizers continually tinker with the 
process, the event itself remains constant every year. The annual event 
has led to a high number of opportunities, which in turn have become 
profitable business lines at IBM.
Learning Radical Innovation Through Socialization
The third finding relates to the culture of innovation at DARPA. 
Program managers come from a variety of backgrounds. While they 
have impeccable academic and professional credentials, many lack 
direct experience with certain innovation skill sets, such as documenting 
a vision, recruiting and leading others, and technology transfer. 
Regardless of their background, expectations are high for DARPA 
program managers to develop and deliver on their program visions 
quickly.
31  O’Connor et al. (2008). Grabbing Lightning.
growing role that physical prototypes serve in long-range planning.30 
This study provides new information about the use of proof-of-concepts 
in vision development as a way to demonstrate feasibility and test 
early hunches before undertaking a new technical initiative. There is 
an opportunity to expand on the relationship between prototyping and 
vision formation.
Innovation: Competitive Advantage from Change. 2nd ed. New York, NY: John Wiley; 
Moss, L. T. and Atre, S. (2003). Business Intelligence Roadmap: The Complete Project 
Lifecycle for Decision-Support Applications. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.
30  Carleton and Cockayne. (2009). “The Power of Prototypes”.
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In addition, DARPA does not provide formal training in innovation 
“know how”, particularly the skills needed to develop program visions. 
Is staff training necessary for radical innovation? According to subjects, 
DARPA has not codified much of its internal procedures historically; 
so new program managers cannot rely on manuals or similar process 
guides. Instead, knowing is a matter of participating. At DARPA, 
subjects reported learning primarily from immersion. From the start, a 
candidate for a new program manager has to be already embedded in 
the research community to be considered for recruiting.
Once at DARPA, program managers described learning by doing, 
particularly by proactively reaching out to colleagues, alumni and other 
members in the network for advice and resources, as well as by gaining 
new knowledge from regular field visits.
In many ways, DARPA is a culture of show, not tell. Through a 
process of socialization, program managers acquire the habits, beliefs, 
and accumulated knowledge of the organization. In sociology, this 
period is known as metamorphosis, when a newcomer becomes an 
established organizational member.32 How people behave and interact 
with one another over time shapes an organizational culture, and the 
data from DARPA is consistent with prior studies about tacit knowledge 
and informal learning occurring within innovation organizations and 
communities of practice.
If an organization is to survive, then research shows that stability 
over time is required, so that one generation of employees transmits the 
dominant social and cultural patterns to the next generation.33 In other 
words, practice is transferred from those who have done it to those who 
need to do it. At DARPA, this transfer of knowledge occurs through 
informal conversations, and, given the short contracts of DARPA 
technical staff, the cycle of generations is rapid. It is remarkable that 
a knowledge-generating organization over fifty years old, which has 
resisted lasting knowledge capture, has maintained such a stable set of 
practices as DARPA has. Based on subject reports, two factors have likely 
contributed most to the unusual stability of DARPA’s culture. First, the 
32  Kramer, M. W. (2010). Organizational Socialization: Joining and Leaving Organizations. 
Cambridge, UK: Polity.
33  Alvesson, M. (1995). Management of Knowledge-Intensive Companies. New York, NY: 
Walter de Gruyter.
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broader infrastructure supporting DARPA program managers, namely 
the support staff, provide continuity across leadership turnovers. 
This support staff functions as an underlying layer of institutional 
permanence, handling the same routines and project coordination tasks. 
Second, the agency’s network structure supports ongoing learning. 
For example, even when program managers leave their agency roles 
officially, they typically stay connected to DARPA in other ways. This 
connection creates additional channels of knowledge sharing between 
staff and also ensures that some institutional memory is maintained 
across staff rotations. New staff rely on the stories and experiences 
shared within the network in order to prepare themselves at DARPA.
Internal Review of Radical Innovation Ideas
Even with the right person and the right idea, a promising technological 
vision may not become a new program at DARPA. There is one final test 
before a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) is released to the public. A 
program manager must pitch his vision internally with a small audience 
for funding approval, and decision-making authority resides namely 
with the agency director and respective office director. Subject reports 
demonstrate that DARPA has consistently followed this governance 
model over the years, actively discouraging larger evaluations in the 
agency’s innovation process. Subjects especially note the benefits of 
speed, convenience, and flexibility from these small group reviews.
DARPA’s model runs counter to the literature and practice of 
innovation, which discusses consensus-based governance models—
such as innovation boards, technology councils, R&D committees, task 
forces, and stage-gates—as a dominant best practice.34 These models 
provide a decision-making framework that help to define evaluation 
criteria, grant decision-making power, and verify feasibility of a new 
34  Bacon, F. R., Jr., and Butler, T. W., Jr. (1973). Achieving Planned Innovation: A Proven 
System for Creating Successful New Products and Services. New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster; Hamel, G. (2002). Leading the Revolution: How to Thrive in Turbulent Times 
by Making Innovation a Way of Life. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press; 
Snyder, N. T., and Duarte, D. L. (2003). Strategic Innovation: Embedding Innovation as 
a Core Competency in your Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass; O’Connor 
et al. (2008). Grabbing Lightning; Skarzynski, P., and Gibson, R. (2008). Innovation to 
the Core: A Blueprint for Transforming the Way your Company Innovates. Boston, MA: 
Harvard Business School Press.
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research idea. A growing body of literature has noted that certain 
models have limitations for radical innovation. Gassmann and von 
Zedtwitz note:
In industries or projects where the science or technology push is the 
dominant driver of innovation, stage-gate processes are too rigid and 
slow. Innovations that are triggered by a technological invention with 
unknown market potential need different processes and techniques to 
succeed.35
Overall, innovation studies endorse a strong philosophy that the 
processes for radical or disruptive innovation must differ from 
traditional R&D processes in order to be effective within an organization. 
By deliberately adopting a model of limited, leadership-driven review 
and following it for over fifty years, DARPA provides empirical support 
for this belief. Instead of creating large task forces, DARPA relies on 
its leadership to approve and support the visions. Instead of formally 
scheduled sessions, DARPA program managers arrange meetings 
when they feel that their new program visions are ready for funding. 
Most of corporate R&D, the work of funding agencies, and academic 
research are actually structured in direct opposition to this approach. 
Members of the science community, who believe that DARPA provides 
an enduring and effective model for advancing radical innovation, 
understand this difference. Penman and Bates write, “Those wishing 
to emulate the success of DARPA and Bell Labs might consider another 
important aspect: freedom from the so called ‘peer review’ that weighs 
down most National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science 
Foundation efforts”.36
Conclusion
Four main findings were discussed in relation to the literature review. 
By describing how visions serve an integral role in DARPA’s innovation 
process, the first finding brings new perspective to innovation studies 
about the role of visions in radical innovation. In particular, new program 
35  Gassmann, O., and von Zedtwitz, M. (2003). “Innovation Processes in Transnational 
Corporations”, in The International Handbook on Innovation, ed. L. V. Shavinina. 
Oxford, UK: Elsevier Science. 702–14, at 704.
36  Penman, S., and Bates, C. C. (1999). “DARPA in the Spotlight”, Science 286/5438: 239.
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visions must meet the criteria of being DARPA Hard, and this term of art 
introduces a working metric for technical breakthroughs that are nearly 
impossible to achieve based on the current state of knowledge and tools. 
Second, the discovery that expert workshops and proof-of-concepts have 
been used repeatedly to convert partial visions into complete visions 
at DARPA shows that activities exist pre-vision and directly influence 
the formation of technological visions. Third, the discovery that new 
program managers receive no formal documentation or training for 
their roles and instead rely on acculturation is consistent with prior 
research on innovation networks and communities of practice. Finally, 
by showing that DARPA has a leadership-driven, decision-making 
model, in which leadership approves a new program vision, the fourth 
finding introduces contradictory evidence to the dominant literature. 
These four findings, supported by empirical evidence, add to the current 
understanding of technological visions and radical innovation research.
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The PC industry is leading our nation’s economy into the 21st century…
There isn’t an industry in America that is more creative, more alive and 
more competitive. And the amazing thing is all this happened without 
any government involvement. (Bill Gates, 1998.)2
The personal computer revolution, born out of risk-taking corporate 
ventures and garage-based innovative individualism, is the epitome 
of the heights than can be achieved by private sector, free-market 
entrepreneurialism. While this is the conventional story, it is inaccurate. 
The personal computer (PC) technologies that have revolutionized 
our everyday lives, whether at the office or at home, have been deeply 
rooted in public sector initiatives as well. As communities throughout 
the country and countries around the world rush to clone their own 
Silicon Valleys, the governmental underpinnings of the original Valley’s 
success should not be overlooked.
1  This chapter originally appeared in Business and Politics 3/3 (2001). The editors of 
this volume gratefully acknowledge the permission to reprint this paper given by 
Cambridge University Press, the publisher of Business and Politics.
2  Microsoft News Release. (1998). “Remarks by Bill Gates”, 18 May. Issued on the day 
the Justice Department launched its anti-trust suit against the company.
© Glenn R. Fong, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.06
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This story parallels the widely-recognized government role in 
spurring a second revolution in information technology: the Internet. 
The current-day internet traces its origins back, of course, to the late 
1960s ARPANET project of the Defense Department. However, when it 
comes to our main window on cyberspace—the personal computer—a 
defense or government link to such a broad-sweeping business and 
consumer appliance is almost inconceivable. Instead, when it comes 
to the origins of what makes a PC a PC—its graphical user interface, 
windows, the desktop metaphor and icons, and the mouse pointing 
device—the genealogy is usually traced back industrially from Apple 
and Microsoft, and then back to the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center 
(Xerox PARC, for short). This accepted history is embodied in the 
mainstream business literature, general media, and popular culture.
What is less well-known—and serves as the foci of this article—is that 
Xerox PARC along with other pioneers of PC technology were associated 
with a significant government-sponsored thrust in desktop computing. 
The Air Force, Army, Navy, NASA, National Science Foundation, and 
most notably, the Defense Department’s Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA or DARPA)33 aggressively and persistently supported 
technologies key to the PC revolution.
Uncovering this political-economic link provides an important 
corrective to the popular lore surrounding the origins of the 
personal computer. In their emphases on private sector initiative and 
entrepreneurial risk-taking, conventional PC histories conform to 
orthodox market-based explanations of technological and economic 
progress. The role of government in spurring innovation and 
encouraging risk-taking is downplayed if not outright dismissed. In 
contradistinction, this article “brings the state” into the PC realm of 
apparent market purity.4
In making this case, we start mid-story with the Xerox-Apple-
Microsoft connection. Reflecting a balance in political-economic analysis, 
this portion of the article is business-centered as it is important to briefly 
3  The agency was founded in 1958 as ARPA, changed to DARPA (“Defense” added) 
in 1972, reverted back to ARPA in 1993, and then back to DARPA in 1995. The 
acronym used in this article will shift according to the time period under discussion.
4  Echoing the statist literature in political science and sociology. See Evans, P., 
Rueschemeyer, D., and Skocpol, T. (1985). Bringing the State Back In. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press.
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establish what would come of earlier R&D efforts. The article then 
jumps back to the pre-Xerox, pre-commercialization story where the 
government role takes center stage. Before concluding, the penultimate 
section fast forwards by briefly looking ahead to the government’s, 
particularly DARPA’s, continuing influence on personal computing 
with the onset of the twenty-first century.
PARC and HCI
Xerox could have been the IBM of the 90’s… could have been the 
Microsoft of the 90’s. (Steve Jobs, 1996.)5 
Microsoft Windows, the Macintosh, the mouse, the desktop metaphor 
with icons, file directories, and folders—indeed the very notion of 
computing at the individual, personal level—can all in the first (but not 
last) instance be traced directly back to the Xerox PARC Alto computer. 
The first two aforementioned systems were introduced in 1985 and 
1984, respectively,6 while the Alto was completed in 1973.
Before tracing this genealogy, it would be appropriate to briefly 
demarcate what we are tracing—our dependent variable. What the 
layperson calls a “personal computer” is, of course, an integration of a 
plethora of different technologies. A core subset of these technologies—
and the core focus of this article—is what computer scientists call 
“human-computer interface”, or HCI. HCI is concerned with enhancing 
the performance of joint tasks by humans and computers. To improve the 
structure of communication between human and machine, HCI brings 
together (1) the computer science and engineering fields of computer 
graphics, operating systems, programming languages, and software 
development; (2) behavioral science disciplines in communication 
theory, linguistics, learning theory, and cognitive psychology; and (3) 
graphic and industrial arts and design, as well as ergonomics. Examples 
of HCI techniques include keyboard commands; pointing devices; touch 
5  Triumph of the Nerds. (1996). Public Broadcasting System. 12 June.
6  Windows 1.0 was introduced in 1985, but would not qualify as a fully functional 
graphical user interface. While version 1.0 and even version 2.0 had windows 
containing document contents, and while different programs could be open at the 
same time, the windows could not be overlapped (only tiled) and neither utilized 
graphical icons. Only with Windows 3.0 in 1990 would Microsoft offer a functional 
GUI. See Allison, D. (1993). “Bill Gates Interview”, Smithsonian Institution.
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screens and other display technologies; voice, handwriting and gesture 
recognition; eye movement tracking; biological and psychic sensing; 
computer speech; graphical user interfaces; user navigation and menu 
selection tools; windows environments; and desktop metaphors.7 
Ultimately, from the user perspective, HCI technologies result in the 
user-friendliness and “look and feel”—or lack thereof—of our PCs.
HCI technology provided the crucial linkage between two other 
developments in the 1970s that brought us the PC.8 In a top-down 
development, the processing power of mainframe computers was slowly 
being brought to individual users through computer time-sharing.9 The 
computer was still in the basement, but scores of users could tap into its 
resources through remote terminals. While representing a disservice to 
the mainframe’s prowess, simple computer games, such as Spacewar!, 
offered a glimpse of real-time interactive computing. Time-sharing, 
however, could reach only relatively limited numbers of users.
A second, bottom-up development of the 1970s would bring 
individualized computers to users, but handicapped with primitive 
features. Here we have the rise of computing devices cobbled together by 
and offered to electronics hobbyists and enthusiasts. While computers 
such as the Altair 8800 sat on a desktop, their interfaces were very 
rudimentary. To program the Altair, users had to flick a series of toggle 
switches for each program step. Hardly a model of interactivity, these 
machines had neither displays nor keyboards.
The first major effort to develop a broadly functional individualized 
computer with HCI-inspired interactivity and user-friendliness took place 
at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center. PARC was established in 1970 
to provide the technological undergirding for Xerox —the king of paper 
photocopying—to move into the “paperless” world of office computing. 
In the process, PARC became the premier draw for the country’s best 
computer scientists—“like Disneyland for seven-year-olds”.10
7  Association for Computing Machinery, Special Interest Group on Computer-
Human Interaction. (1992). Curricula for Human-Computer Interaction, T. H. Hewitt, 
et al. New York, NY: ACM
8  These two other developments are covered by Ceruzzi, P. E. (1998). A Modern 
History of Computing: 1945–1995. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
9  Computer time-sharing, like the development of Internet and HCI technologies, 
was initiated by government program, specifically by ARPA.
10  Hiltzik, M. (1999). Dealers of Lightning: Xerox PARC and the Dawn of the Computer Age. 
New York, NY: Harper Business. 153.
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PARC’s strategy centered on what it called “distributed interactive 
computing”, and was embodied in the Alto office computer. The Alto 
was “distributed” in that it was all about getting the computer up from 
the basement and on to individual desktops. It was “interactive” both in 
the sense that Altos were to be networked with one another, and in their 
design for real-time responsiveness and user-friendly approachability 
for individual users.11
The Alto was intended for use by one individual with stand-alone 
processing power and memory. It was configured much like today’s 
PC. It had a high-resolution monitor that could display a full-sized 8.5 
by 11-inch page, a keyboard, a three-button mouse, a removable hard 
disk cartridge, and ports for printer and Ethernet connections. What 
today we would call the computer’s tower was an Alto cabinet about 
the size of a portable refrigerator that can be found in today’s college 
dorm rooms.12
The Alto’s monitor was a key feature of its user interface. Beyond 
its full-page dimensions, the Alto monitor trumped the standard-of-
the-day “character generator” displays—which, in typewriter spirit, 
would produce fully formed text characters in a preset font and a preset 
color (usually green). Instead, the Alto could display high-resolution, 
user-defined fonts and graphics. Using now-standard “bit mapping” 
technology, the Alto could turn on and off half a million dots across 
its monitor—essentially turning everything on screen, including text, 
into pictures. Bit mapping also allowed the computer screen to display 
exactly what would be output from a printer—a feature that is known 
as “what you see is what you get” or WYSIWYG.
The Alto’s user friendliness is now almost second nature, but was 
revolutionary in 1973.13 Xerox designers began with the assumption that 
computer users were more interested in getting their work done than 
11  Consistent with the HCI focus of this article, it does not elaborate on the networking 
aspects of the Alto.
12  A picture of the Alto can be seen at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xerox_Alto#/
media/File:Xerox_Alto_mit_Rechner.JPG
13  Smith, D. C., Irby, C., Kimball, R., Verplank, B., and Harslem, E. (1982). “Designing 
the Star User Interface”, Byte 7/4: 242–82; Johnson, J., Roberts, T. L., Verplank, W., 
Smith, D. C., Irby, C. H., Beard, M., and Mackey, K. (1989). “The Xerox Star: A 
Retrospective”, IEEE Computer 22/9: 11–29; Miller, L. H., and Johnson, J. (1996). 
“The Xerox Star: An Influential User Interface Design”, in Human-Computer Interface 
Design: Success Stories, Emerging Methods, and Real-World Context, ed. M. Rudisill, C. 
Lewis, and T. D. McKay. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann. 70–100
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being interested in the computer itself. Therefore, an important Alto 
design principle was to make the computer as invisible and as intuitive 
as possible.
They chose a graphical user interface, or GUI, for personal computing.14 
A graphically simulated office served as a working metaphor. Images 
on screen represented the physical objects of an office—documents, 
folders, file cabinets, in-baskets, out-baskets, waste baskets, mailboxes, 
printers—all on an electronic rendition of a desktop. These images 
or icons could be manipulated with a mouse pointer to simulate the 
physical actions of opening, moving, filing, saving, deleting, etc. The 
goal was to make everything needed visible on screen and subject to 
direct manipulation rather than requiring indirect and memory-taxing 
(not for the computer, but for humans) keystroke combinations.15
More than a decade before the Mac and Microsoft GUIs, the Alto 
had windows to display document contents. Multiple windows could 
be open at the same time, overlapped, and resized; documents could 
integrate text and graphics; and the windows had title bars, mouse-
clickable command buttons, and scroll bars. The Alto had a full slate 
of applications for word processing, graphics (including animation), 
printing, email, and playing music. The Alto operating system even 
allowed for task-switching—the capability to easily and quickly switch 
between programs.
Nearly two thousand Altos were built and used by government, 
industry and universities. A commercial version of the system, renamed 
the Xerox Star, was introduced in 1981—a full three and four years 
ahead of the Mac and Windows, respectively. The Star was marketed 
as “a new personal computer designed for offices intended for business 
professionals who create, analyze and distribute information”.16
By current standards, the Xerox interface did suffer from certain 
limitations. Commands such as “open”, “copy” and “move” required 
a combination of mouse manipulations and special function key 
14  A picture of the Xerox GUI can be seen at https://www.computerhistory.org/
revolution/input-output/14/347/1859
15  Ironically, analysts have pointed out that Xerox pushed the physical desktop 
metaphor too far—requiring cumbersome mouse manipulations where simple 
keyboard commands would have been sufficient (e.g., requiring that a document 
icon be moved over a printer icon instead of a simple key command for printing). 
Miller and Johnson. (1996). “The Xerox Star”, 93.
16  Smith, et al. (1982). “Designing”, 653.
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operations. Resizing windows and moving icons also required mouse 
and function key combinations. Menu bars were at the top of each 
window, rather than a single set of menus at the top of the screen 
as a whole—resulting in the display of multiple and repetitive menu 
labels.
At the same time, and more significantly, the Alto suffered from 
being ahead of its time. While it was marketed as the dream machine 
for the “knowledge worker”, such workers hardly existed in any real 
sense in 1981, let alone in 1973.17 And even if the market existed, the Alto 
was far from a marketable product—with each machine costing over 
$16,000 to build. The resulting commercial demise of the Alto and Star 
is legend in the business world. A popular recounting of this disaster 
was titled Fumbling the Future: How Xerox Invented, then Ignored, the First 
Personal Computer.18
Alto’s Offspring
When Apple sued Microsoft in 1988 for stealing the “look and feel” of its 
Macintosh graphical display to use in Windows, Bill Gates’ defense was 
essentially that both companies had stolen it from Xerox.19
Xerox “fumbling its future” does not mean that its technologies were 
commercial failures. Indeed, many of the PARC and Alto technologies 
were spectacularly commercialized—but just not by Xerox. For instance, 
outside of the HCI area, notable PARC alumni have made market 
blockbusters out of their Xerox work:
• Bob Metcalfe brought his Ethernet work to market by founding 
3Com.
17  Baecker, R. M., and Buxton, W. A. S. (1987). “The Star, the Lisa, and the Macintosh”, 
in Readings in Human-Computer Interaction: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. R. M. 
Baecker and W. A. S. Buxton. Los Altos, CA: Morgan Kaufmann. 649–52. Even 
the Xerox salesforce had difficulty “getting it.” Upon the conclusion of an Alto 
demonstration, one brave soul asked, “Where’s the click?” Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of 
Lightning, 393.
18  Smith, D. K., and Alexander, R. C. (1988). Fumbling the Future: How Xerox Invented, 
then Ignored, the First Personal Computer. New York, NY: W. Morrow. For PARC’s 
commercial fate, see also Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning.
19  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, xxv. Bill Gates has remarked: “Hey, Steve, just 
because you broke into Xerox’s house before I did and took the TV doesn’t mean I 
can’t go in later and take the stereo.” MacWeek, 14 March 1989, p. 1.
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• Charles Geschke and John Warnock have commercialized 
the computer rendering of graphics for laser printing by 
co-founding Adobe Systems.
• Edwin Catmull and Alvy Ray Smith took their computer 
animation work first to Lucasfilm and then co-founded 
Pixar—making the movies Star Trek, Toy Story and A Bug’s Life 
along the way.
When it comes to HCI technology, the Xerox legacy and progeny is 
even greater. In particular, the transfer of technology and, even more 
importantly, the transfer of people from PARC has been crucial to 
developments at both Apple and Microsoft.20
Apple’s Day in the PARC
The flipside of Xerox’s fumbling the PC’s future is the Macintosh story. 
These two stories are, in fact, opposite sides of the same coin. The 
Macintosh story begins when Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO, takes a tour of 
Xerox PARC in December 1979.
In 1979, Apple was concerned it would soon lose its first mover 
advantage in the PC industry. Apple employee Jeff Raskin suggested that 
Xerox PARC held the keys for Apple’s future. In the early 1970s, Raskin 
had spent considerable time at PARC while he was a visiting scholar 
at Stanford’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.21 After Apple arranged 
for Xerox to purchase $1 million dollars of Apple’s skyrocketing shares, 
PARC agreed to show Apple the Alto.
The Alto team made not one, but two presentations—and not just to 
Jobs, but to a dozen of Apple’s leading executives and programmers. 
Upon seeing the Alto, Apple software designer Bruce Daniels declared, 
“That’s it—that’s what we want to build”.22 While no “blueprints” 
20  Other Alto-inspired GUI efforts not covered in this paper include those by Digital 
Research, IBM, and VisiCalc—efforts that did not match the success of the Mac or 
Windows.
21  Jeff Raskin, http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~mac/lore2.html (website no longer active 
at time of publication); Linzmayer, O. W. (1999). Apple Confidential: The Real Story of 
Apple Computer. San Francisco, CA: No Starch Press. 52.
22  Rogers, M. (1983). “The Birth of the Lisa”, Personal Computing, February, 89–94; 
Levy, S. (1994). Insanely Great: The Life and Times of Macintosh. New York, NY: 
Penguin Books (chapter 4).
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were transferred, Apple came away from these sessions with a vision 
of the future of personal computing, and eventually key members of 
the PARC team.
The Xerox visit first inspired the development of the Lisa computer 
system—the Apple computer that immediately preceded the Macintosh. 
The Lisa was in development before the Xerox visit, but it was slated to 
have a non-graphical user interface and a non-bit mapped character-
generator display. It also did not have a mouse. All this changed after 
the Xerox visit. In the words of Apple executive Larry Tesler, the Lisa 
was “completely redefined… only the code name, some of the hardware 
components, and a few of the staff members stayed the same”. From 
the Alto, the Lisa would directly borrow the desktop metaphor, 
pop-up menus, overlapping windows, and scroll bars. After the 1981 
introduction of the Xerox Star, the Lisa team made further changes to 
their GUI including the incorporation of desktop icons. On Apple’s part, 
the Lisa would be the first to introduce the menu bar at the top to the 
screen (instead of menus atop each window), the one-button mouse, 
pull-down menus (point-and-drag mouse movement), and icons that 
could be dragged with the mouse and double-clicked to open.23
Akin to the fate of the Alto, the Lisa was also a commercial failure 
when it was introduced in January 1983. But its graphical user interface 
was transferred directly into the Macintosh. Indeed, PARC-savvy Jeff 
Raskin had begun development of the Mac in Spring 1979. After the 
Xerox visit, Raskin added the mouse to the Mac.24 Beginning in January 
1982, key members of the Alto-inspired Lisa team were transferred to 
the Macintosh division. Lisa software programs for word processing 
and graphics (LisaWrite, LisaDraw) would be converted to the Mac 
(MacWrite, MacDraw). The two product teams were completely merged 
in November 1983, and the Mac was introduced January 1984.25
Besides inspiration, the Xerox influence on Apple took on a second 
major form: the transfer of key PARC personnel to Apple. PARC alumni 
Alan Kay and Larry Tesler were two of the major coups for Apple. 
Alan Kay was PARC’s chief evangelist for personal computing. In his 
23  Linzmayer. (1999). Apple Confidential, 54–56; Miller and Johnson. (1996). “The Xerox 
Star”, 94; Tesler, L. (1985). “The Legacy of the Lisa”, Macworld, September, 17–22; 
Rogers. (1983). “The Birth of the Lisa”.
24  Ceruzzi. (1998). A Modern History of Computing, 273.
25  Tesler. (1985). “The Legacy of the Lisa”; Linzmayer. (1999). Apple Confidential, 57–75.
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1969 dissertation, Kay outlined a Dynabook—a computer the size of a 
notebook with an 8 by 10-inch flat screen, integrated keyboard, all of 2 
inches thick, weighing in at two pounds. He had essentially envisioned 
today’s laptop computer.
For the Alto, which he viewed as an “interim Dynabook”, Kay led 
the development of its overlapping windows capability. The Alto not 
only allowed users to work in and see more than one window at a time, 
but it was the first system that allowed windows to be resized and 
moved—including over one another. This overlapping capability was a 
major advance over the pre-existing standard of tiled multiple windows 
that were fixed in place, and virtually expanded the working space of a 
computer monitor. Kay also inspired the Alto’s pop-up menus—where 
the click of one of the mouse’s buttons would cause menu options to 
appear on screen from which a command (e.g., paste) could be selected.26
In 1980, Kay became chief scientist at Atari, where he applied his 
HCI visions to interactive gaming. In 1984 he became an Apple Fellow, 
and inspired the company’s successful PowerBook laptop computer 
line, and the Newton—the industry’s first personal digital assistant 
(PDA) and forerunner to the Palm Pilot and other handheld computing 
devices. Since 1996, Kay has been a Disney Fellow and Vice President of 
Research and Development at the Walt Disney Company.
Larry Tesler preceded Alan Kay in moving from Xerox to Apple. 
Tesler worked in Kay’s section of PARC, where he was dedicated to 
making computing more intelligible to the average user. For the Alto, 
Tesler designed Gypsy, a powerful word processing program that 
employed a graphical user interface with extensive icons and menus. 
In Gypsy, the mouse could point to and select blocks of text, whereas 
previous applications only used the mouse to position the cursor and 
called for keyboard commands for text selection. As an illustration of 
its user friendliness, Gypsy was the first program to replace commands 
for deleting a block of text and then placing it elsewhere with the simple 
labels of “cut” and “paste”.27
In December 1979, Tesler was one of the two major presenters of 
the Alto to Steve Jobs and company. In July 1980 he would move to 
Apple. Tesler first headed up the Lisa user interface team, then helped 
26  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 224–28.
27  Ibid., 201–03, 207–10.
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design the Macintosh including its one-button mouse, and then led the 
Newton PDA development team. He eventually rose to the position of 
Vice President and Chief Scientist before leaving Apple in 1998 to found 
a software startup.
Kay and Tesler were not alone in making the move from Palo Alto to 
Cupertino, where Apple is headquartered. For instance, Dan Ingalls—
Kay’s right hand man and co-author of one of the Alto’s operating 
system—would follow Kay to Apple. Tom Malloy, who worked on 
word processing programs for the Alto, would go on to Apple and write 
the word processor for the Lisa (LisaWrite). Former Xerox PARCers 
Bruce Horn and Steve Capps would co-write the Macintosh Finder, its 
graphical file directory. Altogether, some fifteen PARC alumni would 
make the move to Apple.28
Microsoft’s Window on Xerox
While the Xerox-Apple story is better known, Microsoft was also a 
major beneficiary of PARC’s work. First, Microsoft Windows drew 
directly from the Alto-inspired Macintosh. Not unlike Jobs’ 1979 visit 
to Xerox, Microsoft CEO Bill Gates visited Apple in 1981. There he saw 
a Mac prototype, and immediately thereafter began development of 
Microsoft’s GUI, Windows. In 1982, Mac prototypes were delivered to 
Microsoft in order for the software company to develop Word and Excel 
for the new machine. At the same time, the prototypes were used to 
guide the development of Windows.
This Mac influence would show up even when Gates expressed 
dissatisfaction at Windows’ early development. The Microsoft CEO 
would complain: “That’s not what a Mac does. I want Mac on the PC, I 
want a Mac on the PC”.29 
To correct the situation, Gates transferred his resident “Macintosh 
wizard”, Neil Konzen, to the Windows team. Having developed 
Microsoft’s initial applications for the Mac, Konzen rewrote much of the 
28  Ibid., 214–15, 217–18. 316–17; Miller and Johnson. (1996). “The Xerox Star”, 76; 
Linzmayer. (1999). Apple Confidential, 54
29  Campbell-Kelly, M., and Asprey, W. (1996). Computer: A History of the Information 
Machine. New York, NY: Basic Books; and Linzmayer. (1999). Apple Confidential, 
136. For an image of the early Windows interface, see https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Windows_1.0#/media/File:Windows1.0.png
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Windows code by emulating the Mac’s internal structure. The results, in 
Konzen’s words, were “Mac knockoffs”. Even certain Mac system errors 
were carried over to the Windows platform.30
While the Mac served as a go-between for Xerox’s influence on 
Microsoft, there were direct Xerox-Microsoft connections as well. To 
begin with, Gates got his tour of PARC and an Alto demonstration in 
1980. Soon thereafter, Microsoft purchased a Xerox Star, the commercial 
version of the Alto. Microsoft did not intend to put the machine to 
operational use. Instead, in the words of one of Microsoft’s leading 
programmers, “we just wanted everybody in the organization to get 
used to the desktop and to the mouse… we used it for education of the 
people”.31
That programmer was Charles Simonyi, who embodies yet another 
type of Xerox influence on Microsoft: PARC alumni who moved from 
Palo Alto to Bellevue and Redmond, Washington, where Microsoft 
has been headquartered. At PARC, Simonyi co-wrote the Alto’s “killer 
app”—Bravo, its first word processor. Bravo was the first program that 
could insert text in the middle of a document, display fancy typefaces, 
number pages, format odd margins, and print almost exactly what was 
on screen,32 and it served as the basis for Tesler’s Gypsy word processor.
Not unlike Larry Tesler’s 1979 presentation to Steve Jobs and 
subsequent move to Apple, it was Simonyi who demonstrated the Alto 
to Gates in November 1980, and subsequently moved to Microsoft 
in February 1981. Joining as Microsoft’s fortieth employee, Simonyi 
essentially “brought Microsoft Word with him”.33 According to 
Gates, Simonyi was specifically brought “on board to help us write 
applications that would eventually become very graphical”,34 and 
Simonyi characterized his mandate as to spread the “PARC virus” in 
30  Wallace, J., and Erickson, J. (1992). Hard Drive: Bill Gates and the Making of the Microsoft 
Empire. New York, NY: Harper Business, 221, 273–74. While corporate rivalry 
has inhibited prominent personnel transfers between the two companies, some 
members of the Mac team would move on to Microsoft. For instance, Susan Kare 
did graphic design work for Windows 3.0 after designing the first icons, typefaces, 
and other graphics for the Macintosh. Linzmayer. (1999). Apple Confidential, 73.
31  Brockman, J. (1997). “Intentional Programming: A Talk with Charles Simonyi”, 
Edge Foundation, 6 June, https://www.edge.org/conversation/charles_simonyi- 
intentional-programming
32  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 198–200, 358–60.
33  Ibid., 395; see also Miller and Johnson. (1996). “The Xerox Star”, 76.
34  Allison, D. (1993). “Bill Gates Interview”, Smithsonian Institution.
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Bellevue.35 As director of advanced product development, Simonyi 
hired and managed the teams developing the entire suite of Microsoft 
applications, including Excel and PowerPoint, as well as Word. Simonyi 
is one of the “seven software samurai” to whom Gates turns for advice, 
and has been a member of the Executive Committee, the company’s 
most senior-level decision-making team.36 When Microsoft’s Research 
Division was established in 1991, Simonyi became its Chief Architect.
While Bill Gates hired Simonyi to lead the development of the 
graphically-oriented Microsoft Office Suite, Gates also tapped a second 
PARC computer scientist to lead the development of the Windows 
operating system: Scott MacGregor. At PARC, MacGregor oversaw 
development of the Xerox Star’s windowing system. In summer 1983, 
Gates recruited MacGregor to became head of the Windows engineering 
team. In MacGregor’s words, “Microsoft was looking for somebody 
who had done this thing before. They didn’t want to reinvent the wheel. 
That’s why they went shopping at Xerox”. In that shopping spree, 
Microsoft would hire others including Dan Lipkie, a Xerox programmer 
who would work on Word as well as Windows.37
Microsoft’s Research Division is the site of Xerox’s continuing 
influence on the software company. At the Microsoft labs, Simonyi has 
been joined by four other of PARC’s leading lights: Chuck Thacker, 
Butler Lampson, Gary Starkweather, and Alvy Ray Smith.38 Thacker, 
the lab’s Director of Advanced Systems, was none other than the chief 
designer of the Xerox Alto. He championed the Alto’s high-resolution 
bit-mapped display over the monochrome green monitors of the day, 
and he designed the Star’s first central processor. Lampson, now a 
Microsoft Distinguished Engineer, first conceived of and started work 
on Alto’s Bravo word processor—work that Simonyi would later pick 
up on. Lampson also designed the second central processor for the Star. 
Starkweather developed the Alto’s laser printer and, in the process, 
launched a whole new industry: desktop publishing. Smith, a Microsoft 
Fellow till 1999, wrote the Alto’s graphics program. Before joining 
Microsoft, Smith would design for Lucasfilm, co-found Pixar, and win 
35  Brockman. (1997). “Intentional Programming”.
36  Wallace and Erickson. (1992). Hard Drive, 369.
37  Wallace and Erickson. (1992). Hard Drive, 253–55.
38  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 397–98.
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two technical Academy Awards. For Microsoft, these PARC alumni 
have worked on advanced programming and graphics, hand-held and 
wireless computing devices, and computer security.
Xerox’s legacy extends, of course, well beyond Apple and Microsoft. 
Its current-day manifestations are innumerable, but two in particular 
merit mention here. Akin to Alan Kay’s move from Xerox to Atari 
(before moving on the Apple), HCI advances have been a key driving 
force behind the interactive gaming industry, with applications ranging 
from game consoles and joy sticks to virtual reality environments. 
The World Wide Web, which began with text-based interfaces like 
Gopher, exploded in popularity only after user-friendly graphical user 
interfaces were employed by the Mosaic and Netscape web browsers. 
And members of the original Macintosh development team are about 
to give the open-source Linux operating system a major shot in the arm 
by applying a user-friendly GUI to the up-and-coming challenger to the 
Windows and Mac OS’s.39
Even without a more comprehensive assessment of Xerox’s legacy 
(a project worthy of an entire piece on its own), its import should not 
be in doubt. That import sets the proper perspective for considering 
the R&D that preceded and led into Xerox’s effort—a task to which we 
now turn.
The Rest of the Story
Silicon Valley. The World Wide Web. Wherever you look in the 
information age, Vannevar Bush was there first.40
The Alto system grew from a vision of the possibilities inherent in 
computing: that computers can be used as tools to help people think 
and communicate. This vision began with Licklider’s dream of man-
computer symbiosis.41
39  Festa, P. (2000). “Apple, AOL Veterans Making Linux Easy”, CNET News.com, 16 
February; Markoff, J. (2000). “Old Apple Macintosh Team Aims to Put Linux on the 
Desktop”, New York Times, 21 February; “The New Face of Open Source OS?”; Norr, 
H. (2000). “A Less Complex Linux”, San Francisco Chronicle, 21 February.
40  Zachary, G. P. (1997). “The Godfather”, Wired, November, 152.
41  Lampson, B. W. (1988). “Personal Distributed Computing: The Alto and Ethernet 
Software”, in A History of Personal Workstations, ed. A. Goldberg. New York, NY: 
Addison-Wesley. 291–344, at 293.
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Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad program is one of the most significant 
developments in human-computer communication.42
While the commercial ramifications of Xerox PARC’s work cannot be 
over emphasized, Xerox was not the sole source of the HCI revolution. 
Just as Apple and Microsoft drew upon Xerox, so too was Xerox the 
beneficiary of the prior work of others.
At this point, the political-economic balance of this account shifts. 
While the narrative thus far has been heavily business-oriented, what 
follows concerns more of a political dynamic. Most of the innovations 
and people discussed thus far were in fact influenced by government-
sponsored initiatives. Those initiatives began with Vannevar Bush, J. C. 
R. Licklider, and Ivan Sutherland.
Vannevar Bush
The Online Encyclopedia Britannica entry for “graphical user interface” 
reads as follows: “There was no one inventor of the GUI; it evolved with 
the help of a series of innovators, each improving on a predecessor’s 
work. The first theorist was Vannevar Bush”.43 The source of this 
attribution was Bush’s vision of a “memex”,
in which an individual stores all his books, records, and communications… 
It consists of a desk… On the top are slanting translucent screens, on 
which material can be projected for convenient reading. There is a 
keyboard, and sets of buttons and levers… if the user inserted 5000 
pages of material a day it would take him hundreds of years to fill the 
repository… If the user wishes to consult a certain book, he taps its code 
on the keyboard, and the title page of the book promptly appears before 
him, projected onto one of his viewing positions… [with] one of the 
levers to the right he runs through the book before him, each page in turn 
being projected at a speed which just allows a recognizing glance at each. 
If he deflects it further to the right, he steps through the book 10 pages at 
a time; still further at 100 pages at a time. Deflection to the left gives him 
42  Norberg, A. L., and O’Neill, J. E. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology: 
Information Processing for the Pentagon, 1962–86. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 36.
43  Levy, S. (1988). “Graphical User Interface”, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/graphical-user-interface. The following 
quotations are taken from Bush, V. (1945). “As We May Think”, Atlantic Monthly, 
July. 
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the same control backwards… he can leave one item in position while he 
calls up another.
Bush went on to consider the memex’s applications:
The lawyer has at his touch the associated opinions and decisions of his 
whole experience, and of the experience of friends and authorities. The 
patent attorney has on call the millions of issued patents, with familiar 
trails to every point of his client’s interest. The physician, puzzled by 
its patient’s reactions, strikes the trail established in studying an earlier 
similar case, and runs rapidly through analogous case histories, with 
side references to the classics for the pertinent anatomy and histology. 
The chemist, struggling with the synthesis of an organic compound, 
has all the chemical literature before him in his laboratory, with trails 
following the analogies of compounds, and side trails to their physical 
and chemical behavior.
This vision of the memex is widely recognized in government, industry, 
and academic circles as the first major articulation of the modern 
personal computer, including hypertext and internet links. Xerox-
Apple alumnus Alan Kay observes that “Bush’s vision of a hyperlinked 
10,000 volume library in a desk had a great impact on the development 
of personal computing”.44 Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide 
Web, notes that “to a large part we have Memexes on our desks today”.45
The memex was not the product of a science fiction writer conjuring 
up visions of the future; nor an entrepreneur toiling away on a garage 
work bench; nor an industrial researcher supported by a well-financed 
corporate laboratory. Instead, Vannevar Bush was a government official. 
More specifically, Vannevar Bush was the Director of Office of Scientific 
Research and Development—the chief science advisor to the President 
of the United States. When Bush envisioned the memex, the President 
was Harry Truman; the date July 1945. 
Between 1941 and 1947, Vannevar Bush served as science advisor to 
both Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. His greatest contribution 
44  Kay, A. (1995). Simex: The Neglected Part of Bush’s Vision. Presentation at “As We 
May Think—A Celebration of Vannevar Bush’s 1945 Vision”, MIT Department of 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. 12–13 October, http://dougengelbart.
org/content/view/258/000/
45  Berners-Lee, T. (1995). Hypertext and Our Collective Destiny. Presentation at “As We 
May Think—A Celebration of Vannevar Bush’s 1945 Vision”, MIT Department of 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. 12–13 October, https://www.w3.org/
Talks/9510_Bush/Talk.html
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in office is highly debatable in both the best and worst of senses. First, 
he organized the 6000-strong scientific enterprise to help prosecute 
the U.S. war effort. While he was not physically in the sands of New 
Mexico, Bush oversaw the Manhattan Project to create the first atomic 
bomb. Second, he established the structure of the country’s postwar 
science and technology effort—including the prominent roles played by 
military R&D, the National Science Foundation, and university-based 
research.46
Then there is the memex. Bush’s vision inspired R&D efforts 
throughout government, industry, and academia. The lead player in 
this R&D was the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).
J. C. R. Licklider
Since its inception in 1958, ARPA has supported both the development of 
military-specific weapons technologies, and more generic technologies 
with the potential for military application. The former includes ballistic 
missile defense and tactical anti-tank weapons technologies, and even 
the M-16 rifle. The latter includes R&D in new materials, novel energy 
sources, and biomedical technologies, as well as computer science.
ARPA began its computer science work in 1962, when it established 
its Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) as one of a half 
dozen technology-specific offices within the agency.47 Starting off with a 
$7 million annual budget, IPTO’s funding was larger than the computer 
research budgets of the rest of the government combined. Over the next 
eight years, the IPTO budget would more than quadruple.
Most of IPTO’s funding went to university research. It is hard to 
imagine now, but before 1962 no formal university computer science 
programs existed. ARPA’s IPTO grants were essential in establishing 
the country’s first graduate programs in computer science, including 
those at MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, Utah, and Carnegie Mellon.48
These and other ARPA-funded programs will be returned to below. 
First, however, we turn our attention to the ARPA official who served 
46  Zachary, G. P. (1997). Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American 
Century. New York: Free Press.
47  IPTO has undergone a number of name changes over the past 40 years, and is 
currently named the Information Innovation Office.
48  Norberg and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology.
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as the guiding light behind this effort—J. C. R. Licklider. As quoted 
above by Xerox PARCer Butler Lampson, the Alto would grow out of 
Licklider’s vision.
J. C. R. Licklider was IPTO’s inaugural director from 1962 to 1964. 
Earlier, as an MIT professor, Licklider “got fired up about the idea 
Vannevar Bush had mentioned in 1945, the concept of a new kind of 
library to fit the world’s new knowledge system”. Licklider’s 1959 book, 
Libraries of the Future, was not only dedicated to Bush but expanded 
upon the memex concept. When he moved on to ARPA, he brought with 
him his “religious conversion” to interactive computing.49
From ARPA, Licklider galvanized the computing research 
community around two pathbreaking concepts. Given the first one—
“the intergalactic network”—it is almost understandable to overlook the 
second. The intergalactic network was “the first concrete proposal for 
establishing a geographically distributed network of computers”.50 As 
initiated by Licklider, the network would first take the form of computer 
time-sharing links and later transform into the ARPANET/Internet.
As consequential as this first concept has been, the second—“man-
computer symbiosis”—is arguably just as profound. Licklider 
came to computing not as a computer scientist, but as an academic 
psychologist. His interest was in how computers could contribute to, 
rather than replace, human cognitive processes. He was concerned that 
the rudimentary user interfaces of computers of the 1950s hindered 
the technology’s true potential. To realize that potential, he called for 
computing advances in real-time processing and interactivity.
He called for advances in the computer’s outward face to its user—
its display—and in how users input instructions into the computer, 
including via graphical input and automatic speech recognition. In 
calling for a “much tighter coupling between man and machine”, 
Licklider sought to realize “interaction with a computer in the same 
way that you think with a colleague whose competence supplements 
you own”.51
49  Rheingold, H. (1985). Tools for Thought: The People and Ideas of the Next Computer 
Revolution. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, http://www.rheingold.com/texts/tft/ 
(chapter 7).
50  Campbell-Kelly and Aspray. (1996). Computer, 288.
51  Licklider, J. C. R. (1960). “Man-Computer Symbiosis”, IRE Transactions on Human 
Factors in Electronics 1: 4–11, https://doi.org/10.1109/thfe2.1960.4503259
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These are all matters of human-computer interface, and Licklider 
defined the HCI agenda for decades to come. ARPA-supported research 
universities not only took part in building Licklider’s “intergalactic 
network”, but they launched major HCI initiatives as well.52
Ivan Sutherland
When Licklider prepared to leave ARPA in 1964, he selected Ivan 
Sutherland to replace him as IPTO director. Sutherland was one of the 
first researchers to take up Licklider’s HCI challenge. His 1962 PhD 
project at MIT, called Sketchpad, was the first-ever computer graphics 
program where the user could make drawings on screen interactively.
Sketchpad is widely recognized as the seminal program that 
started off the entire field of computer graphics.53 But Sutherland’s 
immediate motivation was to advance human-computer interactivity. 
Indeed, the subtitle of his project was “A Man-Machine Graphical 
Communication System”.54 Three features made Sketchpad, as quoted 
above, “one of the most significant developments in human-computer 
communication”.
First, Sketchpad was one of the first computers with a monitor, and a 
user’s work would immediately be represented on screen. This form of 
interactivity is now easy to take for granted, but before Sketchpad, users 
had to wait for a print-out in order to see their work.55
Second, Sketchpad was one of the first computers to use a pointing 
device. A hand-held “light pen” was employed to make drawings. The 
pen would make physical contact with the screen and its “light” would 
be picked up by the computer. Moving the pen would draw lines on 
screen in real-time. The pen could also be used to grab-and-drag images 
as well as rotate, expand or contract an image. A major user interface 
break-through, before Sketchpad users had to express object geometry 
52  More on Licklider can be found in Waldrop, M. M. (2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. 
R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing Personal. New York, NY: Viking 
Press. 
53  Wolfe, Roaslee, ed. (1998). Seminal Graphics: Pioneering Efforts that Shaped the Field. 
New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery. 
54  Sutherland, I. E. (1963). “Sketchpad: A Man-Machine Graphical Communication 
System”, Proceedings of the AFIPS Spring Joint Computer Conference 23: 329–46. See 
also Norberg and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology, 125–28.
55  Wolfe. (1998). Seminal Graphics.
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by typing coordinates on a keyboard. The light pen would later lead to 
today’s mouse.
Third, Sketchpad was the first system with a rudimentary windowing 
system. The Sketchpad screen could be split to produce two work areas 
or windows. One section could, for example, display a close-up view of 
an object in the other section.56
The Sketchpad project was sponsored by the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force. This funding is a reminder that government agencies other than 
ARPA have also supported HCI technology. In this particular case, the 
three military services provided support to Sutherland before IPTO was 
even established.
Licklider hired Sutherland to explicitly carry on IPTO’s HCI work. 
As IPTO director, Sutherland would fund major university programs in 
computer graphics. Besides fueling the burgeoning field of computer-
generated images, this research would provide the foundation for 
computers with “graphical” user interfaces, “picture” icons, and high-
resolution bit-mapped displays. Such displays, interfaces, and icons—
along with Sketchpad-derived windows and pointing devices—would 
be incorporated into the Xerox Alto.
Xerox’s ARPA Brats
Xerox PARC was set up near the Stanford campus. For the next ten years 
the ARPA dream took up residence at PARC.57
A veritable “ARPA Army”—a phrase coined at PARC—would fill the 
ranks of computer scientists at the Xerox. This influx into Xerox was 
led not by a researcher from an ARPA-supported university, but by an 
official direct from ARPA itself: Robert Taylor.
Robert Taylor
J.C.R. Licklider not only selected Ivan Sutherland to replace him as 
director of IPTO, but chose Robert Taylor to be associate director. When 
56  Perry, T., and Voelcker, J. (1989). “Of Mice and Menus: Designing the User-Friendly 
Interface”, IEEE Spectrum 27/9: 46–51, at 48–49.
57  Rose, F. (1989). West of Eden: The End of Innocence at Apple Computer. New York, NY: 
Viking Penguin, 45.
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Sutherland finished his term as director in 1966, Taylor took his place, 
serving through to 1969.
Robert Taylor “heartily subscribed” to Licklider’s vision of computing 
even before joining ARPA.58 In his first year in office, he advanced 
Licklider’s “intergalactic network”, transforming it from a computing 
time-sharing paradigm to a decentralized packet-switching network, 
the ARPANET. While ARPANET’s construction would begin under 
Taylor’s successor at IPTO, Lawrence Roberts, the network’s design was 
completed under Taylor. Taylor was also a true believer in Licklider’s 
theme of “man-computer symbiosis”. Taylor held a NASA research post 
in HCI just prior to joining ARPA, and distributed interactive computing 
became his “sacred cause” as director of IPTO.59 As described in a 1968 
paper, co-authored with Licklider, Taylor envisioned a computer for 
each individual user; each with a large television monitor, a keyboard, 
and “electronic pointer controllers called ‘mice’ [that could] control the 
movements of a tracking pointer on the TV screen”.60 This vision grew 
directly out of the memex of Vannevar Bush. It also presaged Xerox 
PARC’s Alto.
When Xerox started forming its PARC facility in 1970, one of the 
first people they tapped was Robert Taylor. As quoted above, “for the 
next ten years the ARPA dream took up residence at PARC”. Taylor 
has been called “the impresario of computer science at Xerox PARC”.61 
Taylor exercised this influence as head of the Computer Science 
Laboratory (CSL)—the largest of PARC’s four internal labs. It was CSL 
that would become the mecca for fifty of the country’s top computer 
scientists.
In the Spring of 1971, Taylor set CSL’s agenda by proposing that it 
build the machine he had written about in 1968. Two years later, the Alto 
realized his vision. While his researchers would undertake the Alto’s 
design and development, the general concept and the “Alto” name came 
from Taylor.62
58  Norberg and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology, 29.
59  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 19.
60  Licklider, J. C. R., and Taylor, R. (1968). “The Computer as a Communications 
Device”, Science and Technology 76: 21–31.
61  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 3.
62  Smith, D. K., and Alexander, R. C. (1988). Fumbling the Future: How Xerox Invented, 
Then Ignored, The First Personal Computer. New York, NY: W. Morrow, 170.
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Besides setting the lab’s agenda, Taylor hired its staff. He did so 
not by merely reading resumes. Instead, he chose his people from 
ARPA-funded research centers. Indeed, he chose researchers whom 
he, Licklider, and Sutherland had directly and personally supported 
through IPTO.
ARPA’s Army
Stanford, Berkeley, Utah, and SRI were the major programs that Taylor 
drew from. Most of these researchers—and their exploits at Xerox, Apple, 
and/or Microsoft—have already been noted in the first half of this article. 
Here we reveal their university and ARPA pedigrees. To help keep the 
names and affiliations straight, Figure 6-1 graphically displays some of 
these people and places. Stanford’s Artificial Intelligence Laboratory 
was established in 1962 with ARPA funding. Indeed, into the 1970s, 
most, if not all, of the computing research conducted at Stanford would 
be supported by ARPA—as would be the case at Berkeley, Carnegie 
Mellon, Illinois, MIT, UCLA, and Utah.63 Out of Stanford, Taylor hired 
Larry Tesler and Charles Simonyi, who would later go on to Apple and 
Microsoft fame, respectively.
In 1963, IPTO began supporting Project Genie at Berkeley, a 
small-scale computer time-sharing project. Charles Thacker and 
Butler Lampson, as well as Simonyi from Stanford, would first come 
together to work on this project and its commercial Berkeley Computer 
Corporation spinoff.64 While burdened by the main-frame paradigm, 
this experience sparked their pursuit of interactive computing. The 
three were considered among the country’s top programmers, and 
Taylor hired them as a group to join PARC in 1970. Taylor would hire 
others from Berkeley including Peter Deutsch, Ed Fiala, Jim Mitchell, 
and Dick Shoup. Thacker, Lampson, and Simonyi would all end up at 
Microsoft.
One of the Berkeley faculty members that directed Project Genie, 
David Evans, would not go to Xerox. Instead, he remained in academia 
training students, many of whom would make the trek to PARC. This 
is the Utah connection, where Evans became head of the computer 
63  Norberg and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology, 290.
64  Ibid., 102–03; Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 18–19, 68–78.
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science department in 1966. As IPTO director, Taylor would make a $5 
million award to Evans to transform Utah into a center of excellence for 
computer graphics.65 Ivan Sutherland, Taylor’s predecessor and creator 
of the Sketchpad program, would be on the Utah faculty from 1968 to 
1973. Taylor himself would spend a year at Utah between his ARPA and 
PARC tenures.
Taylor would bring to CSL many Utah students including Jim Curry, 
Bob Flegal, Martin Newell, and John Warnock. But the key hire for the 
Alto and HCI at Xerox was Alan Kay in 1972. Kay came to Utah in 1966 
as one of Evans’ first graduate students. At their very first meeting, 
65  Norberg and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology, 137–43.
Fig. 6-1 From ARPA to Windows. (Figure prepared by the author.)
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In designing a system to augment human intelligence, Engelbart 
used Vannevar Bush’s memex concept as an ideal type.68 Over a two-
decade period, Engelbart would develop a computerized personal 
information storage and retrieval system to replace paper and hardcopy 
filing systems. Called NLS (for oN Line System), the system was not a 
personal computer, but rather a networked workstation. It had a large 
video monitor and input devices to manipulate information on screen, 
but it was all cabled into a remote mainframe computer.
Still, NLS made two major contributions to “man-computer 
symbiosis” and HCI. First, it advanced windowing capabilities by being 
able to divide the display screen into four work areas—an improvement 
over the split-screen capability of Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad system. 
The user could now easily shift work from one window to another.69 
Second, NLS introduced a new pointing device to move a cursor within 
and between document windows. Engelbart conducted a series of 
studies comparing various pointing devices including Sketchpad’s light 
pen, track balls, joysticks, and even a knee-switch under the desktop.70 
What he decided upon was a device that “stays put when your hand 
leaves it do something else (type or move a paper) and reaccessing [it] 
68  Rheingold. (1985). Tools for Thought, 260.
69  Oerrt and Voelcker, “Mice and Menus”, 49.
70  English, W. K., Engelbart, D. C., and Melvyn, A. B. (1967). “Display-Selection 
Techniques for Text Manipulation”, IEEE Transactions on Human Factors in Electronics 
8/1: 5–15.
Evans assigned the new student Sutherland’s Sketchpad dissertation. In 
a reaction any professor would die for, Kay has described his reading of 
Sketchpad as “seeing a glimpse of heaven”.66 Kay would try to capture 
a bit of that heaven first in his own dissertation, then at PARC, and later 
at Apple.
One of the major ARPA-supported research centers that has yet to be 
mentioned, and that has made major contributions to the PC industry, 
is the think tank Stanford Research Institute (SRI). SRI was the home of 
computer scientist Douglas Engelbart from 1957 to 1975. Engelbart was 
inspired by Licklider’s notion of augmenting (rather than replacing) 
human intellect via “man-computer symbiosis”. Indeed, Engelbart’s lab 
at SRI was called the Augmentation Research Center.67
66  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 91.
67  Englebart, C. (1994). “Biographical Sketch: Douglas Carl Engelbart”, Bootstrap 
Institute, http://www.dougengelbart.org/content/view/88/45/; Hiltzik. (1999). 
Dealers of Lightning, 63.
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proves quick and free from fumbling… and it doesn’t require a special 
and hard-to-move work surface”.71 
This device is, of course, the mouse. Initially the size of a brick and 
carved out of a block of wood, the underside of Engelbart’s mouse had 
two wheels positioned at right angles to one another that could digitally 
track and convey its position to the computer.72 While the wheels would 
be replaced with a ball, the computer mouse was not invented by Xerox 
in 1973 let alone Apple in 1984. It was created by Engelbart in 1964.
The system described earlier in Robert Taylor’s 1968 paper—a large 
video screen, keyboard, and a mouse—was Engelbart’s NLS. Not only 
did Taylor properly cite Engelbart in that paper, but Engelbart had 
three major connections to Taylor and ARPA. To begin with, Taylor—
while at NASA—provided initial funding for Engelbart’s project. The 
Air Force did as well. Both NASA and the Air Force were interested in 
how operators in their command centers could best interface with their 
computers.73 As in the case of Sutherland’s Sketchpad project, Engelbart 
received support from these other organizations before IPTO was even 
established.
Then, with IPTO’s establishment in 1962, “Douglas Engelbart was 
one of the first persons to apply for funding”.74 Not only did he gain 
IPTO funding, the support would significantly rise during Taylor’s 
tenure. ARPA funding would continue until 1975, and Engelbart’s 
research team would expand from two to nearly fifty. In 1968, ARPA 
and NASA co-sponsored a major presentation of the NLS to the public 
that amazed the wider computing research community.
Then there is the Xerox connection. In the words of Butler Lampson, 
the NLS “made a profound impression on many of the people who 
later developed the Alto”.75 Both the mouse and windows were directly 
incorporated from NLS into the Xerox computer.
Moreover, in what became a running theme, Taylor hired key 
members of the NLS team to come to PARC. Akin to David Evans 
remaining at Utah, Engelbart would not himself make the move to 
71  Levy, S. (1994). Insanely Great: The Life and Times of Macintosh. New York, NY: 
Penguin Books, 41.
72  A picture of the Engelbart mouse can be seen at https://www.computerhistory.org/
revolution/input-output/14/350
73  Norberg and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology, 131.
74  Ceruzzi. (1998). A Modern History of Computing, 260.
75  Lampson. (1988). “Personal Distributed Computing”, 294.
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Xerox. But Taylor did hire Engelbart’s right hand man, Bill English. 
English was NLS’s hardware expert and had done the detailed design 
work on the mouse. Taylor offered English that chance to “reproduce 
NLS, or something like it, at PARC”.76
Another member of the NLS team, Roger Bates, would help develop 
the Alto’s high-resolution bit-mapped display. NLS alumnus Charles 
Irby would help design the user interface for the Xerox Star. Altogether, 
a dozen of Engelbart’s team would make the move to PARC.77 Given 
these hires from SRI and the universities, ARPA-supported research 
would leave an “indelible stamp on almost every major innovation to 
emerge from PARC”.78
Beyond ARPA’s influence on Xerox, it is difficult not to mention 
other major computer scientists that have been supported by IPTO—
including Wesley Clark, Lynn Conway, Michael Dertouzos, Edward 
Feigenbaum, John Hennessy, Daniel Hillis, John McCarthy, Carver 
Mead, Marvin Minsky, Alan Newell, David Patterson, and Raj Reddy. 
Then there are those that have left their mark in the commercial world. 
We have already mentioned Bob Metcalfe of 3COM, John Warnock 
of Adobe Systems, and Edwin Catmull of Lucasfilm and Pixar—all 
of whom came out of PARC. We can now note their earlier ARPA-
backing at Harvard and Utah (last two). To this list we can add Nolan 
Bushnell (Utah), founder of Atari; Jim Clark (Utah), co-founder of 
Silicon Graphics and Netscape; and Bill Joy (Berkeley), co-founder of 
Sun Microsystems.79
But our focus here has been on HCI-specific ARPA-supported 
researchers who made their way to Xerox PARC and then contributed 
to or influenced developments at Apple or Microsoft. Even with these 
restrictors, the ARPA reach is substantial. “ARPA does Windows” is 
more than a catchphrase.
76  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 67; Ceruzzi. (1998). A Modern History of 
Computing, 260.
77  Hiltzik. (1999). Dealers of Lightning, 173. 
78  Ibid., 67.
79  See Computing Research Association. (1997). Computing Research: A National 
Investment for Leadership in the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Computing Research 
Association; National Research Council. (1995). Evolving the High Performance 
Computing and Communications Initiative to Support the Nation’s Information 
Infrastructure. Washington, DC: National Academy Press (chapter 1); and Norberg 
and O’Neill. (1996). Transforming Computer Technology.
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Windows on the Future
The story has now come full circle. Vannevar Bush’s extraordinary 
vision is followed up by ARPA’s Licklider, Sutherland, and Taylor. 
They sponsor the Stanfords, Berkeleys, Utahs and SRIs. Xerox draws 
upon this research and the researchers (plus Taylor). Then Apple and 
Microsoft commercialize Xerox’s work. The rest, as they say, is history.
But the PC revolution does not stop with Windows. And ARPA’s 
hand in matters HCI is not confined just to decades past. Indeed, ARPA’s 
and other direct government support for further advances in personal 
computing continues to this day.
A high-level conference sponsored by Intel in March 2000 illustrates 
this continuing influence. Five hundred of the world’s leading computer 
scientists came together for Intel’s Computing Continuum Conference 
to “define the next era of computing, communication, and interaction 
in the digital world”.80 Three dozen “visionaries” made presentations 
on topics ranging from artificial intelligence to ubiquitous networked 
computing. Table 6-1 lists the five presentations that were organized for 
a panel explicitly on HCI.
80  Intel Computing Continuum Conference. (2000). 15–17 March, https://www.intel.
com/pressroom/archive/releases/2000/cn031500a.htm 
The primary funding sponsors of this leading-edge HCI research 
are identified. Seven sponsors are government agencies (including 
the European Union), and three are industry. Significantly, DARPA 
is a sponsor in four of the five cases; followed by National Science 
Foundation (NSF) sponsorship of three.
The DARPA funding is part of its Human Computer Interaction 
Program. Altogether eleven universities, companies, and government 
labs have been part of this effort. The NSF funding—under its own 
Human Computer Interaction Program—went to thirty-four universities 
by the time this chapter was originally published in 2001. Research 
being undertaken includes work on three-dimensional graphical user 
interfaces; intelligent animated life-like computer characters capable 
of natural face-to-face conversational interaction; and an “intelligent 
room” embedded with vision, speech understanding, multimedia, and 
networked interactive computing systems.
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Table 6-1 Human Interface Panel, March 2000. (Table prepared by the author.)
The eleven DARPA-sponsored projects include important industry 
connections. In addition to major co-sponsors such as Intel, NTT, and 
the Information Technology Research Institute, lower-level funding 
has come from the likes of Acer, America Online, Apple, Discovery 
Communications, GE, Hewlett-Packard, Hughes Research, NCR, NEC, 
Nokia, Philips, Sony, and Toyota. DARPA-sponsored students from 
these on-going HCI projects have gone on to take positions with these 
companies as well as with AT&T Research, Bell Labs, Compaq, Dragon 
Systems, General Magic, IBM Research, Lucent, Microsoft Research, 
Sarnoff, and Silicon Graphics.
The names of the researchers have changed and the number of 
funded universities has grown since the 1960s. While the results will be 
hard to stack up to those of the earlier period, no matter what the results 
the government influence remains pervasive.
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Conclusions
Government funding of advanced human-computer interaction 
technologies built the intellectual capital and trained the research teams 
for pioneer systems that, over a period of 25 years, revolutionized how 
people interact with computers.81
In contrast to the thrust of this argument are sentiments such as that 
quoted at the top of this article. Bill Gates is not alone in holding this 
view. His is the mainstream perspective on the development of the 
PC industry; indeed, of the development of virtually the entire “new 
economy”. Case in point is Tim Draper, who personally provided 
startup capital for Hotmail (the world’s largest email provider), Four11 
(internet white pages directory), and Upside (one of the most widely 
read business technology magazines).
In 1997, Draper penned an editorial that articulated much of Silicon 
Valley’s attitude towards the government—an attitude legitimated by 
the publication in which it appeared, the Wall Street Journal. Draper 
starts by telling us he “earned an MBA from Harvard and an electrical 
engineering degree from Stanford. I worked at Hewlett-Packard 
and Alex. Brown before starting a venture capital firm. My favorite 
periodicals are Upside and the Red Herring, not the Washington Post 
or the Weekly Standard. In my free time I surf the Net; I don’t watch 
Capital Gang or C-SPAN”. Writing under the title, “Silicon Valley 
to Washington—Ignore us, Please”, Draper then shares his view of 
Washington:
We in the high tech business have reason to feel good… Our industry now 
accounts for 11 percent of gross domestic product and a quarter of U.S. 
manufacturing output. We employ more than 4.2 million people, who 
earn almost double the average salary of manufacturing workers. Our 
industry is the biggest reason the U.S. has the world’s most competitive 
economy. We ought to count our blessings that most of our industry is 
2,500 miles from Washington and that most bureaucrats either fear, don’t 
care about or don’t understand technology. And we’ve done just fine 
without their help… Washington doesn’t understand my business, [and] 
81  Card, S. K. (1996). “Pioneers and Settlers: Methods Used in Successful User Interface 
Design”, in Human-Computer Interface Design: Success Stories, Emerging Methods, 
and Real-World Context, ed. M. Rudisill, C. Lewis, P. G. Polson, and T. McKay. San 
Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann Publishers. 122–69, at 164.
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I’d like it to stay that way. The fact is that politicians and government 
bureaucrats can’t help us; they can only get in the way… If the U.S. wants 
more good jobs, better lives, and a stronger economy, the best thing 
lobbyists, bureaucrats and politicians can do is leave us alone.82
“We’ve done fine without their help” and “they can only get in the 
way” are typical of how many “new economy” participants view the 
development of their own industry. This view permeates coverage 
in Fortune and Business Week and the general media. Even the highly 
regarded six-hour PBS documentary on the history of the PC, Triumph of 
the Nerds, overlooks the government connection.83 In contrast, we have 
observations such as those of Stuart Card, quoted at the beginning of 
this section. Card might be in a position to know. He has been with 
Xerox PARC for twenty-five years, and currently heads its User Interface 
Research Group. His comment comes from a fifty-page technical paper 
he compiled on the historical development of HCI.
Card is not alone. Dr. Brad Myers, Senior Research Scientist at 
Carnegie Mellon’s Human Computer Interaction Institute, warns against 
“the mistaken impression that much of the important work in Human-
Computer Interaction occurred in industry”.84 Instead, as computer 
historians Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray have written, 
“almost all the ideas in the modern computer interface emanated from 
laboratories funded by ARPA’s Information Processing Techniques 
Office”.85 Even one of Silicon Valley’s own—Charles Geschke, President 
and co-founder of Adobe Systems—acknowledges that it was ARPA 
support that “has allowed the current PC industry to flourish”.86
Uncovering this political-economic link provides an important 
corrective to the popular lore surrounding the origins of the personal 
computer. This article “brings the state” back into the PC realm of 
apparent market purity. Government support for the development 
of the PC should take its place on a list that includes the Internet, the 
82  Draper, T. (1997). “Silicon Valley to Washington—Ignore us, Please”, Wall Street 
Journal, 4 March, emphasis in original.
83  Myers, B. A. (1968). “A Brief History of Human Computer Interaction Technology”, 
ACM Interactions 5/2, 44–54.
84  Myers. (1968). “A Brief History”.
85  Campbell-Kelly and Aspray. (1996). Computer, 266.
86  Geschke, C. (1999). “The U.S. Environment for Venture Capital and Technology-
Based Start-Ups”, in Harnessing Science and Technology for America’s Economic Future: 
National and Regional Priorities, ed. National Research Council. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press.
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computer chip, and the PC’s bigger brother, the mainframe.87 The federal 
government’s role in supporting the development of the Internet is now 
widely acknowledged. The ARPANET of 1969 was followed by the 
NSFNET of 1985. This support extends to the government’s on-going 
Next Generation Internet project.
The government’s support of the chip industry goes back to military 
R&D funding in the 1940s and procurements into the 1960s by the 
Air Force and NASA of 100 percent of the industry’s production. 
Government support of the chip industry would continue into the 1980s 
and 1990s with the Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Program and 
SEMATECH consortium.
And, of course, Defense and Energy Department support of the 
mainframe and supercomputer industry stretches from the ENIAC of 
1945, IBM’s 1953 Stretch computer, the SAGE computer in 1954, Cray’s 
first supercomputer in 1976, the 1996 Intel teraflop machine, and even 
IBM’s 1997 chess champion Deep Blue. This kind of support continues 
today with government programs such as the High-Performance 
Computing and Communication Initiative and the Accelerated Strategic 
Computing Initiative.
The Internet, the computer chip, the mainframe, and the PC: together, 
these four innovations define the information technology revolution 
that has fueled the new economy of the twenty-first century. No doubt 
university and corporate researchers, as well as private entrepreneurs, 
have made this revolution possible. But popular mythology, corporate 
P.R., and political ideology aside, credit also goes to government.
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7. Rethinking the Role of the 
State in Technology Development: 
DARPA and the Case for Embedded 
Network Governance1
Erica R. H. Fuchs
1. Introduction
Debates on the appropriate role for government in technology policy 
often fall into two camps—proponents of free markets; and proponents 
of government choosing technology winners. Among those who favor 
a strong role for government, most view the state’s role as limited to 
facilitating technology investment through tax policy, subsidies, and 
funding for basic research. A few argue for coordination of technology 
investment across the many arms of government. In search of this 
coordination, these few often turn to top-down bureaucracy. What is 
missing from these debates, however, is an alternative government role 
that has existed for the past fifty years in the U.S.: the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency, or DARPA.
Staffed at any moment with little more than one hundred people 
and $3 billion with which to stimulate U.S. innovation, this small arm 
of government charged with “preventing technological surprises” has 
1  This chapter was originally published in 2010, in Research Policy Volume 39/9: 1133–47. 
© Erica R. H. Fuchs, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.07
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met with fame and controversy beyond what its size would suggest. 
Historians have attributed to DARPA creation of everything from 
the Internet,2 and the personal computer,3 to the laser4 and Microsoft 
Windows.5 DARPA has appeared on the pages of Playboy Magazine,6 
and the screen of the popular television show, The West Wing.7 Most 
pertinently, among those who study national innovation systems, 
DARPA has come to be seen as the pioneer of the methods now used 
broadly in what is called the U.S. Developmental Network State.8 As a 
consequence, today, agencies ranging from the intelligence community 
(ARDA—1998, IARPA—2006),9 to the Department of Homeland Security 
(HSARPA—2002), to the Department of Energy (ARPA-E—2007), all 
seem to want their own “ARPA”.
Despite such past success, between 2001 and 2008 DARPA underwent 
tremendous change. This change, initiated by director Tony Tether, 
brought on an outcry from the computing community—one of the primary 
benefactors and success stories of DARPA.10 This criticism suggested that 
DARPA was no longer “the old DARPA”. An in-depth look at history, 
however, shows that such change, and subsequent criticism, as occurred 
under Tether were not new. Rather, over the past decades, DARPA has 
2  Newman, N. (2002). Net Loss: Internet Prophets, Private Profits, and the Costs to 
Community. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
3  Allan, R. (2001). A History of the Personal Computer. Ontario, CA: Allan Publishing. 
4  Bromberg, J. (1991). The Laser in America, 1950–70. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
5  See Fong’s chapter above (Chapter 6). 
6  Sedgwick, J. (1991). “The Men from DARPA”, Playboy 38 (August), at 108, 122, 
154–56.
7  Graves, A. (2004). “The Stormy Present”, The West Wing. National Broadcasting 
Company. 7 January.
8  Block, F. (2007). “Swimming against the Current: The Hidden Developmental 
State in the U.S.”, Politics and Society 36/2: 169–206, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0032329208318731; McCray, W. P. (2009). “From Lab to iPod: A Story 
of Discovery and Commercialization in the post-Cold War Era”, Technology and 
Culture 50/1: 58–81, https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.0.0222
9  The Advanced Research and Development Activity (ARDA) was created in 
1998, and modeled after DARPA. ARDA’s name was changed to the Disruptive 
Technologies Office (DTO) in 2006. In December 2007, ARDA/DTO was folded into 
the newly created IARPA.
10  Computing Research Community. (2005). Joint Statement of the Computing Research 
Community. House Science Committee Hearing on the Future of Computer Science 
Research in the U.S. Washington, DC; Lazowska, E., and Patterson, D. (2005). 
“An Endless Frontier Postponed”, Science 308/5723: 757, https://doi.org/10.1126/
science.1113963; Markoff, J. (2005). “Pentagon Redirects its Research Dollars”, New 
York Times, 2 April. 
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gone through repeated shifts in its focus and its internal governance 
structures. This dynamic presents a puzzle—with so much change, what 
then is the DARPA model that its imitators should be copying?
To answer this question, at least in part, this paper focuses on the 
period immediately before and after the most recent changes within 
DARPA. Drawing on over fifty interviews, the paper uses grounded 
theory-building methods11 to uncover the processes used by DARPA 
program managers to influence technology trajectories in the U.S., and 
how those processes may have changed during Tether’s directorship. 
The paper focuses on the involvement of DARPA’s Microsystems 
Technology Office (MTO) in the development of four semiconductor 
materials technologies critical to the converging telecom and computing 
industry and to meeting the performance targets set by Moore’s Law.
The telecom and computing industries provide a useful example 
of industrial sectors traditionally supported by government funding 
and in particular by DARPA.12 In addition, the telecom and computing 
industries are a classic example of sectors that have undergone a recent 
decline in corporate R&D labs and a shift to a vertically fragmented 
industry structure, a phenomenon experienced more broadly in the 
U.S. innovation eco-system.13 Notably, despite the dramatic differences 
between DARPA from 1992 to 2001 versus from 2001 to 2008, during 
both time periods, the telecom and computing industries had already 
undergone vertical disintegration.
The results of this research suggest that past studies have, by focusing 
on DARPA’s culture and structure, overlooked a set of lasting, informal 
institutions among DARPA program managers. In the case of DARPA’s 
Microsystems Technology Office, what changed under Tether was not 
the processes used by the program managers, but rather the situations in 
which program managers apply these processes. Prior to 2001, DARPA’s 
processes for seeding and encouraging new technology trajectories 
11  Glasner, B., and Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies of 
Qualitative Research. London, UK: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson. Eisenhardt, K. (1989). 
“Building Theories from Case Study Research”, Academy of Management Review 
14/4: 532–50, https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1989.4308385 
12  Flamm, K. (1988). Creating the Computer: Government, Industry, and High Technology. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.
13  Mowery, D. C. (1999). America’s Industrial Resurgence? An Overview. U.S. Industry in 
2000: Studies in Competitive Performance. National Academy Press, Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press, 1–16.
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involved (1) bringing star scientists largely from academia together to 
brain-storm new technology directions, (2) seed funding research themes 
common across disconnected star researchers, (3) encouraging early 
knowledge-sharing between these star researchers through required 
workshops, and (4) providing third-party validation for new technology 
directions to external funding agencies and industry. These processes 
support the sources of, knowledge flows around, and development of 
social networks necessary for initiating new technology directions in 
the research community. In contrast, since 2001, the DARPA program 
manager’s processes for coordinating technology directions involve (1) 
orchestrating the involvement of established vendors with academics 
and startups, (2) supporting knowledge-sharing between industry 
competitors through invite-only workshops, (3) providing third-party 
validation of new technology directions, and (4) supporting technology 
platform leadership at the system level. These new processes support 
the coordination of technology development within industry across a 
vertically fragmented industrial ecosystem such that the technology 
develops in line with longer term commercial and military goals.
These results suggest that, rather than being forced to choose 
between the extremes of free-markets or the heavy-hand of bureaucratic 
government, there is a third alternative for government support 
of cutting-edge technology development. In this third alternative, 
embedded government agents—who gain knowledge centrality and 
social capital in their role as DARPA program managers—are able 
to re-architect social networks14 among researchers so as to influence 
new technology directions. In doing so, these embedded agents are in 
constant contact with the research community, understanding emerging 
themes, matching these emerging themes to military needs, betting on 
the right people, bringing together disconnected researchers, standing 
up competing technologies against each other, and maintaining the 
systems-level perspective critical to orchestrate these disparate research 
activities spread throughout our national innovation ecosystem.
14  In this paper, the phrase “re-architect social networks” encompasses all activities 
in which DARPA program managers bring together disconnected or less connected 
members of the research community, subsequently building active research 
communities, and thereby providing validation of technology directions to achieve 
organizational goals. Section 5. in this chapter (“Results and Discussion”) unpacks 
the full range of activities engaged in by DARPA under the umbrella of this phrase.
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2. The Developmental Network State
Debates on the appropriate role for the state in science and technology 
development have continued for over two hundred years.15 In the 
U.S., even when a role for the state is acknowledged, the appropriate 
government function is often viewed as influencing the volume, not the 
direction of investment.16 Under Keynesian thought, “economic policy 
meant manipulating spending and taxation, money and credit”, not 
coordination of technology development.17 And yet, a host of literature 
documents alternative roles for the State in technology development 
beyond manipulation of spending and regulation. 
One categorization of this literature is to split it into two types of 
theories—those that depict a Weberian-style hierarchy or “developmental 
bureaucratic state”; and those that argue for “experimental federalism”, 
“flexible developmental state”, “developmental network state”, 
or “networked polity”.18 Whereas the “Bureaucratic State” evokes 
descriptions of “centralized command-and-control” and “top-down 
policies” leveraging “government-based research and firm subsidies 
to develop local expertise in targeted industries;” the “networked” 
alternative is often described as “decentralized and distributed” with 
“mutual adjustment” and a focus on facilitating “building trust” and 
“coordination and cooperation among relevant parties”.19 In both 
governance forms, writers argue that to be successful, public officials 
must have “embedded autonomy”—i.e. be “embedded in a concrete set 
of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized 
15  Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
London: Metheun & Co.
16  Graham, O. (1992). Losing Time: The Industrial Policy Debate. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
17  Ibid.
18  Ansell, C., (2000). “The Networked Polity: Regional Development in Western 
Europe”, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13/3: 
303–33, https://doi.org/10.1111/0952-1895.00136; Block. (2007). “Swimming against 
the Current”; Breznitz, D. (2007). Innovation and the State. New Haven, RI: Yale 
University Press.
19  Sabel, C. (1993). “Studied Trust: Building New Forms of Cooperation in a 
Volatile Economy”, Human Relations 46/9: 1133–70, https://doi.org/10.1177/ 
001872679304600907; Ansell. (2000). “The Networked Polity”; O’Riain, S. (2004). 
Politics of High-Tech Growth: Developmental Network States in the Global Economy. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press; Breznitz. (2007). Innovation and the 
State.
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channels for the continued negotiation and renegotiation of goals and 
policies”.20 
In describing the networked polity, Chris Ansell proposes “that 
the state can operate as a liaison or broker in creating networks and 
empowering nonstate actors, especially when state actors occupy a 
central position in these networks”.21 The existing network literature 
helps us understand the emergence and consequences of being a 
broker. According to Ronald Burt,22 a broker is an individual who 
forms the only link between otherwise disconnected actors. Lee 
Fleming and David Waguespack add to this definition, distinguishing 
between brokers and boundary spanners.23 Here, Fleming and 
Waguespack’s boundary spanners are individuals who span 
different theoretical or organizational areas, but need not be the only 
individual playing that role. Thus, while all brokers are boundary 
spanners, not all boundary spanners broker.24 Notably, neither Burt 
nor Fleming gives agency to the broker or boundary spanner. While 
Burt focuses on how the structure of the network puts the broker in 
a position of power, Fleming and Waguespack focus on how existing 
human and social capital lead to individuals emerging as leaders in 
a community.25 In her qualitative field study, Natalia Levina brings 
in this agency.26 Specifically, she suggests that to create a new field, 
boundary-spanners must produce and use objects that become locally 
useful to both fields and acquire a common identity.27 However, 
20  Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press; Ansell. (2000). “The Networked Polity”.
21  Ansell. (2000). “The Networked Polity”.
22  Burt, R. (1992). Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.
23  Fleming, L., and Waguespack, D. (2007). “Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and 
Leadership in Open Innovation Communities”, Organization Science 18/2: 165–80, 
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1060.0242
24  Fleming and Waguespack. (2007). “Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and 
Leadership”.
25  Fleming and Waguespack. (2007). “Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and 
Leadership”.
26  Levina, N. (2005). “The Emergence of Boundary Spanning Competence in Practice: 
Implications for Implementation and Use of Information Systems”, MIS Quarterly 
29/2: 335–63, https://doi.org/10.2307/25148682
27  According to Levina, boundary objects are artifacts such as physical prototypes, 
engineering sketches, or standardized reporting forms that can span beyond the 
physical, temporal, or social limitations of an individual boundary spanner. A 
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while Levina provides practical insights into the boundary-spanning 
role, her boundary-spanner remains an inside member of the focus 
community.
In contrast to this earlier work, recent research has begun to 
explore network plasticity—or the ability of managers to change social 
networks to achieve organizational objectives.28 In contrast to structural 
theories, which focus on how network structures create constraints and 
opportunities for organizational actors, or naturalistic theories, which 
focus on how spontaneous forces shape network dynamics, these new 
agency theories focus on network change agents who sit outside and 
act upon the community or network of focus.29 For example, in their 
study of Levi’s jeans, Lester and Piore suggest that in the early, open 
ended stages of innovation, R&D managers must act as “cocktail 
hostesses”, bringing together the correct parties to the table, and 
helping facilitate the flow of conversation in order to be successful 
in their goal of promoting innovative new ideas.30 Likewise, in his 
longitudinal study of eight technology collaborations, Jason P. Davis 
found that managers of successful collaborations prune networks of 
existing ties that are information bottlenecks in the emerging network 
collaboration and, rather than rely on social processes, remake these 
networks with competency pairing, which forms ties between actors 
with complementary knowledge across organizational boundaries.31 
This new research, in which managers have agency to change the shape 
of the existing network to achieve organizational objectives, suggests 
that a different, and more fundamental role may exist for the state in 
influencing technology development. Describing the role of the state in 
regional development in Western Europe, Ansell writes, “the state does 
boundary object as locally useful if it is incorporated into practice in multiple of the 
fields it spans. A boundary object has a common identity if it is typical enough to 
be readily recognized in both fields. For example, computer aided design (CAD) 
software is useful and common to both the photonic and electronic semiconductor 
communities (Levina. (2005). “The Emergence of Boundary Spanning Competence”).
28  Davis, J. P. (2009). “Network Dynamics of Exploration and Exploitation: Pruning 
and Pairing Processes in Collaborative Innovation”, MIT Working Paper.
29  Ibid.
30  Lester, R. K., and Piore, M. J. (2004). Innovation: The Missing Dimension. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press.
31  Davis. (2009). “Network Dynamics”.
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not simply act as a mediator or coordinator, but also actively tries to 
create relationships between third-party actors”.32
While the existing network polity literature hints of such activities 
by the state, the empirical examples of the networked state contained 
therein are surprisingly similar. The majority of the examples are of the 
government playing a role in industrial or technology development 
in industrializing nations in the process of catch-up.33 In the few 
examples from developed countries, the role of the state is to connect 
firms to enable incremental innovation, support collaborative learning 
among firms, and help smaller firms catch-up, primarily in the context 
of regional economic development or upgrading in manufacturing.34 
In nearly all examples, the state acts either by linking firms to facilitate 
increased economic transactions, dissemination of knowledge, 
and collaborative learning,35 or by linking individuals to build 
communities.36 Throughout these examples the state lacks an active 
role in identifying and influencing technology directions. Instead, the 
state, as a central node in the network, helps create network linkages, 
disseminate knowledge, or act as the breeding ground for communities 
without influencing the direction or content of discussions. To find 
an example of the state influencing technology directions one must 
turn to Japan—a country often characterized as a “bureaucratic” 
32  Ansell. (2009). “The Networked Polity”.
33  Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 
1925–1975. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Fransman, M. (1993). The 
Market and Beyond: Information Technology in Japan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press; Amsden, A., and Chu, W. (2003). Beyond Late Development: Taiwan’s 
Upgrading Policies. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press; O’Riain. (2004). Politics of High-
Tech Growth; Breznitz. (2007). Innovation and the State.
34  Sabel, C. (1996). “A Measure of Federalism: Assessing Manufacturing Technology 
Centers”, Research Policy 25/2: 281–307, https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(95)00851-
9; McEvily, B., and Zaheer, A. (1999). “Bridging Ties: A Source of Firm Heterogeneity 
in Competitive Capabilities”, Strategic Management Journal 20: 1133–56, https://doi.
org/10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199912)20:12%3C1133::aid-smj74%3E3.0.co;2–7; Ansell. 
(2000). “The Networked Polity”; Whitford, J. (2005). The New Old Economy: Networks, 
Institutions, and the Organizational Transformation of American Manufacturing. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
35  Ansell. (2000). “The Networked Polity”; Amsden and Chu. (2003). Beyond Late 
Development; O’Riain. (2004). Politics of High-Tech Growth; Whitford. (2005). The New 
Old Economy.
36  Breznitz, D. (2005). “Collaborative Public Space in a National Innovation System: A 
Case Study of the Israeli Military’s Impact on the Software Industry”, Industry and 
Innovation 12/1: 31–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/1366271042000339058
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development state that chooses technology winners. And yet, Japan’s 
facilitation of research cooperation between competing firms echoes 
many of the themes written in the literature on the networked polity.37 
Indeed, the literature on the Japanese government goes farther than 
what can be found in the networked polity literature on Europe, the 
U.S., and industrializing nations.
Daniel Okimoto describes the importance of the Japanese 
government’s focus on working with companies on consensus 
building,38 and on articulating long-term vision in the development of 
new technologies.39 Relatedly, Martin Fransman describes the Japanese 
government’s self-identified role in helping firms overcome the 
downfalls of “bounded vision” 40—i.e. the idea that different kinds of 
organizations (a) receive different kinds of information as the results of 
their primary activities, and (b) are limited in what they search for and 
“see” by the overall objectives of the organization. Here, according to 
Fransman, Japan believes that the limitations in the vision of for-profit 
firms and the vision of the government can be overcome by bringing 
the two together.41 Both of these themes are echoed in the case study 
presented here on DARPA.
Of course, organizational forms other than the state can also 
facilitate the connecting of disconnected agents and architect 
networks. As suggested by Dan Breznitz’s example of military 
training in Israel,42 education and training—such as being in common 
graduate programs—can build scientific communities and long-lasting 
networks. Conferences can act as venues for existing communities 
to contest and form agreement around the viability of competing 
technology directions.43 Firms, such as Intel, can orchestrate the 
co-development of technologically interdependent platforms across 
37  Johnson. (1982). MITI and the Japanese Miracle; Fransman. (1993). The Market and 
Beyond.
38  Okimoto, D. (1987). Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial Technology for 
High Technology. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
39  Ibid.
40  Fransman. (1993). The Market and Beyond.
41  Ibid.
42  Breznitz. (2005). “Collaborative Public Space”.
43  Garud, R. (2008). “Conferences as Venues for the Configuration of Emerging 
Organizational Fields: The Case of Cochlear Implants”, Journal of Management 
Studies 45/6: 1061–88, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2008.00783.x
188 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
firms, universities, and government labs as is necessary to continue 
to advance their specific business model.44 None of the above pieces, 
however, are by themselves sufficient to seed and develop new 
technology directions that meet needs beyond the short-term market 
demands that drive firms. While communities developed through 
education and training may have common backgrounds, they do not, 
in and of themselves, have direction. While conferences can act as 
direction deciders, for a conference to play this role, the community 
must already exist. Finally, while firms may be able to play many of 
these roles as platform leaders, they will not have the same incentives 
as government (having a goal of profits rather than national security, 
economic growth, and social welfare), and their “vision”45 will be 
more short-term.
In this chapter, I leverage extensive empirical data to unpack an 
active, network-changing role of the state that goes beyond the previous 
literature on the place and application of a networked polity. First, I 
focus on cutting-edge, new technology development. In particular, I 
describe how in the development of new technologies, the state need 
not stop at merely bringing the appropriate actors together, nor must it 
go so far as choosing “focus industries” or “technology winners”, but 
rather it can leverage its knowledge centrality and ability to connect 
disconnected actors to identify and influence new technology directions 
that achieve its organizational goals. 
Further, I describe a state that, in the development of a single new 
technology, leverages all of the earlier-described roles of network 
governance—from building new communities to community 
consensus-making on directions, to platform leadership outside of the 
constraints of firm incentives—to achieve its goals. Finally, I show that 
to find such a networked polity influencing technology development 
we need not look to Japan or to the late industrializing nations, but 
rather that this networked polity already exists in the U.S. To unpack 
existing practices, I turn to the pioneer of the U.S. Developmental 
Network State, DARPA.46
44  Gawer, A., and Cusumano, M. A. (2002). Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, 
and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
45  Fransman. (1993). The Market and Beyond.
46  Block. (2007). “Swimming against the Current”.
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3. The Changing Faces  
of DARPA
Long-time defense analyst Richard Van Atta writes, “There is not 
and should not be a singular answer on ‘what is DARPA’—and if 
someone tells you that [there is], they don’t understand DARPA”.47 
And yet, with so much success, it has been hard for analysts not to try 
to pin down the “DARPA model”. Van Atta himself summarizes the 
DARPA organizational environment into three key characteristics: (1) 
it is independent from service R&D organizations, (2) it is a lean, agile 
organization with a risk-taking culture, and (3) it is idea-driven and 
outcome-oriented.48
These themes are echoed in DARPA’s self-described twelve 
organizing elements, along with two additional themes—a focus on 
hiring quality people (“an eclectic, world-class technical staff”), and 
the importance of DARPA’s role in connecting collaborators.49 Others 
have suggested that DARPA’s “single customer” (the military) and 
“clear mission” (enhancing U.S. military capabilities) is a critical aspect 
of the DARPA model.50 And yet, as shown in the history that follows, 
the emergence, interpretation and actualization of these organizational 
features has evolved dramatically over the decades since DARPA’s 
creation in 1958. In many ways, these changes can be grouped into 
decade-based shifts, as shown in Table 7-1. In this paper, I focus on the 
shift initiated in 2001 by Tony Tether. To understand this shift, however, 
it is necessary to look back at the other shifts within DARPA across the 
previous decades.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was founded 
under President Eisenhower in February 1958 by Public Law 85–325 
and Department of Defense Directive 5105.41, as a direct consequence 
47  Van Atta, R. H. (2007). Energy Research and the “DARPA Model”. Subcommittee on 
Energy and Environment, Committee on Science and Technology. Washington, DC: 
U.S. House of Representatives, 9.
48  Ibid.
49  Bonvillian, W. B. (2006). “Power Play, The DARPA Model and U.S. Energy Policy”, 
The American Interest 2/2, November/December, 39–48, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2006/11/01/power-play/
50  Mowery, D. C. (2006). Lessons from the History of Federal R&D Policy for an “Energy 
ARPA”. Washington, DC: Committee on Science.
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of the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957.51 Initially, ARPA was 
charged with preventing technological surprises such as Sputnik.52 
Many blamed the advent of Sputnik on the rivalry at the time 
between the military services, and ARPA was set up to cut through 
that rivalry. After its founding, ARPA’s first priority was to oversee 
space activities until NASA was up and running and to screen new 
technological possibilities, shutting down those without merit.53 By 
1960, all of ARPA’s civilian programs were transferred to the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and all of its military 
space programs were transferred to individual Services. At this point, 
ARPA was forced to face the question of its longer-term role. President 
Eisenhower had always insisted that the Cold War was fundamentally 
a contest between two economic systems, and that it would be won 
or lost economically, not militarily.54 This perspective, in which the 
distinction between military and civilian technology was blurred, 
would stay with ARPA throughout the 1960s.
With space activity oversight behind it, ARPA focused its energies 
on ballistic missile defense, nuclear test detection, propellants, and 
materials.55 It was at this time that ARPA took on the role of bringing 
along military ideas that other segments of the nation would not or 
could not develop, and carrying them to proof-of-concept.56 ARPA’s 
goal was then to transition the technology out of the laboratory and into 
the hands of users or producers who would bring it to full adoption and 
exploitation.57
51  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution: Government Support for 
Computing Research. Computer Science and Telecommunications Board. History, 
Commission on Physical Sciences Mathematics and Applications. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press.
52  Ibid.
53  Flamm, K. (1987). Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International 
Competition. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute; Roland, A. (2002). Strategic 
Computing: DARPA and the Quest for Machine Intelligence 1983–93. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press.
54  Roland. (2002). Strategic Computing.
55  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution. 
56  Roland. (2002). Strategic Computing. 
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ARPA’s independent status not only insulated it from established service 
interests, but also tended to foster radical ideas and keep the agency 
tuned to basic research questions.58 When the agency-supported work 
became too much like systems development, it ran the risk of treading 
on the territory of a specific service.59 ARPA also established in the 1960s 
its critical organizational infrastructure and management style: a small, 
high-quality, managerial staff, supported by scientists and engineers on 
rotation from industry and academia, successfully employing existing 
DOD laboratories and contractors (rather that creating its own research 
facilities), to build solid programs in new, complex fields.60 Finally, 
ARPA emerged as an agency extremely sensitive to the personality and 
vision of its director.61
Following Army Brigadier General Austin Betts,62 Jack Ruina became 
DARPA’s third director in 1961 at the same time as President Kennedy 
took office. As director, Ruina cemented the agency’s reputation as an 
elite, scientifically respected institution devoted to basic, long-term 
research projects. Ruina believed that independence and intellectual 
quality were critical to attracting the best people, both to ARPA as 
an organization and to ARPA-sponsored projects.63 A Professor of 
Electrical Engineering on leave from the University of Illinois, Ruina 
valued scientific and technical merit above immediate relevance to 
the military.64 During his tenure, Ruina decentralized management 
at ARPA, and began the tradition of relying heavily on independent 
office directors and program managers to run research programs. To 
meet his goals for the agency, Ruina encouraged creative use of existing 
Department of Defense managerial mechanisms including “no-year 
58  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution. 
59  Ibid.
60  Barber Associates, R. (1975). The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958–1974. 
Report prepared for the Advanced Projects Research Agency. Springfield, VA: 
Defense Technical Information Center; National Research Council. (1999). Funding 
a Revolution.
61  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution. 
62  Betts, the second ARPA director, had suffered under the perception within the 
Pentagon that he favored his own service agency. On his recommendation, all 
subsequent ARPA/DARPA directors have been civilians (Roland. (2002). Strategic 
Computing).
63  Barber Associates. (1975). Advanced Research Projects Agency; National Research 
Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution.
64  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution; MIT. (2009). “Research 
Affiliates: Jack Ruina”, MIT Security Studies Program.
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money”, unsolicited proposals, sole-source procurement, and multi-
year forward funding.65 Through the mid-1960s, DARPA remained 
committed to supporting basic research with long-term importance, 
even if there was no immediate military application.66
By the 1970s, however, the war in Vietnam had become the driving 
force at DARPA, tending to redirect research towards military purposes 
and raising concerns about the effect of defense funding on university 
research. Under President Richard Nixon, Congress forbade military 
funding for any research that did not have a “direct or apparent 
relationship to a specific military function or operations”.67 The 
legislation, which was enacted into law as the Mansfield Amendment to 
the Defense Authorization Act of 1970 (Public Law 19–121), was short-
lived, but had the longer-term impact of shortening the time horizons 
for government research support, and in particular defense research.68 
In keeping with the political times, ARPA’s name was officially changed 
to DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) in 1972. 
Then, in 1975, George Heilmeier became director of DARPA.69 Under 
Heilmeier’s directorship, all proposals needed to address six questions: 
(1) what are the limitations of current practice, (2) what is the current 
state of technology, (3) what is new about these ideas, (4) what would be 
the measure of success, (5) what are the milestones and the “mid-term 
exams,” and (6) how will I know you are making progress. In contrast 
to Ruina, Heilmeier led with a heavy hand, giving all DARPA orders 
a “wire brushing” to ensure that they had concrete “deliverables” and 
“milestones”.70 In short, Heilmeier viewed DARPA as a mission agency, 
whose goal was to fund research that directly supported the mission of 
the DOD.71
In the 1980s, with the Vietnam War over, defense concerns gave way 
to industrial competitiveness as the primary driver of research policy. 
The U.S. increasingly feared that the microelectronics and computer 
industries would go the way of the auto industry—to Japan. These fears 
were not unfounded. By the end of the 1980s Japanese semiconductor 
65  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution.
66  Flamm. (1987). Targeting the Computer.
67  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution, 112.
68  Ibid.
69  Ibid.
70  Roland. (2002). Strategic Computing.
71  Roland. (2002). Strategic Computing.
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manufacturing equipment suppliers were gaining market share at a rate 
of 3.1 percent a year, and U.S. semiconductor manufacturers planned 
to purchase the majority of their equipment from Japanese suppliers.72 
Given the heavy-handed role of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), later renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI), helping companies cooperate on new markets 
and technologies, there were increasing cries in the U.S. for government 
action.73
In 1984, the National Cooperative Research Act exempted research 
consortia from some antitrust laws and further facilitated collaborations. 
Then, in 1987, fourteen U.S. semiconductor companies joined a not-
for-profit venture, SEMATECH, to improve domestic semiconductor 
manufacturing. The next year, the federal government appropriated $100 
million annually for the next five years to match the industrial funding. 
DARPA had since the late 1970s been supporting the development of 
“silicon foundry” capabilities to allow cost-effective fabrication of new 
types of integrated electronic devices by designers lacking easy access to 
costly production facilities.74 With semiconductor manufacturing seen 
as vital to defense technology, the SEMATECH money was channeled 
through DARPA.75
This paper begins its story in the 1990s. During this period, the 
U.S.’s focus on international competitiveness grew, further distancing 
DARPA from its role with the military. In 1992, Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney announced “a new, post-Cold War DOD strategy of spending 
less on procurement of new military systems, while maintaining funding 
for R&D to develop new technologies for building future systems and 
for upgrading existing systems”.76 The next year, the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) wrote, “Early stages of R&D, 
in which ARPA is most heavily involved (basic research through 
technology demonstration), will probably be least affected by reductions 
in defense spending” (following the cold war). The OTA continued, 
“Furthermore, based on military interests alone, ARPA will probably 
72  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution.
73  Ibid.
74  Flamm. (1987). Targeting the Computer.
75  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution. 
76  Office of Technology Assessment. (1993). Defense Conversation: Redirecting R&D. 
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On 20 January 2001, however, George W. Bush took office as 
the 43rd President of the United States, and DARPA’s focus on dual-
use technologies came to an end. On 18 June 2001, Tony Tether was 
appointed as the new Director to head DARPA. Prior to becoming the 
director of DARPA, Tether had steadily risen in his career through a 
variety of military and industrial positions. Having served for four 
years as the director of the DOD’s National Intelligence Office (1978–
1982), he came to the position of DARPA director under a directive from 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that the new director must make 
DARPA “an entrepreneurial hotbed that will give the U.S. military the 
tools it will need to maintain the nation’s access to space and to protect 
satellites in orbit from attack”.80 Less than three months after Tether 
was appointed, the U.S.’s post-cold-war peace time landscape began 
to change. On September 11, 2001, two hijacked planes were flown 
into the World Trade Center in New York City, a third hijacked plane 
was flown into the Pentagon, and a fourth hijacked plane attempted 
an attack on Washington, D.C. In response, on 7 October 2001 the U.S. 
invaded Afghanistan, and on 21 March 2003, the U.S. began its invasion 
of Iraq. In his statement to the House of Representatives on 27 March 
2003, Tether highlighted DARPA’s role in “bridging the gap” between 
fundamental discoveries and military use.81 This slogan, “Bridging the 
Gap”, was subsequently added to the official logo for DARPA.
80  Rensselaer. (2002). “DARPA Inside”, Rensselaer Magazine.
81  Tether, T. (2003). Statement by Dr. Tony Tether, Director, Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency. Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and 
become more involved in the development of dual-use technologies. 
Despite the apparent divergence of military and commercial systems, 
many component technologies from which these systems are constructed 
continue to converge”.77 During the period from 1992 to 2001 DARPA was 
led by three directors—Gary Denman (1992–1995), Larry Lynn (1995–
1998), and Frank Fernandez (1998–2001). During Gary Denman’s tenure, 
DARPA briefly dropped its “D” and returned to its original name of ARPA. 
Both Lynn and Fernandez continued Denman’s focus on basic research. 
Lynn was part of DARPA’s first inclusion of basic biology research into 
DARPA’s budget.78 Fernandez focused on quality and independence in a 
manner reminiscent of ARPA’s second director, Ruina.79
77  Ibid.
78  Marshall, E. (1997). “Too Radical for NIH? Try DARPA”, Science 275/5301: 744–46.
79  Fernandez, F. (2000). Statement by Frank Fernandez Director, Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency. Given before the U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
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During his time at DARPA, Tether made significant changes to the 
agency’s policies, shown above in Table 7-2, which brought on an outcry 
from the academic community, especially the computing community.82 
Although overall DARPA funding remained constant, the proportion 
going to university researchers dropped by nearly half.83 In contrast to 
the flexibility and discretion given to researchers in the 1990s, funds 
under Tether were tied to “go/no-go” reviews linked to pre-defined 
deliverables—i.e. technical achievements defined either in the solicitation 
itself or by the researchers as part of responding to the solicitation—that 
must be achieved within a pre-specified time period (typically six to nine 
months).84 This focus on milestones and go/no-go reviews is reminiscent 
of DARPA policies under Heilmeier. In addition, DARPA raised the 
classification of research programs and increased restrictions on the 
participation of non-U.S. citizens.85 Most significantly, many solicitations 
precluded universities and small startups from submission as prime 
contractors, instead requiring the formation of teams and forcing startups 
and universities to team with large established vendors.86
Looking back over the decades since DARPA was founded, it 
is not immediately clear that the concerns expressed in the 2000s by 
the academic community with regards to DARPA being “dead” were 
warranted. Under Tether, DARPA did indeed shift its funding away from 
academia and, at the same time, shifted its funding model. However, 
change in DARPA’s immediate goals and the director-level rules on 
how to meet those goals, is common, if not the rule, over the DARPA’s 
history.87 With so much change, the puzzle is what is the DARPA 
Capabilities, House Armed Services Committee, United States House of 
Representatives. Washington, DC.
82  Computing Research Community. (2005). Joint Statement; Lazowska and Patterson. 
(2005). “An Endless Frontier Postponed”; Markoff. (2005). “Pentagon Redirects”.
83  Computing Research Community. (2005). Joint Statement; Lazowska and Patterson. 
(2005). “An Endless Frontier Postponed”; Markoff. (2005). “Pentagon Redirects”. 
84  The Ultraperformance Nanophotonic Interchip Communications (UNIC) program, 
discussed in greater detail in Section 5.2. in this chapter (“DARPA under Tony 
Tether (2001-present)”), provides an example of a proposal under Tether with 
multiple phases, each with go/no-go deliverables.
85  Computing Research Community. (2005). Joint Statement; Lazowska and Patterson. 
(2005). “An Endless Frontier Postponed”.
86  Defense Science Board. (2005). High Performance Microchip Supply. Washington, DC: 
National Academies Press.
87  Mowery and Langlois and others have noted the tension between developing 
technologies required for highly specialized, low-volume defense applications, 
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model, and is there something fundamental about DARPA, across the 
decades, that its imitators should be copying? Past research has focused 
on DARPA’s organizational culture, structure, and goals as the critical 
and lasting features of the “DARPA-model”. In this paper, I argue that 
beyond these organizational features, there are informal processes used 
by the program managers to influence technology directions, which 
have been overlooked in past literature, and have been institutionalized 
so as to last through changes in directorship and organizational focus.
4. Methods
This paper uses grounded theory-building methods88 to unpack the 
processes by which DARPA influences technology development. I 
conduct a case study89 of four materials technologies critical to the 
advancement of Moore’s Law. Two of these technologies—SiGe 
and strained Si—received DARPA funding in the mid-nineties and 
were subsequently introduced into microprocessor designs and 
mainstream Si-CMOS production lines. The remaining two materials 
advances—3D packaging technology and integrated photonics—were 
funded under Tether and are identified by the ITRS Roadmap and in 
and technologies required for civilian applications (Mowery, D. C., and Langlois, 
R. N. (1996). “Spinning Off and Spinning On (?): The Federal Government Role 
in the Development of the U.S. Computer Software Industry”, Research Policy 25: 
947–66, https://doi.org/10.1016/0048-7333(96)00888-8). Several items are worth 
noting on this point. First, as described in the above paragraphs the extent to which 
DARPA’s location within the military narrowed the scope of what science it could 
fund has varied significantly over the decades—ranging from periods such as 
those under Heilmeier and Tether, where the immediate needs of military missions 
figured prominently, to periods such as those under Ruina, or when SEMATECH 
funding was channeled through DARPA where the needs of the military missions 
figured less prominently. Second, while DARPA program managers must as part 
of “selling” any project be able to describe its eventual benefit for the U.S. military, 
depending on the budget category (basic research, applied), the research can be 
quite basic and thus far from any application, especially in an office such as the 
Defense Sciences Office (DSO) and MTO. Finally, due to overlapping needs in the 
area of microprocessors and commercial demand outpacing that of the military, 
even under the Tether period DARPA commissioned roadmaps of military versus 
commercial technical needs to help guide its funding decisions.
88  Glasner, B., and Strauss, A. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies of 
Qualitative Research. London, UK: Wiedenfeld & Nicholson; Eisenhardt. (1989). 
“Building Theories”; Yin, R. K. (1989). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
89  Eisenhardt. (1989). “Building Theories”; Yin. (1989). Case Study Research.
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academic publications as potentially critical to meeting the targets set 
by Moore’s Law in the upcoming decade. All four of these technologies 
were supported by program managers within DARPA’s Microsystems 
Technology Office (MTO), which, until April 1999, went by the name of 
the Electronics Technology Office (ETO).90
In conducting my research, I triangulated participant observation, 
qualitative interview data, archival data, and bibliometric data to provide 
a holistic view of the forces driving technological change.91 My results 
draw primarily from fifty semi-structured interviews with DARPA 
office directors and program managers, industry representatives, 
and university professors who were involved in the development of 
SiGe, strained silicon, integrated photonics, and optical interconnects 
between 1992 and 2008. I identify key scientists and technologists in 
the “invisible college”92 in this technical area through a snowball effect 
based on names mentioned in early interviews and in news documents.93 
I subsequently cross-checked this list using DARPA’s online archives 
for the period and identified additional DARPA program managers 
involved in funding these technologies. I executed the interviews so as to 
ensure that they included (1) DARPA MTO office directors and program 
managers from both before and after Tony Tether took the directorship, 
and (2) a representative cross-section of scientists and technologists 
from within academic institutions, startups, and the five established 
microprocessor vendors—Intel Corporation, Advanced Micro Devices 
(AMD), International Business Machines (IBM), Hewlett Packard (HP), 
and Sun Microsystems (Sun). I also asked each respondent to provide 
an up-to-date biography and curriculum vita (CV), including a list of 
90  Reed. (1999). “Defense Advanced Projects Agency’s Electronics Technology Office 
Changes Name”, High Beam Research. Reed Business Information.
91  Jick, T. D. (1979). “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in 
Action”, Administrative Science Quarterly 24: 602–11, https://doi.org/10.2307/2392366
92  Price, D. D. S. (1963). Little Science, Big Science… and Beyond. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press.
93  Derek de Solla Price described the “invisible college” as an informal communication 
network among elite scholars from different research institutions often within a 
subject specialty. I use the term “invisible college” a bit loosely since the list is one 
of researchers identified by each other as “key people in this area” or “key people 
to talk to”, and while communications are documented in the interviews, the exact 
form or extent of communication is not known. Finally, it is worth noting that 
in this “invisible college”, “research institutions” encompasses everything from 
universities, to start-ups, to large computing firms, to DARPA itself (Price. (1963). 
Little Science.).
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all of their publications and patents to-date in their career. I used these 
individual CVs to better understand the bibliometric records of each 
interviewee, as well as their co-patenting and co-publishing records 
with other scientists. I completed all interviews between September 
2006 and October 2008.
I conducted several participant observations throughout the course of 
the study to gain insights into both the optoelectronics and microelectronics 
industries and DARPA’s role in technology development. Early on, I was 
able to conduct a three-hour participant observation of a DARPA-funded 
team in the process of developing its technology so as to acquire Phase II 
funding. I was also able to attend multiple industry conferences through-
out the course of the study, due to my own prior technical activity in the 
area, through additional connections from my interviews, and through 
my ongoing professional activities studying the converging telecom and 
computing industry. These industry conferences included three of the 
Bi-annual Microphotonics Industry Consortium conferences (Fall 2007, 
Spring 2007, Fall 2008), Phontics North 2007, the 2007 IEEE Computer 
Elements Vail Workshop, the Optoelectronics Industry Development 
Association (OIDA) 2008 Annual Forum, and the OIDA Manufacturing 
and Innovation in the 20th Century Workshop in Spring 2008.
Finally, I have been able to draw on extensive archival data available 
through the Carnegie Mellon University libraries, online, and saved 
within the personal collections of David Hounshell. DARPA provides 
a wealth of archival data online, as well as through their technical 
archives. In addition, a host of information about both DARPA and 
company initiatives can be found in the popular press, congressional 
hearings, and in industry trade journals. Together, I use these online 
DARPA archives and available news sources to document DARPA 
solicitations, workshops, conferences, and press releases as related to 
the four materials technologies.
5. Results and Discussion
I present my results in three sections. In the first section, I unpack five 
distinct steps by which DARPA program managers seed and encourage 
new technology trajectories. This section draws exclusively on archival 
data and interviews with academics, industry members, and program 
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managers before Tony Tether’s period as director, specifically between 
1992 and 2001. The second section of the results then explores the 
changes within DARPA under Tony Tether. Here, I again draw on 
archival data and interviews with academics, industry members, and 
program managers but instead from 2001 to 2008. This section again 
proposes five methods by which DARPA seeded and encouraged new 
technology trajectories, and compares these methods, and the recipients 
of their efforts, to those found in the previous period. In the final section, 
I discuss overarching themes that emerge across the two periods and 
describe the role of the program manager.
 5.1. DARPA in the 1990s (1992–2001)
Based on archives and interviews from academics, industry members, 
and DARPA program managers active during this period from 1992 
to 2001, I identify five processes by which DARPA program managers 
during this period tap into existing social networks to seed and encourage 
new technology trajectories. These five processes are (1) identifying 
directions, (2) seeding common themes, building community, (4) 
validating new directions and (5) not sustaining the technology. I 
describe each of these processes in detail, and their significance below.
1) Identifying directions: To influence the direction of technology 
development so as to meet mission goals, a DARPA program manager 
must first identify the direction in which to go. To do this, DARPA 
program managers engage in three complementary activities: talking 
with mission directors to understand the needs of the military, 
bringing together elite scientists to brainstorm research directions that 
meet the needs of the military, and talking with existing researchers 
to understand emerging technology directions within the research 
community. The first activity DARPA program managers cannot 
escape. There are military liaisons in the DARPA building, who are 
senior officers, and have the role of connecting program managers with 
the needs of the military. In addition, DARPA program managers visit 
military installations around the country throughout the year to better 
understand military needs. The second and third activities, however, 
require greater agency on the part of the DARPA program manager. 
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Over the years, DARPA has developed several formal institutions that 
enable DARPA program managers to bring together elite scientists to 
brainstorm research directions that meet the needs of military missions.
Among its formal institutions, most notable is the DARPA-Defense 
Sciences Research Council. The DARPA-Defense Sciences Research 
Council holds an annual summer conference that brings together “a 
group of the country’s leading scientists and engineers for an extended 
period, to permit them to apply their combined talents in studying and 
reviewing future research areas in defense sciences”.94 At this summer 
conference, top scientific and technical researchers in the country 
are exposed to major problems facing the U.S. military, and asked to 
identify technological directions to solve these challenges.
In addition to the Council’s annual summer conference, DARPA 
leverages several smaller task forces and technology groups. Each year 
following the Council’s summer meeting, smaller groups of Council 
members meet for Council workshops and program reviews, whose 
reports are made directly to DARPA.95 Other formal advisory activities 
include Department of Defense’s Defense Science Board (DSB) task 
forces, and Information Sciences and Technology Study Groups (ISAT).96 
Like the Council’s workshops and program reviews, DSB97 and ISAT 
task forces can be called to address specific topics or challenges.
DARPA is not limited to holding these brainstorming sessions to 
identify directions within formal committees. Brainstorming sessions 
can also be called together by individual DARPA program managers, 
and can be much more informal. One DARPA program manager 
describes his role in bringing scientific leaders together around a 
common theme.
94  Defense Sciences Research Council. (1997). Defense Sciences Research Council Summer 
Conference Summary Report. Defense Science Research Council Summer Conference, 
LaJolla, California, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
95  Ibid.
96  ISAT has similar workings to the Defense Science Board task forces, but are focused 
on military challenges associated with information technology.
97  The DSB was established in 1956, in response to recommendations of the Hoover 
Commission. Today, the DSB’s authorized size is thirty-two members selected 
for the pre-eminence in science and technology and its application to military 
operations, and seven ex-officio members. The task force consists of DSB board 
members, and other selected consultants or experts (Defense Science Board. (2008). 
Defense Science Board: History. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of 
Research and Engineering, https://dsb.cto.mil/history.htm).
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We were talking with Paul Robinson about the notion of building very 
high volume carbon nanotubes that were functionally matched… And 
I said, gee, Rick’s always been working in that area, let’s just call him 
in. Rick’s a Nobel Prize chemist. So we called him. He was there in two 
days. And so Lieber came over from Harvard. We sat around. And it was 
a great discussion.
The above-described interaction occurred in the mid-90s. Here, in 
supporting innovation DARPA program managers are the cocktail 
hosts described by Lester and Piore as necessary for the early-stage 
brainstorming of new ideas.98 The DARPA program managers select 
the members of the party, and help start the conversation necessary to 
brainstorm and identify the necessary new directions.
It is important, however, to look closer at the above quotation. 
As shown in Table 7-3, all of the people at the above-mentioned 
gathering, with the exception of the DARPA program manager, 
could be characterized as Lynne Zucker’s and Michale Darby’s “star 
scientists”.99 None of them, however, have bibliometric or other paper 
trails of intellectual ties with each other. These results are in striking 
contrast with the majority of social networks research, which focuses 
on documenting collaborations through patent co-authorships. These 
early-stage, informal, roundtable technical conversations are the type of 
conversations that cannot be found in bibliometric studies. Further, it is 
in precisely these formative conversations where the state’s involvement 
in bringing together the right parties may be particularly influential in 
determining future directions.
2) Seeding common research themes: DARPA program managers do not 
stop at a series of brainstorming session with elite scientists. In addition, 
DARPA program managers are continually returning to the field to find 
emerging projects and capabilities within the research community. In 
this role, they not only identify additional research directions, but also 
encourage research in those directions by funding researchers working 
on common themes that have the potential to contribute to military 
98  Lester and Piore. (2004). Innovation.
99  Zucker, L., and Darby, M. (1996). “Star Scientists and Institutional Transformation: 
Patterns of Invention and Innovation in the Formation of the Biotechnology 
Industry”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 93/23: 709–12, https://doi.
org/10.1073/pnas.93.23.12709 
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needs. Further, in contrast to the brainstorming sessions, in this field-
based activity of identifying emerging directions and encouraging 
research in those directions, the DARPA program manager need not 
necessarily, or at least immediately, bring everyone into the same 
geographic space.
One DARPA program manager explains,
So I’ll tell you the SiGe story… So, the first guy to show me this, actually 
two guys,… was the guy who founded Amberwave. He showed me this 
is possible. And then Jason Woo and UCLA,… he showed me a plot of 
bandgap as a function of percent Ge. And he had two plots. He came to 
DARPA. And he said, look, there is a dependency, here it is, it follows 
band gap theory… And I said, “Jason, two dots don’t make a program… 
I need a third dot”. And he faxed me a chart the next day… So I sent him 
a small seeding.
At the same time I called Bernie (a fellow at IBM), and I said, “Bernie, 
have you ever seen this bandgap dependency in SiGe? You know, do you 
think it’s something we can exploit?” He said, “Funny you should ask. 
We’ve been looking at the same thing, and we’ve got some ideas as well”. 
So I funded him $2 million or whatever it was.
In this function, the DARPA program manager is neither acting as a 
broker—connecting otherwise disparate actors; nor as a boundary-
spanner—identifying, translating, and relaying information across 
firm, cultural, or technical boundaries; in the traditional sense.100 
Instead, the DARPA program manager is using his connections with 
researchers to identify emerging directions and capabilities within 
the research community, and seed-fund common themes across these 
disparate researchers. While the program manager is perhaps relaying 
some knowledge about the one researcher to the other or about general 
activities in the technical community, at first, he may be the only 
connection between them.
100  Fleming and Waguespack. (2007). “Brokerage, Boundary Spanning, and 
Leadership”.
Upon closer scrutiny of the above quote, these results also have a 
second significance. Specifically, similar to the results in section (1), 
background research on the technologists referenced by the DARPA 
program manager in the above quote, show both Eugene Fitzgerald (“the 
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again to be what Zucker and Darby would classify as star scientists101 
(see Table 7-4). Thus, this DARPA program manager is describing his 
contact with three star scientists, working in the same area. These results 
are significant given Zucker and Darby’s findings that star scientists are 
very protective of their techniques, ideas, and discoveries in their early 
years, tending to collaborate most within their own institution, which 
slows diffusion to other scientists.102 Assuming Zucker and Darby’s 
findings are correct, here, the sole connecting person, who is aware of 
all three of the star scientists’ activities, may be the DARPA program 
manager (Table 7-4).
Finally, it is worth noting that in playing out this role of seeding 
common research themes across disparate researchers, the DARPA 
program manager does not always fund the same technologies. At 
times, DARPA program managers fund competing technologies aimed 
at solving the same problem. The same program manager explains such 
an example in a different funding situation,
Take the case of thin-film technologies. In that case I funded two parallel 
programs. I funded IBM, because they were convinced that the parallel 
junction for thin-film SOI wasn’t going to go on forever, and they wanted 
more thick-film SOIs for the company manufacturing purposes. And 
then I funded Lincoln Labs to do thin-film SOI… I pitted Lincoln against 
IBM… So, they both succeeded, and IBM is still manufacturing thick-
film SOI today.
3) Building community: increasing information flows, growing the base: 
DARPA’s role in seeding disparate researchers working on common 
research themes (whether the same or competing technologies) has a 
second significance. In receiving funding from DARPA, researchers 
are required to present to each other in workshops, thus further 
increasing the flow of knowledge between star scientists during early-
stage research. Fitting with their classification as star scientists, neither 
Fitzgerald nor Meyerson—who are at different institutions—have ever 
co-patented or co-published. Yet, through DARPA, Fitzgerald and 
Meyerson were brought together in workshops to present to each other 
their research. What would otherwise have been knowledge kept within 
their organization was forced at some level (with the exception of some 
101  Zucker and Darby. (1996). “Star Scientists”.
102  Ibid.
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company-proprietary details which are presented solely to the program 
managers) to flow between the two. In funding disparate researchers, 
DARPA program managers promote the sharing of knowledge between 
star scientists, who left to their own devices would, according to the 
literature, tend to be very protective of their knowledge. In some cases, 
these workshops may even lead to new collaborations. Jason Woo, for 
example, started in the field somewhat later than Fitzgerald or Meyerson 
(1991), and, as the 1998 IBM Faculty Award he received suggests, may 
have even developed a relationship with IBM through his funding from 
DARPA.
4) Providing third-party validation of new technology directions: in addition 
to DARPA program managers’ roles in bringing researchers together to 
brainstorm new technology directions, seeding disparate researchers to 
gain momentum around those directions, and bringing those researchers 
together to share their results, DARPA program managers play a 
fourth role in technology development. Specifically, DARPA program 
managers’ funding actions act to provide external validation for new 
directions. One program manager explains, “So the DARPA piece, 
while large, was the validation for IBM to spend their own money”. He 
continues, “The same way for the Intel piece. You know, Intel certainly 
looked at that project, and then Intel ended up funding it internally, 
but the fact that DARPA went back to them three and four times and 
said, this is an important thing, this is an important thing, you know, it 
got to the board of directors, and it got high enough that they set up a 
division to do this”. A university professor makes the same point with 
respect to DARPA’s role with other funding agencies, in this case NSF. 
The professor explains, “See, once you’ve gotten funding from DARPA, 
you have an issue resolved, and so on, then you go right ahead and 
submit an NSF proposal. By which time your ideas are known out there, 
people know you, you’ve published a paper or two. And then guys at 
NSF say, yeah, yeah, this is a good thing”. He continues, distinguishing 
DARPA’s place within the broader U.S. government system, “NSF 
funding usually comes in a second wave. DARPA provides initial 
funding”. As a consequence, he concludes, “DARPA plays a huge role 
in selecting key ideas” (from among the broader set of ideas present in 
the research community). 
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5) Avoiding reliance on the state: Finally, despite DARPA’s role in 
validating new technology directions both to other funding agencies 
and in industry, DARPA program managers from the 1992–2001 period 
take note to point out that DARPA is not the “sustaining piece” in 
commercializing a new technology. As one DARPA program manager 
explains, “So we ran all of these design- of-experiment concepts, and 
you know,… we were doing great stuff, really good science. But the 
tipping point,… is the fact that IBM saw the value in this to the point 
that they started investing in it”.
This emphasis on the state not sustaining technology is an important 
final piece. Past research has warned of the tendencies for companies 
to become reliant on support from the state.103 History suggests that 
DARPA has had many successes transitioning subsequent development 
and production of its early-stage technologies to commercial (e.g. laser,104 
the Internet,105 and the personal computer)106 and military (e.g. F-117A, 
Predator, Global Hawk)107 organizations. Future research should explore 
DARPA program manager’s mechanisms for transitioning technology 
development, and how they handle technologies that do not transition.
103  Allen, T., Utterback, J., Sirbu, M., Ashford, N., and Hollomon, J., (1978). “Government 
Influence on the Process of Innovation in Europe and Japan”, Research Policy 7/2: 
124–49; Sirbu, M. (1978). “Government Aid for the Development of Innovative 
Technology: Lessons from the French”, Research Policy 7/2: 176–96, https://doi.
org/10.1016/0048-7333(78)90004-5; Zysman, J. (1983). Governments, Markets, and 
Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
104  Bromberg. (1991). The Laser in America.
105  Newman, N. (2002). Net Loss: Internet Prophets, Private Profits, and the Costs to 
Community. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
106  Allan. (2001). History of the Personal Computer.
107  Van Atta, R., Lippitz, M., et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition, DARPA’s Role 
in Fostering a Revolution in Military Affairs. Volume 1. Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analyses, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada422835, https://fas.org/irp/agency/
dod/idarma.pdf
5.2. DARPA under Tony Tether (2001-present)
Tony Tether was appointed director of DARPA on 18 June 2001. 
As discussed above, Tether made many changes within DARPA, 
which were poorly received from the academic, and particularly the 
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computing, community. These changes included shifting funding from 
universities to industry (especially, established vendors); changing 
funding solicitations from broad agency announcements with few 
checks and balances to announcements with go/no-go reviews linked 
to pre-defined deliverables; and precluding universities and startups as 
prime contractors on many solicitations, instead requiring the formation 
of teams with established vendors as the prime contractors.
These changes in the framework of funding at DARPA can best 
be understood by looking at a program during this period.108 One 
such program, DARPA’s Ultraperformance Nanophotonic Intrachip 
Communications (UNIC) program,109 is outlined in Table 7-5 above. As 
shown in the table, the UNIC program consisted of three phases. The first 
phase lasted nine months. To pass this phase the program required the 
“development, fabrication, and demonstration, of silicon nanophotonic 
devices”. The second phase was two years. This phase was focused 
on designing and validating photonic networks between the devices 
developed in phase I, and “established the credibility of the technology 
within the microprocessor community”. Program submissions were 
required to establish “interim milestones every six months”, associated 
with “demonstrable, quantitative measures of performance”. As shown 
in Table 7-5, with the exception of one team at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT I), established companies, like HP, IBM, and Sun 
Microsystems, were placed in the position of prime contractors, while 
108  One predominant type of DARPA solicitation is called a Broad Agency 
Announcement, or BAA. BAAs occurred regularly during both the pre-Tether and 
the Tether period. The nature of many BAAs changed, however, under Tether. An 
example of the phases and pre-defined deliverables associated with a Tether-period 
BAA is provided in this paragraph. For the purpose of comparison, a Very Large 
Scale Integrated (VLSI) Photonics solicitation from the pre-Tether period (i.e. with 
fewer checks and balances) reads as follows: “(DARPA/ETO) is soliciting innovative 
research proposals to develop VLSI-level microfluidic analysis and synthesis 
systems (MicroFlumes) and to develop the design tools for the implementation of 
mixed technology systems that include microfluidic, electrical, kinematic, optical, 
and electromagnetic domains (Composite CAD). Of particular interest in Area 1 
(MicroFlumes) are technology developments… that integrate multiple analysis & 
synthesis programs (or sequences of microfluidic processing steps) in one system… 
Of particular but not sole interest in Area 2 (Composite CAD) are design support 
tools, models and methods that include, but are not limited to, [list of possible 
interest areas].”
109  DARPA Ultraperformance-Nanophotonic-Intrachip-Communication Program, 
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universities (MIT II, Stanford, UCLA) and startups (Luxtera, Kotura) 
were members of the contractor-led team.
And yet, despite these dramatic changes under Tether in the 
framework of funding at DARPA, as shown in the upcoming section, 
the five processes by which DARPA program managers influence 
technology directions have remarkably remained the same. The 
recipients of these processes, however, and as a consequence, the 
implications, have changed significantly (Table 7-5).
1) Identifying directions: As in the 1992–2001 period, to identify new 
technology directions that meet military needs, DARPA program 
managers in the 2001–2008 period engaged in three complementary 
activities: talking with mission directors to understand the needs of 
the military, bringing together elite scientists to brainstorm research 
directions that meet military needs, and talking with existing 
researchers to understand emerging technology directions within 
the research community. As there are no changes in their activities 
talking with mission directors, I skip that discussion here. I discuss 
the program managers’ activities bringing together elite scientists to 
brainstorm research directions that meet military needs briefly below. I 
discuss program managers’ activities talking with existing researchers 
to understand emerging technology directions within the research 
community in the next section.
Based on the empirical data to which I had access, nothing changed 
within the formal institutions used by DARPA program managers for 
bringing together elite technology leaders to brainstorm new technology 
directions. The same institutions as were used during the 1992–2008 
period, existed and were used throughout the 2001–2008 period. For 
example, a February 2005 DSB task force focused on High Performance 
Microchip Supply, a topic of great interest to DARPA, and around which 
the Microsystems Technology Office had several solicitations. What I 
could not tell from my empirical data, was whether the composition of 
these brainstorming sessions may have changed after Tether took on 
the directorship. In particular, while I was able to access nearly half of 
the DARPA-Defense Sciences Research Council summaries for the pre-
Tether period (1992, 1993, 1996, and, 1997), I was not able to gain access 
to any of these summaries from the period after Tether took office. While 
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this lack of public access to these reports could be representative of 
increased classification of research programs during this period, it also 
could be that the 2001–2008 period is more recent, and these summaries 
have simply not yet been released.
2) Seeding common themes: orchestrating the involvement of established 
vendors with academics and startup companies: As from 1992 to 2001, 
DARPA program managers during 2001–2008 did not stop at a series of 
brainstorming sessions with elite scientists. Instead, program managers 
continually return to the field to find out emerging directions and 
capabilities within the research community. As described in Section 
5.1. of this chapter (“DARPA in the 1990s (1992–2001)”), the DARPA 
program managers need “vision”, but not necessarily the original ideas. 
One program manager explains, “This is an opportunity that people 
will actually tell me their best ideas and we can see what we can do with 
those. It’s really amazing in that sense”. Another program manager 
clarifies, “I was not working in a vacuum, right?” He continues, “[I would 
ask people], ‘Can you provide this functionality? Can you provide that 
functionality?”’ This probing and testing of the research community to 
explore what is possible in a given technology—here silicon photonics, 
mimics the same probing being done by the program managers in the 
1992–2001 period, in the case quoted, in SiGe.
As discussed in Section 5.1., at times DARPA program managers 
fund disparate researchers doing similar research for achieving a 
particular end-goal, and at other times, DARPA program managers 
fund competing technologies for achieving a particular end goal. One 
DARPA program manager suggests, “I think our best [programs] are 
the ones where there’s multiple solutions to a common problem”. He 
explains that in one program, “I have six performers and the reason I 
have six is because I was able to convince the Director that this is an 
extremely high-risk effort. I don’t know which technology or which 
architecture is going to win, if any… [But], if you give me four and they 
all fail, maybe you left the wrong two out”. This theme is echoed in 
the first program manager’s comments, “I wanted to have three or four 
ideas that I could say, ‘Look… here are paths we could go along. I don’t 
know which if any of them will be successful.’… if I didn’t have those, 
then I cannot go and sell the program”.
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In their continual connection with the field, DARPA program 
managers not only identify additional research directions, but also 
encourage research in those directions by funding researchers working 
on common themes that have the potential to address military needs. 
In seeding disparate researchers around common themes, the DARPA 
program manager is neither a broker nor a boundary-spanner. Rather, 
he takes in ideas from the existing research community, identifies 
directions, and then funds disparate researchers working on common 
themes that hold potential in contributing to achieving an end-goal. 
He synthesizes emerging ideas into common themes. He integrates 
common themes into directions to meet military goals. Finally, he 
directs researchers along these directions through carefully crafted 
funding solicitations.
The disparate researchers in the 2001–2008 time period are, however, 
very different than those funded in the period from 1992 to 2001. Where 
in the first time period the disparate researchers were star scientists, 
in the latter period, the disparate researchers are teams of startups, 
universities, and prime contractors. A startup company founder 
described his interactions with DARPA’s program managers, and 
the role the program managers played in encouraging research in the 
academic and industrial communities around their ideas: “So DARPA 
has program managers, and we were talking to them, and they got excited 
about this project, and they said, let’s try to get a program out. So we 
worked with… the DARPA program manager, and they got interested 
in the field, and they got a program out of this. They got a bunch of 
other people involved in the program”. Here, the “other people” are the 
companies and universities for the UNIC program shown in Table 7-5.
Unlike in 1992–2001, when startup companies would have been 
funded directly, in 2001–2008, startup companies were frequently not 
able to be the primary contractor on a proposal. In the case of the above 
startup company, the company needed to team up with an established 
vendor to receive funding for the project. Describing this process, the 
program manager clarifies, “I have never… said, ‘I want you to work 
with these two.’” He clarifies, “You have to structure the solicitation 
in such a way that… they would do that on their own”. The program 
manager goes on to describe this system-level goal, “There was one… 
condition imposed on [the teams], and that was that these things must 
 2157. Rethinking the Role of the State in Technology Development
be developed in a… foundry compatible process”. He explains, “I don’t 
want people to go out and do something in the basement, and say that, 
‘Ah, I produced the best results in the world,’ in a process that is totally 
incompatible with anything else that the industry does. Because the 
whole idea here was to leverage the industry’s path down the road of 
smaller and smaller devices”. While at first glance, this requirement 
for established vendors to be the primary contractors may seem 
limiting, it may also have an important purpose. In particular, recent 
research has shown that with the decline of corporate R&D labs and 
the vertical fragmentation of industries, firms today face new challenges 
coordinating across firms when advancing technology platforms,110 
aligning incentive structures across these interdependent firms,111 and 
supporting long-term research within such ecosystems.112 By leveraging 
his birds-eye view of research in the community, the DARPA program 
manager can help ensure that technical activities being engaged by 
disparate entities, such as startups, in the vertically disintegrated 
framework fit in the broader industry picture.113
3) Building community: supporting knowledge flows between competitors 
and enabling technology platform leadership at the systems level: As seen 
in Section 5.1 of this chapter, DARPA’s role in seeding disparate 
researchers working on common themes has a second significance. In 
receiving funding from DARPA, researchers are required to present 
to each other in workshops, thus further increasing the flow of 
knowledge between researchers working on common themes. Under 
110  Gawer, A., and Cusumano, M. A. (2002). Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, 
and Cisco Drive Industry Innovation. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press; 
Iansati and Levien. (2004). The Keystone Advantage. 
111  Casadesus-Masanell, R., and Yoffie, D. B. (2005). “Wintel: Cooperation and 
Conflict”, Management Science 53/5: 584–98, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0672
112  Ibid.
113  Multiple academic informants in areas outside the technical scope of this paper 
described situations under the Tether administration in which they shared a new 
idea with a program manager, expecting to subsequently be funded under the 
BAA, only to find later that a large contract manufacturer had been funded to 
do their idea, and they had received no funding. While these stories could not be 
validated, they highlight the importance of trust between the program managers 
and the researchers they fund in DARPA’s system of technology development. If 
this trust is lost, the DARPA program managers lose their position of knowledge 
centrality, and are no longer able to successfully identify and influence new 
technology directions within the research community.
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Tether, DARPA funding recipients are required to attend and present 
to each other in workshops at the end of each go/no-go program phase. 
However, in contrast to the 1992–2001 period, where institutionally 
isolated start scientists were brought together, in the 2001–2008 period, 
these researchers are established vendors and their teams of startups 
and university professors. In response to a presentation of an early 
proposal for this work, which I gave at an industry conference, one 
university professor angrily responded, “I can tell you what you’ll find. 
I was there (at the DARPA workshop), and they’re (the companies) all 
presenting to each other what they’re going to do. They’re all talking 
to each other. And they’re all doing the same thing”. And yet, in the 
case of established vendors, DARPA workshops may provide them 
with a critical opportunity to share new ideas and agree (implicitly or 
explicitly) on technology directions. One industry respondent explained 
the importance of such an opportunity to coordinate in today’s industry 
environment, “You just can’t make anything happen in industry (today) 
on your own, because it’s completely impossible. You have to find a 
partner, you have to convince your competition this is the right thing 
to do”. He continued, “You’re guiding people [your competitors]… and 
they ask, ‘Why are you helping me with this?’ and the fact is you give 
them information so the suppliers are in the right place to help you”.
DARPA is not only supporting the coordination of technology directions 
across competitors. By encouraging teams of startups, universities, and 
prime contractors, DARPA may also be helping coordinate technology 
directions in a vertically fragmented industry in a second way. One 
established vendor emphasizes both the importance of DARPA’s systems 
perspective and of DARPA giving the established vendors power by 
making them the primary contractors. He explains, “Here, the technology 
is being driven by the systems companies. Very few companies have 
the resources to do system-level exploration without DARPA funding. 
DARPA funding is enabling the system players to determine the direction 
of this technology. If you don’t get the system guys involved, you end up 
getting widgets that don’t work in the bigger picture”. 
This system-level goal is already hinted at in Section 2 (“The 
Developmental Network”) by both the startup company—which notes 
that DARPA “got a bunch of other people involved”, and by the DARPA 
program manager—who emphasizes the importance of developing 
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new technologies compatible with the established industry platform. 
Finally, another established vendor emphasized the importance of 
DARPA’s longer-term vision in supporting technology trajectories 
across the vertically disintegrated industry, saying, “You need someone 
with a longer-term horizon. Ten years from now, we want a teraflop of 
computing. But we don’t have more than a six-month time horizon”.
With the decline of corporate R&D labs and the vertical fragmentation 
of industries, firms today face new challenges in establishing 
appropriate sources of new inventions and in coordinating subsequent 
technology development across the myriad of affected firms. Recent 
research has documented challenges in the coordination across firms 
in advancing technology platforms,114 in aligning incentive structures 
across interdependent firms,115 and, in particular, in supporting long-
term research within such ecosystems. 
Within DARPA between 1992 and 2001, the mandate to present 
early-stage research in DARPA workshops encouraged star scientists to 
divulge information that they might otherwise have kept confidential 
within their institution, and thereby helped align them on similar 
trajectories. In contrast, in the case of DARPA under Tether, the 
teams DARPA forms between universities, startups, and established 
vendors, and its subsequent mandatory workshops are supporting the 
coordination of technology trajectories across a vertically fragmented 
industry and the alignment of long-term technology trajectories.
4) Providing third party validation for new technology directions: As during 
1992–2001, DARPA also played a fourth role in technology development 
from 2001 to 2008. Specifically, it provided external validation 
for new directions. Under Tether, instead of DARPA’s funding 
providing validation to industry and NSF for latter-stage funding and 
commercialization, it instead validates technology directions within 
the vertically fragmented industrial ecosystem. This validation of a 
new technology can be particularly helpful for startups. The CEO 
and founder of one startup described the challenge of breaking into 
the broader industry knowledge network, saying, “[In contrast to a 
large company or M.I.T.],… as a small company, you have to develop 
114  Gawer and Cusumano. (2002). Platform Leadership; Iansati and Levien. (2004). The 
Keystone Advantage.
115  Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie. (2005). “Wintel”. 
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a contact. Headhunters… [can] also bring information to you. We are 
starting to discuss with (large systems vendor)… They’re trying to keep 
us developing pieces of technology they need”. Another startup founder 
emphasizes the importance of DARPA’s validation. He explains, 
“[Venture capital] investors are highly motivated to see the company 
succeed. As a consequence, they will lie through their teeth about what 
the company can do. DARPA funding and ATP funding [funding from 
the Commerce Department’s former Advanced Technology Program] 
have the added benefit of communicating to a third party a validation 
of the technology”.
5) Breeding reliance on the state? Finally, like the DARPA program 
managers from 1992 to 2001, DARPA program managers from 2001 
to 2008 were concerned to not become the sustaining force for any 
technology. Under Tether, DARPA program managers were particularly 
encouraged to focus on the last step of transitioning the technology to 
the military and (or) to industry. As one program manager explained, 
“The third phase is a very important phase usually… it’s the last phase… 
[It] defines how you will transition the technology in this office, say, to 
somewhere else”. He continues, “Dr. Tether pays extra attention to your 
plan for Phase III”.
And yet, some members of the industrial community whose positions 
involved shorter term time horizons and the pressing realities of 
commercialization expressed caution about participating in DARPA-
based activities. One established computing vendor explained, “So, <my 
company> as a whole has just shied away from government funding… 
<Our company> labs, or whatever, they’ll get a little DARPA funding, 
but most of that is, has never, produced anything of value, from a… 
commercial perspective. That wasn’t saying it wasn’t of value within 
the industry, but just trying to delineate”. A startup company CEO and 
founder expressed similar concerns, “Sometimes I’m very nervous about 
getting too much focus on defense money. I don’t want to lose track of 
the fact that I’m developing products, not technology”. He continues, 
“DARPA is funding the industry so far ahead. If you’re developing for 
10 years from now, DARPA is great. But how do you manage not to lose 
revenue unless the market is starting in now… Some of the technology 
developed for the next generation—I don’t know if it is applicable that 
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well to (now). I’m not sure DARPA’s direction is the direction to go”. 
He concludes, “I think… <my company> is ideally placed for (today’s 
technology). But, admittedly, not necessarily for the long term”.
These results do not conflict with the supportive comments made 
by established computing vendors in Section 3. (“The Changing Faces 
of DARPA”) above. Rather, they help underscore DARPA’s role in 
coordinating longer term technology trajectories, while not being 
accepted by industry for coordinating technologies required in the 
shorter term. Notably, while the interviewee was not participating in 
any DARPA-funded projects, the labs at the same established computing 
vendor were participating in DARPA contracts from the Microsystems 
Technology Office at the time of the interview.
Further, the concerns expressed by the above established vendor and 
startup founder may not be unwarranted. A recent study on awards 
from the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) by the 
National Academy of Sciences shows that while small businesses 
receiving government funding are good at achieving mission goals, 
they are frequently not successful at surviving in the long-term or at 
technology commercialization.116 Since the time of the interview, the 
above-described startup has joined an established vendor’s team, and 
acquired DARPA funding for developing the longer-term technology. 
Most recently, as part of the UNIC program described in Table 7-5, Sun 
Microsystems received a $44 million contract for the next five years to 
continue to develop the photonic system-on-a-chip technology. Whether 
or not some startups and established vendors who were involved in 
DARPA funding during the Tether period end up developing a reliance 
on the State, will remain to be seen.
6. Discussion: the DARPA Program Manager—
Embedded Network Agent
Key to understanding DARPA’s role in influencing technology 
directions is understanding the role of the program manager, not as 
someone who “opens windows” to which researchers can bring funding 
116  Wessner, C. W., ed. (2007). SBIR and the Phase III Challenge of Commercialization. Policy 
and Global Affairs Division. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, https://doi.
org/10.17226/11851
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ideas,117 nor merely as a “boundary spanner” (and possibly a “broker”) 
who connects different communities,118 but rather in a more active role. 
The nature of this role makes it difficult to describe, as it comes through 
in the seemingly conflicting descriptions of the DARPA program 
manager role by members of the research community. One former 
office director explains, “It really comes down to the program manager. 
A program manager that has a passion for an idea, that understands the 
technical elements of an idea, and has some vision for where it might 
go”. On the other hand, industry and academic researchers consistently 
describe themselves as the people with the ideas, and DARPA program 
managers as the people who funded them, provided legitimacy, and 
helped provide the funding and community support to bring the vision 
to fruition. In the words of one university professor, a DARPA program 
manager would “touch” on “people like [professor’s name] and others 
he knew well, and [say] ‘hey, help me, give me the ideas.’”
This seeming inconsistency, however, can be resolved through the 
DARPA program managers’ own description of their role. As a former 
member of the research community who suddenly rises in status and 
holds the promise of money, the DARPA program manager becomes a 
central node to which information from the larger research community 
flows. In this role, the DARPA program managers are in constant 
contact with the research community, bringing people together to 
brainstorm new directions, understanding emerging research themes, 
matching these emerging themes to military needs, “betting on the right 
people”, connecting disconnected communities, standing-up competing 
technology solutions against each other, and maintaining the system-
integrating view. In executing these tasks, they must, indeed, have 
“vision”, but this vision does not necessarily involve themselves having 
the ideas. In the words of one program manager, “There were people 
around who I could go [to] and talk to [and] see what their ideas were… 
What they could do”. Program managers from both periods, 1992–2001 
and 2001–2008, describe this same idea-seeking behavior.
Most importantly, DARPA program managers conduct all of these 
activities, without explicitly choosing the technology winners. At times 
117  Block. (2007). “Swimming against the Current”.
118  Ansell. (2000). “The Networked Polity”; Block. (2007). “Swimming against the 
Current”.
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they seed disconnected researchers working on common themes—
whether with the same or with competing technologies—that hold 
potential to meet military needs. As the DARPA program manager 
from the preceding paragraph explains, “So obviously… I would not 
propose a program if there were no ideas [among researchers] that 
would address the challenges that we [at DARPA] had to address. I 
just didn’t know what… particular idea would work”. He continues, 
“But I wanted to have three or four ideas that I could say, ‘Look,… here 
are paths we could go along. I don’t know which, if any of them, will 
be successful.’… if I didn’t have those, then I cannot go and sell the 
program”. In other cases, they bring together disconnected researchers, 
whether to brainstorm directions, to work together (on teams), or to learn 
from each other (in workshops). As described by a program manager 
from the 1992–2001 period, “You get communities together that don’t 
naturally talk and you give them some latitude and some life, and you 
push them forward and see what comes out of it”. In this situation, 
“Conversations were often… one-upmanship… You know, sort of 
realizing what other people were doing and you’d reset your goals, and 
you’d kinda all move. And the role of the program manager was kind of 
to keep the band marching down the street”. Finally, throughout these 
activities, whether bringing together members of research communities 
that may not normally talk, or funding an entire suite of technologies 
necessary to meet an integrated outcome, DARPA program managers 
contribute a system-level perspective to organizing national R&D. As 
one program manager from the 1992–2001 period explained, “… we 
were able to broaden it out, do the VLSI, do the hardware, acceleration, 
do all the stuff [necessary to advance Moore’s Law] and sure enough we 
stayed on that ops curve and we were pulling the industry along”. The 
same systems-level view is seen in the 2001–2008 period.
Thus, while the DARPA program manager is, indeed, sometimes a 
broker—acting as the only connection between disconnected researchers 
or communities—and sometimes a boundary spanner—connecting 
communities to support the development of a new field—his role is 
much more active than that prescribed to these positions in previous 
literature. The DARPA program manager is not only a connector, but 
also a conductor and a systems integrator. He comes to his position 
through his prior social capital and position in the network. Once in this 
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position, he holds and leverages particular powers. Yet, what is most 
significant, is the deliberate role the DARPA program manager plays in 
changing the shape of the network once in this position, so as to identify 
and influence new directions for technology development.
7. Conclusions
Several years after Tony Tether took office, popular press articles began 
suggesting that the U.S.’s great engine of technology change—DARPA—
was “dead”.119 Drawing on a case study of DARPA’s Microsystem’s 
Technology Office from 1992 to 2008, I argue that this perceived death 
is because past analyses have, by focusing on the organization’s culture 
and structure, overlooked a set of lasting, informal institutions among 
DARPA program managers. In the case of DARPA’s Microsystems 
technology office before and during the directorship of Tony Tether, 
what changed is not the processes used by the program managers, but 
rather the situations to which program managers apply these processes. 
Prior to 2001, DARPA’s processes for seeding and encouraging new 
technology trajectories involved (1) bringing star scientists largely 
from academia together to brainstorm new ideas, (2) seeding disparate 
researchers around common themes, (3) encourage early knowledge-
sharing between these star researchers through workshops, and (4) 
providing third-party validation for new technology directions to 
external funding agencies and industry. By identifying ideas across, 
bringing together, and seed funding star scientists (who may otherwise 
institutionally isolate their knowledge) around common themes, 
DARPA was able to support the sources of, knowledge flows around, 
and development of social networks necessary for initiating new 
technology directions in early-stage research. In contrast, since 2001, the 
DARPA program manager’s processes for gaining momentum around 
new ideas involve (1) orchestrating the involvement of established 
vendors with academics and startups, (2) supporting knowledge-
sharing between industry competitors through invite-only workshops, 
119  CRC. (2005). Joint Statement; Lazowska and Patterson. (2005). “An Endless Frontier 
Postponed”; Markoff. (2005). “Pentagon Redirects”; Shachtman, N. (2008). “Darpa 
Budget Cut $130 Million for ‘Poor Execution’”, Wired, 25 September, https://www.
wired.com/2008/09/darpa-budget-sl/
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(3) providing third-party validation of new technology directions 
to a vertically fragmented industry, and (4) supporting technology 
platform leadership at the system level. Here, DARPA is supporting the 
coordination of technology development across a vertically fragmented 
industry in whose direction the military has interest and in which long-
term coordination of technology platforms is particularly challenging.
These results suggest a new form of technology policy, in which 
embedded government agents re-architect social networks among 
researchers so as to identify and influence new technology directions in 
the U.S. to achieve an organizational goal. In this role, these agents do not 
give way to the invisible hand of markets, nor do they step in with top-
down bureaucracy to “pick technology winners”. Instead, they are in 
constant contact with the research community, understanding emerging 
themes, matching these emerging themes to military needs, betting on 
the right people, connecting disconnected communities, standing up 
competing technologies against each other, and maintaining that birds-
eye perspective critical to integrating disparate activities across our 
national innovation ecosystem.
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8. DARPA’s Process for Creating 
New Programs1
David W. Cheney and Richard Van Atta
Introduction
The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is 
widely recognized to be a highly successful R&D agency. It has been 
credited with making investments that have led to a large number 
of innovations and important advances in electronics, computing, 
and robotics, as well military advances such as stealth aircraft, smart 
weapons, and autonomous vehicles. In light of its success, there has 
been interest in learning from DARPA and adopting its methods. In the 
United States, there have been several attempts to apply the DARPA 
model to other agencies, including the Intelligence Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (IARPA), the Homeland Security Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (HSARPA), and the Advanced Research Projects 
Agency-Energy (ARPA-E). Other countries have also been interested in 
learning from the DARPA model. Most notably, in Japan, the Cabinet 
Office’s Council on Science, Technology and Innovation has sponsored 
the ImPACT program, which was in part inspired by DARPA and is 
intended to support high impact, high risk R&D.
1  This paper was written for Japan’s New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (NEDO) and was completed in March 2016. The 
authors gratefully acknowledge NEDO’s support.
© D. W. Cheney and R. Van Atta, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.08
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A key aspect of any successful R&D program is to pick the right 
problems to work on—problems that are both important and also 
addressable within the time and resources of the program. This typically 
is one of the greatest challenges in creating a successful R&D program. 
DARPA appears to be very successful at picking good problems to 
address, and it has a remarkable record of supporting timely and ground 
breaking projects. DARPA programs often appear to be unconventional 
and represent different choices than normal government or private 
R&D investment. How does DARPA identify and decide on these 
unconventional topics?
In recent years, literature on DARPA’s management practices has 
emphasized:2
• DARPA’s non-hierarchical and non-bureaucratic organization
• The role of highly talented, entrepreneurial program managers 
(PMs) who serve for limited (three- to five-year) duration
• That research is performed entirely under contract with 
outside organization
• The use of short-term funding for seed efforts to test promising 
concepts, and a clear willingness to terminate non-performing 
projects
With respect to the selection of focus areas, the literature has noted:
• DARPA’s emphasis on ‘‘high-risk/high-payoff’’ projects, 
selected and evaluated based on the impact they could make 
to achieve a new capability or meeting a defense need.
• The key role that its program managers play in developing 
programs, gathering ideas from the technical community, 
making funding decisions and in managing programs, and 
working DARPA’s technical community as well as the defense 
community.3
2  Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation”, The Journal of Technology Transfer 36: 469–513, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-011-9223-x (Chapter 13 in this volume).
3  Fuchs, E. R. H. (2009). “The Road to a New Energy System: Cloning DARPA 
Successfully”, Issues in Science and Technology 26/1, http://issues.org/26-1/fuchs/
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Most studies have not focused specifically on where program ideas 
come from, and many studies have drawn their conclusions from one 
part of the agency, or at one time.
Against this research backdrop, NEDO Washington asked us to do a 
study of specific cases that illustrate how DARPA chooses its program 
areas. These cases focus on the selection of programs, not on the 
individual projects that make up programs (although the distinction is 
not always so clear, leading us to discuss a few major projects). Moreover, 
the focus is on the formation, and not the execution of programs.
We were asked to have the cases cover:
• Some well-known and easily understandable technologies
• A range of DARPA offices
• Programs that generated technologies for different military 
services
• A variety of time periods, with a preference for relatively 
recent projects.
Our study has several important limitations. First, the study was 
limited in scope, time, and resources, and is not comprehensive. While 
any R&D agency with more than fifty years of history cannot be fully 
characterized by a handful of case studies, a particular challenge in 
studying DARPA is that DARPA has changed over time and that its 
processes differ in different parts of the organization. DARPA is often 
recognized to be relatively free of bureaucracy, but the lack of rules and 
structure also leads to a lack of consistency throughout the organization 
and over time. As a result, while our study describes how DARPA has 
operated at different times and in different parts of the organization, it 
cannot be considered a complete description of how DARPA develops 
new programs.
Our selection of cases studies may also have several biases. Due to 
limitations in time and resources, we focused on programs for which 
information was more readily available. These included cases for which 
the authors personally knew key individuals who could discuss the 
cases, as well as cases that had already been well described, either by 
us or by others.
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Most of our cases took place in the late 1980s and early 2000s, and 
many of our cases are concentrated in periods that are often considered 
somewhat atypical of DARPA. First, the period from 1988 to about 1996 
was characterized by a very high interest in dual-use technology. The 
loss of industrial competitiveness in key industries and technologies, 
combined with changing defense needs with the end of the cold war, led 
to an expansion of programs that were outside of DARPA’s traditional 
mission and were intended to help support the competitiveness of 
key industries. During this period, Congressional and Administration 
priorities exerted an unusual influence in creating new programs.
Second, the period from 2001 through 2008 was characterized by 
unusually strong top-down direction, due to the management style of 
the director during this period, Dr. Anthony (Tony) Tether. Programs 
that were started in this period tended to have more influence from the 
DARPA director than in most other periods. Thus, while there is no 
single period of DARPA’s history than can be described as completely 
typical, the period in which many of our cases are concentrated are 
notably atypical.
There are several other sources of potential bias in the selection 
of cases. One is that it is easier to get information about programs 
that DARPA chooses to publicize. Like most organizations, DARPA 
highlights its successes more than its failures. When DARPA makes 
information available on a program, program managers are less 
inhibited in discussing it, and journalists or analysts are more likely to 
write about it, all of which increases the information on the program 
available in the public domain. DARPA programs that are well-known 
may differ systematically from less visible programs.
Because we did not do a random sample of DARPA programs, we 
cannot generalize our findings to all of DARPA. Other analysts, looking 
at different parts of DARPA at different times, may come to different 
conclusions. Several of our interviewees reported that they viewed their 
program as an atypical DARPA program. Indeed, one of the findings of 
the report is that atypical programs are common.
A further limitation is that each case is not comprehensive. In most 
cases we relied on one interview supported by background materials; it is 
quite possible that other participants would have different perspectives 
on each case.
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General Framework and Typical Patterns  
of Program Development
Figure 8-1 illustrates the influences on the development of new 
programs at DARPA. As will be discussed in the case descriptions, not 
all of the influences are present in every case, and the relative strength 
of the influences from the various sources differs significantly among 
the cases.
Fig. 8-1  Influences on DARPA’s Program Development. Source: TPI. Notes: IDA 
is Institute for Defense Analyses; DSB is Defense Science Board; JASON is 
a group of high-level government science and technology advisors; DOD 
is Department of Defense; DOE is Department of Energy; OSD is Office of 
the Secretary of Defense. (Figure prepared by the authors.)
In the archetypal DARPA program development process, information 
concerning useful new capabilities comes from the Department of 
Defense, while information concerning what is technically possible, 
and what areas might be ripe for advancement, comes from the 
technical community. Information and analysis may come from the 
community of think tanks and advisory committees that advise the 
Department of Defense and DARPA. The DARPA program manager 
has the responsibility for taking this input and constructing a program, 
usually made up of a set of projects, with defined technical goals that 
are aggressive but can potentially be met within a defined time frame 
and within a budget. The PM (Project Manager) must put together a 
program that is sufficiently challenging, important, and doable, to be 
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approved by the office director and ultimately the DARPA director. The 
“Heilmeier Catechism” (see Table 8-1) provides a set of questions the 
DARPA program managers should be able to answer to get approval 
for their program.
Table 8-1 Heilmeier’s Catechism.  
Source: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/heilmeier-catechism 
George H. Heilmeier (DARPA director 1975-1977) developed 
a set of questions known as the “Heilmeier Catechism” to 
help Agency officials think through and evaluate proposed 
research programs:
• What are you trying to do? Articulate your objectives 
using absolutely no jargon.
• How is it done today, and what are the limits of current 
practice?
• What is new in your approach and why do you think it 
will be successful?
• Who cares? If you succeed, what difference will it make?
• What are the risks?
• How much will it cost?
• How long will it take?
• What are the mid-term and final “exams” to check for 
success?
Within the broad categories of groups that provide information into the 
program development process, there are many subcategories. Within the 
Department of Defense, there may be input from the military services 
(Army, Navy, and Air Force) as well as the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), and these may all have different views on the 
importance of new technology. Within the technical community, there 
are universities, defense laboratories, defense contractors, and others, 
each of which bring different viewpoints. Of special influence are the 
parts of technical community that have had long-term interactions with 
DARPA, as contractors and as sources of program managers.
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There are many variations in the influences on programs. In some 
cases, the military need drives the process, and the program is set up 
to develop a prototype that may not require fundamental advances 
in technology. In other cases, the DARPA director or a DARPA office 
director may drive the process. They may have particular interests that 
they believe DARPA should pursue, and they will recruit a program 
manager to execute a program built around those interests. In other 
cases, the drive may come from DARPA’s technical community, which 
may make DARPA aware of the potential that advances in science and 
technology may have for the military. In some cases, a general need may 
come from the defense community, but the key ideas that form the basis 
for a program may come from the technical community, in workshops 
or in response to a Request for Information (RFI) or a Broad Agency 
Announcement (BAA). In some cases, outside advisors, the Congress, 
and/or the Executive Office of the President (including the President’s 
key science, economic, and national security advisors) have played 
important roles in shaping DARPA programs.
The different DARPA offices can vary in their processes for program 
development. In general, the Defense Sciences Office (DSO) can be 
expected to interact more with the research community while the 
Strategic Technology Office (STO) and Tactical Technology Office (TTO) 
tend to interact more with the military services. The other three technical 
offices—the Biological Technologies Office (BTO), Microsystem 
Technology Office (MTO) and Information Innovation Office (I2O)—are 
somewhere in between.
The influences on DARPA program development have also changed 
over time. In DARPA’s early days, much of its work was driven by large 
defense projects in space, missile and satellite development (especially 
before NASA was established) and nuclear test detection. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, the needs of the Vietnam War were a major 
influence. In the late 1970s into the mid-1980s, DARPA initiated major 
thrusts in radically new weapons concepts, such as stealth aviation and 
standoff precision strike. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, DARPA was 
given new dual-use roles by the Congress and the Administration, and 
funds for industrial consortia in semiconductors, optoelectronics and 
other areas were administered by DARPA. In much of the 2000s there 
was a refocusing on defense applications, as well a strong top-down 
influence from the Director, Anthony Tether.
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These various influences on DARPA program development are 
illustrated in the next section through case studies.
Case Studies of the Development of DARPA Programs
We focused our study on the nine cases of the development of DARPA 
programs as described in Table 8-2.
Table 8-2 Case studies in this chapter. (Table prepared by the authors.)
In each case, we have tried to focus on a specific program, but we 
discuss related activities that preceded and followed the program. In 
some cases, the identification of a program for analysis, and when it 
started, is not so clear, as the agency may have funded small projects 
before the main program began, so the precursors to a program may 
have begun well before the DARPA program was created.
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For each program, we characterize the program by name, goal, 
DARPA office, time period, and main results. Then we examine the 
history of the program and where the idea for the program came from. 
Whose idea was it? How advanced was the idea when DARPA took it 
on? Were there antecedent ideas and programs? Was the program part of 
a broader and long-standing set of DARPA activities? How long was the 
proposal in development? Were there small projects, termed “seedlings”, 
to test key concepts before the main program was established? Was the 
program significantly modified in goals or approach?
We discuss the background of the program managers and their role. 
What were they hired to do? Did the PMs have the idea, were they given 
the idea, or did they find the idea? Then we discuss other key roles 
in the formation of the programs including the role of the technical 
community, the DARPA senior management, and other elements of the 
Department of Defense.
Finally, we discuss the lessons learned from the case and what the 
case illustrates about DARPA’s process of program formation.
Have Blue (Stealth)4
Overview
The “Have Blue” program was the DARPA program that produced the 
original prototype “stealth” aircraft that is much less visible to radar 
and other detection methods. It was managed in the Tactical Technology 
Office.
Planning studies began in 1974, and the program to develop the 
prototype plane took place in 1976 to 1978, with subsequent follow-on 
support to the Air Force through 1981. The program was highly 
successful, and led to a new generation of aircraft, starting with the 
F-117A, that represented a major increase in military capabilities.
4  Van Atta, R., Lippitz, M., et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition, DARPA’s Role 
in Fostering a Revolution in Military Affairs. Volume 1. Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analyses, 11–15, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada422835, https://fas.org/irp/
agency/dod/idarma.pdf
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Context and history of the program development 
Origins
By the early 1970s it was clear to the U.S.’s strategic defense planners that 
the Soviet Union had achieved air defense capabilities that would have 
made penetrating Soviet airspace difficult. This presented the U.S. with 
a fundamental strategic challenge, requiring the development of new 
alternatives if the U.S. and NATO were to deter or combat the Soviet 
Bloc without having to resort to nuclear war. A central party to address 
this threat was the Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(DDR&E) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, who at that time was 
Dr. Malcolm Currie. Currie assumed this position in 1974 and, based 
on guidance from Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, sought greater 
innovation from the defense research community to develop emerging 
technologies to address the Soviet military buildup.
It was in this larger context in 1974 that Chuck Myers, Director of 
Air Warfare Programs in the Office of the DDR&E, mentioned to Robert 
Moore, then Deputy Director of DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office 
(TTO),5 an idea he called the “Harvey concept”.6 The concept was to 
create a tactical combat aircraft that was much less detectable by radar 
or infrared, acoustic, or visual means.
A primary objective was to use only passive measures (coatings and 
shaping) rather than depending on support aircraft carrying jammers. 
Such a plane would allow for new types of deep air attacks, replacing 
the “air armada” tactics using a large number of aircraft that had become 
the norm in Air Force and Navy aviation.
The Harvey idea was not entirely new, as some techniques to make 
aircraft less visible had been used in highly classified reconnaissance 
aircraft (both manned and unmanned). However, there were no serious 
efforts to employ such capabilities on a weapons platform. To do this, 
significant advances in radar cross-section reduction were needed 
to overcome Soviet integrated anti-aircraft systems. Myers wanted to 
fund aircraft companies to propose conceptual designs. Coincidentally, 
shortly after the Myers-Moore discussion, DDR&E Malcolm Currie sent 
5  Moore became TTO Director in 1975.
6  “Harvey” was the name of an invisible rabbit in a popular play and 1950 movie of 
the same name.
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out a memo stating that he was not satisfied with the innovation he 
saw coming out of DOD research. The memo also invited organizations 
to propose radical new ideas. Representing the TTO Office, Moore 
nominated the “Harvey” idea, renaming it “High Stealth Aircraft”.
Ken Perko from the Air Force Systems Command at Wright 
Patterson Air Force Base had recently been recruited as a program 
manager to build up a tactical air program within DARPA’s TTO. Perko 
had worked in the Air Force on DARPA-sponsored work on “low-
observable” research for drones and remotely-piloted vehicles, and had 
some knowledge of this field. DARPA’s Moore therefore assigned Perko 
the task of contacting U.S. defense aviation contractors directly to solicit 
their ideas on approaches to achieve extremely low radar cross-section. 
Moore recalled that most of the vendors submitted slightly improved 
radar cross-section reduction, but nothing that would reach the order-
of-magnitude goals that DARPA was seeking. Based on these initial 
submissions, DARPA ultimately funded small preliminary studies at 
Grumman, McDonnell-Douglas, and Northrop. Three formal study 
contracts followed, awarded to McDonnell-Douglas, Northrop, and 
Hughes (for its radar expertise). While these studies were under way, 
Lockheed became aware of the project (Lockheed had not been invited to 
participate initially because it was not considered to be active in tactical 
aircraft) and contacted DARPA requesting permission to participate 
in the first phase concept development, without compensation. This 
request went to DARPA Director George Heilmeier, who granted 
Lockheed permission.
DARPA Have Blue Prototype
By the summer of 1975, it was clear that only Lockheed and Northrop 
had credible, near-term concepts for making aircraft radically less 
visible to enemy antiaircraft radar. Perko, Moore and Heilmeier met to 
develop a strategy and decided that a full-scale flight demonstration 
would be needed to make the results convincing. However, Heilmeier 
insisted that the program should not go forward without Air Force 
backing. Air Force support was highly uncertain, as the Air Force saw 
limited value in a stealthy strike aircraft, given the severe performance 
compromises that they assumed would be required to achieve a very 
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low radar cross-section. There were also competing Air Force R&D 
priorities, most notably the Advanced Combat Fighter program (which 
eventually became the F-16).
DDR&E Currie discussed the problem directly with General David 
Jones, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and General Alton Slay, the Air 
Force R&D Director. Although the Air Force remained skeptical as to a 
stealth strike fighter’s value, Currie and Jones brokered a deal to obtain 
active Air Force support for the DARPA stealth program, provided that 
funding for the stealth development would not come out of existing 
Air Force programs, especially the F-16. With that agreement, Phase 
II of DARPA’s stealth aircraft program—Have Blue—began in 1976. 
Lockheed won the sole Phase II award, in part due to the record of its 
“Skunk Works”7 for on-schedule accomplishment of high-risk, high-
classification projects, especially the SR-71 Blackbird.
Have Blue was a quarter-scale proof-of-concept aircraft designed to 
evaluate Lockheed’s concept for “very low-observable” capabilities while 
meeting a set of realistic operational requirements. The development 
program at Lockheed’s Skunk Works was highly classified (a Special 
Access Program or SAP), but managed in an environment open to 
experimentation and flexible problem solving, with a high degree of 
communication among scientists, developers, managers, and users. 
Shortly after the program began, its management was transferred to the 
Air Force, due to its being highly classified. Importantly, only a total 
of a dozen or so people in OSD, DARPA and the Air Force knew of the 
Have Blue program. OSD leadership under Currie and Myers kept the 
program focused and moving forward in the face of many fundamental 
uncertainties.
Transition to Air Force—Senior Trend
Successful flights of Have Blue planes in 1977 made it clear that a 
stealthy aircraft could be built and flown. Based on these results—
and guided by the high priority of countering Soviet numerical 
superiority with U.S. technology—Currie’s replacement in the Carter 
7  “Skunk Works” was the name given to Lockheed’s Advanced Development 
Programs (ADP), which was famous for rapidly developing new airplanes in an 
un-bureaucratic environment, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skunk_Works.
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administration that took office in January 1977, Under Secretary of 
Defense (Research and Engineering) (USD(R&E)) William Perry sought 
accelerated development of a real weapons system. The DARPA stealth 
program was then immediately transitioned to an Air Force acquisition 
program—called “Senior Trend”— with an aggressive schedule to have 
operational planes in only four years, forgoing the normal development 
and prototyping stage. The objective was to build and deploy a wing 
of stealth tactical fighter-bombers (seventy-five planes) as rapidly as 
possible. Furthermore, in order to obtain the largest possible technical 
lead, it was deemed necessary to hide the acquisition by making Senior 
Trend a highly secret program. The resulting operational aircraft was 
dubbed the F-117A.
Impact
The first F-117A “stealth fighter” was delivered in 1981, and fifty-nine 
were deployed by 1990. In 1991, the F-117A was an outstanding success 
in the Gulf War. It helped the U.S. achieve early air superiority critical 
for defeating heavily defended targets. It did so in the face of the same 
type of Soviet anti-aircraft systems that had been effective against U.S. 
aircraft in Vietnam and other wars. In championing stealth, DARPA 
harnessed ideas from industry and the military service laboratories to 
pursue a radical new warfighting capability. Stealth combat systems had 
not been pursued because the Services lacked a strong interest in such a 
nontraditional concept. With high-level support from civilian leadership 
across presidential administrations, DARPA overcame that resistance, 
set out priorities, and obtained funding for the considerable engineering 
work to develop a proof-of-concept aircraft demonstration system. This 
demonstration enabled top civilian and Service leadership to proceed 
with confidence. OSD and Service leadership, once persuaded, rose to 
the challenge, and provided funding and support to implement a full-
scale weapons program.
From the outset Have Blue was a “crash” program, designed to 
develop and deploy a breakthrough capability in as short a time 
as possible. Achieving this required a highly focused technology 
development, prototyping and acquisition approach. The approach 
was driven by a national-level strategic imperative that was initiated 
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out of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and developed by DARPA. 
The subsequent implementation was through a highly classified Air 
Force Program with direct and close oversight of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering. Throughout this process the 
focus was delivering an operationally capable stealth strike aircraft in 
four years. The imperative of offsetting the Soviet air defense capabilities 
drove decisions on the structure of the program, the selection of the 
performer, the oversight mechanisms. The program had ambitious but 
clear objectives that helped focus the contractor and the government on 
working together pragmatically to achieve the outcome.
Background and Role of the Program Manager
Ken Perko, the program manager for Have Blue, worked closely with 
TTO Director Robert Moore in (1) getting industry inputs, (2) assessing 
the competing approaches, and (3) selecting the eventual contractor, 
Lockheed, to produce the Have Blue prototype. While Perko had earlier 
experience in related DARPA programs in low observables when 
working for the Air Force, the idea to actively pursue such a radically 
different aircraft came from the top down, led by Myers and supported 
at DARPA by Moore.
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
Myers (Director of Air Warfare Programs in the Office of the DDR&E) 
was the true instigator of a “stealthy” tactical aircraft—initially called 
“Project Harvey”. Indeed, Myers was a driver of new aviation concepts 
more broadly, including the notion of a mini-fighter that would be 
intrinsically low-observable. In essence he was OSD’s aviation leader 
and engaged the Services and DARPA actively to pursue new ideas.
DARPA Director George Heilmeier was both a champion and a 
skeptic. He was an advocate of pursuing radical new concepts, and 
especially in scaling these up as proof-of-concept demonstrations. 
However, he also realized that only the Air Force could actually produce 
a successful aircraft weapon system. Therefore, he insisted that Air 
Force backing be obtained, which required intervention by Dr. Currie, 
the DDR&E. Heilmeier was actively involved with Moore and Perko 
in strategizing how the program should be scoped and conducted. His 
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involvement was predicated on Have Blue being such a high-priority 
program with such high-level interest (as well as being a very high-cost 
program relative to most DARPA programs).
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) Currie had 
sent out a memo stating that he was not satisfied with innovation he 
saw coming out of DOD research. The memo also invited organizations 
to propose radical new ideas. Representing the TTO Office, Moore 
nominated the “Harvey” idea, renaming it “High Stealth Aircraft”. 
Currie subsequently used his office to leverage Air Force participation 
in Have Blue and subsequently the Senior Trend program that led to 
the F-117A.
Moore focused DARPA’s involvement in the Have Blue program. He 
took on Myers’ challenge to see whether an “invisible” combat aircraft 
was possible and worked with program manager Perko to determine 
the options and develop the approach.
Key Insights
Have Blue shows that DARPA could be extremely responsive to high-
level priorities of OSD and indeed the White House. DARPA saw itself 
as the organization that could and should take on high-risk programs 
that could fundamentally improve the national security position of 
the United States. This was exactly what it did in response to DDR&E 
Currie’s (and Defense Secretary Schlesinger’s) call for greater defense 
innovation to meet the Soviet threat. OSD articulated the challenge—can 
a stealthy aircraft be made? DARPA organized and funded the research 
to discern what could be done and then developed the prototype that 
demonstrated this.
DARPA conducted Have Blue as a “black program”—classified 
above Top Secret. This was done to keep the Soviet Union from knowing 
what was being done. Importantly, such programs are known within 
the DOD to very few, and also very few individuals outside (including 
only a handful in Congress). This permits them to proceed with less 
scrutiny than is the norm. However, such classification places a great 
deal of extra burden on the project management.
Have Blue shows the role of civilian leadership in pushing concepts 
that the military services resist. Stealth combat systems had not been 
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pursued by the Air Force because they conflicted with their priorities 
and concepts for combat aviation. The Air Force lacked interest in such 
a nontraditional concept that compromised performance—especially 
speed, maneuverability, and self-defense. However, with high-level 
support from civilian leadership across administrations, DARPA 
overcame that resistance, set out priorities, and obtained funding for the 
considerable engineering work to develop a proof-of-concept aircraft 
demonstration system. Have Blue is also an example of where an OSD-
identified need led DARPA to fund several conceptual studies, and then 
DARPA developed the most promising of these into a program. Such 
conceptual studies can be a key part of program development.
Assault Breaker (Standoff Precision Strike)
Overview
Assault Breaker was the demonstration of a concept for finding, hitting 
and destroying targets on a battlefield from a distance—known as 
“standoff precision strike”—by employing a “system of systems”. The 
program combined airborne radar, long-range tactical ground-based 
missiles and terminally-guided submunitions, linked to a rapid, all-
source targeting system. The Assault Breaker program began in 1978 and 
concluded in 1983, and was run through DARPA’s Tactical Technology 
Office (TTO). It is generally recognized that the result of this program 
was a joint operational concept that would revolutionize the battlefield.8
Context and History of Program Development
Assault Breaker had its origins in a DARPA study jointly funded 
with the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) to define alternatives 
to allow the United States “to respond flexibly to a military threat 
from an aggressor nation”. This was a large, multi-participant study 
comprised of strategic thinkers and technologists who were drawn 
together as the “New Alternatives Panels”, organized under DARPA 
and DNA to respond to Presidential, National Security Advisor, and 
Secretary of Defense concerns that there was a need to “broaden 
8  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, 15–16. 
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the spectrum of strategic alternatives” available (other than nuclear 
strike) to “limit Soviet aggression”.9 The classified work of these 
panels was simply titled the Long Range Research and Development 
Plan. These deliberations converged around new defense concepts 
that emphasized standoff precision strike. It was understood that 
to actually combine capabilities to do this would require unproven 
and unprecedented integration of a wide variety of technologies that 
dictated a unified development, integration and employment of both 
targeting and weapons systems.10 
DARPA was given the task of implementing the precision strike 
concept based on the integration of inputs from (1) the Long-Range 
Research and Development Planning Program; (2) ideas from DARPA 
program manager Leland Strom for using Moving Target Indicator (MTI) 
radar to guide a missile to a target area and then use terminally guided 
submunitions to destroy the targets; and (3) briefings from industry on 
using tactical missiles with submunitions with electro-optical seekers. 
The Director of DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office, Moore, drew upon 
these ideas to propose the Integrated Target Acquisition and Strike 
System (ITASS) as a DARPA program to develop and demonstrate such 
capabilities. Moore asked MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory to flesh out this 
concept, including potential systems that could be incorporated, and 
the feasibility of enabling technologies that would be needed.11 When 
DARPA Director Robert Fossum approved the program in 1978 it was 
renamed Assault Breaker.
Establishing the Assault Breaker Program
There had been several rather disparate R&D efforts of the military 
services on parts of the technology underpinnings of what became 
Assault Breaker, such as the newly deployed E-3 Sentry (AWACS) 
aircraft, which led to the DARPA-Air Force Tactical Air Weapons 
Direction System Program (TAWDS), which then was renamed Pave 
Mover.
9  Ibid., 16, quoting ARPA/DNA Long Range Research and Development Plan, Final 
Report of the Advanced Technology Panel (1975), vi.
10  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, 8.
11  Ibid., 18.
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Pave Mover was then merged into the Assault Breaker program, 
and subsequently became JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack 
Radar System).12 Similarly the Air Force and Army were both working 
on various programs to develop new munitions for attacking ground 
targets and ways to deliver these from a distance including an array 
of submunitions that could be directed to individual targets, including 
the Air Force’s Wide Area Anti-Armor Munitions (WAAM) and 
the Army’s Terminally Guided Sub-Munition (TGSM). These new 
individual weapons technology concepts were all inputs to Moore in 
DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office, and all influenced DARPA PM 
Leland Strom in formulating a concept that integrated such capabilities, 
which he presented to Moore. These separate developments in sensing, 
missiles, submunitions, as well as command and control, were inputs 
into an integrated capability (system of systems) in a DARPA-funded 
project (ITASS) conducted by Lincoln Laboratory.
While these concepts were developed by 1976, the actual Assault 
Breaker Program to develop and demonstrate these integrated 
capabilities did not start until 1978. This was the result of several factors: 
(1) the change of Administrations in 1976, bringing in new leadership; 
and (2) concerns by new DARPA Director Fossum that the Assault 
Breaker was “fragile” in combining multiple capabilities that were 
unproven both individually and together in a combat environment. 
Moreover, Assault Breaker was itself different from “normal” DARPA 
military programs in that it was more about integration of several 
relatively near-term technologies, rather than a leap in technology itself. 
Thus, DARPA Director Fossum and his immediate superior, Under 
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E), William 
Perry, both new to the Pentagon in 1976, had to evaluate the complex 
proposals for standoff precision strike and determine whether and how 
to proceed. It should be noted that both Fossum and Perry were well 
versed in the earlier developments through their industry backgrounds 
and as advisors to DOD. Moreover, Perry was an enthusiastic advocate 
for the overall concept of standoff precision-guided weapons, as 
articulated in his testimony in 1978 upon becoming USDR&E.
12  Van Atta, R., Deitchman, S., and Reed, S. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments. 
Volume II. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 5–6, https://apps.dtic.mil/
dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a241725.pdf
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Background and Role of the Program Manager
The Assault Breaker program was the result of higher-level inputs 
above the DARPA program manager. The key individual in developing 
the program was Moore, who was Director of the Tactical Technology 
office. Assault Breaker was driven by a high-level strategic imperative 
from the White House (President Nixon and Security Advisor Kissinger) 
to address Soviet military capabilities threatening Western Europe. This 
translated into a DARPA-DNA sponsored study group that identified the 
general concept of standoff precision strike using conventional weapons 
as a way to “offset” Soviet-Warsaw Pact armor. However, it was Moore 
who harnessed inputs from a TTO program manager, Leland Strom, 
and inputs from industry, into an initial study by Lincoln Laboratory 
and then used that to formulate the Assault Breaker Program.
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
Assault Breaker was in fact a multi-project four-phase program, with 
these sub-projects managed by a set of DARPA TTO PMs. For example, 
the Pave Mover airborne reconnaissance aircraft (which subsequently 
became JSTARS) was under PM Nicholas Willis. In its first phase, the 
program supported continued development of individual component 
technologies, such as the sensors, radars, and automatic target 
recognition—most of which were being pursued within DARPA under 
various PMs. The second phase was then testing in parallel different 
contractor approaches for systems level capabilities. In the third phase, 
more complex integration of systems-of-systems was demonstrated in 
competition. Finally, the fourth phase linked together the integrated 
system into a large, complex demonstration.13
Assault Breaker was managed under a unique approach under 
DARPA with an actively involved steering group that included the 
Director of DARPA, Fossum, as well as Lt. Generals from both the 
Army and the Air Force. Notably DARPA reported directly to Under 
Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), Perry for this project. 
Moreover, Moore was elevated from DARPA to the position of Deputy 
13  These phases are described in specifics in Van Atta, et al. (1991). DARPA Technical 
Accomplishments. Volume II, V-9, V-10.
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Under Secretary of Defense for Tactical Warfare Programs, to provide 
continued oversight of this and related programs.14 DARPA was thus 
given direct responsibility for managing what became a combined set of 
projects conducted mainly under the Army and Air Force.
Key Insights
The Assault Breaker program is an example of a very large-scale 
systems integration project, driven by highest-level military priorities, 
with the DARPA office director playing a key role in orchestrating the 
development of the implementing concepts.
• DARPA first supported a conceptual study (with the DNA) 
to determine an overall concept to meet a high-level security 
problem.
• DARPA then funded under the Office Director’s initiative a 
detailed technical assessment of options and approaches for 
the integrated system-of-systems.
• Assault Breaker was an integration of multiple projects that 
were being individually pursued and managed by a set of 
DARPA PMs mostly being supported by individual military 
services. DARPA fostered the demonstration of these as an 
integrated system, which was largely counter to the culture 
and priorities of the separate military services.
• A unique management structure reporting to the Under 
Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering) was 
established with the DARPA Tactical Technologies Office 
conducting day-to-day management.
• Program managers played primarily a management oversight 
role over very large individual sub-programs and their overall 
integration into a proof-of-concept demonstration.
14  Assault Breaker was in fact one of several large-scale DARPA programs for 
developing an integrated response to the Soviet Bloc. Another one was the Stealth 
aircraft program reported upon here as well. Moore moved to his position in OSD 
to provide broad oversight of all these programs as they matured and transitioned.
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Amber/Predator (High Altitude  
Long Endurance UAVs)
Overview15
Amber, out of which grew the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV), was a specific program that developed from the Teal Rain 
program for advancing technologies for High Altitude Long Endurance 
(HALE) UAVs. The UAV that became Amber was proposed to DARPA 
in 1978 by its developer, Abraham Karem, who owned a firm called 
Leading Systems, Inc. The PM whom he briefed did not pursue the 
idea, but DARPA Director Fossum heard the presentation, overruled 
this rejection, and funded it out of his own office’s funds. Based upon 
this support, Karem successfully developed and demonstrated a UAV 
called Albatross. DARPA then in 1984 began a program for Amber, a 
scaled-up version of Albatross. Amber was a classified reconnaissance 
UAV, which was flown in 1986—just two years after the initial DARPA 
contract. However, Amber was used only in small numbers (by the 
CIA), and, with no subsequent DOD business, Karem’s firm, Leading 
Systems, Inc., went into bankruptcy and was sold to General Atomics. 
After a decade of delay, OSD pushed renewed interest in HALE UAVs 
and Amber was modified under a DARPA program to become Predator, 
an extremely successful intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) system that has been used extensively by U.S. and allied forces in 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.16
Context and History of the Program Development
The concept of an unmanned aerial vehicle can be traced as far back as 
World War I with a British radio-controlled “guided explosive laden 
unmanned air vehicle [intended] to glide into German ships”. During 
World War II Germany further developed radio-controlled rockets, 
15  Van Atta, R. H., Cook, A., et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role 
in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs. Volume 2. Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, VI-2, VI-5, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada422835, 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a422835.pdf
16  Predator was subsequently fitted with a missile that allowed it to become an attack 
weapon itself.
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including the V-1. During World War II the United States converted 
B-17s into BQ-7 radio controlled “flying bombs”, and then after the 
war modified additional B-17s as the QB-17G for such purposes as 
collecting atmospheric samples from nuclear tests, and later as target 
drones. The Air Force in the 1960s worked with Ryan Aerospace to 
develop an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft called the Firebee, which 
was used to conduct reconnaissance over North Vietnam and southern 
China, particularly to substitute for the manned U-2 spy plane in 
heavily defended areas. The Firebees were air-launched from a C-130 
aircraft. With the termination of the Vietnam conflict, and subsequent 
drawdown of forces, Air Force interest in UAVs waned.
DARPA and UAVs
DARPA’s initial involvement with UAVs was with remotely piloted 
vehicles (RPVs) used first in support of tactical reconnaissance in 
Vietnam.17 However, by the early 1970s the expense and complexity of 
these earlier systems led to their demise, and the Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering, John Foster, urged that DARPA should 
focus instead on using lightweight, rugged, inexpensive model airplane 
technology, which became DARPA’s Mini-RPV program. That program 
led to the successful development and testing of relatively small, fixed-
wing UAVs, but these did not transition into any operational UAVs, as the 
Army’s Aquila program which was based on these ultimately failed when 
requirements, weight and costs spiraled out of control. Thus, DARPA’s 
first foray into UAVs ended with little actual deployed capabilities.18
DARPA High Altitude Long Endurance UAVs
In 1978, DARPA funded the aircraft developer Abraham Karem to 
develop a very-long endurance very high altitude (90,000 feet and 5-day 
17  Van Atta, et al. (1990). DARPA Technical Accomplishments. Volume I, 28–23, 28–25.
18  It should be noted that the technologies did become further developed and deployed 
as combat systems by Israel as the Mastiff, Scout and Pioneer UAVs. Ironically, the 
U.S. Navy and Army acquired the Pioneer from Israel and eventually this led to the 
development of the Shadow tactical UAV by AAI, which is now part of Textron. 
See Hirschberg, M. J. (2010). “To Boldly Go Where No Unmanned Aircraft Has 
Gone Before: A Half-Century of DARPA’s Contributions to Unmanned Aircraft”, 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (January): 11–13.
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flight endurance) UAV under the Teal Rain program. Teal Rain was a 
classified DARPA program to explore technology for long endurance 
UAVs driven by the problem that prior efforts, largely by the Air Force, 
had resulted in very large and expensive aircraft. Teal Rain projects 
were expressly “unfettered, technology-push studies to generate new 
ideas”.19 Based on this initial support Karem, using his own funds, 
and under his own firm, Leading Systems, Inc., built prototypes of a 
new UAV, the Albatross, for which DARPA then supported flight tests. 
DARPA then began a program in 1984 for Amber, a scaled-up version 
of Albatross. Amber was a classified reconnaissance UAV, which was 
flown in 1986—just two years after the initial DARPA contract.
From a technical standpoint Amber was highly successful and 
Leading Systems invested in considerable technology development for 
improving performance and operational capabilities. However, in 1987, 
when the program was transferred to the Navy, Amber became a victim 
of Navy funding priorities. Moreover, Congress established within the 
DOD a Joint Program Office for UAVs consolidating all the military 
efforts.
With existing UAVs meeting then current Service requirements, the 
more advanced Amber was not selected to continue into acquisition. 
Leading Systems could not survive this misfortune and was sold first 
to Hughes and then to General Atomics. Karem, now associated with 
General Atomics, kept the Amber concept alive by developing a lower 
performance version called the Gnat 750, which was aimed at the 
international market. A few were sold to Turkey. Others were acquired 
by the CIA, which supported further development.
Predator
In 1990 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff established a requirement for Long Range Endurance 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition. The JROC put 
forward a three-tier approach for this.20 Tier I was a quick reaction 
19  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, VI-15, quoting 
DARPA Program Manager Charles Heber.
20  The three-tier concept was articulated in a memo by Deputy Secretary of Defense 
John Deutch. Tier III was to be a very high altitude, long endurance stealthy 
UAV. After considerable machinations, Tier III devolved into two alternative 
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capability that could be satisfied by the General Atomics Gnat 750. Tier 
II was labeled “Medium Altitude Endurance” and a scaled-up version 
of the Gnat 750 was seen as the best approach for this. This became the 
Predator. Predator was initially an incremental modification of the Gnat 
750—essentially a stretched airframe and longer wings with additional 
ISR sensors—with linkage to satellite system for communications. 
Subsequent developments added substantial new operational 
capabilities for target acquisition and strike. The initial system comprised 
an aircraft, sensors, communications capabilities, and a ground station 
for aircraft control. Subsequently, laser target designator capabilities 
and then Hellfire missile launch capabilities were added.
As an aircraft, Predator is not highly complex. Primary complexities 
were involved in the control software and in the satellite communications 
linkage. The operational linkage through the Ground Control 
Station was a complicating factor. The technologies were generally 
mature. Most of the technology had been developed under DARPA, 
although with limitations and iterative developments. A major new 
development was use of satellite communications. Predator used GPS 
satellites for navigation, being the first UAV to overcome line-of-sight 
range limitations through use of satellite technology. Predator used 
commercial satellite data links for control and imagery transmission.
While much of the technology in the Predator system was in 
place, the implementation of a tactical intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR) UAV in the field was largely untried. The 
implementation of this system became an urgent priority of Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD)-driven due to a need to have ISR capabilities 
to support efforts in Bosnia and later in Iraq. Consequently, Predator 
was developed as an urgent program, although not based on formal 
military-service derived requirements. The Gulf War in 1991 highlighted 
serious deficiencies in airborne tactical-level ISR, particularly for 
wide-area coverage. The Predator arose out of high-level (Secretary of 
Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Director CIA) 
concerns that these ISR capabilities needed to be kept affordable.
platforms—Tier II+, which became the Global Hawk UAV, and Tier III-, which 
was called Dark Star, a smaller, stealthy system. Dark Star was cancelled after two 
crashes and costs that escalated excessively. Global Hawk subsequently became 
very successful in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.
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Predator was put into service using a “non-standard” accelerated 
process known as the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
(ACTD) process. Use of the ACTD “allowed use of a streamlined 
management and oversight process, provided for early participation of 
the user community, and bound the schedule length. The goal of the 
ACTD was to demonstrate military utility in a relatively short timeframe. 
The use of mature technology was intended to limit risk”.21 Under the 
ACTD process, Predator was delivered for user experimentation in just 
six months. Predator was successfully employed in Bosnia (just a year 
after its first flight), Kosovo, and the no-fly zone in Iraq. Predator was 
later used in Afghanistan, becoming a weapons platform, firing Hellfire 
missiles.
Predator provides a clear example of a successful demonstration of 
innovative new capabilities prior to their being identified as military 
requirements. With this demonstration the operational community 
championed the novel HALE UAV capabilities for use in combat. 
Through this demonstration “technology push” became “demand pull” 
and the Predator went from demonstration to an accelerated acquisition. 
Of paramount importance was the fact that Predator met a compelling 
need for which there was no existing system, and that it was able to 
evolve to meet additional needs as these were identified.
Background and Role of the Program Manager
The program manager for the HALE Program was Charles Heber who 
served as director of the High Altitude Endurance Unmanned Air 
Vehicle Joint Program Office at the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA). Previously, he had served as Deputy Director of 
DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office, where he oversaw UAV programs. 
Prior to that he was deputy director of technology for the Office of Naval 
Research’s (ONR’s) Low Observables Technology Office. Heber was the 
manager of this set of programs, not the initiator of the ideas for it. The 
ideas were brought to DARPA from the outside (primarily by Abraham 
Karem for Amber and then Predator).
21  Drezner, G., et al. (1999). Innovative Management in the DARPA HAE UAV Program, 
MR-1054-DARPA. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
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Other Key Roles in Program Formation
Dr. Robert Fossum, the Director of DARPA, played a crucial role in 
formulating a program around the notion of a high altitude, long 
endurance (HALE) UAV. He initiated DARPA’s Teal Rain program that 
investigated advanced technology concepts for HALE—essentially 
technology push programs to generate new ideas. One of these 
programs was Karem’s Amber. According to Fossum, he personally 
supported Amber when the cognizant PM was uninterested in 
pursuing it.
While DARPA, particularly under Fossum, supported HALE 
developments, these developments foundered with military service lack 
of interest until a decade later. In the 1990s DARPA became reengaged 
with the high-level of interest of OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
implementing UAV-based long endurance ISR capabilities. Notably, 
many of those pushing for this were experienced in the prior HALE 
UAV efforts through DARPA in the 1980s. This included Secretary 
of Defense Perry, and Larry Lynn, who had been Deputy Director of 
DARPA in the early 1980s and was now Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts. Lynn’s position was, in 
fact, created expressly to achieve a breakthrough in ISR technologies. 
He and others were convinced that only DARPA could effectively 
manage the ambitious HALE UAV implementation that would lead to 
both Predator and Global Hawk being fielded.
Key Insights
Some key lessons from the HALE UAV evolution and development 
include:
• The concept of UAVs did not originate with DARPA—there 
had been prior efforts to develop and deploy them. However, 
military service interests in UAVs were generally short-lived 
and at critical junctures DARPA was critical in promulgating 
and refocusing UAV developments.
• DARPA’s work in support of UAVs has spanned several 
decades, starting in the 1970s, but was not continuous. The 
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programs that eventually led to implemented systems were 
built upon previous efforts.
• The initial impetus for smaller mini-RPVs came directly from 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), John 
Foster, who encouraged DARPA to take on this new direction.
• DARPA’s focus on RPVs corresponded with an OSD level 
focus on addressing Soviet Bloc (and Chinese) threats by 
being able to see and hit deep targets and quickly destroy their 
forces before they could mass for strike.
• DARPA supported development of several enabling 
technologies essential to overall UAV capabilities including 
sensors, command and control, structures, which contributed 
to UAV communication, navigation, targeting.
• DARPA determined at the highest level (DARPA Director) 
to move away from smaller tactical UAVs (RPVs) to High 
Altitude, Long Endurance UAVs. This refocusing was 
supported by inputs from high-level advisory organizations 
(Defense Science Board) and OSD leadership.
• DARPA leadership generally supported the concept of High 
Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAVs despite the lack of 
interest of the Military Services. However, the specific HALE 
concepts were brought to DARPA by individuals (Karem) and 
firms (Boeing, Ryan Aeronautical, General Atomics).
• DARPA helped to develop a novel, non-standard approaches 
for development and initial acquisition (the ACTD mechanism) 
to speed implementation of UAVs.
• Strong high-level (OSD) support for the development, 
demonstration and deployment of novel HALE UAV defense 
capabilities outside of standard Service processes were crucial 
for these new capabilities to gain traction.
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Optoelectronics Program22
Overview
Optoelectronics at DARPA is generally considered to have started as the 
optronics program that began in 1984, under John Neff. The program 
was stimulated by requirements of the Strategic Computing Initiative 
that DARPA launched in 1983, which required advances in networking 
and signal processing. In the 1989–1992 period the program was 
expanded and renamed the Optoelectronics Program, taking advantage 
of congressionally provided funds for university-industry consortia and 
university optoelectronic centers. The program started in the Defense 
Science Office (DSO), but moved to the Microsystems Technology Office 
(MTO) when that office was established in 1991. The program led to 
major advances in optical communication, including networks that use 
“wavelength division multiplexing” (WDM). The program was followed 
by several additional DARPA programs that made further advances at 
the component and system level, and in the integration of optical and 
electronic technologies. The program and its successors are credited with 
accelerating the development and demonstration of WDM components 
and systems, encouraging the adoption of technical standards that 
helped the industry grow rapidly, and creating community of experts 
who helped North American companies move quickly in WDM.
Context and History of the Program Development
Several influences came together to shape the optoelectronics program. 
One influence was the increasing importance of high-performance 
computing and networking. By the 1980s, the U.S. military relied 
increasingly on advanced information technology and communications 
for intelligence, battlefield intelligence, and logistics. DARPA had 
long supported computing and networking technology, including the 
foundation of the ARPANET and Internet. In 1983 DARPA launched 
22  Sources for this section include: interview of Dr. Andrew Yang, by authors 
March, 2016; Optoelectronics Industry Development Association. (2001). Creating 
Bandwidth for the Internet Age. Washington, DC: OIDA; Block, F. L., and Keller, M. R. 
(2011). State of Innovation: The U.S. Government’s Role in Technology Development. New 
York, NY: Paradigm Publishers.
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a Strategic Computing Initiative to advance computing, which 
included the optronics programs. In 1987, the Reagan Administration 
proposed a new high-performance computing initiative, including 
networking, which evolved into the High Performance Computing and 
Communications Initiative (HPCCI). DARPA volunteered to take the 
lead in advancing the technology of networking. DARPA expanded 
its support of the development of experimental networks and the 
underlying technologies, including optoelectronics.
Another stream of influence was the evolution of optical 
communications in the telecommunications and computing industries. 
Optical fiber-based communications had rapidly been expanding 
in telecommunications, but using only one frequency of light at a 
time. Since the mid-1970s, researchers considered the possibility of 
sending multiple streams of light down the same fiber using different 
wavelengths to increase the data flow through the fiber, known as 
wavelength division multiplexing (WDM). Early work was done by 
both the telecommunications industry, led by AT&T and Bellcore, and 
the computing industry, led by IBM. In the early 1980s, AT&T used an 
early version of WDM in a pilot system. However, WDM at this time was 
limited by two problems. First, to transmit signals over long distances, 
there was a need to amplify the signals along the way, and this required 
converting optical signals back into electronic signals, then amplifying 
them, and subsequently reconverting them back to optical signals. This 
process was very expensive. A second key challenge was converting 
data streams into and out of wavelength-divided light signals, through 
multiplexing and de-multiplexing.
In the late 1980s, there were possible solutions to both of these 
problems. The development of the erbium-doped fiber amplifier 
provided the means to amplify light signals without having to convert 
them to electronics. Advances were also made, primarily by IBM, in 
multiplexing and de-multiplexing the light signals.
While in the late 1980s there was industry interest and capability 
in these technologies, both the telecommunications companies and 
computer companies were under stress. Previously, IBM and AT&T had 
monopoly or near-monopoly positions that allowed them to generously 
fund R&D. However, the breakup of AT&T and IBM’s weakening 
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competitive position led to reduced R&D funding, and neither saw 
optical communications as a lucrative market.
Another important part of the context was the decline of U.S. 
competitiveness in information technologies in the 1980s. This led 
to Congressional concern and interest in expanding investment in 
key technologies and in supporting industry. In 1990, Congress gave 
DARPA extra money in the fiscal year 1991 budget to fund a series of 
industry-university-government R&D consortia. Congress had earlier 
provided funds for the SEMATECH consortium, in which the Defense 
Department and the semiconductor industry shared the cost of a 
project to improve semiconductor-manufacturing technology. Senators 
such as Jeff Bingaman (NM) were impressed with the early results 
of SEMATECH, and decided to extend the model to other areas of 
technology. Congress did not earmark the new money for any particular 
technologies or projects, but instead left the decision on what projects 
to fund to DARPA.
The combination of these influences created a situation in which 
the DARPA program managers believed it was timely to pursue a 
program to take advantage of the recent advances in component WDM 
technologies (light amplifiers and multiplexing), in order to make major 
progress in digital communications systems that would have both 
defense and commercial benefits.
The program managers put forth a proposal to spend $20 million 
of this extra FY (Fiscal Year) 1991 money for optoelectronic consortia. 
DARPA’s leaders agreed, and later they added approximately $10 
million of regular FY 1992 agency funds to this effort. Three consortia 
received this initial funding, with a focus on developing experimental 
WDM systems. These three DARPA-supported projects helped 
revolutionize optical communications. They included:
• The Optical Network Technology Consortium (ONTC). 
Bellcore (later Telcordia) led ONTC. Other participants 
included Nortel, Rockwell, the Hughes Research Laboratory, 
United Technologies, Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory, Columbia University, and Pacific Bell. ONTC 
is generally credited with designing the standard systems 
architecture for long-distance, telephone based WDM fiber 
networks. Several of the key technical participants in ONTC 
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went on to play roles in a subsequent DARPA project, MONET, 
discussed below.
• All Optical Network Consortium (AONC). MIT’s Lincoln 
Laboratory led this research program, with participation by 
Bell Labs, MIT, and Digital Equipment Corporation. AONC 
drew heavily on earlier AT&T research and on government-
funded R&D investments at Lincoln Lab and MIT. Its goal 
was to create a high-speed fiber-optics architecture that was 
entirely optical, with no electronic regenerators needed to 
amplify weak optical signals, and was well suited to handling 
computer data rather than phone calls.
• IBM. IBM won the third contract and focused on developing its 
ideas for key components for WDM, particularly multiplexer/
de-multiplexer (“mux/demux”) devices that take multiple 
data streams, mix them into the WDM light streams, and 
separate them out again at the end of the fiber line. IBM built 
one of the first practical WDM networks.
These three consortia focused on the development of both (1) key WDM 
devices, such as mux/demux devices, and (2) systems architectures that 
would enable an entire WDM network to operate. DARPA’s office for 
electronic devices, MTO and its computing office (now the Information 
Innovation Office) cooperated in funding and managing this program.
In 1991, during the time of these three initial consortia projects, 
DARPA also began funding university centers in optoelectronics. 
These generated graduate students trained in the new technology and 
continued to advance the technology. They focused on improving 
devices for fiber-optic networks and other applications.
The 1991 Gulf War reinforced Pentagon and DARPA interest in 
developing new data communications technology, and this interest, 
combined with the technical successes of the three consortia projects, led 
to a new DARPA initiative—the Broad Band Information Technology 
Program (BIT), also known as Global Grid. An important Global Grid 
project was MONET—the Multi-Wavelength Optical Network Project, 
which ran from FY 1994 through FY 1999. Led by Bell Labs, AT&T Labs 
(which formed after most of the original Bell Labs went to Lucent), 
and Bellcore, MONET extended the work of the earlier ONTC project. 
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MONET brought together the key people from telecommunications 
companies, equipment producers, and government users, and 
developed a realistic and feasible WDM architecture. It also promoted 
technical standards and created a community of WDM experts.
Background and Role of the Program Manager
In 1989, Andrew Yang, became the program manager. He was hired 
to replace John Neff who was PM from July 1983 through September 
1988, and who had come to DARPA from the Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research (AFOSR). Yang came from the Hanscom Air Force 
Base in Massachusetts, which was the Air Force’s center for developing 
and acquiring command and control, communications, computer, 
and intelligence systems, and is also the location of MIT’s Lincoln 
Laboratory. He was recruited to DARPA by Sven Rooslid, another 
Hanscom alumni at DARPA. Yang was considering retirement when 
the opportunity for the DARPA job came up. He left the Air Force and 
joined DARPA.
Yang changed the name of the program from optronics to 
optoelectronics, but did not make other major changes initially, and 
continued to support the development of new optoelectronic devices. 
When the consortia money became available from Congress, Yang put 
together a proposal for this, and was successful.
Yang stressed that it is better for a PM not to push his/her own idea, 
but rather to find the best ideas and push those,23 arguing that this 
will result in better ideas and more support for these ideas. He further 
stressed the importance of being flexible and pursuing more than one 
path towards the goal. Developing the right program is largely a matter 
of timing (technology, needs, and funding all coming together). One 
needs to be able to adapt if new opportunities come up (or new sources 
of funding appear).
He noted that there are a lot of personal connections between PMs, 
researchers, and future PMs. Technical communities recognize that it is 
good to get their people into DARPA to help keep the funding flowing 
to their community.
23  Interview of Dr. Andrew Yang, by authors March, 2016.
 2618. DARPA’s Process for Creating New Programs
Yang was followed, in 1993, Anis Husain, as well as Robert Leheny, 
and Brian Hendrickson. Their programs continued optoelectronic 
consortia (e.g., MONET project) and invested in optical signal processing 
technologies and integration of optoelectronics and electronics on chips.
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
Congress played a key role in providing funding for the consortia, as 
well as support for working on projects that have commercial as well as 
defense benefits.
Industry played a significant role in shaping the program. There was 
industry interest in establishing optoelectronics consortia by 1989. In 
1991, the industry formed the Optoelectronics Industry Development 
Association to provide an organized voice for industry. DARPA 
provided funding for OIDA to create technology roadmaps, which 
in turn provided information to DARPA about important technology 
needs. Industry played a central role in establishing the consortia that 
were the center of the program.
There was little direct influence on the optoelectronic program 
from the military services or headquarters, but there was substantial 
interaction with the defense research laboratories, and especially the 
Air Force laboratories, due to the close connection between the DARPA 
program managers and Hanscom Air Force Base.
Key Insights
In the 1990s, there was strong emphasis on industrial competitiveness 
through consortia, and DARPA was given funds to support them. 
DARPA efforts included a focus on community building and standard 
setting, in addition to making technology breakthroughs. DARPA 
funded the optoelectronic industry’s technology roadmaps and formed 
research consortia that developed real world WDM architecture.
DARPA supported optoelectronics in some form from at least 1985 
to 2005 in a series of projects that built upon, at least in part, previous 
projects. In this regard, the important role of the program manager is 
not necessarily coming up with a completely original idea, but rather 
in understanding what the right program is to advance the field at a 
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particular time. It is important to sense when component advances 
make advances in systems technology possible. In this case, it was also 
important that the advances to expand digital communications capacity 
occurred just as the Internet was expanding, creating demand for 
increased bandwidth.
At the time of the program, DARPA management was not highly 
metric-driven. Broad Agency Announcements (which formally 
announced funding opportunities to the public) were relatively new—
established around 1990.
The case also illustrates some of the networks from which DARPA 
program managers are drawn. In optoelectronics, several of the PMs 




The DARPA High Definition Systems program was started in 1989 
as the High Definition TV program. It was renamed as the High 
Definition Systems Program in 1990 and continued until 1993. It was 
started in DARPA’s Defense Manufacturing Office. After this office 
was discontinued in 1991, the program became part of the Electronic 
Systems Technology Office. The program supported work on a number 
of display-related technologies, including materials and manufacturing 
techniques. One novel technology supported by the program, digital 
mirror projection technology, became a commercial success in electronic 
projectors, and led to an Emmy Award in 1998 and an Oscar Technical 
Achievement Award in 2015.25
24  Sources for this section include: Interview by the authors of Marko Slusarczuk 
(DARPA PM—High Definition Systems Program—Defense Manufacturing Office, 
1989–1993); Sternberg, E. (1992). Photonic Technology and Industrial Policy: U.S. 
Responses to Technological Change. New York, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 207–18.
25  Their OSCAR citation read as follows: “To Harold Milligan, Steven Krycho and 
Reiner Doetzkies for the implementation engineering in the development of the Texas 
Instruments DLP Cinema digital projection technology. Texas Instruments’ color-
accurate, high-resolution, high-quality digital projection system has replaced most 
film-based projection systems in the theatrical environment”, http://www.oscars.
org/news/21-scientific-and-technical-achievements-be-honored-academy-awardsr.
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Context and History of the Program Development
Some key aspects of the context for the HDS (High Definition Systems) 
programs were that:
1) In the 1980s, the U.S. competitive position in many technology 
industries, including electronics, appeared to be declining, 
primarily with respect to Japan. This was a matter of national 
concern, but also political debate. Democrats, who controlled 
the Congress, generally advocated a more aggressive 
government role to help technology industries through R&D, 
while Republicans, who controlled the White House, were 
opposed to industrial policies that would support specific 
commercial industries. SEMATECH (also funded through 
DARPA), a consortium to help the semiconductor industry 
and its suppliers, was formed in 1987 with support from both 
political parties in Congress and the White House.
2) Throughout the mid-1980s, there had been substantial 
discussion that high definition television would be the next 
driver of consumer electronics and information technology. 
Both Japanese and European TV manufacturers were 
discussing analog standards for the HDTV. U.S. manufacturers 
had already largely withdrawn from the television market, but 
some saw HDTV as a way back in. Displays were recognized 
to be important for a variety of defense applications, but the 
display industry was also seen as important to maintaining 
U.S. capabilities in electronics.
3) The U.S. Department of Commerce had considered a 
program to support HDTV, but this was rejected by the Bush 
administration as industrial policy. DARPA did not feel 
limited by this restriction because it could justify support of 
the technology due to its importance to defense.
DARPA Director Craig Fields initiated the HDTV program. He viewed 
high resolution displays as critical for defense, but also saw HDTV as 
important for the U.S. electronics and semiconductor industries. Firms 
in these industries were viewed as being important to maintain the 
defense industrial base to produce the technologies the DOD needs. 
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The one remaining U.S. television maker, Zenith, had contacted DARPA 
with a proposal for a research project. Craig Fields and others explored 
this, talked with other companies, and held a workshop on photonics. 
They started a $30 million program and released a Broad Agency 
Announcement (BAA) in 1989. It attracted substantial interest, with 
eighty-seven proposals being submitted.
Background and Role of the Program Manager
Marko Slusarczuk was hired as program manager in 1989 to manage 
the HDTV program. He came to DARPA from the Institute for Defense 
Analyses (IDA, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
that serves the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and works closely 
with DARPA) which he had joined in 1984 as a research staff member 
after earning an ScD in Materials Science from MIT and a law degree 
from Boston College Law School and having practiced law.
He was urged to apply to be a PM at DARPA by Ruth Davis, an 
IDA board member, who recommended him to DARPA Director Fields. 
Fields had just begun the HDTV program and had an interim PM, but 
was looking for someone to take it over fulltime. Slusarczuk knew of the 
program based on a Washington Post article and specifically asked that 
he be its PM, and Dr. Fields hired him for the position.
Slusarczuk was not initially a display technologist, but he had a 
substantial background in the underlying microelectronics and materials 
technologies. He stated that his main source of ideas for development 
came from his interactions with individual companies and academic 
researchers. Moreover, he had also earned a law degree and understood 
issues regarding business development. His experience at IDA gave him 
a perspective regarding defense interests in microelectronics generally. 
This background helped Slusarczuk see the need to support not just the 
end-product display technologies, but also the underlying component 
and materials technologies, which included the highly specialized glass 
substrates for displays produced by Corning Glass and color filters 
produced by Brewer Science.
Once hired as PM, Slusarczuk had a high level of autonomy to 
reshape the program. DARPA had brought in subject matter experts as 
reviewers from the three military services to assess the proposals that 
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responded to the BAA. These reviewers selected three technologies as 
inputs that they recommended DARPA pursue: Liquid Crystal Displays 
(LCDs)—primarily of interest to the Air Force for aircraft cockpits 
and for use in large screen command centers; Electro-luminescent 
(EL) displays—primarily of interest to the Army for ground vehicles; 
and Plasma displays—primarily of interest to the Navy for large ship 
displays. The reviewers specifically rejected several other more novel 
display technologies. Slusarczuk reviewed all the submissions to the 
BAA and the reviews and determined that some of the technologies the 
reviewers had rejected should be supported. In particular, a proposal 
that had been rejected was the Texas Instrument (TI) Digital Mirror 
project, which Slusarczuk decided merited more attention. He consulted 
with another DARPA PM, William Bandy of the Microelectronics 
Office, who agreed with him that the digital mirror technology, while 
risky, had great potential. Slusarczuk funded the TI project as well as 
the three projects the military services recommended. The funding was 
not sufficient to fully fund the TI project. Nonetheless, he encouraged 
TI to proceed and to take on the risk, stating that “DARPA will take 
on all risks of failure”,26 and thus essentially asserting that TI would 
be shown as successful. He was able to provide additional funds to 
TI the following year, and the project was indeed a success. TI further 
developed the digital mirror technology, which became a commercial 
success. 80 percent of movie houses and 50 percent of all electronic 
projectors use the TI technology.
The program was originally focused on High Definition Television 
(HDTV), which Slusarczuk viewed as too narrow and too commercially 
oriented (given the political dispute over the appropriateness of 
DARPA helping commercial industries). He reoriented the program to 
High Definition Systems (HDS). Fields was removed from the DARPA 
Director position in 1990 in part due to his disagreement with the Bush 
White House on DARPA’s role in supporting dual-use technologies.
Slusarczuk saw his approach as consisting of (1) providing an overall 
vision; (2) identifying and filling holes; (3) providing connectivity 
across the technology area. From his perspective, his role was to seek 
out potential in what was unproven. Slusarczuk said he saw himself “as 
the conductor of an orchestra”. He was “totally unconstrained” with 
26  Interview of Marko Slusarczuk by the authors, March 2016.
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no reviews, no specific milestones. He had to demonstrate progress, 
but was not held to concrete milestones. This flexibility allowed him to 
adjust program direction as the technologies evolved. He could make 
decisions without consulting management at each step. He feels that 
this was the general approach at DARPA at the time. 
Regarding how he developed the program, he said he had complete 
authority within the budget to layout and pursue his research agenda. 
He mentioned that he even briefed Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney 
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell without 
having to review these briefs with anyone at DARPA. He said that today 
at DARPA that this would be very unlikely.
Management was very hands-off. Slusarczuk stated that he never 
had to seek approval for any decisions once he became the PM. He 
informed and consulted with management, but the decision ultimately 
rested with him. He worked under Michael Kelly, the Director of the 
Manufacturing Technology Office (MTO) at DARPA.
Slusarczuk said another thrust he took on his own was funding 
companies to work on underlying manufacturing technologies needed 
for making advanced displays. This included companies such as 
Applied Materials, which made production equipment for depositing 
and etching the amorphous silicon for LCDs, Standish Industries for 
assembling the glass panels into displays and filling them with the 
liquid crystal material, and MRS which made lithography equipment 
for imaging the electronics onto the glass substrates. He supported 
work on the phosphors needed for plasma displays (Phosphor Center 
of Excellence at GA Tech, plus individual research efforts to develop 
blue phosphor). He also conceived an industry consortium (USDC) for 
providing inputs from display makers on the equipment and materials 
infrastructure needed.
He encouraged or required participants in his program to work 
together in a variety of ways. He required university programs that 
received more than $250,000 from his program to send their principle 
investigator to a private company working on the DARPA display 
program to learn what problems commercial firms had in display 
technologies. He also used annual “information exchanges” in which all 
participants in his program were required to attend in order to “share 
and collaborate”. During these sessions he said he would hold special 
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meetings with specific participants to encourage linkages between firms 
based on connections that they might not themselves see. “I could do 
this because I had knowledge across the program that they didn’t”.27
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
The DARPA Director, Craig Fields, played a key role in establishing the 
program. There was also strong influence from Congress and the White 
House. Political sensitivities encouraged the shift from HDTV to HDS.
Congress strongly supported the program, while the White House 
was initially opposed. With the change from President Bush to Clinton, 
the White House also strongly supported the program, and enabled 
additional funding.
Industry also played a role, with early support for a program coming 
from industry. The idea for the digital mirrors technology, which 
became one of the most important parts of the program (and perhaps 
produced the most notable result), came from an industrial proposal in 
response to the Broad Agency Announcement.
The DOD services had input to the program through their review of 
proposals in response to the BAA. They each tended to want to continue 
to support technologies in which they already had some involvement 
(plasma, LCD, electro luminescent).
Key Insights
In this case, the PM was not the source of the idea for the program, 
but had a major influence in shaping the direction of the program. 
The program idea came from the DARPA director, based on his view 
of what was important to both industry and the defense establishment 
in the long run. The PMs role was as the conductor of an orchestra 
and driver of the program; he identified gaps that needed to be filled 
for the program to succeed. This case also illustrates that sometimes 
DARPA’s originality is not in the idea for the program, but in its ability 
to support creative ideas within the program (in this case the digital 
mirror technology).
27  Interview of Marko Slusarczuk by the authors, March 2016.
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The PM at that time (and in that office) had a high level of autonomy 
in this case, and was not required to meet rigid metrics. The case also 
illustrates the importance of Congressional and Administration politics 
in some areas of DARPA technology at some times.
Spintronics (Quantum Computing)28
Overview
Development of magnetics-based and quantum microelectronics at 
DARPA was initiated and sustained by program manager Stuart Wolf 
in DARPA’s Defense Sciences Office (DSO) from 1993 through 2005. 
The Spintronics program developed non-volatile magnetic memory 
(MRAM) devices and led to SPiNS, a project which sought to develop 
spin-based integrated circuits (ICs). During this period Wolf started a 
dozen related programs in the field of magnetics and electron spin for 
microelectronics. Thus, Wolf exemplifies the role of PM as a program 
initiator—in fact, he was what might be termed a serial instigator of 
programs, as he sought to develop and build on the initial ideas into 
increasingly diverse and complex technology developments.
Context and History of the Program Development
Stuart Wolf became a project DARPA manager in 1993 while he was 
still at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), where he was the Branch 
Head in Materials research. In that capacity he had provided technical 
consultation to DARPA’s Defense Science Office, specifically to program 
manager Frank Patten on high temperature superconductivity. High 
temperature superconducting materials had been discovered in 1987 
and DARPA wanted a program in this area. Patten asked Wolf to help 
put together a program. Thus, Wolf was a government scientific expert 
who advised DARPA on creating this new program.
In 1993, Wolf informed Patten that he was to take a sabbatical from 
NRL and was considering going to the National Science Foundation 
for the year. Patten suggested that Wolf instead come to DARPA as a 
28  This section is primarily based on Stuart Wolf, interview with Richard Van Atta, 
March 2016.
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PM—but to do this he would have to come for a minimum of two years. 
To accommodate Wolf, DARPA agreed for Wolf to be “part-time” an 
NRL while serving as a DARPA PM.
Wolf had specific ideas on developing his own program at DARPA 
based on developments in magnetic materials and devices. His branch at 
NRL had explored various aspects of magnetic materials, including work 
on how to make magnetic thin films. This research had contributed to the 
development of Giant Magnetoresistance (GMR) in France and Germany. 
Wolf’s idea was to explore possible applications of GMR structures.
Spintronics
Wolf began what he termed a “super-seedling” with $5 million of funds 
from the Technology Reinvestment Project (TRP).29 The participants in 
this program included IBM, Motorola, Cornell University, and Non-
Volatile Electronics (NVE). Since IBM had already been working on 
GMR sensors for hard drives, this application was eliminated from this 
project. The seedling led to two results: (1) magnetic sensors, and (2) non-
volatile magnetic memory (MRAM). The latter, MRAM, was developed 
by IBM, Motorola, and Honeywell. The program was explicitly dual-
use, as “DOD uses a lot of magnetic memory”, but the then current 
technology—plated wire magnetic memory—was comparatively 
bulky. The argument was that use of MRAM technology would allow 
a memory device with 128 Kb capacity, that cost $250,000 and weighed 
40 pounds, to be replaced by an MRAM megabyte chip that would 
cost on the order of $1000. Wolf renamed this program “Spintronics” 
for SPIN TRansport electrONICS. In an interview with TPI, Wolf noted 
a couple of additional features of this program: (1) it lasted 10 years; 
(2) it was cost-shared with industry on a sliding scale in which for the 
first year the funding was 80 percent DARPA and 20 percent industry. 
The funding then shifted progressively more to industry (70–30, 60–40, 
50–50) so that by the end industry was paying the bulk of the costs.
29  The Technology Reinvestment Project was an in initiative of President Clinton to 
use defense funds to support dual-use technologies, with the intent of helping the 
defense-related industries shift to non-defense markets following the end of the 
Cold War. See Congressional Budget Office. (1993). “The Technology Reinvestment 
Project: Integrating Military and Civilian Industries”, July, https://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/103rd-congress-1993-1994/reports/93doc158.pdf
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Beyond Spintronics
In the TPI interview, Wolf said that he drew upon his background as 
Branch Head in electronic materials at NRL to conceive of additional 
programs for DARPA. One of these was Frequency Agile Materials for 
Electronics (FAME), which drew on NRL work on superconductivity 
used in tunable filters. The military application that was the initial 
focus of this program involved replacing phased arrays that were then 
controlled using costly diodes. The advantage of “paraelectric devices” 
resulting from the FAME Program was that they varied continuously 
and were much cheaper. Initially they were manufactured using ceramic 
materials processing, but later were made with sputtered thin film 
processes. Devices based on this technology now are used in cellphones.
Wolf said that the process he went through was very straightforward. 
He would propose an idea to the Office Director of the Defense Science 
Office, who was very supportive of his ideas, and then he (Wolf) 
would “pitch the idea” to the DARPA Director. He said his ideas were 
generated from his role as a Branch Head at NRL and his own technical 
reading about advanced electronic materials. For example, his reading 
of research papers on the prospects for magnetic semiconductors—
including one from Japan on a GaMnAs magnetic semiconductor that 
could be tuned using an electric field—led him to believe that this 
would create a new opportunity for spin-based ICs, which he pursued 
in his spintronics program. One program that evolved from this was 
DARPA’s SPINS program (SPin IN Semiconductors).
Wolf also funded a consortium to explore whether it was possible 
to create gate-defined quantum dots as Qbits. They produced a single 
electron quantum dot as a Qbit using GaAs. Later this was done 
with silicon. Wolf decided that, while this was one way to produce 
a Qbit, there were other approaches that were being developed. He 
conceived of a project called QuIST—Quantum Information Science 
and Technology—one of which’s goals was to identify the best way to 
produce Qbits. This project has led to on-going research. Furthermore, 
Wolf has stimulated other programs for other DARPA PMs. One 
example is a program on “metamaterials”, which his colleague from 
NRL, Valerie Browning, started when she came to DARPA as a PM. One 
outcome of this program is negative refractive index materials, which 
are used in specialized lenses and antennae.
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Background and Role of the Program Manager
Wolf is an interesting example of DARPA’s varying approach to 
Program Management. He was recruited by a current PM based 
on his having supported that PM as a technical advisor for several 
years. Wolf is an expert on electronic materials, magnetism and 
related superconductivity—an expertise deriving from his having 
been a scientist and manager at the Naval Research Laboratory. This 
background was the basis of his knowledge and connections that 
permitted him to conceive so many DARPA projects. Thus, he brought 
to the PM position long-standing expertise in the new field of quantum 
electronics.
He was brought into DARPA’s DSO as an employee of the NRL and 
stayed at DARPA from 1993 to 2005, being renewed year to year by the 
DARPA Director. By 2003 the DARPA Director, Tony Tether, decided 
that, since Wolf was essentially fulltime at DARPA, he should sever his 
ties to NRL. Tether made special arrangements for this to occur. Wolf 
retired from NRL and joined the faculty at the University of Virginia, 
but with the agreement that he would stay “on loan” at DARPA for 
another two years before going to the university.
Wolf is unusual at DARPA not only for his long tenure, but also for 
creating a number of different projects: Magnetic Materials Devices, 
followed by Spintronics, FAME, QuIST, and SPinS. He also started 
programs in Hard Magnetic Materials called AMPS (Advanced Magnets 
for Power Systems), SuperHyPE for Superconducting Hybrid Power 
Electronics, ATM for Advanced Thermoelectric Materials, MO-SAIC 
for Molecular Observation and Imaging using Cantilevers, FASTCARS 
for Femtosecond Adaptive Spectroscopic Techniques for Coherent 
Anti-Stokes Raman Spectroscopy, FLAME, for Femtosecond Lasers 
for Materials Exploitation, and finally FHOENICS for Femtosecond 
High Output ENergy Integrated Coherent optical Systems. He was also 
instrumental in initiating CNID, the Center for Nanoscale Innovation 
for Defense, which included UCLA, UCSB, UC Riverside, and AMRI, 
the Advanced Materials Research Institute at the University of New 
Orleans.
Additionally, Wolf’s twelve-year tenure at DARPA exemplifies 
the fact that DARPA exercises considerable flexibility in its program 
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management—in this case renewing him as a PM for three times the 
normal four-year assignment.
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
The Spintronics case is one in which the PM played the dominant role in 
program formation. Wolf drew upon ideas from the scientific literature 
and through interaction with his colleagues, and program ideas were 
supported by the DSO office director and approved by the DARPA 
director.
Key Insights
Dr. Wolf constitutes a clear example of a PM being the initiator of 
DARPA programs. He had technical expertise in a new field of science 
and technology and through his NRL management perspective was 
highly connected to leading research and researchers. He took the lab 
and university-based research and through industry pushed it into 
initial implementation.
DARPA provided a venue for Wolf to conceive and grow several 
programs that took an incipient field from the conceptual research stage 
to development of practical devices. While this drew heavily on his NRL 
experience, DARPA provided a means for him to organize ambitious 
implementation programs involving numerous participants, which was 
beyond what he could do at NRL.
Wolf’s twelve-year tenure at DARPA demonstrates that it is an 
organization that is flexible even within its own “rules”—such as a PM 
only being hired for four years.
Personalized Assistant that Learns (PAL)30
Overview
The Personalized Assistant that Learns (PAL) program was an artificial 
intelligence (AI) program run through the Information Processing 
30  This section is primarily based on interview of Ray Perrault (co-PI of CALO project), 
by David Cheney, March 2016.
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Techniques Office (IPTO) from 2002 to 2009. It consisted of two projects, 
the CALO31 project (managed by SRI International), and the RADAR32 
project (managed initially by Carnegie Mellon University). The PAL 
program (and specifically the CALO project) is best known for leading 
to the Siri application on the Apple iPhone, but was also transitioned to 
the military’s Command Post of the Future (CPOF) system.
Context and History of the Program Development
DARPA had funded artificial intelligence since the 1960s, with several 
cycles of optimism and expansion followed by disappointments and 
contracting funding. Artificial intelligence had been making progress 
in several different domains, such as speech recognition, cognition, 
and machine learning, but there had not been a project that integrated 
advances across all of these domains and shown what AI could do.
The initial impetus for an initiative came from DARPA director Tony 
Tether, who wanted to do something in cognitive computing systems—
systems that can reason, learn from experience, take advice, explain 
themselves, and respond intelligently to situations never encountered 
before.33 He hired Ron Brachman as the IPTO office director for this 
purpose. Brachman was leader in the AI community. He had worked 
at BBN and AT&T Bell labs, and then AT&T technologies. He was 
highly respected in the community and was very strong in knowledge 
representation, and he had put together a very strong team at AT&T. 
Changes at AT&T (cuts in their research programs) had put him on the 
job market, and Tether was able to attract him to DARPA.
Brachman worked with the community to develop the program. He 
talked to a lot of people in the community and structured the intellectual 
area. During these discussions, the concept emerged of doing a large 
project to bring together the various pieces of AI—speech, learning, 
cognition, etc., all integrated by a prime contractor. The focus was on 
developing a virtual personal assistant that could help search for and 
retrieve information, schedule meetings, make appointments, and so 
on. The idea for a large project integrated by a prime contractor was 
31  “Cognitive Agent (or Assistant) that Learns and Organizes”.
32  “Reflective Agents with Distributed Adaptive Reasoning”.
33  DARPA. (2003). “DARPA Awards Contract for Pioneering R&D in Cognitive 
Systems”, DARPA News Release, 16 July, http://www.adam.cheyer.com/pal.pdf
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supported by Tether. This was very different from the typical DARPA 
program.
They held a workshop with members of the technical community. 
Since Brachman knew the community, he had a good idea of the 
capabilities of different groups. It was clear early in the process who 
Brachman wanted in the program, and Tether took Brachman’s word 
for who should participate. A BAA was released, and the original SRI-
led proposal for CALO, based on the discussions at the workshop, 
was focused on a broad integrative system that combined different 
elements of AI: vision, natural language, planning, learning, etc. 
The twenty-page proposal was given to Tether, who rejected it and 
demanded that it be refocused on learning. So, the focus shifted 
away from the integration of every part of AI, and towards learning 
in every part of AI. It was clear that there would be a project, and 
that it would use the same project team as in the original proposal. 
However, the focus of the work needed to change in order to focus 
the program—and specifically the metrics and tests to demonstrate 
progress—around machine learning. The first year’s test would be of 
the system components, but each component had to focus on learning 
within that component—e.g., learning in natural language; learning in 
speech recognition, etc. It was a legitimate and interesting approach, 
but it was not the only possible approach. 
The focus on learning did make it clear and specific. They graphed 
what the system performance was with learning, versus what it would 
have been without learning, and it helped to sell the program.
A team led by Carnegie Mellon University won a second smaller 
project known as RADAR that focused more narrowly on helping 
managers to cope with tasks such as organizing their email, and 
planning meetings.
The CALO project had four phases with an evaluation at the end of 
each. The last phase was focused on technology transition, and so the 
final phase evaluation was based on how the results were transitioned 
to different applications. CALO was transitioned into part of the 
Command Post of the Future, for which General Dynamics was the 
prime contractor. They also developed a version called “CALO Express” 
that was created for use by DARPA PMs. It was built and demonstrated, 
but it never got through DARPA’s certification process to be put into 
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their IT system. SRI also used the CALO technologies to develop Siri for 
mobile phones and spun this off (with venture capital funding) as a new 
company that was later acquired by Apple.
Background and Role of the Program Manager
The PM, David Gunning, was hired after the BAA was out and 
proposals had been submitted. He did not have a role in the conception 
of the program. Gunning had previously been a PM at DARPA, and 
was the PM for the Command Post of the Future project, which was 
highly successful. He was brought back to manage PAL. He contributed 
to the project, but he was not hired for his program ideas—he was 
hired to manage the program that Tether and Brachman had conceived. 
He managed it throughout the duration, from 2003–2008. It is not 
uncommon for DARPA office directors to seek and hire PMs who are 
able to further develop and execute the Office Director’s ideas. PMs are 
often brought in to manage programs that already exist, and then are 
expected to develop their own new ideas.
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
The DARPA Director and IPTO Office Director played the key roles 
in forming and shaping the PAL program project. The Office Director 
came from the community, and the community shaped the program 
through workshops. There was less direct influence on the program 
from DOD.
Because this program was much larger than most DARPA programs, 
it was visible to Congress and received substantial Congressional 
oversight due to its size. It was threatened with cancellation by the 
Congress. However, Brachman and others were able to defend the 
program so that it continued to receive funding.
Zach Lemnios, Brachman’s deputy at IPTO, was also influential in 
forming the project. He came on board in April 2002. He was very good 
at managing the bureaucracy and ended up as Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering, after going to Lincoln Labs. He 
subsequently became Vice President, Research Strategy and Worldwide 
Operations at IBM.
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Key Insights
1) PAL was driven from the top down, but was also built on the 
AI community’s perception of what was needed, in an area 
DARPA had long supported.
2) Some DARPA programs are initiated by DARPA Directors 
and Office Directors rather than PMs.
3) DARPA sometimes uses a prime contractor, which fills some 
of the functions of the PM, to integrate different research 
teams towards a common goal.
4) Some DARPA programs are large enough that they receive 
Congressional scrutiny.
5) In AI, DARPA support has not been continuous but has come 
in waves. DARPA provided support for five years or so and 
then stopped, and then later started another program. The 
technical community can be significantly disrupted when 
DARPA stops its funding.
6) A challenge for DARPA is when to decide that it has done 
enough in an area. This can be when progress is slow, or when 
commercial entities are getting ready to take over. DARPA 
used to provide more continuous support for fields.
Topological Data Analysis34
Overview
Topological Data Analysis (TDA) was a Defense Science Office program 
from approximately 2004 to 2008. The program developed data analysis 
techniques for massive data sets. The program spawned TDA research 
groups at universities and led to the formation of the Ayasdi software 
firm in 2008, founded by the DARPA-funded principal investigator 
(Carlsson) and his graduate or post-doc students. Ayasdi (www.ayasdi.
com) which is now a 100+ person, venture capital-funded firm that is 
conducting data analysis for a large number of clients.
34  This section is primarily based on Mervis, J. (2016). “What Makes DARPA Tick?”, 
Science 351/6273: 549–53; and Cochran, D. (2016). Personal Communication with 
David Cheney, April.
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Context and History of the Program Development
Gunnar Carlsson, a Stanford mathematics professor, had developed 
an interest in the possibility of using topological methods for data 
analysis. He had been receiving NSF support for “pure math” (math 
developed under its own logic, without thought of applications) aspects 
of algebraic topology. Benjamin Mann, a program director at NSF, who 
had known Carlsson in graduate school (under the same advisor, James 
Milgram at Stanford), was aware of Carlsson’s work and interests. 
Mann arranged for Carlsson to give a lecture at NSF on possible data 
analysis applications of topology, and arranged for Douglas Cochran, 
the DARPA program manager of math programs to attend. Mann and 
Cochran were co-program managers of a joint NSF-DARPA program. 
Cochran liked Carlsson’s ideas and procured “seedling” funding to 
get him started as a DARPA investigator. The topic was timely because 
of the explosion in massive data sets (big data) and the need for new 
techniques to make sense out of the data, which has applications 
in intelligence and other areas. Cochran also used the possibility of 
launching a larger DARPA program in topological data analysis as bait 
to attract Mann to DARPA. He advised Mann on developing a program 
that would work in DARPA, so that when Mann met Tony Tether, he 
already had a fairly well-developed proposal for TDA. The seedling 
produced impressive results, identifying patterns in a data set that had 
not been identified through existing methods of analysis. These results 
allowed Mann to get Tether’s approval for the full multi-year program.
Background and Role of the Program Manager
Cochran, the first program manager involved with TDA, is a 
mathematician who has been on the faculty at Arizona State University 
since 1989 and who served as a PM at DARPA from 2000 to 2005. He 
received his PhD in Applied Mathematics from Harvard.
Mann, who became the main program manager responsible for 
TDA, received his PhD in math from Stanford, had held several 
tenured academic positions and then became a program officer in 
NSF’s mathematics division. While there, he got to know Cochran 
when they jointly ran an NSF-DARPA program on “Computational and 
Algorithmic Representations of Geometric Objects”.
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Mann arrived in DARPA in June 2004 and stayed until 2010. He started 
up several other programs, including one to establish fundamental 
mathematical principles in biology. Upon leaving DARPA, he became a 
vice president in Ayasdi, the new TDA company.
At the time, new ideas came into DSO in DARPA in a bottom-up 
fashion. A PM (or potential PM) learned of a compelling technology 
“push” or DOD need “pull” and developed a program concept around 
it, promoting it to the DARPA Director. New PMs were expected to 
come to their job interview with fairly well-developed ideas for new 
programs. In general, candidates were coached by current PMs and the 
DSO director before meeting with the DARPA Director, who personally 
made all PM hiring decisions (often after sending candidates away with 
additional “homework” questions to answer and then meeting with 
them again). Current PMs often identified and recruited candidates to 
become future PMs.
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
The key ideas that enabled the program came from the technical 
community, especially Carlsson. The DARPA director played a role in 
approving the program. The recognition that data analysis is applicable 
to anti-terrorism efforts, a key priority in the post-2001 environment, 
was an important factor in getting approval for the program.
Key Insights
This illustrates a mode of interaction in the more basic science parts of 
DARPA. PM-driven projects are an important mode in DSO. PMs who 
are part of a technical community come to DARPA for the opportunity 
to do bigger and more aggressive things than they can with NSF or NIH 
funding. The PMs often have a good idea of the opportunities and the 
performers.
This case also illustrates that there is some important interaction 
between NSF and DARPA, including both joint programs and 
movement of people between the agencies. Some university programs 
are supported by both agencies. Such programs have been occurring for 
a long time (several decades).
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Furthermore, this case illustrates the close and mutually reinforcing 
network among researchers and PMs, especially in DSO. PMs come 
from the research community and often fund researchers who they 
know and may recruit others from the community to be the next PM. 
PMs may return to the DARPA-supported research community after 
serving as a PM.
Revolutionizing Prosthetics35
Overview
The Revolutionizing Prosthetics program is intended to produce 
better prosthetic arms, using advances in robotics and brain-machine 
interfaces. It began in 2006 in the Defense Sciences Office (DSO), and 
was transferred to the Biological Technologies Office (BTO) when that 
office was created in 2014. The program continues today. The program 
has produced a new prosthetic arm that has been approved by the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (which regulates medical devices). It has 
demonstrated robotic arms that are both brain-controlled and provide 
tactile feedback to the brain.
Context and History of the Program Development
The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to many soldiers (as 
well as civilians in the local population) losing limbs. This was due in 
part to improved trauma medical care (and advances in body armor) 
that allowed many soldiers to survive injuries that would have been 
fatal in previous wars. Much progress had been made in developing 
workable prosthetic legs, but developing effective prosthetic arms had 
been much more challenging due to the many directions of movement 
and sensitivity of control required of arms and hands.
35  Sources for this section include: Belfiore, M. (2009). Department of Mad Scientists. 
New York, NY: Harper Collins; Burck, J. M., Bigelow, J. D., and Harshbarger, S. 
D. (2011). “Revolutionizing Prosthetics: Systems Engineering Challenges and 
Opportunities”, Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 30/3: 186–97; Miranda, R. A., et 
al. (2015). “DARPA-Funded Efforts in the Development of Novel Brain-Computer 
Interface Technologies”, Journal of Neuroscience Methods 244: 52–67.
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The private market for prosthetic arms was not large or lucrative 
enough to drive innovation in prosthetics, and so there was a clear need 
for DOD investment to give injured soldiers a better life.
Previous DARPA programs, such as the Brain Machine Interface 
(BMI) program and the Human Assisted Neural Device (HAND) 
program, had developed techniques to enable direct brain control of 
computers and use of motor neural signals and sensory feedback for 
control of appendages or robotic devices. These showed that direct brain 
control of prostheses could be possible, and that the potential existed for 
much more sophisticated prosthetic arms.
While driven by a clear military need, Geoffrey Ling, the PM and 
a physician, is generally credited with creating the Revolutionizing 
Prosthetics program, motivated by his experiences serving as a military 
doctor in Iraq and Afghanistan. The DARPA Director, Tony Tether, 
was also strongly encouraging a program in this area. The goal of the 
Revolutionizing Prosthetics program was originally to create a neurally-
controlled device, packed into the size and weight of a native human 
arm, that could do most or all of the things expected of a human arm. The 
program was started in 2006 and led to two main projects. The largest 
was led by the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) of Johns Hopkins 
University. APL led a consortium of more than 30 research institutions 
and private companies in a project focused on prosthetics controlled 
by neural impulses, either through noninvasive surface electrodes, 
more-invasive wireless intramuscular implants, or peripheral nerve or 
cortical implants.
A second project was started that did not require the same degree 
of neural integration (requiring no surgery), and with prosthetics that 
would be controlled by muscular contractions. This project went to 
DEKA Research and Development (the firm headed by inventor Dean 
Kamen, who is known for creating the Segway transportation device).
Background and Role of the Program Manager
Ling, the founding PM for the program, was an army colonel and 
intensive care doctor. He had a PhD in pharmacology from Cornell 
University and an MD from Georgetown University. He joined the 
Army and was assigned to the Uniform Services University of the Health 
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Sciences, the military medical school, where he treated patients, taught 
medical students, and ran a research lab. He did a neurology residency 
at Walter Reed Medical Center, and trained in neurocritical care at 
Johns Hopkins University, with a specialty in caring for traumatic brain 
injury. He was encouraged to consider DARPA in 2002 from a navy 
commander and intensive care unit doctor, and he was then recruited 
by the Director of the DSO, Michael Goldblatt. Ling went on a tour of 
duty in Afghanistan in 2003, where he saw many civilians and military 
personnel with limb injuries, and this motivated him to join DARPA to 
try to develop better technologies for limb injuries. He joined DARPA 
in 2004 but then was deployed to Baghdad in 2005. When he returned, 
he started the Revolutionizing Prosthetics program, which requested 
proposals in 2005 and began in 2006.
After establishing and running the Revolutionizing Prosthetics 
program and several other programs, he became Deputy Director of the 
Defense Sciences Office, and then became an Assistant Director in the 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He later returned 
to DARPA as the first director of the Biological Technologies Offices 
(BTO).
Other Key Roles in Program Formation
The program development was clearly influenced by military needs that 
came out of Iraq and Afghanistan and was also built on prior DARPA 
projects. The DARPA director, Anthony Tether, was actively involved 
in hiring Ling, in the decision to fund APL as the prime contractor, and 
in expanding the program to include the second path that became the 
DEKA project.
Key Insights
This program is larger (over $100 million) and longer (thus far, ten 
years) than the typical DARPA project. Like the PAL program, it 
uses a prime contractor (in this case APL) to integrate a large project 
consortium. While this model is not the typical DARPA program, it also 
is not unique (both PAL and Revolutionizing Prosthetics were started 
when Tony Tether was the director and reflect his influence).
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This is an example of a program that was motivated by a clear 
military need but also shaped by a passionate PM.
Findings, Conclusions, and Key Observations
Process of Program Development
It is clear from these cases that there is no single DARPA program 
development process. Ideas for DARPA programs come from many 
places (the technical community, military, advisors, and companies). 
Programs develop in many different ways, and the process differs by 
program, over time, and with different DARPA directors. The approach 
also varies according to:
1) The maturity of the technology (whether a completely new 
area or one that DARPA has supported before)
2) Whether the technology being developed is at a component or 
system level; and
3) The political environment at the time (whether non-defense 
applications are a factor in whether to support the technology).
When discussing DARPA, it is important to be clear about which part 
of DARPA one is discussing, and which time period. What some may 
think of as the “standard DARPA model”—with programs initiated and 
driven by the program manager—better represents the more upstream, 
science and technology driven parts of DARPA (DSO, BTO, MTO) than 
the defense systems-oriented TTO and STO. The latter often support 
larger projects and are more likely to be driven from the top down, as 
can be seen in the Assault Breaker and Stealth cases.
While there is no single program development process, there 
are several typical patterns of program development. These can be 
characterized as follows.
Top down assignment from DOD, OSTP, White House, DARPA 
director, or others. This was especially common in DARPA’s early 
days, when the focus was on satellites, missile defense, and test ban 
monitoring, and is more common at the systems level (in the TTO and 
STO offices), when the goal is to develop a new military system that 
meets an important defense need. In several cases, the drive for new 
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systems came from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, usually the 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, rather than from the 
military services, which tended to be more resistant to new technology. 
In some cases, DARPA funded a variety of conceptual studies to 
generate ideas for programs to meet a military need. In other cases, 
the DARPA director played an important role in supporting an area of 
technology that he or she thinks will be useful to the services in the long 
run (whether the services want it or not).
Programs based on the PM’s Idea. There are cases where the PM 
comes up with the idea, wins support for it, and develops a program. 
In many cases it is not the PM’s idea alone, but rather the PM has 
successfully drawn ideas from the technical community and used those 
ideas to form a program. PM-initiated programs appear to be more 
common in the Defense Science Office and in the more basic technology 
offices. Many such programs start with a seedling to test their viability. 
In some cases, a PM may be hired for a specific program. In other cases, 
they may be hired to implement an existing program (often when the 
current PM is leaving) and then are expected to develop their own 
program over the next year or two.
Long-standing thrust areas. Some new programs do not appear to 
be radically new. In some cases, DARPA has supported a community 
(e.g., mathematics, optoelectronics, and artificial intelligence) for some 
time. New programs may be similar to old programs that didn’t succeed 
previously, but for which technology advances have made success more 
likely. Some programs represent the logical (if aggressive) next steps 
in a field, and there may be consensus in the community about what 
the next priorities are. In such areas there is a tension between a desire 
for continuity and the need for originality. The community wants some 
continuity of support, while DARPA sees its role as disruptive change 
that may require the disruption of existing communities. DARPA 
management feels a need to make sure DARPA’s work does not become 
incremental and inappropriate for DARPA.
Many programs represent a combination of these patterns. For 
example, DARPA may work on a general problem due to top down 
interest, such as the need to be able to detect improvised explosive devices 
better, but the program manager may get ideas from the community 
through workshops and in responses to a request for information (RFI) 
or BAA to get the more specific ideas that result in a program.
284 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
It is important to note that DARPA programs are often (but not 
always) preceded by smaller studies. These may be conceptual studies 
of systems or technical studies to test the viability of a key technology 
(seedlings).
Roles of Program Managers
There is a variety of kinds of PM, and PMs view their roles somewhat 
differently. Some PMs are visionaries. Some are idea generators. Some 
are champions/drivers of other’s ideas. Some are facilitator/enablers 
of communities. Some are hired to manage complex programs that 
have been conceived by someone else, such as an Office Director or the 
DARPA Director. Each kind can be successful.
PMs generally have a common role in assembling a program, serving 
as its champion (advocating the program and overcoming whatever 
obstacles are in its ways), and managing the program, but the PM may or 
may not be the source of the idea for the program. Some PMs inherited 
programs or were hired to manage programs. Some PMs see their role 
as finding the best ideas from the community and supporting them, 
rather than originating an idea. Some PMs see their role as conducting 
an orchestra of contractors.
Many DARPA managers are recruited and recycled through a small 
community. Many PMs come from and return to organizations such as 
IDA, SRI, Lincoln Labs, other defense labs, as well as universities that 
receive DARPA funding. We found that some PMs stay more than the 
standard three to five years, and some have served multiple assignments 
at DARPA over decades.
PMs have a variety of backgrounds. They are more likely to have 
an academic/research background in the upstream offices (DSO, BTO, 
MTO, I2O) and are more likely to have defense or industrial background 
in the systems offices (TTO, STO).
The autonomy of PMs has varied substantially over time. At some 
times, the PMs have had a great deal of autonomy in shaping their 
programs and have had very little oversight. At other times, especially 
during the directorship of Anthony Tether, the director was actively 
involved in shaping many programs.
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Additional Observations
The cases we examined illustrate that the key element for the success 
of a DARPA program is not always the originality of the program. In 
some cases, a program topic may not be surprising, but the program 
may generate creative proposals for projects. This was the case for the 
digital mirror projection system in the high definition systems case, as 
well as in the prototype UAV. In other cases, the DARPA program may 
be distinctive not for its program idea but because of its unconventional 
approach—such as the use of a large-scale industrial consortium or using 
a prime contractor to integrate university, company, and laboratory 
research. DARPA’s impact may also come from the focus with which an 
idea (which may have already been supported in a small way by other 
agencies) is executed. DARPA may achieve greater effects by pursuing 
an idea with greater funding, more urgency, and more aggressive and 
specific focus.
In many cases, timing is a key element of success. Part of the art 
of having a successful program is the ability to sense when science 
and technology advances at the material and component level have 
advanced enough to enable advances at the systems level, or to detect 
when an area of technology is at a state such that a concentrated effort in 
a specific area can enable a major advance. DARPA does not always get 
this timing right—there have been cases when DARPA has discovered 
that the alignment of the necessary factors was not in place and after a 
time, even as short as a year, either cancelled or redefined a program. 
Often, however, DARPA learns from these cases and establishes another 
program when further progress has been made.
While DARPA seeks to be largely independent of politics and acts 
independently of other agencies, some cases did exhibit the importance 
of Congressional and White House interaction, especially regarding 
dual-use technology in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The cases also 
illustrate how DARPA collaborates with other agencies, such as the 
National Science Foundation and the Defense Nuclear Agency, on 
various programs and studies.
One of DARPA’s strengths is its flexibility and lack of bureaucracy. 
On the other hand, this leads to a lack of consistency in processes 
and to a weak institutional memory. Over the period of the cases in 
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this study, DARPA has evolved towards greater systematization. 
The institutionalized use of the Heilmeier questions, the use of BAAs 
and Requests for Information (RFIs) to formally solicit input from a 
broad range of potential participants, the requirement for customer 
involvement in programs, and the increased emphasis on achieving 
specific milestones and metrics all reflect some organizational learning 
and institutionalization.
Concluding Thoughts
This study suggests that the approaches used to initiate DARPA 
programs have varied over time and in different parts of the agency. A 
question for organizations that are interested in adapting some aspects 
of the DARPA model, is “which DARPA does one want to copy?” There 
are several candidates. One option would be the “dual-use” DARPA that 
supported key technologies such as semiconductors and optoelectronics 
and industrial consortia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This might 
be appropriate for organizations that are seeking to strengthen the key 
industries in their domain.
Another option is to follow the model that is most prevalent in the 
Defense Sciences Office, which emphasizes developing breakthrough 
new technologies, based on opportunities created by advances in 
fundamental science and technology. This model may be most appealing 
to organizations whose purpose is to create more radical innovation.
The third option would be to follow the model of the Tactical 
Technology Office and Strategic Technology Office, which emphasizes 
the development of systems in response to well-articulated needs. This 
model may be most appropriate for an organization whose mission is to 
meet a well-defined social need, whether defense or health care.
It may also be useful to consider the evolution of DARPA over 
time and its interaction with its environment. As the cases have 
shown, DARPA interacts with a diverse community of researchers and 
technologists in universities, research laboratories, defense contractors, 
think tanks and the military, and these can be a source of ideas for 
programs. This community has co-evolved with DARPA, and is better 
developed now than in DARPA’s early years. Organizations that seek 
to emulate DARPA, may wish to consider both how to develop this 
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community, as well as how to operate before such a community is well-
developed. It may be that DARPA’s early days, rather than its current 
state, provide a more useful model for new organizations.
All of these considerations suggest that, rather than copying 
a single model of DARPA’s processes, it may be wise to emulate 
DARPA’s flexibility and adaptiveness, giving freedom to the Director, 
and subsequently to the Office Directors, to choose the modalities 
for initiating programs that appear to be the best for the particular 
circumstances. In reflection, this is the approach that has worked at 
DARPA and it is hard to argue against its success.
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9. Some Questions about the 
DARPA Model
Patrick Windham
Often observers of DARPA ask basic questions about how the agency 
operates and the role it plays within the U.S. Department of Defense. 
This chapter provides brief answers to some of these questions.1
Is decision-making at DARPA “top-down” or “bottom-up”? DARPA 
is a mix of the two, but mostly “bottom-up”. The agency director and 
deputy director do identify broad technical areas that they and others in 
the Defense Department think are important, but program managers, in 
consultation with the broader technical community, propose and then 
run specific R&D programs. In the “systems offices” at DARPA, office 
directors and the agency director talk with DOD officials and identify 
what they believe are significant long-term technological challenges 
and opportunities for U.S. national security. But again, the program 
managers propose and then run the actual R&D programs.
How can DARPA respond to Defense Department needs but still 
have great autonomy? DARPA asks both senior defense officials and 
the broad technical community what challenges and opportunities 
they see in the decades ahead. However, DARPA’s job is to think about 
1  The questions listed here about apparent paradoxes in the DARPA model were 
first raised in the fall of 2013 by Hiroyuki Hatada, then Chief Representative of 
the Washington, DC, office of Japan’s New Energy and Industrial Technology 
Development Organization (NEDO). The editors are grateful to him for raising 
these questions and helping us to frame this discussion.
© Patrick Windham, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.09
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and create long-term technologies. It is not responsible for developing, 
maintaining, and improving current military systems; other parts of 
DOD perform those duties. In this way, DARPA has the freedom and 
funding to identify and create new, long-term technologies.
However, in time of war, senior DOD officials may ask the agency 
to help solve some difficult and immediate technical problems. For 
example, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq DARPA worked 
with other DOD agencies on the problem of detecting roadside 
bombs (“improvised explosive devices”) and also helped to improve 
communications in those war zones.
How can DARPA make long-term progress with new technologies 
when the agency’s programs are only three to five years long? William 
B. Bonvillian and Richard Van Atta point out that DARPA has “multi-
generational programs”: if the results of an initial program are 
promising, then there can be follow-on work. But if the initial program 
fails or points in a different direction, then the program is terminated or 
redirected. The use of three- to five-year projects allows great flexibility.2 
Why does DARPA sometimes fund several different research projects 
within a single program? While some programs will fund a single large 
R&D project, such as the development of a prototype military system, 
other programs fund multiple research projects performed by different 
research teams. There are at least two reasons for multiple awards 
within a single program. 
First, when trying to develop a new basic technology the agency 
often funds multiple teams with different technical approaches, to see 
which approaches are most promising. This is a “portfolio policy,” in 
which the agency funds multiple ideas and then learns which work 
and which do not. Moreover, funding different teams with different 
ideas also allows the research teams to learn from each other, further 
advancing the overall technology. For this reason, a program manager 
may organize periodic meetings of a program’s various R&D performers 
and ask these researchers to share information and learn from each 
other. 
Second, in some cases the development of a new technology or 
capability requires several complementary parts. For example, the 
2  Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation”, The Journal of Technology Transfer 36: 469–513, 
at 473–74, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-011-9223-x (Chapter 13 in this volume).
 2919. Some Questions about the DARPA Model
desired technology might need several hardware components plus 
associated software. In these cases, a program might fund several 
R&D teams, with each of them responsible for an important part of the 
overall effort. If the technology proves promising, then that program 
or a follow-on program might fund work on additional steps that go 
beyond the initial R&D work, such as the integration of components or 
applications or the demonstration of the new technology’s applications.
How do DARPA programs maintain continuity and success when 
program managers change every few years? New program managers 
have responsibility for existing programs and then make their own 
judgments about whether and how to continue them.
How can an agency build political support when it will not generate 
significant new technologies until many years from now? In the U.S., 
this can be a problem for several reasons: political leaders often want 
relatively quick results, applicants who do not get grants can complain 
to Congress, and other agencies or parts of your own department may 
see your agency as a rival. DARPA succeeds because it has an important 
defense role, it has a record of successes, and it does not threaten the 
budgets of other R&D agencies.
The new Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E) 
has thus far built important political support. It has done so by investing 
in a range of areas that people care about, by having credible processes, 
by soliciting views from everyone, by being transparent, by helping 
even losing applicants with valuable advice, and by working hard to 
convince other parts of the Department of Energy (DOE) that it is a good 
partner, not a rival.
How can a DARPA-type agency or program avoid rigid internal 
bureaucratic processes? Van Atta and others emphasize the importance 
of a very “lean” management structure. At DARPA a program manager 
needs approval from only two levels to get a new program: his/her office 
director (and deputy) and the agency director (and deputy). In addition, 
DARPA does not have a separate evaluation or audit office; evaluation 
is a constant process of judging which programs and R&D projects 
within those programs are succeeding or not. Program managers are 
not required to spend a great deal of time reporting to an audit unit.
Related, how can an agency demonstrate accountability (and create 
the political credibility that it needs to survive politically) but still 
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be relatively free of outside bureaucratic processes such as committees, 
layers of approval, audits, and so forth? Senior government groups 
oversee (supervise) all U.S. government agencies, including DARPA. 
For DARPA, these groups include senior DOD officials, the DOD Office 
of the Inspector General, the President’s Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), DOD and Congressional audit agencies, and of course 
the U.S. Congress.
However, DARPA has successfully argued that it does good 
work, that it follows all government rules, that it is has good internal 
evaluation processes, and that it needs autonomy and freedom from 
bureaucratic processes in order to do its job well. These arguments have 
largely succeeded, and neither senior DOD officials nor Congressional 
committees try to manage the details of the agency’s work. In the long 
run, DARPA’s successes and lack of scandals help it convince Congress 
and senior administration officials that it is doing a good job and does 
not need intensive bureaucratic supervision.
Specifically, how can an agency have credible rigorous evaluation 
of projects without highly bureaucratic and time-consuming reviews? 
This is a very important question, because evaluation is important not 
only to the effectiveness of the agency but also to its political credibility, 
since any agency that does not carry out proper evaluation and maintain 
high quality will eventually lose political support.
DARPA’s process for evaluating programs and R&D projects 
within those programs differs from other U.S. Government science 
and technology agencies. Some other agencies use formal evaluation 
groups, which examine projects and provide useful information on 
the quality of research and how to improve operations. The former 
Advanced Technology Program/Technology Innovation Program at 
the U.S. Department of Commerce had a highly respected evaluation 
unit. Other agencies, such as the National Science Foundation (NSF) 
and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), maintain quality through 
both rigorous competition among applicants and the use of peer review 
as part of their overall merit review processes. At these agencies, the 
review processes include examinations of whether those applying for 
new grants have done good work in the past and therefore are likely to 
do good work in the future.
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DARPA is different. It expects a great deal of its R&D performers, 
but it also expects that these high-risk R&D projects will not always 
work as originally planned. Things will “go wrong”. Some DARPA 
directors therefore will not judge projects in terms of the original 
and sometimes unrealistic milestones.3 Other directors have required 
that program managers get formal approval to change milestones 
and metrics. In both cases, however, the problems that arise provide 
important information that contributes to learning and adaptation. 
Surprise and change are normal. DARPA program managers therefore 
help R&D performers learn from problems and adjust research 
projects.
In this world, evaluation is a constant process, done by program 
managers and their office directors. Based on this ongoing process of 
learning, DARPA program managers try to help their R&D performers 
and discuss changes in projects. However—and this is very important—
if a specific R&D project, or even an entire program of projects, fails 
to produce results, then DARPA will stop this work and move money 
into other, more promising areas. In addition, every year the agency 
formally reviews all of its programs. In addition to working with 
R&D performers, DARPA officials routinely talk with senior Defense 
Department civilian officials, with leaders of the military services, and 
sometimes also with leaders of DOD laboratories and research agencies 
to get their views on the usefulness and quality of the agency’s programs. 
Here, too, the agency engages in continuous process of communication 
and evaluation.
This process of “continuous evaluation” works for several reasons: 
DARPA program managers are technical experts who can both help 
R&D performers and judge whether the performers are making 
acceptable technical progress or not; office directors and the agency’s 
directors and deputy directors are themselves technical experts who can 
judge results and are willing to terminate unproductive programs; the 
agency emphasizes the importance of learning; and both senior Defense 
Department officials and members of the U.S. Congress see that DARPA 
does high-quality work.
3  Dugan, R. E., and Gabriel, K. J. (2013). “‘Special Forces’ Innovation: How DARPA 
Attacks Problems”, Harvard Business Review 91/10: 74–84.
294 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
How does DARPA survey and analyze needs, technological trends, 
and future developments? Does DARPA use think tanks or consultants? 
DARPA has two major processes for gathering information.
First, program managers talk extensively with scientists and 
engineers in their fields, understanding technology challenges and 
opportunities. For example, program managers will talk with university 
scientists, corporate researchers, and experts in government laboratories 
to understand technology trends and possible future developments. 
Second, program managers and DARPA leaders talk extensively 
with military officers and leading experts to understand what long-term 
needs the Defense Department might have and what types of technical 
solutions might help. These conversations take several forms: informal 
conversations with military officers assigned to DARPA, frequent 
conversations between DARPA leaders and the top civilian officials in 
the Defense Department, meetings every three months or so between 
DARPA leaders and senior military officials, “study groups” that meet 
regularly over several months to discuss a topic, interactions with the 
Defense Science Board (DSB) and other high-level advisory groups, 
and, in some cases, formal studies conducted by outside analysts and 
think tanks, such as the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA).
One important issue for DARPA is whether or not other DOD 
agencies or think tanks have already done a good job of analyzing needs, 
trends, and opportunities in particular areas of technology or national 
security. If other agencies conduct useful analyses of, for example, space 
technologies and needs, then DARPA can use that information. But in 
some areas no one else has considered which types of new technologies 
might solve long-term challenges. In these cases, DARPA needs to 
organize its own meetings with military officers and others and conduct 
its own analyses.
How does DARPA recruit program managers? And how specific or 
broad is the subject area that DARPA presents when recruiting program 
managers? Because program managers usually serve for only a few 
years, DARPA’s office directors and the agency director and deputy 
director spend much of their time recruiting new program managers. 
In some cases, departing program managers will recommend people 
to replace them. In other cases, office directors and the agency director 
and deputy director will ask colleagues in the technical community for 
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recommendations. DARPA officials will look for candidates who are 
technically strong, have a good vision of where technology might go in 
the future, and have strong leadership skills.
These informal recruitment processes work well because the 
office directors and agency heads are themselves technically-trained 
individuals who know the R&D community well and can effectively 
judge the technical qualifications of potential program managers. They 
also understand what leadership skills are needed.
Recruiting prospective employees can sometimes be difficult, for 
both professional and personal reasons. University professors usually 
are not required to give up their current jobs, since they can take “leaves 
of absence”, but they may worry about leaving graduate students or 
interrupting their own research. Company people face other concerns. 
DARPA usually requires that company employees leave their jobs 
before being eligible to join the agency, which is difficult even if they 
know that they will probably get a good job when they return to the 
corporate world. In addition, government salaries in the United States 
are much lower than corporate salaries. 
In turn, both university and corporate people may also have personal 
concerns about joining DARPA. People with school-age children and 
whose spouses have careers may be reluctant to move to the Washington, 
DC, area for several years. Some people decide to come to DARPA while 
their families stay at home, leading to weekly commutes, but not every 
prospective employee wants to go through that constant travel. On the 
other hand, older people who are semi-retired and whose children are 
grown may find it easier to accept a DARPA position. Van Atta provides 
additional important insights into why individuals may or may not 
accept a position at DARPA.4
A new program manager will work in a specific subject area. He 
or she will propose and then run new programs in that area, and 
sometimes may also run existing programs created by earlier program 
managers. The programs can be quite complex, often involving work 
that brings together researchers from multiple disciplines. For example, 
a program that seeks ways to improve how an injured person can use her 
4  Van Atta, R. (2013). Innovation and the DARPA Model in a World of Globalized 
Technology. Presentation at the National Institute of Science and Technology Policy 
and the Center for Research and Development Strategy, Tokyo, July.
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brain to control artificial arms will involve physicians, neuroscientists, 
robotics experts, and others. Meanwhile, an effective program manager 
will need to understand enough about all of these disciplines to 
design a sensible research program and identify and select competent 
researchers. In this way, the work of a DARPA program manager can 
be both specific (focused on specific questions or challenges) and broad 
(that is, multi-disciplinary).
When DARPA recruits a university professor, does DARPA allow 
that professor to continue his/her university research and teaching? 
Usually professors will temporarily stop their academic research and 
teaching while serving as DARPA program managers. They need to 
focus on their DARPA responsibilities—not on their previous activities. 
Of course, this situation can cause difficulties. A professor may have 
on-going research projects and a number of graduate students working 
on their PhD projects. Usually, professors coming to DARPA will ask 
other professors to handle these responsibilities. But in some cases, 
they may continue working with existing graduate students, advising 
them from Washington and also reading drafts of their PhD theses. 
If a DARPA program manager is also a medical doctor, that person 
sometimes will be allowed to continue working part-time in a hospital 
or academic medical center.
How does DARPA decide about R&D themes, and what do program 
managers decide about R&D themes? Four points are important.
First, as mentioned earlier in this book, DARPA has two general 
activities: (1) maintaining strong leadership in basic technologies and (2) 
creating and demonstrating new equipment or processes that could help 
the Defense Department in the future. So, DARPA’s technology offices 
pay attention to promising new technologies and often also pay particular 
attention to the long-term challenges facing the military services.
Second, within these overall subject areas DARPA’s main criterion 
for selecting R&D themes and programs at any given time is to ask 
whether the agency can make a significant difference. That is, both 
program managers and senior agency managers look for game-changing 
technologies that can contribute to U.S. national security. Selecting 
themes and programs in any given year is a matter, therefore, of looking 
at both technological opportunities, and the specific long-term challenges 
facing the Defense Department at that time. Sometimes, senior Defense 
 2979. Some Questions about the DARPA Model
Department officials or even the President will direct DARPA to work 
on specific topics. For example, when ARPA first began work in 1958 
it focused on three key presidential priorities: space, missile defense, 
and nuclear-test detection.5 Usually, however, DARPA officials will talk 
with senior Defense Department officials about long-term challenges, 
talk with the technical community about new technical opportunities, 
and then decide itself which projects offer the most potential.
Third, DARPA’s priorities do change over time. For example, 
computer networking was a major priority from the 1960s through 
the 1980s, and this pioneering work led to the Internet. Subsequently, 
other agencies and the commercial sector took the lead in building the 
Internet, and DARPA switched to other opportunities and challenges. 
It still does work in computing and communications, but now it 
concentrates on new problems and opportunities, such as cybersecurity 
and big data. Another example is that, for many years, DARPA did little 
work in biology; DARPA was a physics and engineering agency. But 
the combination of bioterror threats, severe brain and other injuries to 
U.S. soldiers, and exciting new scientific and technical opportunities, 
has led DARPA to make biology, medicine, and synthetic biology major 
priorities.
Fourth, the fact that DARPA has no internal laboratories and instead 
funds temporary three- to five-year programs gives the agency the 
flexibility it needs to change themes and programs as new challenges 
and opportunities arise.
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PART II:  
 
THE ROLE OF  
DARPA PROGRAM MANAGERS

10. DARPA—Enabling  
Technical Innovation1
Jinendra Ranka
The Role of DARPA
DARPA is a unique institution that is consistently evolving. Every 
program manager you ask will give you a different view of DARPA. 
Everyone has a different opinion, whether it be a DARPA program 
manager, a performer on a DARPA project, a small business, the academic 
community, other government organizations, or the public. This is 
important to understand and is a result of how DARPA is structured, 
and how DARPA works with so many different technical communities 
on ground breaking high-risk projects that can have enormous potential. 
There are plenty of failures to criticize, but the successes have changed 
the world. DARPA is a very individualistic agency and I simply am 
presenting my view as a former DARPA program manager.
My experience at DARPA was very different from that given in the 
next chapter, and illustrates the diversity of the agency. I was a program 
manager in the Strategic Technology Office at DARPA from 2008 to 
2013. I had spent the prior few years at MIT Lincoln Laboratory working 
as a scientist who enjoyed research, but had minimal management 
experience. Though I had a background in academic, commercial, 
1  This chapter is based on a presentation that Dr. Ranka made at the Workshop on 
“How to Support Disruptive Change: Lessons from the DARPA Model”, National 
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, 25 February 2014.
© Jinendra Ranka, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.10
304 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
and government research, I had never directly worked on a DARPA 
program. I knew little about the agency outside of the ARPANET.
DARPA has a relatively flat organizational structure. All program 
managers have a limited time at DARPA and are driven to accomplish as 
much as possible in that short time. The need to replace approximately 
twenty percent of the program managers each year requires the agency 
to be aggressive in hiring while being careful not to sacrifice technical 
excellence. Soon after a highly intensive vetting process with a DARPA 
office, I met with the agency director and had the most unique interview 
of my career. Three weeks later, I was a program manager at DARPA 
working on the ideas I wanted to pursue.
DARPA’s history is important to understand as it has shaped the 
agency culture. The government created ARPA four months after the 
1957 launch of Sputnik. The key people involved were President Dwight 
Eisenhower—a former general who distrusted the military industrial 
complex and who wanted a new agency that could coordinate closely 
with the technical community and could develop technology rapidly—
Neil McElroy—the new Secretary of Defense, a former president 
of Procter & Gamble, who had absolutely no defense or military 
experience, was not a scientist or engineer, but knew what it took to 
run an organization and be effective—and James Killian—a scientist 
and the president of MIT, who was instrumental in the creation and 
design of ARPA. It was intentionally created to work with the research 
community for the Department of Defense, but was created outside of 
the military services. The agency’s original charter was quite simple: 
“ARPA will do what the Secretary of Defense wants it to do”.
DARPA and Innovation? 
DARPA’s mission is to develop breakthrough technologies for national 
security. In a similar fashion, ARPA-E was recently formed to advance 
U.S. energy research and IARPA for the intelligence community. 
DARPA is part of the Department of Defense and works closely with 
the different military services, but does not directly serve any of them. 
DARPA projects focus on the long term, and the agency is willing to 
take risks the services may not be willing to consider.
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Program managers focus on high-risk/high-payoff projects that 
typically run for four to six years each, with well-defined metrics 
to measure success and ensure the truly hard problems are being 
addressed. DARPA looks at a broad range of national security problems 
and then invests to develop prototype technologies that solve those 
problems. Many of these technologies have broad uses, civilian as well 
as military, but, ultimately, all our work is anchored to our defense 
mission. Research for the sake of advancing scientific understanding is 
important, but it is not DARPA’s mission. DARPA is there to create and 
prevent strategic surprise for national security.
DARPA focuses on adapting and executing faster than traditional 
government institutions are structured to do. DARPA must understand 
how to innovate and evolve rapidly, to address current problems as 
well as potential future technology gaps. Over the past two decades, 
advanced technology has shifted focus away from government and 
military dominance and towards the commercial sector. As such, the 
threats we face are rapidly evolving. While traditional military threats 
continue, we now also need to address cyber warfare, communication, 
encryption, social media, manufacturing, and much more. The 
traditional defense agencies were not designed to quickly address such 
disparate and complex technical areas as they rapidly evolve. DARPA 
has been addressing these problems for years and continues to make 
further investments.
DARPA is also structured to remove barriers to innovation. True 
innovation and innovative technologies do not appear based on 
a prescribed schedule, and can be hampered by aversion to risk, 
bureaucracy, funding limitations, lack of focus, and poor coordination. 
In a risk-averse culture, funding is often directed toward incremental 
technical improvements rather than riskier efforts which may provide 
dramatic new advancements. Coordination is important as the projects 
connect the research community to real users of the technology, with 
real problems and constraints. Similarly, limited user insight can be 
another barrier. You may have an idea, but you are not sure how to 
properly transition it to the user community or marketplace. It doesn’t 
matter if you are in government, commercial, or academic research: these 
are challenges that we all face in technology development. To address 
this, DARPA programs are designed to be aggressive and focused. The 
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agency provides the resources needed, attracts the best technical people 
to develop and run well-defined programs, and provides the oversight 
and coordination to ensure the best chances of success. DARPA doesn’t 
simply fund people to work on hard problems, but funds new attacks to 
those problems through R&D projects that may be high-risk, but have 
the potential of achieving high payoff, high-impact results.
After a program is approved by the DARPA director, the program 
manager is given a significant amount of control. They effectively become 
the CEO, COO, CTO, and CFO for the program. The PM is provided 
with a long-term budget, with enough flexibility and finances to actually 
accomplish the proposed program. But this flexibility is coupled with 
accountability. The DARPA director and the office director act as the 
board of directors, and review program progress based on the vision, 
metrics, and deliverables that were originally proposed. Typically, 
the agency director and office directors will have had experience as a 
DARPA program manager. They know what it takes to run a DARPA 
program and will not hesitate to terminate or require course corrections 
for a program that does not meet performance metrics, or provide 
additional resources to programs that are successful at the “DARPA 
Hard” challenge.2
Developing and Running DARPA Programs
How does one actually develop a program idea? You first need to 
understand the problem you would like to solve and the current 
solutions. What are the limits to the current approach and what has 
been tried in the past? Is there a simple path forward, either technical or 
non-technical? A high-tech solution is not always the best answer. You 
also have to look and see what is possible. What are the fundamental 
scientific limits for the problem you are trying to address? What are 
the potential manufacturing limitations from now to the foreseeable 
future? What may can be done beyond that? From the answers to these 
questions, you develop a vision of what is possible, and you define 
goals, metrics, and a plan on how to actually achieve that vision. In a 
sense, you are not trying to predict the future, you are the one driving it.
2  The concept of a “DARPA Hard” problem is also discussed in this volume’s 
Chapter 5.
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As an example of looking at the future, imagine it is 1990. You look at 
the growth of computer processing power and communication network 
speed. The growth in the number of transistors in a commercially 
produced integrated circuit has been following Moore’s Law, doubling 
approximately every two years. Now ask what is possible twenty 
years from now, in 2010, if computer processing power continues to 
increase at the same rate? In 1990, student computer use at universities 
was not widespread, with most students sharing limited computing 
resources. Yet, if computing processing power and network bandwidth 
followed the historical trend, as they were far from the fundamental 
limits of circuit size or capacity, you could easily predict that within 
the next decade desktop and laptops would be widespread across 
campuses. By 2010, hand held computing devices would dominate 
the marketplace and be capable of streaming high-definition content 
in real time. In fact, DARPA contributed to many of the technologies 
in your smartphone—not just the processor, but also displays, voice 
recognition, and inexpensive GPS receivers. DARPA tries to envision 
what future technologies and applications are possible, and then sets 
out to create that future with a specific goal in mind. The mindset is not 
the six to twelve-month product development cycle that the commercial 
world is driven to.
Now, the agency understands that many programs will not succeed. 
Typically, five or ten out of one hundred programs meet their goals and 
are transitioned to the user community. However, this does not mean 
the other programs have failed, at least from a DARPA perspective. It 
just means that the original vision or the transition is not fulfilled. A 
revised program may succeed, and valuable lessons may be learned 
from a technical dead-end. A failure, in DARPA’s view, happens when 
a program does not succeed because of lack of due diligence, because 
a program manager did not understand the problem correctly, did not 
clearly define the program, did not develop effective goals and metrics, 
or did not properly understand the risks involved, and did not look at 
ways to mitigate those risks. A failure occurs because you did not do 
your job as a technical expert and as the DARPA program manager, not 
because the problem was too hard to solve at present.
This definition allows the agency to work on very hard and high-
impact projects. As a program manager, you are not worried about 
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failure because the task is too difficult. The only thing you need to 
ensure is that you do the job you joined DARPA to do.
Hard and high-impact projects are always going to be risky. You 
cannot be fearful and avoid risk that is inherent to a program. You just 
need to understand what the risks are and find ways to address them. 
When new risks are identified, do not just push them aside. You identify 
them and you aggressively attack those risks to make sure the program 
succeeds.
As a program manager, and as a technologist, you also need to find 
a certain balance. Fundamentally, I am an optimist. I know technology 
has enormous potential. But at DARPA it is important to understand 
the need for a sense of pessimism. At DARPA, so many people come in 
and present ideas they believe to be new and novel, and in the end, most 
ideas have resurfaced time and again, and, from your experience, you 
know that these ideas have fundamental flaws. You realize that good 
new ideas are rare, and good new DARPA breakthrough ideas even 
rarer. Despite this, it is important to be optimistic about technology 
development, and to learn to thoroughly question everything. That is 
one of the key aspects of the DARPA culture: if you do not look closely 
and question, you will not understand the nature of the problem, and 
its possible solutions. You will not understand what difference a new 
approach might make and you will not understand which ideas are 
promising and which are not.
A program manager must be respectful of people’s ideas. One thing 
that I learned at DARPA—maybe one of the most important—is that 
when someone comes to you looking for funding for a new idea, they 
are actually exposing vulnerability to you. Any good idea, anything that 
challenges long held beliefs or practice, will have a number of issues. 
It is always easier to focus on those weak points rather than to try and 
fully understand the potential and possibilities of a new concept. In 
that situation, you have the option as a DARPA program manager to 
focus on all of the potential faults, or you can take a balanced approach 
and look at the possibilities as well as the questions that need answers. 
Observe the substance of the idea, the supporting science, and the 
implications. If you always focus on the faults, or mock an idea, people 
will be hesitant to approach you with new concepts. Though very few 
ideas will be of interest, and most will either be poorly thought out or 
presented like a TED talk, you have to be very respectful for every idea 
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brought to you. Understand that your job is not only to pursue your 
own ideas, but to foster and select good ideas that are presented to you.
In turn, the ideas you pursue must focus on producing tangible 
results. At DARPA you need to be program- and project-oriented, 
rather than an investigative researcher. DARPA develops prototypes to 
show what the future can be. If your end result is simply a paper or 
presentation, you have not proved what is possible. If you demonstrate 
a robot climbing a wall to the world, on the other hand, then people 
truly will believe it is possible.
New ideas must have a valid approach. You must demonstrate that 
the physics and science are valid and at least have gone through the 
first-order calculations. At DARPA, a program manager will often fund 
“seedling” efforts prior to a program. Seedlings are quick efforts that 
provide evidence for a program that moves an idea from disbelief to 
doubt. There will always be missing pieces that you know must be 
worked on. This is acceptable, as long as you have a possible approach 
and develop metrics to measure your progress. You need to have 
thought in detail of at least one possible technical approach, a straw man 
solution. From this, you can estimate cost and schedule. Also, if you are 
going to ask people to propose solutions to your program, you need to 
be reasonably confident there is one possible approach. However, you 
should never limit a program to only that one approach. A diversity of 
approaches is important to any successful program.
Key to making this process work is by clearly defining goals and 
metrics. Metrics specified for the early phases of a program help ensure 
you are making progress and tackling the “DARPA Hard” challenges 
by focusing on the technical problems. Concise final goals and metrics 
in R&D provide a clear definition of what are you trying to accomplish 
to the outside world. This is immensely important to DARPA program 
manager, as the metrics define what she or he is investing in, the 
capability, what are the hard challenges, how is success measured, and 
what is the impact. For potential proposers, it provides clear guidance 
on what their solution must be capable of achieving.
Performance metrics help identify the key technical challenges and 
capabilities, independent of possible solution. This allows a program 
manager to gauge how different solution in the program are progressing 
and how well they are overcoming the key challenges. Metrics may 
change as a program progresses and the technical challenges evolve, and 
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as you learn more about the problem and have a better understanding 
of the missing pieces to the solution. There are always missing elements 
to a program, where even with your straw man design and scientific 
vetting, you are not sure they are technically possible. These DARPA 
Hard challenges are valuable as they provide new capabilities, assuming 
you succeed.
How each DARPA program is managed can vary greatly between 
different program managers. What the program managers have in 
common is the freedom and flexibility to be successful in a high-risk 
effort, and a fixed timeline to succeed.
Important Questions to Ask
All DARPA programs have to answer a basic set of questions, known 
as “The Heilmeier Catechism” (or “Heilmeier questions”), named after 
former DARPA director George Heilmeier. They are listed in Box 11-1. 
They are fundamental questions that any technology development 
effort should be asked. If there are parts that do not have an answer, the 
program is not yet ready to start. 
George H. Heilmeier (DARPA director 1975-1977) developed a set of 
questions known as the “Heilmeier Catechism” to help Agency officials 
think through and evaluate proposed research programs:
• What are you trying to do? Articulate your objectives using 
absolutely no jargon.
• How is it done today, and what are the limits of current practice?
• What is new in your approach and why do you think it will be 
successful?
• Who cares? If you succeed, what difference will it make?
• What are the risks?
• How much will it cost?
• How long will it take?
• What are the mid-term and final “exams” to check for success?
Box 11-1. “The Heilmeier Catechism”.  
Source: https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/heilmeier-catechism 
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As a program manager, you need to have something new in your 
approach and you have to know what difference that is going to make. 
Is it a 2x improvement with 10x the cost or is it a 10x improvement 
at half the cost? It must make a difference that the end user will care 
about. It must have a significant impact. You have to be able to estimate 
how much it will cost and how long it will take. You need specific 
goals, metrics, and milestones in order to clearly define the program. 
Answering these questions does not imply a program has a high chance 
of success. In all honestly, I don’t know of any way to determine if a 
new program is going to be successful, but I think there are ways to 
determine if a program has significant flaws and has not been properly 
thought out. High-risk projects need a clear vision.
Timelines 
When DARPA hires a program manager, that decision does not mean 
that the agency has approved that person’s proposed programs. Hiring 
you means they like the ideas that you are presenting and understand 
that you are a technical expert in that field. It could take anywhere from 
a few weeks to a few months or even years to actually get approval for 
your program.
Program managers come to DARPA because they have an ambitious 
idea to pursue and their interest in supporting national security. They 
typically do not come to run other people’s programs, though managing 
existing programs is part of the job. The true excitement in DARPA is in 
seeing your own idea from start to completion.
All DARPA program managers are term limited. A PMs initial 
employment contract with DARPA is for two years. At any time if you 
do not believe that the agency is adequately supporting you, then you 
can leave. If the agency does not think you are doing a good job, then 
they will not renew your contract. The typical tenure at DARPA ranges 
from three to five years. Having a limited tenure for program managers 
is important as it fosters a sense of urgency for a PM in pursuing their 
program vision. For the agency, this helps ensure that creativity and 
productivity remain fluid.
After a program is approved by the Director, the program manager 
writes a Broad Agency Announcement (or BAA) that describes the 
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program, the metrics, how companies and universities can propose to the 
program, what is required in a proposal, how proposals will be evaluated, 
timelines, and the general governing rules. It usually takes about one 
month to complete and get approval to release the BAA to the public. 
Proposals to the program BAA are typically due between forty-five and 
sixty days after the BAA is released. The program manager will often 
hold a workshop to review the program vision and metrics and provide a 
forum for others to discuss and form teams to respond to the BAA.
The amount of technical information required for a proposal is 
substantial. A proposal needs to describe how a performer plans 
on meeting the program metrics, with a detailed technical analysis, 
schedule, and cost estimate. It takes several people about a month of time 
to put together a good proposal—a substantial resource commitment. 
Companies that have an idea or solution to propose are willing to invest 
the resources because they believe in DARPA, and they know that there 
will be a fair and extensive evaluation process that focuses on the technical 
merits of the proposed solution. Companies know that if their proposal 
is selected, DARPA has the resources and funding to see the program to 
completion. This reputation is important, as it encourages a wide range 
of companies to propose to a BAA. They also trust DARPA to properly 
protect the intellectual property and ideas disclosed in a proposal.
It will typically take two months for the proposals to be evaluated 
by the PM and a team of government experts, and final selection of 
the proposals to be funded. Another three months is required to put a 
company or university under contract for the program. In total, it takes 
about six months from approval by the Director to when the selected 
performers start their technical work on a complex, multimillion-dollar 
R&D effort. That is incredibly efficient for any government agency, 
and this speed is one of the beauties of DARPA and its structure. If a 
PM is only going to be at DARPA for four years, a slow bureaucratic 
government process would be a problem. The DARPA structure is there 
to ensure that technical excellence and speed are not orthogonal.
Additional Thoughts on Why DARPA is Needed
I wish to add a few more points about why DARPA is needed and why 
it is valuable. If you look at many of the modern technical innovations 
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that drive the world economy, they are based on fundamental scientific 
developments that arise from periods of intense investment. Truly 
new fundamental technologies and innovative ideas that can change 
society are rare. They also tend to be highly reliant on government 
support, especially from long-term basic and applied research. The U.S. 
Government spends over $3 billion each year to ensure that DARPA 
continues to push the limits of science and technology, plus many 
billions more at other federal R&D agencies.
DARPA is one part of the government S&T funding structure. 
DARPA’s role is to show the world what is possible, building prototypes 
that demonstrate new capabilities. In the process, DARPA advances 
science to overcome technical roadblocks. It is a place of ideas. It is 
not afraid of risks, as risks are inherent in any innovative idea. At the 
same time, it is not an academic institution, and it is important to stay 
within the realm of reality. Rigor must be maintained, with well-defined 
goals and milestones. It is essential that it is understood, from both the 
management and technical perspective, that these are hard programs.
DARPA has followed this approach for over sixty years, and has 
earned the respect from the technical community based on what has 
been accomplished. This reputation provides very important political 
capital that no agency can ever afford to lose. DARPA is one grand, 
continually evolving experiment, which observes what works and what 
does not work, and which continues to persevere, making changes 
where necessary. As long as DARPA maintains that culture, DARPA 
maintains that political capital.
DARPA does not work alone. It relies on the technical performers 
whose proposed program solutions DARPA funds, and extensive 
collaboration with the military user community. Once a new technology 
is developed, it has to be transitioned to the military and commercial 
realm. In the end, it is the need and market that drives the transition, 
with the Department of Defense as the targeted customer. 
The DOD is an early adopter for expensive, high performance system 
and often continues the support until the commercial space becomes 
sufficiently mature.
DARPA continues to push future innovations. In 2004, DARPA held 
a grand challenge to look at autonomous vehicles. In the first challenge, 
the best team only completed 12 km of the 240 km route. One year later, 
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at the second challenge, five teams crossed the finish line. Ten years later, 
we have the initial glimpses of commercial autonomous vehicles, based 
largely on the work of those teams. Ten years from now, autonomous 
vehicles will be common in the commercial world. DARPA is continuing 
with robotics today, with the DARPA Robotics Challenge (see Chapter 
11, below). What will all this work lead to in 2023? DARPA looks at the 
future, see what’s possible, and then tries to drive technology and create 
that future.
A Flexible and Supportive Agency
The DARPA Director and Office Directors are responsible for developing 
the agency strategy and technical thrusts. They need a continual influx 
of program managers to come in with ideas to build programs in 
those areas. If an advanced technology agency wants to be successful, 
it not only needs to hire technical experts as program managers, but 
also provide a way for these people to succeed. DARPA has found an 
effective way to do both of these things. It enables its program managers 
to succeed.
When you come in as a DARPA program manager, there is no 
rulebook to guide you, but rather you learn what you need to do with 
the help of the DARPA support staff. This is one of the reasons that 
the agency is such an individualistic organization. A DARPA program 
manager can often spend up to 25 percent of their time on the road. A 
typical tour at DARPA can be exhausting, but the agency makes sure 
you have the support you need.
A friend once told me that if you have something that you wanted to 
get done, needed to get done, then DARPA was the place to go. There are 
not many places that would give you a greater opportunity to change 
the world while working with the best and brightest. The DARPA mix 
of innovation, speed, and human experience is singularly unique, and 
when it is time to depart, you will leave with pride in what you, your 
colleagues, and the agency have accomplished.
11. Program Management  
at DARPA:  
A Personal Perspective1
Larry Jackel
In this chapter, I provide a perspective on my experiences at DARPA 
as a program manager. In Chapter 10 above, Jinendra Ranka recounts 
his experiences as a DARPA program manager. These two perspectives 
expound highly different experiences. While there are certainly common 
themes, there is also a large degree of variance.
How does one create programs at DARPA? When I started at 
DARPA, I had a general charter to work in the area of applying machine 
learning to robotics, which had not been done to a significant extent up 
to that time. Before I joined DARPA, I knew machine learning groups 
at Bell Laboratories, although I had no direct experience in robotics. 
At DARPA, I was first assigned to take over two programs that were 
concluding. One program dealt with autonomous navigation, and one 
program concerned vehicle mobility. For the first six months, I was busy 
familiarizing myself with these fields: I watched the field tests, paid 
attention, and asked lots of questions.
During these first six months at the agency, I was able to identify 
factors that limited the performance of robots, and I then proposed three 
1  This chapter is based on a presentation that Dr. Jackel made at the Workshop on 
“How to Support Disruptive Change: Lessons from the DARPA Model”, National 
Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, 25 February 2014.
© Larry Jackel, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.11
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new programs to overcome limitations largely by applying machine 
learning to robotics.
Getting New Programs Approved
To get the programs approved, I first worked with the directors of 
two offices. One of my proposed programs received approval from 
the director of the Tactical Technologies Office (TTO), which develops 
prototype systems. I also worked in a second office, the Information 
Processing Techniques Office (IPTO, now called the Information 
Innovation Office, I2O), and my office director there helped me with 
the two other programs that I managed. Once we had developed the 
briefs, it was the role of the agency director at that time, Tony Tether, to 
make the final decisions. This was fairly typical, with the office directors 
coaching program managers and helping them prepare before they seek 
the agency director’s approval.
Soliciting and Reviewing Proposals
After the concept for the program is approved and established, DARPA 
puts out a document called a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA)—a 
request for proposals. We would typically get between five and ten times 
as many submissions as we could fund. I wish to point out that this is 
not necessarily a positive, because putting together a proposal requires 
a tremendous amount of work on the part of the proposers. If we only 
fund a tiny fraction, then many researchers waste a large amount of 
their time preparing proposals. A better policy has developed in later 
years in which people submit short papers, known as whitepapers. On 
the basis of these short papers, program managers encourage those 
researchers who look likely to be funded to submit larger proposals, 
and those who look less likely to receive funding are not encouraged to 
submit full proposals. This saves time both for the researchers and also 
for the program managers.
In my own case, I had perhaps a hundred proposals to read. This 
was time-consuming, and, at times, painful, in that it was frustrating to 
observe the amount of effort people had put into proposals that would 
not be funded.
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In order to pick the proposals that would be funded, I, as a program 
manager, appointed a team of government employees to read and 
review the proposals. This is not a peer review process akin to that 
conducted by the National Science Foundation, in which university 
professors review the proposals. Instead, a handful of government 
employees, led by the program manager, conduct the review. Our 
review was a rank-ordered list of the various proposals. Then we took 
that list to the DARPA director’s office, and he would say: “Okay, I have 
so much money, I can fund up to this level.”
Managing Programs
Next, I want to discuss managing programs. 
On the one hand, program managers need humility. When I came 
to DARPA, I received some advice from my predecessor, who had 
managed the programs that I inherited. He informed me: “When you’re 
a DARPA PM, you’ll be treated like a king by those who depend upon 
you for funding. Do not act like a king. Stay humble. Your job is to serve 
the taxpayer”. When you become a program manager, you suddenly 
attract many new friends, and people never contradict you. This can 
lead to a false impression of your own intellect and ability. It is therefore 
paramount that you understand that you are not as smart as the people 
surrounding you pretend that you are. It also means that you have to 
treat the people who you will fund with respect and must not treat them 
badly.
On the other hand, unlike NSF, the programs at DARPA are actively 
managed by the program manager. First, we set clear and realistic 
goals and schedules. There are milestones that R&D performers have 
to meet for the program to continue. In addition, we provide technical 
support and guidance when possible. In the robotics area, for example, 
I was not an expert in robotics per se, but I knew a great deal about 
machine learning. I would help the performers in their research by 
giving them suggestions on how to improve the behavior of the robots 
by incorporating learning. I was also actively involved in testing and 
evaluation. I greatly enjoyed the fact that, most of the time, I never wore 
a suit and a tie. Usually, I would be out in the mountains or the desert 
with hiking boots and blue jeans testing the robots.
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For example, one time we brought some of the principal investigators 
to Fort Carson in Colorado, which is right at the foothills of the Rocky 
Mountains (where we conducted some of the robot testing). I am an 
experimental physicist, and this meant that when it came to the testing, 
I used the methodology that I had learned in physics while testing 
robots. I was actively involved in planning the actual test. It gave me the 
opportunity to exercise my pleasure in being a scientist.
It is very rare that programs proceed as the program manager 
expects: changes must be made to programs to ensure that progress is 
made to larger goals. In this way, program managers need to learn and 
adapt, and help their performers learn and adapt. They must, therefore, 
be both humble and active.
A typical program manager will have the necessary technical expertise 
and research experience. Very often, they will also have managerial 
experience. It is essential that they have a good understanding of relevant 
technology, along with the ability to lead a research community.
Independence, Responsibility, and Accomplishments
DARPA trusts its program managers and gives them great independence. 
In my own case, I was required to report on each program to the upper 
management about once a year. During the intervals between these 
reports, I largely had full autonomy in running the programs.
DARPA program managers also have considerable resources. 
For example, consider Dr. Gill Pratt, who later became the program 
manager for robotics, the leader of the 2012–2015 DARPA Robotics 
Challenge, and the person I helped in my subsequent role as a consultant 
to DARPA. Dr. Pratt had a total budget of about $50 million per year 
over six years—roughly $290 million in total. With that money, he ran 
programs in robotics, neuromorphic computing and computer vision. 
This money was adequate funding to make significant advances in the 
targeted technology.
One example of where the agency and its R&D performers made 
progress was the DARPA Robotics Challenge that I mentioned earlier, 
which was budgeted at $80 million over several years. The goal for 
that program was to develop robots capable of assisting humans and 
responding to natural and manmade disasters. Much of the inspiration 
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came from Dr. Pratt’s experience trying to help at the Fukushima 
nuclear plant, after the 2011 accident there. The Robotics Challenge led 
to some impressive improvements in robots and became an example of 
how a DARPA program, with good leadership and adequate funding, 
can make real progress.

PART III:  
 
APPLYING THE DARPA MODEL IN 
OTHER SITUATIONS

12. Lessons from DARPA for 
Innovating in Defense Legacy 
Sectors1
William B. Bonvillian2
As World War II grew and the U.S. production machine began to ship 
war supplies to Britain in every available ship, an enduring transfer was 
occurring in the opposite direction. The critical moment was in August 
1940: British science leader Henry Tizard landed in Halifax and took a 
train to Washington, leading a small scientific team on a multi-month 
mission. In a suitcase they carried perhaps the most critical technology 
of the war: an early prototype of the microwave radar.
However, it was not the technology alone that was so important, 
but rather, the innovation organization model. The American team, led 
by industrial organizer and technologist Alfred Loomis and reporting 
to Vannevar Bush, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s science czar, immediately 
realized the importance of the small radar device, and they also 
learned about and replicated parts of the system that led the British to 
operational radar. The essentials were replicated at the Rad Lab at MIT, 
where microwave radar advances exploded into a galaxy of electronic 
applications, then transferred to Los Alamos. As explored below, the 
1  This paper originally appeared in modified form in 2015 in The American Interest 11/1, 
as “All that DARPA Can Be”, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/08/01/
all-that-darpa-can-be/ 
2  William B. Bonvillian is indebted to his Georgetown colleague Prof. Charles Weiss 
for numerous insights behind this article.
© William B. Bonvillian, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.12
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organizational lessons included: form critical innovation institutions, 
organize them on an “island/bridge” model, create a thinking 
community, and link technologists to operators.
Thirteen years after the end of the war, these innovation organization 
lessons were translated directly into the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), perhaps the most successful federal R&D 
agency ever. We review a series of questions: what are the foundations 
of the DARPA model? What is the context of contending innovation 
models it operates in? What do the four innovation organizational 
lessons cited above look like up close? DARPA is famous for sponsoring 
much of the R&D that led to the information technology revolution, 
innovating in a “frontier” technology sector. However, it has also 
brought innovations to a “legacy” sector, the conservative military 
bureaucracy. This kind of innovation is much more difficult because 
launching it is contested. Moreover, it is rare—legacy sectors rarely 
undertake disruptive innovations. How did DARPA do this? DARPA’s 
efforts in this legacy territory are much less understood, but because 
legacy sectors constitute most of the U.S. economy, may provide wider 
lessons about the landscape of innovation organization.
The Underlying Innovation Models
Like all R&D agencies, DARPA has an organizational genealogy. 
Initially, then, we turn to the fundamentals—four models for how 
innovation is organized in the U.S. to put the DARPA model into the 
larger context.
The most familiar U.S. innovation model evolved in the immediate 
postwar; it is the so-called pipeline or linear model, developed by 
Vannevar Bush.3 It holds that basic research operating at the frontiers 
of knowledge and supplied by government research investment leads 
to applied research and development. This, in turn, leads to invention, 
to prototyping, and, finally, to innovation and corresponding broad 
commercialization or deployment. 
While subsequent literature showed that this process wasn’t 
really linear—technology influenced science as well as the other way 
3  Bush, V. (1945). Science: The Endless Frontier. Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, https://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm
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around4—“pipeline” is still the term generally associated with this 
technology supply approach.
The World War II-era success of atomic energy, radar, and other 
technologies, derived from advances in fundamental scientific 
knowledge,5 inspired the model; it led to a host of technology advances.6 
It is a “technology push” model, with the government supporting initial 
research with only a limited role in pressing these advances toward the 
marketplace. Therefore, it is inherently a disconnected model, with 
researchers separated from industry implementers.
The second of these models is the so-called induced innovation 
concept explored by economist Vernon Ruttan7 in which technology and 
technological innovation respond to changes in the market, generally to 
market niche opportunities and price signals. It is typically industry led. 
New products in this model often generate from modifications of existing 
technologies to meet new market needs—incremental advances—rather 
than emerging from basic research. This model involves “technology 
pull”—the marketplace pulls technology innovations from firms toward 
implementation in the market.
The third model, which is a variation of the first, can be called the 
“extended pipeline”, a new term. This model enabled many of DARPA’s 
greatest successes. It describes the role of the U.S. Defense Department 
(DOD), which could not live with the inherent inefficiency of the 
pipeline model, where the innovation institutions are disconnected. In 
this model, DOD not only funds the early stages of research, but also 
sponsors the follow-on stages. To obtain the technologies it requires 
to meet national security needs, DOD often will fund the research, the 
development, the prototype, product design, the demonstration, the 
4  Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur’s Quadrant, Basic Science and Technological Innovation. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1–25, 45–89.
5  Buderi, R. (1997). The Invention that Changed the World. Sloan Technology Series. 
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
6  National Research Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution: Government Support for 
Computing Research. Computer Science and Telecommunications Board. History, 
Commission on Physical Sciences Mathematics and Applications. Washington, 
DC: National Academy Press, 85–157 (chapters 4–5), https://doi.org/10.17226/6323, 
https://www.nap.edu/catalog/6323/funding-a-revolution-government-support-for-
computing-research,; Waldrop, M. M. (2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. R. Licklider 
and the Revolution that Made Computing Personal. New York, NY: Viking Press.
7  Ruttan, V. (2001). Technology Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation 
Perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press 
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testbed, all the way to funding implementation and serving as the initial 
market. Important parts of the information technology revolution—the 
Internet for example—were developed in this way, but this development 
was not unique.
Ruttan has noted how DOD also led aviation, electronics, space, 
nuclear power and computing using this model.8 These constitute most 
of the major technology innovation waves of the twentieth century. This 
model links the initial research stage with a governmental role in the 
follow-on technology development stages, connecting the institutional 
actors that dominate each. Agriculture and space advances also employ 
the extended pipeline, and other R&D agencies are starting to emulate 
this more connected system.9 Unlike the pipeline model, it operates at 
all stages of innovation, not simply the early stages.
The fourth model of innovation dynamics, “manufacturing-led” 
innovation, describes innovations in production technologies, processes 
and products that emerge from expertise informed by experience in 
manufacturing. This is augmented by applied research and development 
that is integrated with the production process. It is typically industry-
led, but with strong governmental industrial support. While countries 
like German, Japan, Taiwan, Korea and now China have organized their 
economies around “manufacturing-led” innovation systems, the U.S. 
in the postwar period did not. It is a major gap in the U.S. innovation 
system. This system gap is now starting to affect the ability of DARPA 
and other R&D agencies to translate their technologies into actual 
innovation. 
When the U.S. was constructing its innovation system in the postwar 
period, it paid little attention to manufacturing-led innovation. This 
had been the U.S.’s innovation strength since the nineteenth century; 
it had created the mass production system that had played a central 
role in winning World War II. Production was not the problem, since 
the U.S. dominated it. Instead, the U.S. focused on its research system, 
the front end of innovation, which had emerged at scale during the 
war, but needed to be retained and augmented. This was the system 
8  Ruttan, V. W. (2006). Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and 
Technology Development. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
9  Bonvillian, W. B. (2013). “The New Model Innovation Agencies: An Overview”, 
Science and Public Policy 41/4: 425–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/sct059, https://
academic.oup.com/spp/article-abstract/41/4/425/1607552?redirectedFrom=fulltext
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Vannevar Bush, as President Roosevelt’s science advisor, focused on. 
Others countries, such as Germany and Japan, emerging from wartime 
chaos, had to concentrate on rebuilding their industrial bases, and thus 
developed and extended their manufacturing-led innovation systems. 
As their economies emerged, Taiwan, Korea and China needed to 
build their industrial bases, and also followed the manufacturing-led 
innovation path.
Innovation Organization
These first four models exist and can be seen at work at varying degrees 
of efficiency in the U.S. economy. The fifth model, which can be termed 
innovation organization, is more a conceptual framework that includes 
the other three and builds on them. It is not a subject in the innovation 
literature.10 However, innovation requires not only technology supply 
and a corresponding market demand for that technology, but also 
organizational elements that are properly aligned to link the two. 
There must be concrete institutions for innovation, and organizational 
mechanisms connecting these institutions, to facilitate the evolution 
of new technologies in response to the forces of technology push and 
market pull. This fifth element is essential in our innovation framework: 
the idea that innovation requires organizations anchored in both the 
public, academic and private sectors, to form the new technology and 
to launch it, if innovation theory is to be practical, creating both ideas 
and means to actually implement them. The focus in the science policy 
literature is on idea creation; detailed evaluation of implementation is 
largely ignored.
In other words, while the first four innovation models—pipeline, 
induced, extended pipeline, and manufacturing-led—are descriptive 
of existing ways of organizing innovation in the U.S., they are limited 
in their reach. The fourth provides the organizing methodology that 
10  Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). “The Connected Science Model for Innovation—The 
DARPA Model”, in 21st Century Innovation Systems for the U.S. and Japan, ed. 
S. Nagaoka, M. Kondo, K. Flamm, and C. Wessner. Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press. 206–37, https://doi.org/10.17226/12194, http://books.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=206 (Chapter 4 in this volume); Weiss, C. 
and Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). Structuring an Energy Technology Revolution. Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 26–28; Nelson, R. R. (1993). National Systems of Innovation. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 3–21, 505–23.
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encompasses the first three and reaches beyond them to the innovation 
implementation system. It includes the full innovation ecosystem—
from research to deployment, but also the forces of culture, political 
and economic systems, technological routines, and social structures for 
innovation. This also means the mechanisms and change agents needed 
to surmount the obstacles in that ecosystem to enable innovation. These 
forces are especially profound in complex, established “legacy” economic 
sectors—like energy, transport, health care delivery, manufacturing, 
higher education, agriculture—and also in defense.11
These tend to lock in established technologies and resist technology 
advances that are different from and disrupt their existing economic and 
technological model. They use political, economic and social systems in 
their defense against disruptive innovation. By recognizing that there 
are institutions and mechanisms operating within an innovation system, 
legacy or otherwise, the innovation organization model enables a richer 
evaluation of innovation and of potential policies to improve the overall 
system. The innovation organization model, then, moves beyond the 
institutional “linkage” idea of the extended pipeline model to embrace a 
series of elements to provide a bigger picture of innovation: connecting 
public and private sectors, from research through implementation; 
merging pipeline and induced innovation, radical and incremental; 
overcoming structural barriers to innovation particularly relevant to 
legacy sectors; and consciously embracing change agents.
These five models fit into an historical context. The manufacturing-led 
model was embodied in the mass production system that the U.S. was 
the first nation to fully develop, and is also embodied in Japan’s quality 
production system. The pipeline model was inspired by the dramatic 
advances seen in World War II deriving from basic science, such as nuclear 
energy from particle physics and electronics from radar advances, in the 
1940s-50s. The induced technology model has long dominated industry’s 
role in innovation, with advances derived largely from incremental 
gains in existing technology, such as, in the 1960s and 1970s, from 
11  Bonvillian, W. B., and Weiss, C. (2009). “Taking Covered Wagons East, A New 
Innovation Theory for Energy and Other Established Sectors”, Innovations 4/4: 289–
94, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/userimages/ContentEditor/1259694503297/
Bonvillianinov.pdf; Bonvillian, W. B., and Weiss, C. (2011). “Complex Established 
‘Legacy’ Systems: The Technology Revolutions that Do Not Happen”, Innovations 
6/2: 157–87, https://doi.org/10.1162/inov_a_00075, https://www.mitpressjournals.
org/doi/pdf/10.1162/INOV_a_00075
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automobiles, consumer electronics and jet aviation. Throughout that 
era, the kind of innovation described by the extended pipeline model 
was humming along, bringing out a personal computing and internet 
revolution in the 1990’s after decades of government R&D inputs. While 
the induced model best fits incremental innovation, the pipeline and 
extended pipeline models best fit breakthrough or radical innovation. 
These breakthrough innovations supply the ingredients for waves of 
innovation that create “frontier” economic sectors that periodically form 
new parts of the economy. Underlying these developments in technology 
advance is the innovation organizational model described here and its 
additional series of elements, vital for understanding our innovation 
system yet largely unexplored. These innovation organization elements 
in the model are important in particular for any analysis of the entry of 
technology innovation into legacy sectors.
Beyond Pipeline
The dominant literature on technological innovation has remained 
focused on the strengths and weaknesses of the pipeline model, because 
of the perception that the frontier economy is key to growth. The 
innovation waves in information technology and biotechnology, for 
aspects of which the pipeline model provides a description, command 
most of the analytical focus to date. This pipeline literature has not 
confronted the problems involved in bringing innovation into established 
legacy economic sectors. It pays too little attention to how the overall 
economic and policy environment affects technological innovation in 
complex networks of both related and unrelated technologies. While 
the extended pipeline is not a term in the innovation literature, there 
is some work describing that model,12 although it is still focused on 
the frontier economy. The induced technology model often pays too 
little attention to the governmental role.13 The literature on induced 
12  See, for example, Bonvillian, W. B. (2006). “Power Play, The DARPA Model and 
U.S. Energy Policy”, The American Interest 2/2: 39–48, at 40–47, https://www.the-
american-interest.com/2006/11/01/power-play/; Alic, J., et al. (1992). Beyond Spinoff: 
Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press.
13  Although Vernon Ruttan was a leading theorist of the induced model, in his last 
book he turned to an exploration of what we call here the extended pipeline model 
(Ruttan. (2006). Is War Necessary for Economic Growth?).
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technology has rested primarily on market pull theory, and on the role 
of firms in filling technology needs based on changing market signals, 
ignoring governmental R&D and policy interventions. The two pipeline 
and the induced models have been viewed as separate and distinct 
paths; to date none has focused on what is described here as the fourth 
direction, innovation organization. If we are to adequately describe the 
framework required for innovation in the range of technologies to be 
introduced into complex and legacy sectors, the organization model 
suggests we must combine and integrate the other three models. The 
systemic barriers to legacy sector innovation also arguably require 
change agents—institutional and individual actors prepared to push 
innovations through the sector barriers at each innovation stage.
To summarize, we have described a series of models of innovation. 
We have noted how they apply to both the frontier as well as the 
legacy sectors that, combined, make up most of the economy. We 
have developed a broad new model that encompasses and adds new 
considerations to the other models to meet the challenge of optimizing 
the organization of innovation. We have a new framework, then, in 
which to understand the functioning of innovation systems and the 
actor institutions that perform within them, including DARPA.
While we placed DARPA in the discussion above within the sweep 
of the extended pipeline model, it also has developed features that 
have enabled it to innovate in the legacy defense sector. This means 
that it represents, as well, key features of what we term the innovation 
organization model. It is this new way of analyzing DARPA’s role that 
is the primary focus of this article.
First Things First—The Front End of the Innovation System
There is an obvious rule functioning here: no innovations, no 
innovation system. Innovation requires not only an understanding of 
the overall system for its development, as set out above, but the first 
problem concerns the earlier stages of the innovation system where 
the innovations originate. Later come the problems of overcoming the 
structural barriers to innovation and creating the linkages between 
the innovation actors at the subsequent stages of the innovation 
process, including the role of change agents, where ideas move to 
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implementation. First, however, we must tackle the problem of how 
to bring about innovation, whether into legacy or frontier sectors. To 
put the horse before the cart, we must begin with the “front end” of the 
innovation system, the research, development, prototyping and early 
demonstration stages.
This means we must move beyond the long-standing focus of 
pipeline theorists on the valley-of-death stage between research and 
late-stage development14 because innovation requires what we can term 
“connected science and technology”—linkages between innovation stages 
and actors—an integrated consideration of the entire innovation process, 
including research, development, and deployment or implementation, 
in the design of any program to stimulate innovation in any complex, 
established technology sector. As noted, this requires drawing on the 
two pipeline models, the manufacturing-led model, and the induced 
innovation model. In addition, we see deep system issues of organization 
for innovation, because new organizational routines are required across 
both the public and private sectors to facilitate integrated policies that 
will support innovation.
These considerations lead to a new approach to innovation policy, 
aimed at what Avery Sen and others call transformative innovation.15 This 
transformational task of innovation for both frontier and legacy sectors 
is usually particularly dependent on the strength of the front end of an 
innovation system. While, by definition, this will be the case for frontier 
sectors—which initially require new innovations—it will not always be 
the case in legacy sectors, where both breakthrough and incremental 
advances may be needed. For example, in the health legacy sector, 
incremental advances in electronic medical records could lead to dramatic 
improvements in the health care legacy sector, although breakthrough 
medical devices and nanoscale drug delivery are also required. Or, in 
14  Branscomb, L., and Auerswald, P. (2002). Between Invention and Innovation, An 
Analysis of Funding for Early-State Technology Development. NIST GCR 02–841. 
Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2, https://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10961-011-9223-x
15  Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation”, The Journal of Technology Transfer 36: 469–513, 
at 470, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10961-011-9223-x; https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10961-011-9223-x; Sen, A. (2014). “Transformative Innovation: What 
‘Totally Radical’ and ‘Island-Bridge’ Mean for NOAA Research”, PhD thesis, 
George Washington University, Washington, 18–56.
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the energy legacy sector, “smart” devices are evolving incrementally 
for the electric power grid, even if technology breakthroughs in power 
electronics are needed as well. Other legacy sectors, such as defense 
or advanced manufacturing, require more breakthroughs. In this way, 
the legacy sector transformational task will be both breakthrough 
and incremental, pipeline and induced. Regardless, we need to focus 
in depth on understanding and strengthening the front-end system; 
otherwise, creation of frontier sectors and transformation of most legacy 
sectors will be largely curtailed.
Strengthening the Front End
Strengthening the “front end” of the innovation system requires an 
innovation capability analysis of the research development, prototyping 
and early demonstration elements, and of the institutions that support 
them. Is the system capable of generating the innovations required to 
bring change to complex and legacy sectors? A series of evaluations is 
needed, and may require implementing system improvements. Since the 
front end of innovation is typically driven, initially, by the pipeline or 
extended pipeline models, we must consider these and their application 
to the optimal innovation organization approach required in taking this 
first step.
A series of factors for consideration in this step are reviewed below, 
and the application of each to DARPA is discussed.
1) Form critical innovation institutions. If R&D is not being 
conducted at an adequate scale by talented researcher 
teams, innovations will not emerge. However, talent alone 
is not enough—talent must be operating within institutional 
mechanisms capable of moving technology advances from 
idea to innovation. Critical innovation institutions represent the 
space where research and talent combine, where the meeting 
between science and technology is best organized. Arguably, 
there are critical science and technology institutions that 
can introduce not simply inventions and applications, but 
significant elements of entire innovation systems.16
16  Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model”.
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This is where DARPA takes center stage, with its history of attracting 
outstanding research talent, and of spurring remarkable technology 
advance.17 In promoting innovations, it has long played within both 
frontier sectors, through its role in the information technology (IT) 
wave, and the defense legacy sector, through its role in such defense 
advances as precision strike, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). As 
the most successful U.S. R&D agency operating in the innovation space, 
and because it represents more of a “connected science and technology” 
approach than other agencies, our initial focus is on lessons that can be 
learned from the characteristics of the DARPA model.
Formed in 1958 by President Eisenhower to provide more unified 
defense R&D in light of the separate, stove-piped military services’ 
space programs that had helped lead to America’s Sputnik failure, 
DARPA became a unique entity, aimed at both avoiding and creating 
“technological surprise”.18 In many ways, DARPA directly inherited 
the “connected science and technology” (linking science research to 
implementation stages) and “challenge” (pursuing major mission 
technology challenges) organization models of the Rad Lab and Los 
Alamos projects stood up by Vannevar Bush, Alfred Loomis and J. Robert 
Oppenheimer in World War II. Building on the Rad Lab example, it built 
a deeply collaborative, flat, close-knit, talented, participatory, flexible 
system, oriented to breakthrough radical innovation. Its challenge 
model for R&D, moved from fundamental, back and forth with 
applied, creating connected science and technology, linking research, 
development, and prototyping, with access to initial production. In 
other words, it followed an innovation path not simply a discovery or 
invention path.
However, innovation requires not only a process of creating 
connected science and challenges at the institutional level, it also must 
operate at the personal level. People are innovators, not simply the overall 
institutions where talent and R&D come together. Warren Bennis and 
Patricia Biederman have argued that innovation, because it is more 
17  Van Atta, R. (2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 50 Years 
of Bridging the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. Kalhikina, and 
M. J. Tully. Arlington, VA: DARPA. 20–29, https://issuu.com/faircountmedia/docs/
darpa50 (Chapter 2 in this volume).
18  Discussion drawn from Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model”, 207, 
209, 215.
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complex than the earlier stages of discovery and invention, requires 
“great groups”, not simply individuals.19 However, unlike other federal 
R&D agencies, DARPA has attempted to operate at both the institutional 
and personal levels. DARPA became a bridge organization connecting 
these two institutional and personal organizational elements.20 
At the heart of the DARPA ruleset is what Tamera Carleton has termed 
a “technology visioning”21 process, which appears to be particularly key. 
It uses a “right-left” research model—its program managers contemplate 
the technology breakthroughs they are seeking to emerge from the right 
end of the innovation pipeline, and then go back to the left side of the 
pipeline to look for proposals for the breakthrough research that will get 
them there. As noted, it uses a challenge-based research model—seeking 
research advances that will meet significant technology challenges. It 
looks for revolutionary breakthroughs that could be transformative of a 
technology sector. All of these elements go into a process where agency 
program managers develop a vision of a technology advance that 
could be transformative, then work back to understand the sequence 
of R&D advances required to get there. If these appear in range of 
accomplishment, the agency has processes that allow very rapid project 
approvals by the agency directors. This technology visioning process 
is very different from the way industry undertakes step-by-step down-
selection of technology options known as the “stage-gate”22 process, 
where budget and market gain are factors used to weed out which 
incremental advances to pursue. The visioning process is also very 
different from how other federal R&D organizations work; these place 
more emphasis on research for the sake of research. In the context of 
attempting to bring innovation into legacy sectors, the visioning process 
may be particularly apt.
19  Bennis, W., and Biederman, P. W. (1997). Organizing Genius: The Secrets of Creative 
Collaboration. New York, NY: Basic Books.
20  Bonvillian and Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA”, 483–84. See also, on the 
origins of ARPA-E, Weiss and Bonvillian. (2009). Structuring an Energy Technology 
Revolution, 161–65, 185–86, 206, 260n9, 262nn17–19.
21  Carleton, T. L. (2010). “The Value of Vision in Radical Technological Innovation”, 
PhD Thesis, Stanford University, Palo Alto, http://purl.stanford.edu/mk388mb2729; 
Bonvillian and Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA”, 485 (italics added).
22  See, for example, Cooper, R.G., Edgett, S. J., and Kleinschmidt, E. J. (2002). 
“Optimizing the Stage-Gate Process”, Research Technology Management 45/5, 43–49, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08956308.2002.11671532
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Other DARPA characteristics enhance its ability to operate at both 
the institutional and personal innovation organization levels. The 
following list is largely drawn from DARPA’s own descriptions of its 
organizing elements:23
• Small and flexible—DARPA consists of only 100–150 
professionals; one can refer to DARPA as “100 geniuses 
connected by a travel agent”.
• Flat—DARPA is a flat, non-hierarchical organization, with 
empowered program managers.
• Entrepreneurial—DARPA’s emphasis falls on selecting highly 
talented, entrepreneurial program managers, willing to 
press their projects toward implementation, often with both 
academic and industry experience. They serve for limited 
(three- to five-year) duration, which sets the timeframe for 
DARPA projects.
• No laboratories—DARPA’s research is performed entirely by 
outside performers, with no internal research laboratory.
• Focus on impact not risk—DARPA’s projects are selected and 
evaluated on what impact they could make on achieving a 
demanding capability or challenge.
• Seed and Scale—DARPA provides initial short-term funding 
for seed efforts that can scale to significant funding for 
promising concepts, but with clear willingness to terminate 
non-performing projects.
• Autonomy and freedom from bureaucratic impediments—
DARPA operates outside the civil-service hiring process and 
standard government contracting rules, which gives it unusual 
access to talent, plus speed and flexibility in contracting for 
R&D efforts.
23  This list is drawn from DARPA. (2008). DARPA—Bridging the Gap, Powered by Ideas. 
Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, http://www.dtic.mil/
cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA433949; DARPA. 
(2003). DARPA Over the Years. Arlington, VA: Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency. For a more detailed evaluation of DARPA’s ruleset, see, Bonvillian and 
Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA”.
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• Hybrid model—DARPA often puts small, innovative firms 
and university researchers together on the same project so that 
firms have access to breakthrough science and researchers see 
pathways to implementation.
• Teams and networks—at its best, DARPA creates and sustains 
highly talented teams of researchers, highly collaborative and 
networked to be “great groups”, around the challenge model.
• Acceptance of failure—DARPA pursues a high-risk model for 
breakthrough opportunities and is very tolerant of failure if 
the payoff from potential success is great enough.
• Orientation to revolutionary breakthroughs in a connected 
approach—DARPA is focused not on incremental innovation, 
but on breakthrough/radical innovation. It emphasizes high-risk 
investment, moves from fundamental technological advances 
to prototyping, and then attempts to hand off the production 
stage to the armed services or the commercial sector.
The above rules are part of the established DARPA culture as a critical 
innovation institution. But there are other important foundational and 
underlying features that DARPA has adopted, not as well understood, 
but more central to building a strong, up front-end innovation system 
that it exemplifies. These provide broad, overall front-end organization 
lessons.
2) Use the island/bridge model. Bennis and Biederman24 have argued 
that innovation requires locating the innovation entity on an 
“island” and protecting it from “the suits”—the bureaucratic 
pressures in larger firms or agencies that too frequently 
repress and unglue the innovation process. Nonetheless, they 
note that there must also be a “bridge” —the innovation group 
must also be strongly connected to supportive top decision-
makers who can press the innovation forward, providing 
the needed resources. Sen has argued this is a foundational 
innovation model.25
24  Bennis and Biederman. (1997). Organizing Genius, 206. See also, Sen. (2014). 
“Transformative Innovation”, which expands and builds on the Bennis-Biederman 
concept.
25  Sen. (2014). “Transformative Innovation”.
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The island/bridge model has been, from the beginning, a key to 
DARPA’s success. Indeed, other innovative organizations use it as well. 
Lockheed’s Skunk Works,26 Xerox’s PARC (Palo Alto Research Center)27 
and IBM’s PC project28 have exemplified island/bridge at the industry 
level, severing innovation teams from interference from the business/
bureaucratic side. As noted in point (4), below, some of the ideas for 
this approach came from the British in the 1940s. While the Skunk 
Works and IBM PC groups also had strong bridges back to “mainland” 
decisionmakers, PARC did not, and exemplifies the need for the bridge. 
DARPA exemplifies the island/bridge model at the federal R&D agency 
level.29 It has initiated innovation in frontier sectors, particularly IT, as 
noted, where it operated largely outside the Pentagon’s legacy systems, 
working with and helping to build emerging technology private sector 
firms. It has also worked within the defense legacy system. It has 
operated as an island there but also used strong links with the Secretary 
of Defense and other senior defense leaders as the bridge; these Defense 
decisionmakers helped bridge technology advances from DARPA 
researchers to the implementing military services.
There are alternative models to the island/bridge model. The “open 
innovation”30 approach is well-known, where firms drop reliance on 
in-house R&D labs and reach out to groups at other, often smaller, 
firms (through acquisitions, technology licensing or partnerships) or 
at universities (linking to public sector funded researchers at these 
institutions and licensing their work or creating collaborations). This 
is primarily, however, a tool for more mature firms facing global 
competition and less able to afford in-house R&D, or their rivals 
attempting to out-compete them. Robert W. Rycroft and Don Kash 
pose a similar model, and broaden it, arguing that innovation requires 
“collaborative networks” at a series of levels that must reach outside the 
organization for a kind of heightened R&D situational awareness, and 
26  Rich, B, and Janos, L. (1994). Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years of Lockheed. 
Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
27  Hiltzik, M. (1999). Dealers of Lightning: Xerox PARC and the Dawn of the Computer Age. 
New York, NY: Harper Business. 153.
28  Chposky, J., and Leonsis, T. (1986). Blue Magic: The People, Power and Politics Behind 
the IBM Personal Computer. New York, NY: Facts on File.
29  Bonvillian and Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA”, 486.
30  Chesborough, H. W. (2003). “The Era of Open Innovation”, MIT Sloan Review 44/3, 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-era-of-open-innovation
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can be less face-to-face and more virtual.31 Neither approach obviates 
the need for an originating innovation “great group” applying an 
island/bridge approach.
3) Build a thinking community. A prerequisite for the ongoing 
success of the island/bridge model is building a community of 
thought. In science, it is well understood that each contributor 
stands on the shoulders of others, building new concepts on 
the foundations of prior concepts. Ernest Walton and John 
Cockcroft, for example, working at Cambridge’s Cavendish 
Laboratory, built an early particle accelerator using a strong 
electrical field. They became the first people to split the atom, 
changing the atomic nucleus of one element (lithium) into 
another (helium) in 1932.32 They built on the active work of a 
host of other contemporary physicists, from the Cavendish’s 
director Ernest Rutherford, to Ernest Lawrence, Merle Tuve, 
Peter Kapitza, James Chadwick, George Gamow and Niels 
Bohr, to name only a few. The group at the Cavendish was 
a remarkable “great group” itself, but it was also part of a 
powerful thinking community that was constantly contributing 
ideas to each other. This community was exemplified by the 
forty physicists who attended the 1933 Solvay Conference, half 
of whom won the Nobel Prize (including Cavendish attendees 
Rutherford, Walton, Cockcroft and Chadwick).
Building a sizable “thinking community” has also been key to DARPA’s 
success, as a source of contributing ideas but also for talent and political 
support.33 Composed of multiple generations of DARPA program 
managers and researchers working in a field supported by DARPA, 
at its best this community becomes a group of change agents and 
advocates. J. C. R. Licklider, a tech visionary of the first magnitude, 
in his two stints at DARPA brought in a succession of office directors 
and program managers and built supporting university research teams 
that initiated a series of multi-generational technology breakthroughs 
31  Rycroft, R. W., and Kash, D. E. (1999). “Innovation Policy for Complex Technologies”, 
Issues in Science and Technology, https://issues.org/rycroft/
32  Cathcart, B. (2004). The Fly in the Cathedral. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
33  Bonvillian and Van Atta. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA”, 476–77, 492.
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that, over time, led to personal computing and the Internet.34 Building a 
thinking community around a problem takes time to evolve, but reaches 
a density and mass where ideas start to accelerate. For example, in the 
field of nanotechnology, physicist Richard Feynman arguably initiated 
the community with a 1959 noted talk entitled “There’s Plenty of Room 
at the Bottom”, urging work at the smallest scale where quantum 
properties operate. In 1981 researcher Eric Drexler published the first 
journal article on the subject, and by 2000 over 1800 articles using the 
term nanotechnology had accumulated, showing a thinking community 
had formed and was starting to accelerate advances.35
4) Link Technologists to Operators. Another key organizational 
feature of successful innovation organizations involves 
connecting the technologists to the operators. This approach 
perhaps is best exemplified by the relationship between 
British scientists and the military on the eve of, and during, 
World War II. In the early 1930s the assumption of all, from the 
Prime Minister down, was that “the bomber will always get 
through”—there was no adequate defense to bomber aircraft, 
which could devastate both military and civilian targets 
virtually at will.36 With Hitler building 4000 aircraft in 1935, 
and with England only a few miles across the Channel from 
the European mainland, the ramifications of this assumption 
in the 1930s’ appeasement policy were profound.
However, a small group began to investigate whether air defenses could 
be created. At the behest of the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) scientific Tizard 
Committee, a scientist team, under Robert Watson-Watt (scientist 
supervisor of a small defense lab) began investigating radio beam 
technology that became radar. However, the technology alone did not 
create an air defense against the bomber; extended trial and error testing 
with RAF pilot teams led by physicist Henry Tizard, Rector of Imperial 
College, developed the operational routines that enabled the British to 
maximize the utility of radar technology for air defense and win the 
34  Waldrop. (2001). The Dream Machine, chapters 2, 5–7, and 466–71.
35  Milunovich, S., and Roy, J. M. A. (2001). “The Next Small Thing—An Introduction 
to Nanotechnology”, Merrill Lynch Industry Comment, 4 September, p. 2, https://
www.slideshare.net/tseitlin/intro-to-nanotechnology-merrill-lynch
36  Clark, R. W. (1962). The Rise of the Boffins. London: Phoenix House, 23–31.
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Battle of Britain.37 In this way, it was the constant testing and evaluation 
with air force operators—fighter interceptor pilots and what became 
ground control groups—that linked the technologists to the operators, 
using new but demonstrated technology-based operating systems. 
Tizard, a World War I pilot as well as leading scientist, famously spoke 
the pilots’ language from shared experience, and the experimental 
regimens he helped devise and the RAF implemented between 1935 
and 1938, coupled with continuing incremental improvements in the 
technology to meet evolving operator needs, changed the course of the 
war.38
Along with Tizard, three members of his RAF committee, A. V. Hill, A. 
P. Rowe and Patrick Blackett, developed a doctrine for linking scientists 
and technologists with operators. This became known as Operations 
Research.39 This approach used statistical analysis of operations, 
applying a range of variable technology and operational approaches to 
find optimal solutions to operational challenges. Operations Research 
had World War I precedents in optimizing anti-aircraft artillery 
developed by Hill40 and was written up by Blackett in 1941 as a chapter 
in a short edited book entitled Science in War, advocating its widespread 
use by the military.41 Blackett, as director of Naval Operational 
Research, subsequently applied the techniques he helped develop to 
the war against U-Boats, which were threatening to cut off Britain’s 
wartime food and supplies. Research by his team (known as “Blackett’s 
Circus”) resulted in dramatic improvements to optimal convoy size and 
air-sea convoy protection, with a corresponding dramatic reduction in 
incidences of U-boat ships sinking.42
The British approach to applying science in World War II was to 
isolate and protect its scientists from military hierarchies—the island/
bridge approach—but also to integrate them with the military operators 
when the outcomes of their research appeared promising. Inventing and 
37  Ibid., 33–54.
38  Clark, R. W. (1965). Tizard. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 23–48, 105–92.
39  The term “Operational Research” was coined by A.V. Rowe in 1937, while working 
as assistant director at the RAF radar research and testing center at Bawdsey; 
“Operations Research” is the American term. Budiansky, S. (2013). Blackett’s War. 
New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 87.
40  Clark. (1962). The Rise of the Boffins, 8–9.
41  Budiansky. (2013). Blackett’s War, 117–18.
42  Budiansky. (2013). Blackett’s War, 113–66, 221–49.
 34112. Lessons from DARPA for Innovating in Defense Legacy Sectors
using Operations Research analysis, it found that the scientists must be 
informed, involved in, and linked to the decision making not just on 
technology but also on related strategy and tactics. The British model 
for using scientists, then, was to keep them out of uniform working in 
separate research centers (from the RAF’s radar operational experiments 
at Biggin Hill and Bawdsey, to the codebreaking at Bletchley Park) as 
islands, but with strong ties to the mainland—the service operators.
Tizard, leading the 1940 Tizard Mission that brought vital British 
microwave radar advances to the Americans before they entered the 
war, spent two months in discussions with American scientists and 
military that year, including extensive exchanges with science leaders 
Vannevar Bush and Alfred Loomis.43 Tizard and his team apparently 
explained to Bush and Loomis the science organizational model he and 
other British science leaders had developed.44 Bush and Loomis ended 
up creating largely the same island/bridge model in the U.S. with links 
to operators, implementing it in such famous projects as the Rad Lab for 
microwave radar advances at MIT45 and atomic weapons development 
at Los Alamos.46 These projects in turn became central to the subsequent 
organization of post-war U.S. science.
DARPA, in its work on major defense technology advances, also 
exemplifies an effort to link technologists with operators, to transform 
operations. Its work on personal computing and the Internet, which 
shattered the arm’s length relationships in mainframe computing 
between technologists and operator/users, exhibits the same drive to 
produce technologies that connect with operators. DARPA’s Tactical 
43  Clark. (1962). Tizard, 248–72.
44  MIT’s history of the Rad Lab states, that “Running conferences [with Tizard Mission 
members] continued till October 13 [1940], and by that time practically everybody 
was agreed that what the program needed was a central laboratory built on the 
British lines: staffed by academic physicists, committed to fundamental research 
but committed even more than that to doing anything and everything needed to 
make microwaves [radar] work.” MIT Radiation Laboratory. (1946). Five Years at the 
Radiation Laboratory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 12, https://archive.org/details/
fiveyearsatradia00mass. See also, Clark. (1962). Tizard, 265, 267 (Tizard meetings 
with V. Bush), 268–69 (Mission meetings with Loomis).
45  Conant, J. (2002). Tuxedo Park: A Wall Street Tycoon and the Secret Palace of Science that 
Changed the Course of World War II. New York, NY: Simon & Shuster, 178–289.
46  Bird, K., and Sherwin, M. J. (2005). American Prometheus, The Triumph and Tragedy 
of J. Robert Oppenheimer. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 205–28, 255–59, 268–85, 
293–97.
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Technologies Office (TTO) is specifically designed to bring technologies 
into military tactical systems, using rapid prototyping to transition to 
air, ground and naval operators.
To summarize the first step of building front-end innovation 
capabilities, one of the important lessons from DARPA’s ability to bring 
innovation into a defense sector with deep legacy characteristics has 
been the importance of critical innovation institutions. To perform at a 
critical level, these institutions should attempt to embody a series of 
characteristics. They should undertake both “connected science and 
technology”—linking science research to implementation stages—and 
“challenge” approaches—pursuing major mission technology challenges. 
As discussed, and as DARPA exemplifies, innovation requires not only 
a process of creating connected science and technology and related 
challenges at the institutional level, it also must operate at the personal 
level. The critical stage of innovation is face-to-face not institutional, so 
while institutions where talent and R&D come together are required, 
personal dynamics, usually embodied in “great groups”, are a necessity. 
The DARPA “right-left” research model can be important to reaching the 
innovation stage, where program managers contemplate the technology 
breakthroughs they seek to emerge from the right end of the innovation 
pipeline, then go back to the left side of the pipeline to look for proposals 
for the breakthrough research that will get them there. This process 
tends to lead to revolutionary breakthroughs that could be transformative 
of a technology sector. A technology “visioning” process at the outset of 
the effort appears to be particularly key. The approach results in high-
risk but high-reward projects.
The island/bridge organizational approach for innovation institutions 
also appears to be important. The innovation team should be put on a 
protected island apart from bureaucratic influences so it can focus on 
the innovation process. The strength of the innovation process will also 
depend on building on forming a solid thinking community as a source 
for ideas and support. Because innovation must span numerous steps 
from research through initial production, means for linking technologists 
to operators appear to be critical. Again, DARPA, more than any other 
U.S. R&D agency, exemplifies these approaches.
These rules apply to the important first step of front-end innovation 
organization. They take in the key features of the extended pipeline 
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model: strong initial research and linkages between researchers and 
the institutions that can lead an innovation through the later stages 
toward implementation. But what about the additional issues presented 
by the innovation organization framework? These include not only the 
front-end research and the institutional linkages, but also overcoming 
the barriers to innovation presented within an innovation ecosystem by 
legacy sectors and the role in that ecosystem of change agents.
In summary, despite its ruleset and the way it exemplifies optimal 
front-end innovation, DARPA is part of a defense innovation system; it is 
an entrepreneurial innovator, but within DOD. To foster implementation, 
it must still rely on the military services, and face the legacy pressures 
they can embody, for the follow-on stages. How DARPA, and its 
allies, have undertaken this innovation within a legacy sector provides 
important lessons for the overall U.S. innovation system.
DARPA Innovation within the Defense Legacy Sector
The defense sector has often led U.S. technological advance. Yet 
historically, militaries have often been the most conservative of 
organizations, seeking to refight the last war, suppressing innovation 
in the name of discipline and reliability, and therefore famously subject 
to technological surprise—Sputnik (which led to DARPA’s creation) is 
a good example. The U.S. military, like all others, exhibits these legacy 
sector tendencies. However, in the late 1970s, after almost three decades 
of Cold War, a remarkable effort began in the Defense Department to 
introduce transformative technologies. That process contains important 
lessons for innovation organization within legacy sectors.
When Harold Brown became Defense Secretary and William 
Perry Undersecretary for Defense Research and Engineering (DR&E) 
in the Carter Administration in 1977, the nation faced a major Cold 
War dilemma. Starting under Eisenhower and Kennedy, the U.S. had 
developed a superiority in nuclear weapons and their missile delivery 
systems that offset Soviet advantages in conventional forces in Europe. 
However, by the mid-1970s, that advantage had faded, with the U.S. 
and Soviets in rough parity in these systems. With its deterrence threat 
eroding, and the Army’s capability in decline as a result of the terrible 
pressures of the Vietnam War, Perry and Brown were deeply concerned 
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about the possible outcome of a conventional warfare confrontation in 
Europe. Concern about mutual destruction blunted the ability to use 
nuclear weapons as a deterrent, and the Soviets had built a three-to-one 
advantage in force levels, tanks, armored fighting vehicles and artillery 
in Europe. As Perry later put it, “We thought they had a serious intent 
to use them, to send a blitzkrieg down the Fulda Gap [the anticipated 
route of the Soviet ground invasion of Western Europe then thought 
possible]”.47 This imbalance in conventional forces could have forced 
the U.S. into a situation where it would have had to employ nuclear 
weapons, with all of their devastating consequences.
Since equaling Soviet force levels in Europe was not feasible, Perry and 
Brown developed an “offsets” theory as the basis for a new U.S. defense 
strategy.48 They decided to achieve parity and therefore deterrence in 
conventional battle through systematic technological advance in order 
to offset the Soviet advantage in force levels. They began a process 
of translating advances in computing, information technology, and 
sensors, which had been initiated and long-supported by defense 
research investments, through DARPA in particular, into three areas of 
advance: stealth, precision strike, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 
These capabilities later became known as the Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA).49
How did this RMA come about? Although this revolution suggests 
the power of DOD’s innovation system, it is also possible, as noted, 
to characterize much of DOD as a legacy sector. The existing military 
paradigms within DOD are averse to the risk of innovation. In many 
cases, this group of RMA capabilities was seen as threatening to vested 
technologies and capabilities and to the officers and their organizations 
that had spent their careers developing and using them. In each case, 
the new technologies faced difficulty in obtaining needed investment 
and support, just like disruptive technologies in civilian firms that are 




49  Marshall, A. W. (1993). “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions—Second 
Version”, DOD Office of Net Assessment, Memorandum for the Record, 23 
August, p. 3; Krepinevich, A. F. Jr. (2002). The Military-Technical Revolution: A 
Preliminary Assessment. Washington, DC: CSBA, 3, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/
documents/2002.10.02-Military-Technical-Revolution.pdf
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organized around older technology—picture clunky electromechanical 
calculating machines and their support systems at the advent of 
electronic calculators. Still, in each case, DOD found a way around these 
legacy challenges, in ways explored below.
DOD does have a series of institutions that can enable a technology 
to emerge from research into production and procurement. At its 
best, these can operate as an integrated innovation handoff system. In 
practice, however, this system can break down, particularly in the links 
between the military services—the Army, Navy, and Air Force—and 
the central functions of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Despite its 
best efforts to create a connected system that can smoothly incorporate 
disruptive technology, DOD is, after all, a half-trillion-dollar annual 
economy dating from 1789, and inevitably has developed significant 
features of a legacy sector. DOD is dominated by its services, which can 
have the characteristics of vested interests defending existing paradigms, as 
is typical of all legacy sectors. The services can employ a series of means 
to assure legacy paradigm dominance, including, to briefly summarize: 
budgeting processes dominated by the services that protect their 
established technologies, from aircraft carriers to tanks; a cost structure 
that commits DOD long term to these established weapons platforms; 
service institutional architectures that limit cross service collaboration; 
and established service-led knowledge/human resources structures that are 
heavily hierarchical, service-oriented, and that limit bottom-up ideas.
These, and related characteristics, have led to four major challenges 
to the defense innovation system: (1) problems in linking innovators 
(such as DARPA research teams) with service-led implementation; 
(2) lack of clarity on security threats the nation faces, thereby creating 
corresponding difficulty in developing department-wide technology 
strategies (for example, the U.S. currently faces both monolithic and 
distributed threats); (3) barriers because of defense business practices 
that curtail innovation, resilience and adaptability (for example, 
through “Lowest Price, Technically Acceptable” (LPTA) procurement 
requirements that sacrifice long term value for short term price gains); 
and (4) too long of an innovation timeline—platform procurements can 
be twenty-five years or longer, which limits experimentation and the 
ability to move technological advances into procurement programs. 
These problems translate into competitive challenges. China, the 
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upcoming peer competitor, currently has some nine jet fighter programs 
ongoing compared to one in the U.S., and dozens of UAV programs 
against less than ten in the U.S. Yet in recent decades, the U.S. has been 
able to overcome comparable problems.
Against this background, we can now explore the legacy sector 
problems faced by three of the major sets of technologies behind DOD’s 
Revolution in Military Affairs to see how these obstacles to innovation 
work out in practice within the defense establishment. In each case, 
DARPA played a critical role, operating, along with key defense leaders, 
as a change agent, to overcome these structural obstacles.
Stealth Aircraft
Air superiority has been a fundamental doctrine of U.S. defense since 
World War II.50 However, Soviet air defense systems by the late Vietnam 
War were making U.S. aircraft ever more vulnerable. This forced the Air 
Force to employ vast air armadas of mixed-purpose aircraft, undertaking 
jamming and electronic counter-measures, chaff dropping, and radar 
attack, so as to protect a smaller number of attack aircraft that were 
actually undertaking the strike mission. As early as 1974, discussions 
began between DOD’s office of the Director of Defense Research 
and Engineering (DDR&E) and DARPA about the need to develop a 
“Harvey” aircraft (named after the invisible rabbit in the play and film) 
that would have a greatly reduced radar, infrared, acoustic and visual 
appearance. The then Director of DDR&E, Malcolm Currie, sent out 
a memo inviting DOD organizations to develop radical new ideas for 
such an aircraft. These ideas became known in DARPA, borrowing a 
term from anti-submarine warfare, as “stealth”, and DARPA began to 
pursue a research agenda around it.
In 1975, a Lockheed engineer, Denys Overholser, located a 
research paper by the Chief Scientist at the Russian Institute for Radio 
Engineering on “Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of 
Diffraction” and realized that from these concepts a computer program 
50  This section draws extensively on chapter 1 (on stealth) in Van Atta, et al. (2003). 
Transformation and Transition; and on Rich, B, and Janos, L. (1994). Skunk Works: A 
Personal Memoir of My Years of Lockheed. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 16–41. 
The author is indebted to the IDA studies cited for much of the analysis in the three 
subsections on defense technologies.
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could be developed for geometric shapes that would minimize the radar 
cross section of an aircraft. Lockheed created the program and brought 
it to DARPA.
DARPA staff understood the importance of the findings, and jumped 
on them. DARPA Director George Heilmeier, however, insisted that if 
the concepts were going to become an aircraft, the Air Force would have 
to take the lead in developing it because developing and buying aircraft 
was not a DARPA role. Currie supported the stealth approach and used 
contacts he had built up in the Air Force leadership to try to bring them on 
board. However, a major Institute for Defense Analyses study found that,
Air Force support was highly uncertain, as the Air Force saw limited 
value in a stealthy strike aircraft, given the severe operational limitations 
that [meant it] would be relatively slow and unmaneuverable, giving 
it limited air-to-air combat ability, and it would have to fly [only] at 
night—a far cry from the traditional Air Force strike fighter. There were 
also competing R&D priorities, most notably the Advanced Combat 
Fighter program (which eventually became the F-16).51
Currie was able to get the Air Force to go along only by securing extra 
funding for the project, so that stealth development would be in addition 
to existing Air Force R&D efforts, and, in particular, would not curtail 
the F-16 program.
William Perry, who succeeded Currie in leading DDR&E, continued 
to press the stealth program forward because it fit perfectly with 
his “offsets” strategy. Lockheed’s noted “Skunk Works” won the 
development contract for what became the F-117 strike fighter. Skunk 
Works used its famous skills in experimentation, flexible problem 
solving, strong engineering and collaboration to successfully push the 
F-117 from idea to break-through reality.52 Northrop, the other defense 
contractor working in the stealth field, embarked on a follow-on project 
that became the B-2 stealth bomber. To retain support from a still 
skeptical Air Force, Defense Secretary Harold Brown made development 
of stealth aircraft “technology limited” as opposed to “funding limited”. 
In other words, the funding for this secret program was open-ended 
and was to continue unless a technological barrier emerged.53 In Desert 
51  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, I–4.
52  Rich and Janos. (1994). Skunk Works, 16–41.
53  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, I–5–6.
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Storm, the F-117 enabled the U.S. to obtain air dominance at the outset of 
the conflict despite being up against the same type of Soviet air defense 
system that had created such difficulty for U.S.-built aircraft in Vietnam.
Because the services had limited interest in such a radical and different 
concept that potentially made many of their existing and upcoming 
aircraft platforms obsolete, stealth overcame the service legacy sector 
barriers listed above (from powerful vested interests, to cost structure, 
to institutional architecture to established knowledge/human resource 
structures) only because of DARPA’s highly innovative organizational 
and technical capabilities, which operated outside the established 
defense service hierarchies. DARPA, in turn, required support from the 
highest levels of DOD’s civilian leadership, including Secretary Brown 
and the heads of DDR&E, and from a separate funding stream. Thus, a 
series of change agents came to bear on the problem, led by DARPA but 
linked to the DOD senior leadership and to Lockheed, a major defense 
contractor with its own unique island/bridge innovation organization, 
its Skunk Works. The Air Force, however, did embrace the technology 
over time. Interestingly, initial attempts to introduce stealth technology 
into Navy ship-building—Lockheed’s Skunk Works developed the “Sea 
Shadow”—failed because of Navy opposition for reasons very similar 
to the Air Force’s concerns.54
Precision Strike
The mix of defense capabilities known as precision strike developed 
as part of DOD’s focus on the RMA, responding to the confrontation 
between Cold War forces in Europe. Faced with much larger Soviet 
forces, William Perry formulated precision-strike objectives as the 
capability to “see all high value targets on the battlefield at any time; 
make a direct hit on any target we can see; and destroy any target we 
can hit”.55 While armies before the RMA had relied on the massed force 
of as many individual weapons as possible and a few overwhelming 
nuclear weapons, precision-strike doctrine focused on the ability to both 
see and select critical high-value targets and to rapidly cripple them in 
order to break down the enemy’s operating capabilities, without major 
54  Rich and Janos. (1994). Skunk Works, 271–80.
55  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, IV-35.
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casualties on either side and without significant civilian casualties.56 
While the wars Clausewitz wrote about were those between mass armies 
inflicting mass casualties on a massive scale, the RMA used precision 
strike to scale this way back.
To achieve precision strike required “joint” efforts between services. 
Air Force and Navy weapons systems would have to work in intimate 
coordination with Army systems. This coordination is never easy 
between rival stovepipes, and weapons procurement itself remains 
service controlled. Again, DOD’s efforts began with DARPA working 
initially outside the service R&D systems. The “Assault Breaker” R&D 
program was envisioned to break up any Soviet charge through the 
Fulda Gap, and was led by a series of related DARPA technological 
development efforts over many years.57 Over time, the technologies 
contemplated in Assault Breaker were modified and evolved into 
DOD’s “1997 Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (S&T) 
Plan”.58 The precision-strike system came to include JSTARS, a large 
aircraft packed with powerful radars to “see” much of the battlefield 
and acquire and track ground targets. These were tied to Army 
Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) that could hit mobile targets well 
behind battle lines, as well as to a range of other precision guided 
missiles and aircraft-launched precision “submunitions” (smaller 
weapons carried in a missile warhead) and “smart bombs”—all linked 
to a “Battlefield Control Element” (BETA) to collect and integrate 
battlefield information.
In summary, the Joint Warfighting S&T Plan entailed a combination 
of technologies for surveillance, targeting and precision-guided 
munitions, all resting on earlier DARPA-led advances in information 
technology. Again, there was service resistance at a number of stages in 
the implementation process. Leadership from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense was required to build and mount the operating systems, and 
was crucial in pressing for more service “jointness”. The retrospective 
Institute for Defense Analyses study found:
56  Department of Defense. (1996). Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan. 
Washington, DC: Department of Defense (chapter 4, Part B, Precision Force, 1. 
Definition), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a310991.pdf
57  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, VI.
58  Department of Defense. (1997). Joint Warfighting (chapter 4, Part B).
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Perhaps even more important than the testing and developing of specific 
technologies [led by DARPA] was the conceptual breakthrough in getting 
the Services to work together across the barriers of roles and missions 
to attack the Warsaw Pact tank threat. This cooperative approach was 
resisted by… the Services, but facilitated by parts of the Army because 
they understood that the Service needed to work more closely with the 
Air Force to meet the European threat… The Services had other priorities. 
The Army continued developing and deploying tanks and helicopters 
and many in the Service did not want to invest in the new missile 
technology. So too the Air Force. The larger Service had more important 
acquisitions: the F-15 and F-16, for example. When competing with 
Service programs, even good new ideas will not get through the system 
without a powerful advocate—and for a Joint concept as sweeping as 
Assault Breaker the advocate had best be the Secretary of Defense.59
The combination of an innovative entity, DARPA, and pressure from the 
Secretary’s Office constituted the change agents required to get around 
the legacy sector problems—from vested interests in the services, to cost 
structure problems through service commitments, to other programs to 
problems in creating collective action between services—that afflict the 
defense establishment.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
The idea for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) began, and went through 
limited development stages in both World Wars, as attack devices, before 
the advent of guided missiles. While there were early Cold War efforts 
by the Navy and Air Force, with some remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) 
used in Vietnam, the Air Force shut down its UAV efforts in 1976 and 
shifted focus to cruise missiles. Work on a Navy anti-submarine rotor 
aircraft (“Dash/Snoopy”) was undertaken in the late 1960s and used on 
ships and by Marines in Vietnam, but subsequently the program was 
terminated.60 Despite this early history, today’s UAVs are pervasive 
on the U.S. battlefield, including for counter-terrorist operations. They 
undertake a wide range of roles: reconnaissance (using cameras, sensors 
and radar), electronic intelligence gathering, long term surveillance, 
target designation, communications relays, and now, carrying on-board 
59  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, IV.
60  The developments discussed in this paragraph are detailed in Van Atta, et al. (2003). 
Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, VI–1–11.
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weapons, attack on specific targets. The U.S. military is approaching the 
point where it will have more UAVs than manned aircraft.
Starting in the mid-1970s, DARPA played a key role in developing 
the enabling technologies that lay behind later UAV success. It funded 
R&D in sensors, radar, signal location systems, controls, lightweight 
and low-visibility airframe structures, long endurance propulsion, and 
new operating concepts. In the 1980s, working with a highly innovative 
designer, Abraham Karem, and his small company, DARPA also funded 
a critical UAV technology development program that built and tested 
the Amber UAV. After initial flight demonstrations, Navy Secretary 
John Lehman, a UAV advocate, provided support for the program.
However, Amber was terminated in 1990, rejected by the services as 
not meeting their durability requirements. Nonetheless, the prototypes 
for Amber pushed the state of the art, developing critical technologies 
that were fundamental to subsequent development. This was an example 
of DARPA pushing outside the box of its R&D role and undertaking 
product development traditionally left to the services. DARPA played 
a significant role in the development of other UAV prototypes during 
this period, and the Navy learned lessons from Israeli drones, which 
were adopted as the “Pioneer UAV” for spotting ship gunfire.61 
However, UAVs were not scaling up. Frustrated with service failures in 
developing UAV technologies, Congress intervened in 1988 and forced 
the consolidation of service UAV programs into a joint project office, 
which led to a third generation of UAV technology.62
Following the remarkable performance of RMA technologies 
in the 1991 Gulf War, the Defense Science Board, the leading DOD 
technical advisory body, highlighted military problems that could 
be resolved by improved UAV capabilities. And in the subsequent 
Clinton administration, the trio of defense and intelligence agency 
leaders, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Undersecretary of Defense 
John Deutch, and CIA Director James Woolsey, pushed together for a 
renewed UAV effort. In cooperation with DARPA, a new “Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration” (ACTD) process was created 
under Deputy Undersecretary for Advanced Technology (and later 
61  Polmar, N. (2013). “The Pioneering Pioneer”, Naval History 27/5: 14–15.
62  Developments discussed in paragraph detailed in Van Atta, et al. (2003). 
Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, VI–11–26.
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DARPA Director from 1995–1998) Larry Lynn, to streamline and 
accelerate defense technology development and management, but with 
early cooperation with service users. In effect, Lynn, Perry and Deutch 
created a new process outside of but involving the services to implement 
new defense technologies, using UAVs to test the approach.
The result was two deployed UAVs, Predator and Global Hawk, 
both of which proved highly successful. Predator proved its worth in 
Bosnia, then in Kosovo, in Iraq no-fly zones, and in Afghanistan, where 
it was also armed with Hellfire missiles, becoming an attack as well as a 
surveillance system. Global Hawk was developed by DARPA (using its 
unique “Other Transaction Authority” to waive traditional acquisition 
laws and requirements in order to speed development) and initially 
deployed in Afghanistan as a highly sophisticated reconnaissance tool.63
The Institute for Defense Analyses study reached several conclusions 
about the on-again-off-again UAV experience:
As occurred with [precision strike and stealth], successful demonstration 
of the technology for RPV/UAVs did not lead to early acceptance and 
deployment of the vehicles… There were often differences between the 
expectations of the DARPA [program manager] and those of the Services 
on performance (unprepared field verses prepared airstrip) and the 
level of development (proof of principle verses the need for extensive 
engineering) needed to transition a program. These differences had 
an impact on the ability of the system to successfully continue into a 
deployed system… The systems did not fit within the existing force 
structure and did not have strong service champions. Without better 
planning they could not survive the budget battles. The developments 
often did not fit with existing [Service] operations and doctrine.64
When UAV programs started, DARPA’s role was to transition the 
technology to the Services after the proof- of-concept stage, with DARPA 
doing the R&D and the services and industry doing the engineering 
and development. Then, with the Amber project, DARPA undertook 
to actually do the development, but the handoff to the services still 
proved difficult. After two decades of problems, the technology 
transition mechanism changed to the “Advanced Concept Technology 
Demonstration” (ACTD), where a new technical transition entity in 
63  Developments discussed in this paragraph detailed in Van Atta, et al. (2003). 
Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, VI–26–38.
64  Ibid., VI-39.
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the Secretary’s Office, using DARPA’s highly-flexible procurement 
authority and building in service participation, undertook a more 
extended process. In effect, a new organizational mechanism was created 
outside the existing system as a change agent that finally succeeded in 
getting around the legacy sector problems between the services and the 
repeated efforts at senior levels of DOD to push innovative technologies.
Change Agents
Innovation does not just happen. Even if the elements cited here for a 
strong innovation system are assembled, someone or some entity must 
serve as the catalyst for change; those change agents can be persons and/
or organizations. Change agents, like innovation itself, must operate at 
both the institutional and the personal, face-to-face level. As usual in 
human affairs, there is no substitute for leadership.
If the front end of the innovation system generally is a prerequisite 
to innovation in legacy sectors, then the concept of change agent, 
suggested in the above discussion of DOD’s technology advances, 
is a requirement as well. In this way, the innovation system needs 
strengthening, including through specific approaches cited here such 
as critical innovation institutions, island/ bridge organization, thinking 
communities, and linking innovators to operators. None of these steps 
alone will implement innovation, particularly in thorny legacy sectors, 
unless there are institutions and accompanying individuals prepared 
to act as change agents. DOD in the past has been able to initiate 
change through (1) competition between services (for example, through 
competing missile programs), (2) struggles between competing groups 
in a service (such as between “brown shoe” aviators and “black shoe” 
battleship sailors in the Navy), or (3) through directives from defense 
civilian leadership. (such as through the DARPA-led advances noted 
above). In each, change agents were critical.
To return to an example cited above, the Royal Air Force in the 1930s 
could be viewed as a legacy sector. Like its German counterpart, it was 
dominated by an emerging air power ethos led by its bomber force, 
which was not focused on generating defenses against bombers—a task 
it considered largely hopeless. It took a defense R&D organization, led 
by defense scientists under Tizard and others, to take on this assumption. 
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To bring on the transformative technology innovation of radar, they built 
a strong research group, made links to political authorities prepared to 
support the effort, and created a working testing process with fighter 
pilot operators. Allied with civilian and RAF leaders, as change agents 
they implemented war-changing technologies and practices.
DARPA led similar changes in UAV’s, precision strike and Stealth in 
similar ways. Nonetheless, here too, change agents were critical. William 
Perry, allied with DARPA in two different tours of duty at DOD, guided 
a series of major innovation efforts though the Department. Moreover, 
he helped initiate a change agent system, putting in place the structures 
and policies that enable the change agents to do their jobs. Other defense 
sector examples include Malcolm Currie at DR&E who supported GPS, 
Stealth and smart weapons in the 1970s, early DARPA Director Jack 
Ruina, who guided its early contributions, and J. C. R. Licklider, the 
first Information Processing Technologies Office Director at DARPA 
and the visionary of personal computing and the Internet. President 
Eisenhower might rate as change agent for putting DARPA in place, 
and Herbert York, the first DARPA chief scientist (and first Director of 
DR&E) for helping to envision its initial structure.
Without such change agents, it is hard to see how innovations, 
particularly in legacy sectors, can emerge out of the innovation pipeline.
Conclusion: Innovation in the Defense Legacy Sector
The stories of the three core breakthrough technologies behind the 
Revolution in Military Affairs illustrate that the defense sector has 
many of the attributes of a legacy sector. However, the important point 
is that DOD found a way to still put these revolutionary technologies 
into place and bring on significant innovation. Unlike most legacy 
sectors where breakthrough and disruptive innovations languish, DOD 
actually implemented them.
DOD turned out to have two major advantages in managing change 
in its change-resistant, entrenched legacy sector. First, it developed 
DARPA, a unique innovation entity aimed not only at radical 
technological advance but also at innovation as a system and trying to 
solve profound puzzles surrounding implementation.
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DARPA operates outside the pressures of the military legacy sector 
and was created and designed as a result of Sputnik to bring innovative 
change to a Defense Department affected by legacy problems. In effect, 
DARPA (and its allies) came to play the role that Hyman Rickover and 
his group played for atomic submarines and that Bernard Schriever and 
his group played for ballistic missiles.
It appears vital, then, to bring front-end innovation capabilities to 
influence legacy sectors. An important lesson from DARPA’s ability to 
bring innovation into a defense sector with deep legacy characteristics has 
been the importance of critical innovation institutions. These institutions 
should attempt to embody both “connected science and technology”—
linking scientific research to implementation stages—and “challenge” 
approaches—pursuing major mission technology challenges. As 
discussed, innovation requires not only a process of creating connected 
science and technology challenges at the institutional level, but it also 
must operate at the personal level.
The critical stage of innovation is face-to-face, not institutional, so, 
while institutions where talent and R&D come together are required, 
personal dynamics, usually embodied in “great groups” are a necessity. 
The DARPA “right-left” research model can be important in reaching 
the innovation stage, where program managers contemplate the 
technological breakthroughs they want to emerge from the right end 
of the innovation pipeline, then go back to the left side of the pipeline 
to look for proposals for the breakthrough research that will get them 
there. This process tends to lead to revolutionary breakthroughs that could 
be transformative of a technology sector. A technology “visioning” 
process at the outset of the effort appears to be a particular key. The 
approach results in seeking high-risk but high-reward projects.
As discussed, the island/bridge organizational approach for 
innovation institutions also appears to be important. The innovation 
team should be put on a protected island apart from bureaucratic 
influences that can ruin it, so that it can focus on the innovation process. 
The strength of the innovation process will also depend on building a 
solid thinking community as a source for ideas and support. Because 
innovation must span numerous steps—from research through initial 
production—the means for linking technologists to operators appear to be 
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critical. Finally, change agents will be required to move the innovation 
toward implementation.
Second, DARPA alone was not enough. Unlike most legacy sectors, 
DOD has an official, the Secretary of Defense, who must by law be a 
civilian, who can exercise authority to force change. If the Secretary sees 
the need for a technology shift, he or she can muster the power, despite 
all the legacy sector checks in the system, to direct it. DARPA has been 
successful when it ties its technological advance to a senior defense 
leader in the Office of the Secretary who is prepared to override legacy 
pressures and be a change agent. Of course, DOD faced an additional 
intense pressure for change—meeting national security needs—but 
these two characteristics, a strong front-end innovation linked to change 
agents, remain central.
There are important lessons here for other legacy sectors: a 
“connected” innovation agency, using the extended pipeline model 
which is outside the legacy system, and then linked to a source of 
power that can direct change—a change agent—has proved to be a vital 
combination in the defense sector’s ability to innovate. The longstanding 
perspective on DARPA has been that its successes have been in the 
“frontier” sector; it is rightly acclaimed for its foundational role in the 
IT revolution. But there is a less understood perspective on DARPA that 
constitutes the other side of the coin: it has brought disruptive, radical 
innovation into a legacy sector.
In this way, DARPA does not only belong in the “extended pipeline” 
model; it also has developed features that have enabled it to innovate in 
the legacy defense sector. This means that it also represents key features 
of what we term the “innovation organization” model. Legacy sectors 
use political, technological, economic and social system barriers in their 
defense against disruptive innovation. The innovation organization 
model recognizes that there are many institutions and mechanisms 
operating within an innovation system, particularly in legacy sectors; 
this mandates a richer evaluation of innovation and of potential policies 
to shift the overall system. DARPA and its senior Department allies have 
found ways, delineated above, to impose this richer mix of policies. 
This mix of strong front-end innovation capability and change agents 
provides basic lessons for innovation in other legacy sectors that go far 
beyond defense to other key parts of the economy.
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13. ARPA-E and DARPA:  
Applying the DARPA Model  
to Energy Innovation1
William B. Bonvillian and Richard Van Atta
Overview
The United States faces powerful economic challenges in the interlinked 
and contradictory nexus of the economy, energy, and environmental 
issues. In this arena, transformative innovation is understood to be a 
key public policy response.2 One element of the response has been the 
creation of an energy-DARPA (ARPA-E).
DARPA was formed to address the problem of transformative 
innovation. Instigated in 1958 by the Sputnik shock, the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (subsequently renamed the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency) was created with an explicit mission: to 
ensure that the U.S. never again faced a national security “technological 
surprise”, like Sputnik, due to failure to pay adequate attention to and 
1  This paper originally appeared in 2011 in the Journal of Technology Transfer 36, at 
469–513.
2  Bonvillian, W. B., and Weiss, C. (2009). “Taking Covered Wagons East, A New 
Innovation Theory for Energy and Other Established Sectors”, Innovations 4/4: 289–
94, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/userimages/ContentEditor/1259694503297/
Bonvillianinov.pdf
© W. B. Bonvillian and R. Van Atta, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.13
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stay focused on break-through technological capabilities.3 DARPA itself 
can be categorized as a disruptive innovation, creating an approach 
to fostering and implementing radically new technology concepts 
recognized as transformational.4
Innovation is recognized as the linchpin for U.S. economic growth,5 
transforming the economy based on new products that provide new 
economic and social functionality. DARPA was at the center of that 
innovation process in the second half of the twentieth century, playing 
a keystone role in the computing and internet innovation waves.6 
However, the process of innovation aimed at such transformation is 
recognized as highly risky and extremely difficult to implement. In 
a complex innovation system laced with market failures between the 
stages of fundamental research and technology transition, governmental 
support increasingly has been viewed as a necessary element. This risk 
and difficulty are captured in the term “disruptive innovation”7—where 
the potential novel capabilities offered by new innovations are impeded 
3  Van Atta, R. (2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation and Discovery”, in DARPA, 50 Years 
of Bridging the Gap, ed. C. Oldham, A. E. Lopez, R. Carpenter, I. Kalhikina, and 
M. J. Tully. Arlington, VA: DARPA. 20–29, https://issuu.com/faircountmedia/docs/
darpa50 (Chapter 2 in this volume); Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). “The Connected 
Science Model for Innovation—The DARPA Model”, in 21st Century Innovation 
Systems for the U.S. and Japan, ed. S. Nagaoka, M. Kondo, K. Flamm, and C. Wessner. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press. 206–37, https://doi.org/10.17226/12194, 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=206 (Chapter 4 in this 
volume).
4  Van Atta, R., Lippitz, M., et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition, DARPA’s Role 
in Fostering a Revolution in Military Affairs. Volume 1. Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analyses, https://doi.org/10.21236/ada422835, https://fas.org/irp/agency/
dod/idarma.pdf
5  See, for example, Solow, R. M. (2000). Growth Theory, An Exposition. 2nd ed. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/
laureates/1987/solow-lecture.html; Romer, P. (1990). “Endogenous Technological 
Change”, Journal of Political Economy 98: 72–102, https://doi.org/10.1086/261725; and 
Jorgenson, D. (2001). “U.S. Economic Growth in the Information Age”, Issues in 
Science and Technology 18/2, http://www.issues.org/18.1/jorgenson.html
6  Ruttan, V. W. (2006). Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and 
Technology Development. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
7  The term was developed by Christiansen, and reflects Schumpeter’s economic 
concept of capitalism (Christiansen, C. (1997). The Innovator’s Dilemma: When 
New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, xviii–xxiv). See, also, Schumpeter, on the concept of “creative destruction” 
in capitalism in which new technologies and processes create or alter firms and 
markets (Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York, NY: 
Harper & Row).
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not only because they are new and different, raising unknowns and 
risks, but because they often entail the potential of disrupting existing 
markets, products, practices and approaches. They bring with them two 
“shocks”: (1) they are sufficiently different that the existing system of 
investment and development is risk averse to them; and (2) in many cases 
they actually are seen as threats to vested products and capabilities, and 
thus face further difficulty in achieving needed investment and support.8 
The threat and risk of such innovations are significantly expanded when 
they attempt to enter in complex, established “legacy” sectors such as 
energy.9 Overcoming these double impediments requires strategically-
focused technology development and management approaches.
ARPA-E, the Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy, was 
established in 2007 as part of the America COMPETES Act10 and initially 
funded under the 2009 economic stimulus, the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act.11 ARPA-E was created to foster disruptive innovation 
in the complex, established “legacy” sector of energy, exactly the 
model described above. Although threatened by the partisan budget 
environment, ARPA-E obtained funding for FY 2011 from Congress at 
close to the same level it was funded in the two previous fiscal years.12 
It has already emerged as a dramatically new model in the energy 
innovation space, worthy of in-depth examination.
This paper looks first into DARPA as a model, asking a series of 
questions: What about DARPA has enabled its success? Is DARPA’s 
success transferable to other arenas? In particular, this paper reviews less 
well-known features of the DARPA model not widely commented on to 
8  Van Atta, R., Bovey, R., et al. (2003). Science and Technology in Development 
Organizations. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
9  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2009) “Taking Covered Wagons East”; Weiss, C., and 
Bonvillian, W. B. (2011). “Complex, Established ‘Legacy’ Sectors: The Technology 
Revolutions that do Not Happen”, Innovations 6/2: 157–87.
10  ARPA-E was first proposed in National Academies of Sciences. (2007). 
Rising above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for a 
Brighter Economic Future. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
152–57, https://doi.org/10.17226/12537, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11463/
rising-above-the-gathering-storm-energizing-and-employing-america-for#toc 
11  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). (2009). P.L. No: 111–15 (signed 
by President 17 February 2009).
12  ARPA-E received $400 million in initial funding from the 2009 stimulus legislation 
(ARRA 2009) for FY’s 2009 and 2010; it did not therefore seek additional funding in 
FY2010, The Administration’s budget sought $550 million for ARPA-E in FY2011; 
Congress funded it at $180 million for FY 2011 (Continuing Resolution FY2011).
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date. Secondly, the paper looks at ARPA-E, raising similar questions: Is 
ARPA-E designed to effectively emulate the DARPA model? Are there 
significant differences in the energy arena that inhibit or prohibit the 
success of this model? Are there new elements in the ARPA-E approach 
modifying and adapting the DARPA approach to increase ARPA-E’s 
chance of success? Do some of the less well-known features of DARPA, 
as noted, provide lessons for ARPA-E?13
There is an additional question behind this inquiry. What 
about DARPA and ARPA-E could or should be emulated by other 
organizations seeking to foster and effect transformative technological 
change? Both agencies represent a different model for technology 
advance. While standard model R&D agencies focus on research not 
technology, rely on a peer review process for selecting awardees, and 
do not use what could be called a technology visioning step in their 
process, DARPA, and now ARPA-E, reverse all these rules. They focus 
early in their processes on developing a vision of new technologies, 
then on developing a research program to achieve that vision, and 
on using empowered program managers, not a disparate peer 
review process, for award selections. DARPA’s remarkable string of 
technology success has demonstrated the power of its model, and early 
successes at ARPA-E suggests it is dynamic and replicable. Features of 
this model may be of interest to other parts of the US R&D system. 
For example, the Department of Education and the National Science 
Foundation are considering an ARPA-Ed for education research, NIH 
is considering a translational research program, and the Department 
of Homeland Security and the intelligence agencies are working on 
implementing existing authority to implement their own DARPA 
clones. Thus, a careful review of the DARPA and emerging ARPA-E 
13  Other attempts have been made in recent years in the federal government to create 
DARPA “clones”, particularly HS-ARPA for the Department of Homeland Security, 
I-ARPA for the intelligence community and BARDA within the Department of 
Health and Human Services for biothreats and health emergencies. While there 
are questions whether these attempts successfully emulated DARPA, this paper 
does not specifically explore these organizations. HS-ARPA was never fully 
implemented; a number of the reasons, and implications for ARPA-E, are discussed 
in Bonvillian, W. B. (2007). “Will the Search for New Energy Technologies Require 
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rulesets may offer lessons not only to each other, but to innovation 
ecosystems more broadly.
The paper then looks at a challenge faced by both DARPA and 
ARPA-E: technology implementation. Both agencies move technologies 
down the innovation pipeline to the prototype or small-scale 
demonstration stage. Neither agency has direct authority to enable 
commercialization of its potentially breakthrough technologies. DARPA 
often relies on procurement programs by military services to form initial 
markets; ARPA-E has no counterpart to the services within DOE. How 
could this implementation hurdle be overcome? The paper concludes 
by reviewing this question, including a model at DOD for achieving 
this. Throughout the paper, drawing from detailed evaluations of 
both agencies, we discuss and make recommendations on the role of 
government in fostering transformative technology energy and national 
security, including in the current and future world of globalized 
businesses, economies and technologies.
I. The DARPA Model
Well-Known Elements in the DARPA Culture
DARPA Deputy Director Ken Gabriel has suggested that several 
features central to DARPA are best explained by its name.14 DARPA, 
(1) is not a broad research organization or lab but a “projects” agency 
pushing particular technology projects; (2) is primarily a “defense” 
agency that should take full advantage of its presence in DOD to move 
its technologies, and (3) works primarily on the “advanced” stage of 
breakthrough innovation not on incremental or engineering efforts that 
other parts of DOD focus on. This gives us a broad-brush portrait, but 
how does it actually operate?
Michael Piore has suggested that DARPA program managers 
exemplify a form of what are known in organizational literature as 
“street-level bureaucracies”.15 Like cops on a beat or school teachers, 
14  Discussion by Kaigham Gabriel, DARPA Deputy Director, at forum on Leveraging 
DOD’s Energy Innovation Capacity, at the Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, 
DC, 25 May 2011.
15  Piore, M. (2008). Learning on the Fly: Reviving Active Governmental Policy in an 
Economic Crisis. Presentation at How Will a New Administration and Congress 
Support Innovation in an Economic Crisis? Sponsored by the Economic Policy 
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or welfare caseworkers, the identity of line officers in bureaucracies, 
even one as creative and flat as DARPA, is best understood by the roles 
they play and the informal rules adopted by their colleagues in their 
professional communities. Piore writes,
… in street-level bureaucracies, a series of tacit rules emerge which the 
agents apply in making their decisions. These rules grow out of the 
culture of the organization as it is shaped by the backgrounds… from 
which the agents are drawn, by the training which they undergo within 
the organization itself, by the discussion and debate which shapes the 
interpretative community in which they operate, and ultimately by the 
way in which their decisions are reviewed by their colleagues informally 
and their superiors formally.16
DARPA is widely understood to embody a series of unique tacit rules 
implemented at the “street level” by its program managers, that reflect 
the organizing principles of its culture, and these are not typical of 
similar such rules at other R&D agencies. The DARPA ruleset includes:17
• a flat, non- hierarchical organization, with empowered program 
managers;
• a challenge-based “right-left” research model;
• an emphasis on selecting highly talented, entrepreneurial 
program managers (PMs) who serve for limited (three- to five-
year) duration;
• research that is performed entirely by outside performers, 
with no internal research laboratory;
• projects which focus on a “high-risk/high-payoff” motif, 
selected and evaluated on what impact they could make on 
achieving a demanding capability or challenge;
• and initial short-term funding for seed efforts that scale to 
significant funding for promising concepts, but with clear 
willingness to terminate non-performing projects.
Institute, ITIF, Breakthrough Institute, University of Calif., Washington Center and 
Ford Foundation, Washington, DC, 1 December, https://www.longviewinstitute.
org/blockvideo/view/index.html. See generally, Chapter 3 in this volume. 
16  Ibid.
17  See, for greater detail on these features, Van Atta. (2008). “Fifty Years of Innovation 
and Discovery”; and Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model for 
Innovation”.
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These rules are widely understood and have been previously explored 
in various studies. However, we believe these are not the only rules that 
need to be understood about DARPA and its culture.
Other Important Elements in the DARPA Model
The model goes beyond the above well-understood features—
historically it has embodied a number of other deep features that 
should be accounted for. Within the overall context of its organizing 
framework DARPA’s structure and focus has ebbed and flowed. In fact, 
its ability to flexibly adapt to changing circumstances is one aspect of 
its success: it has generally avoided becoming entrenched in particular 
technology pursuits, problem focus areas or organizational approaches 
and structures. Thus, as a living, institutional organism there have been 
aspects of its management and implementation that have not necessarily 
been enduring attributes for all of DARPA’s history, but are notable as 
contributing to its success. A discussion of these additional DARPA 
features follows below.
Multigenerational Technology Thrusts—DARPA does more than 
undertake individual projects. It has, in many instances, worked over 
an extended period to create enduring technology “motifs”—ongoing 
thrusts that have changed the technology landscape. Some of the notable 
examples of this are DARPA’s work in information technology (IT), 
stealth, and standoff precision strike. Some of these foci are what might 
be termed broad technology stewardship over a family of emergent 
technologies—including new sensing systems, such as infrared sensing, 
or new electronics devices.18 In these thrust areas DARPA has been able 
to undertake multigenerational technology thrusts and advances over 
extended periods to foster multiple generations of technology.
The DARPA IT thrust area is the most notable in the context of ARPA-
E’s model. The IT thrust began with the now well-known vision of the 
first director of the Information Processing Technology Office (originally 
prosaically labeled the Information Processing Techniques Office), J. 
C. R. Licklider.19 It has endured over decades as “the ambitious vision 
18  Van Atta, R., Deitchman, S., and Reed, S. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments. 
Volume III. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, III, IV-1-IV-5.
19  Waldrop provides a detailed illumination of Licklider’s role in fostering the 
revolution in information technology which has been duly recognized as one of 
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of Licklider for revolutionizing information processing and applying 
it to problems of ‘human cognition’ [that is now] being progressively 
realized”.20 Importantly, the information technology thrust was 
implemented largely outside of the Department of Defense through 
universities and small startup firms that emerged from this research. 
As will be discussed below, these startup enterprises were nurtured by 
the DARPA program through research grants and importantly through 
early purchase of their products as inputs into other DARPA and DOD 
programs.
The long-term support of a thrust area is neither a given nor an 
endowment at DARPA. The thrusts are defined generally as challenges 
appropriate to potentially needed “breakthrough” capabilities. In some 
cases, as with high-energy particle beams, a thrust might be pursued for 
more than a decade, and then be terminated due to its lack of progress 
or impracticality. However, in the case of particle-beam weapons, the 
program reemerged during the 1980s in conjunction with the Strategic 
Defense Initiative.21 The basis of the thrust lay in its promise as a possibly 
revolutionary technology with the prospect of a transformational 
impact and evidence of its progress. The information technology thrust 
clearly demonstrated both this impact and this progress. The particle 
beam thrust, on the other hand, was terminated when it was unable 
to overcome increasing issues of technical complexity relative to 
performance, especially in conjunction with mounting costs.
It should be noted that persistence in an area is not universal 
in DARPA’s ethos or history. DARPA was founded, as noted, as a 
projects agency—not a technology thrust agency. However, implicit 
in its organizational structure of program offices is (at least at specific 
times) a set of basic technical-implementation themes. The specificity 
and focus of these themes have changed substantially over DARPA’s 
history. Moreover, there have been program offices with very dispersed 
and unrelated projects that sometimes raise the issue whether there is 
DARPA’s most remarkable and compelling accomplishments (Waldrop, M. M. 
(2001). The Dream Machine: J. C. R. Licklider and the Revolution that Made Computing 
Personal. New York, NY: Viking Press).
20  Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume 
III, IV-7.
21  Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume 
III, IV-9-IV-10.
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adequate coherence or focus. In this way, it must be understood that 
only some of DARPA’s research, and only some of the time, can be 
identified as an ongoing thrust. Other parts of the agency even at the 
same time may be pursuing a very eclectic set of individual projects 
that at least at that time appear to be disconnected. DARPA, then, 
remains a predominantly project-oriented office, except when it needs 
to periodically launch a new technology thrust.
From a lessons-learned perspective, in relationship to ARPA-E, it is 
worth noting that DARPA itself began with a set of explicit, but very 
high-level programmatic themes, termed “Presidentials”: issues of 
space, missile defense, and nuclear test detection that met Presidential 
priorities. Although the first—“space”—was quickly transferred to the 
newly created National Aeronautics and Space Administration—NASA, 
the others galvanized a set of research programs aimed at a broad 
objective.22 Given their high-level imprimatur, these programs were 
sustained over many years, as they addressed key, daunting challenges. 
Notably, it took senior DOD management (John Foster, Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering) to terminate DARPA’s early missile 
defense work and get it transitioned to the Army. The result was that 
under his mandate the DEFENDER program for ballistic missile defense 
was transferred to the Army for implementation—including the transfer 
of staff from the DARPA program to the Army. This represented an 
early attempt to confirm DARPA’s role as a technology development 
organization, not as a technology implementer.23
A crucial management issue at DARPA, therefore, is how to keep such 
thrusts, themes, or foci from becoming entrenched resource allocations 
that weigh down the organization at the expense of innovation. DARPA 
has not been immune from this phenomenon. Iteratively, it has taken 
22  Licklider’s IPTO Office initiatives in computing gathered momentum when 
Kennedy and McNamara concluded they had a major “command and control” 
problem from their experience in the Cuban missile crisis; expanding Licklider’s 
program was the DARPA response (Waldrop. (2001). The Dream Machine, 200–03). 
23  For DEFENDER transition to the Army, see Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). 
DARPA Technical Accomplishments Volume II, I-17, I-26. Interesting as a contrast, 
DARPA’s initial assignment for detecting Soviet nuclear tests, the VELA program, 
remained within DARPA for many years, and the operation of the Large Aperture 
Seismic Arrays remained under DARPA for decades, as no appropriate agency 
could be identified to take on the responsibility (Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. 
(1990). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume I, XIII-14.
370 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
high-level intervention from the agency director and above DARPA to 
overcome this tendency—and this at times has caused rancor. A more 
recent instance of this management issue was the controversy over 
DARPA’s substantial reduction in funding for university computer science 
programs under Director Anthony Tether in the 2003–2008 timeframe. 
While leaders in the computer science programs at universities protested 
this as undermining DARPA’s noted successes in this field and cutting 
DARPA off from access to ensuing IT talent generations, Tether argued 
that the research in question was not high enough on the high-risk/high-
payoff metric to be appropriate for DARPA.24 This is evidence of the strong 
tensions that can emerge between those who have received funding for 
a successful thrust over the years and the agency’s management, which 
has to make choices on what to fund. To keep such overarching thrusts 
dynamic, as opposed to institutionalized, is a major ongoing management 
challenge for ARPA-E leadership. The ability of researchers and their 
supporters within universities, industry research labs and in Congress to 
press these interests should not be underestimated.
Complementary Strategic Technologies—DARPA has repeatedly 
launched related technologies that complement each other, and which 
help build support for the commercialization or implementation of 
each. This concept of complementary technologies also ties to the notion 
of program thrusts.
One way of thinking about this category is that DARPA is not in the 
“thing” business; rather, it is in the problem-solving business. While a 
specific innovation may have a major impact, it is unlikely that one such 
project by itself will adequately address a major challenge or problem. 
While DARPA may support an individual invention, it usually does 
so because that invention may be an element of an overall solution to 
a challenge. From an historical perspective, DARPA has almost never 
started out with a coherent program thrust (the exception being its 
inaugural Presidential issues, which were really more articulated 
overarching challenges than technical thrusts). The usual history is 
that a DARPA Program Office will pursue several disparate concepts 
initially and then, as the concepts shake out and begin to show promise, 
those that emerge will begin to cohere, and opportunities to integrate 
and link their developments will be identified. Also, as a program 
24  Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model”, 225–33.
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becomes better defined it becomes clearer what is missing in the ability 
to bring it into fruition, and thus, more targeted technology programs 
can be formed to seek alternatives to these barriers. This approach was 
certainly evident in DARPA’s information technology programs as well 
as its microelectronics research. The key, then, to such developments 
is that they do not start out explicitly as coherent, multi-stage inter-
linked development programs. Rather, they become this as merited and 
determined by the progress of the unfolding research.
One example of this inter-linking or complementarity is DARPA’s 
funding of the development of computer workstations for integrated 
circuit design. DARPA program managers realized that the 
complexity of the designs that they were seeking in computer chips 
was outstripping the CAD tools that then existed and they therefore 
funded the development of advanced inter-netted design capabilities 
at various universities. Two results of this project were the Sun 
Microsystems and the Silicon Graphics workstations, both of which 
were developed out of Stanford University. As these capabilities 
became demonstrated, DARPA then urged their commercialization, 
but also supported their researchers doing novel chip design to 
acquire these systems. Notably, the resulting more advanced chips 
became available to developers of more powerful workstations, 
internet servers and routers and PCs, thus fostering a virtuous cycle of 
technology development and adoption.25
The management lesson here is that such complementarity is not 
predetermined nor necessarily obvious at the outset. However, if 
the research is defined too narrowly and without some overarching 
integrated perspective (such as a thrust) it is less likely that, as the 
projects emerge, with some succeeding and others not, that the linkages 
and complementarities amongst them will be identified. To reiterate, 
the purpose of the research efforts is not “things” per se, but to solve 
overarching and daunting challenges or problems.26 The evolving efforts 
to do that then help define the synergies and linkages as the projects 
evolve, with resulting complementary technologies.
25  See Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, 
Volume II (chapter 13), for discussion of this approach, especially Annex B to this 
chapter on the SUN Workstation.
26  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, S-12-S-13.
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Confluence with an Advocate Community—DARPA has spawned 
new economic sectors, enabling new firms that have garnered venture 
capital (VC) support. Accordingly, DARPA has been able to make its 
advances reinforce each other—it has been able to play an intermediary 
role with industry in part by building an advocate community across 
sectoral lines. How has it accomplished this?
Since DARPA itself does not implement the results of the research 
it sponsors, its main path to effecting implementation is by fostering 
and supporting the community of what we can term “change-state 
advocates” as a convener and instigator. In many fields initiated by 
DARPA research, the initial extant research capabilities are disparate 
and dispersed. Since the field is new, it is not well supported within 
the university science community and since it only has, at best, nascent 
technology to demonstrate, there is little in the way of investor or 
industry support. Thus, a key element of DARPA’s success in such areas 
as information technology, sensor systems, advanced materials, and 
directed energy systems is building the community of change agents—a 
broad community fostered over time from its program managers, from 
“graduates” of the DARPA program who go on to roles in academia and 
industry, and from contractors in universities and industry trained in 
the DARPA model and technology approaches. Importantly, this creates 
a close-knit network of individuals who know and trust each other, 
breaking down information/collaboration barriers. This community 
confluence, in turn, creates a connection with the private sector and its 
ability to spur implementation.
A former DARPA office director explains one way this community 
builds itself:
Good DARPA PMs create the conditions for their individual contractors 
to cohere into a technical community. The most visible way is through 
regular (usually annual) program reviews at which all contractors 
present their work and where the really good conversations take place 
in the hallways as participants start seeing how they can connect and 
further their work. This isn’t forced by the PM but s/he plays a vital role 
in nurturing the process. I got to participate in this in semiconductor 
process technology and a couple of other areas, but there are dozens of 
examples of technology communities that started this way. I see ARPA-E 
doing the same.27
27  Prabhakar, A. (2011). Personal Communication, 27 May.
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A corollary to this community development, then, is that it fosters 
DARPA’s role as an intermediary between companies to get them to 
consider working together in value-add ways against their own near-
term individual interests. Companies developing new ideas generally 
value their intellectual property and proprietary position over the value 
of collaboration. The Federal government R&D agencies, and DARPA 
in particular, however, tend to have a more detached “50,000 foot” view 
of the innovation landscape and despite industry’s tendencies, DARPA 
uses this community confluence to incentivize high value collaborations 
without violating the confidentiality of what they learn from industry 
behind closed doors.
Connected to Larger Innovation Elements—Going beyond the 
confluence with its support community, DARPA has been an actor 
within larger innovation efforts, where it is often instrumental, but 
seldom a sole actor. This is important to DARPA’s effectiveness because 
it does not have its own research facilities and its program managers 
do not perform their own research. Thus, DARPA PMs’ most important 
function is to identify and support those who have the potentially 
disruptive, change-state ideas and will ably perform the research. Thus, 
the PM is an opportunity creator and idea harvester within an emerging 
technology field. From this concept-idea scouting perspective DARPA 
has spawned groups of researchers, and from that, new firms that act to 
help effectuate the program’s overall vision.
The information technology thrust initiated by J. C. R. Licklider is the 
most notable example of DARPA creating a dynamic iterative innovation 
eco-system, based on university programs and start up enterprises. The 
major initial research centers for this evolving and expanding nexus 
of technologies included MIT (with Project MAC), Carnegie-Mellon, 
Stanford, Berkeley, UCLA, USC (with ISI), and CalTech. However, 
early-on entrepreneurial private firms, such as Bolt, Beranek and 
Newman (BB&N), DARPA’s internet contractor, also played key roles.28
In the IT sector, DARPA followed a conscious “dual-use” approach, 
recognizing that IT (unlike, say, stealth) would be relevant to civilian as 
well as military sectors, and that by spinning technologies into civilian 
sectors which could focus more capital than defense procurement 
28  Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1990). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume I 
(chapter 20).
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on development and applications, military IT needs could leverage 
off civilian development and the resulting wealth of applications. Its 
connections to larger innovation elements enabled DARPA and DOD 
many more fronts of technology advance than defense development 
alone could have evolved. Since U.S. Cold War success arguably derived 
from its IT advantage and the “Revolution in Military Affairs” it enabled, 
“dual-use” was a profoundly advantageous leveraging success.
Thus, the emerging technical opportunities from the DARPA 
IT programs had synergistic effects with the high-tech investment 
communities in IT springing up principally in the San Francisco and 
Boston areas around Stanford, Berkeley and MIT. While initially early 
DARPA director Robert Sproull felt that computer developments should 
be left to the dominant firm in the market, IBM, Licklider convinced 
him that IBM was mainly interested in large-scale batch processing 
applications and not interested in the technology for the new concepts 
of time-sharing and individualized computing that Licklider was 
championing.29 Thus, DARPA fostered research at these key universities, 
initially at MIT, and this helped such firms as Digital Equipment (DEC) 
expand footholds in a domain that was dominated by IBM’s presence. 
From DARPA-funded IT research starting in the 1960s can be traced an 
expanding number of firms and commercial applications from DEC to 
TELENET (the original internet ISP), Xerox’s Ethernet, Apple’s desktop 
computing (following leads from Xerox PARC), CISCO Systems (internet 
protocol routers), Sun Microsystems, Silicon Graphics, MIPS, Thinking 
Machines, Mentor Graphics, Vitesse Semiconductor, and TriQuint 
Semiconductor.30 From these firms second and third order spin-offs and 
derivative firms can be identified, such as Juniper systems, UUNET, and 
eventually even Google and Facebook, that built their businesses on 
the underlying technologies and capabilities, as well as the investment 
structure of the earlier firms (for example, Anders Bechtolsheim of Sun 
Microsystems was one of the ground floor investors in Google).
29  Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1990). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume I 
(chapter 29).
30  See, for example, Fong, G. R. (2001). “ARPA Does Windows; the Defense 
Underpinning of the PC Revolution”, Business and Politics 3/3: 213–37, https://
doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1025 (Chapter 6 in this volume); National Research 
Council. (1999). Funding a Revolution, Government Support for Computing Research. 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press, https://doi.org/10.17226/6323
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Moreover, DARPA programs, such as the VLSI program in advanced 
microelectronics, had impact by providing underlying technologies that 
not only spurred new companies, but also raised the competency and 
capabilities across the entire industry. The support of the VLSI design, 
production, and higher level computer architecture and design was 
both infrastructural—such as the MOSIS program and the support of 
VLSI design courses at universities—and technological, supporting new 
integrated circuit design concepts of Carver Mead and Lynn Conway, 
that had cross industry impact on major incumbent firms, such as Intel, 
as well as startup firms, such as MIPS.31 
The impact of DARPA pressing innovation onto existing firms, while 
difficult to assess, is exemplified by the following comment by a noted 
venture capitalist:
If DARPA had not been available, university researchers would have 
had to use ‘free’ equipment from companies like Digital and IBM to do 
their research. DARPA funding of research was essential in providing an 
ability to make independent choices. (Vinod Khosla, 1991).32
In addition to connecting with companies, venture capital firms (VCs) 
played a crucial role in the commercialization of DARPA’s information 
technologies. Many of the most prominent California VCs33 literally 
grew up with DARPA, with DARPA-based technologies playing a 
key role in their success and creating deep synergy between these 
two innovation elements. There are numerous very specific examples, 
including Vinod Khosla and Sun Microsystems, FED Corp in displays 
and Silicon Graphics. VCs also followed DARPA programs as a basis 
for identifying the “next big thing;” because of the dynamism of the 
research award process, DARPA awards tended to give their small and 
startup firms a “halo effect”, effectively marking them for follow-up 
support by VCs. VCs and DARPA became symbiotic in the IT sector 
and more broadly, operating as mutual enablers.
31  Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume II 
(chapter 28).
32  Interview with Vinod Khosla (Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). DARPA 
Technical Accomplishments, Volume II, 17-B-11).
33  See Gupta, U., ed. (2000). Done Deals, Venture Capitalists Tell Their Stories. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1–11, for a discussion of the technology 
innovation orientation of west coast VCs.
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However, this connection process with industry has not always 
worked; DARPA has had difficulty in staging its technologies for 
entry into industries at times. For example, DARPA’s “High Definition 
Display” program focused on creating capabilities in the emerging Flat 
Panel Display technology was not able to successfully intercept Japan’s 
lead in commercializing this technology. Other examples of unsuccessful 
endeavors include DARPA’s investments in the Thinking Machine 
development of the Connection Machine parallel processing computer 
and efforts to commercialize digital gallium arsenide computer chips. 
These less successful endeavors point to the facts that:
1) DARPA is a proof-of-concept technology agency, focused on 
high-risk disruptive capabilities—success in such efforts is not 
guaranteed;
2) There are crucial factors beyond technology development and 
demonstration that impinge on success.
However, this downward and outward linking into the research 
community and commercial industry is only one aspect of DARPA’s 
connectivity to larger innovation elements. DARPA, as an agency of 
the Department of Defense, is part of a broader innovation structure 
within and for DOD. Crucial here is that DARPA is an independent 
organization under the Secretary of Defense and is explicitly separate 
from the military service acquisition system. While the Secretary of 
Defense and the underlying Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
bureaucracy rarely directly involve themselves in DARPA’s individual 
research programs, OSD leadership elements at various times have 
played a strong role in identifying the mission challenges upon which 
they want DARPA to focus (see further discussion below on “Ties to 
Leadership”). Whether the challenge is “get us into space”, “offset the 
Soviet advantage in numbers and mass”, or “overcome terrorist abilities 
to strike within the US”, OSD leadership has periodically turned to 
DARPA with broad but explicit mission charters unique from those of 
the existing military research structure. In addition, and relevant here, 
DARPA, working with OSD, has been able to tie its advances to the 
larger innovation elements in DOD, often implementing its technologies 
through service procurement programs.
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To summarize, DARPA has been an actor and creator within larger 
innovation systems that include emerging industry sectors, the venture 
support that backs them, and entities within DOD itself.
Takes on Incumbents—DARPA at times has invaded the territory 
occupied by powerful companies or bureaucracies. As discussed 
above, it drove the desktop personal computing and the Internet model 
against the IBM mainframe model. On the military side of the ledger, 
cooperating with others in DOD, it drove stealth, unmanned systems, 
precision strike and night vision capabilities, despite the lack of interest 
and even express objections of the military services. At times, this has 
taken special mechanisms beyond or outside of (but in coordination 
with) DARPA to achieve.
For example, the Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstrator 
(ACTD) program was created in 1993 by OSD Deputy Undersecretary 
for Advanced Technology Larry Lynn (later DARPA Director from 1995–
1998) to move unmanned high altitude, long endurance unmanned air 
vehicles (UAVs) into initial use. This was used to get the Predator and 
the later Global Hawk systems into the hands of combat units when 
the military services would not further their development after DARPA 
completed its proof-of-concept developments.
Thus, DARPA, at critical technology junctures, has not been afraid 
to push-back against powerful incumbents, both leading industry firms 
and the military, to press disruptive technologies forward.
First Adopter/Initial Market Creation Role—in addition to ties to 
demonstration capabilities, DARPA also has undertaken a technology 
insertion or adoption role. In coordination with other parts of DOD, 
DARPA has been able to create initial or first markets for its new 
technologies. DARPA and DOD were the first adopters of many of the 
IT advances DARPA supported—e.g., work stations (Sun Microsystems, 
Silicon Graphics), and ARPANET as MILNET.
DARPA then provided a critical assist to the launching of Sun by 
extending funds to a number of academic institutions to permit them 
to acquire workstations for their own institutional users and networks. 
According to Khosla, academic institutions (particularly the University 
of California at Berkeley, Stanford, and Carnegie-Mellon) accounted 
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for roughly 80 percent of the orders received by Sun in its first year of 
business, thanks to this DARPA funding.34
DARPA has relied, as discussed above, on both its confluence with its 
advocacy community, and its ties to larger innovation system elements, 
to achieve this.
Ties to Leadership—DARPA has been particularly effective when it 
is tied to senior leaders who can effectuate its technologies through DOD 
or elsewhere. Just as Vannevar Bush and Alfred Loomis in World War II 
were able to press developing defense technologies into implementation 
using their direct links to President Roosevelt and Secretary of War 
Stimson, DARPA at critical technical moments has been able to call on 
senior allies. Several examples follow below:
• Undersecretary for Defense Research and Engineering 
William Perry: Perry supported stealth and precision strike, 
as initiated and backed under Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown. Initial interest in what became stealth technologies 
was driven by OSD seeking capability to overcome Soviet 
air defenses. Precision strike was driven by the Brown/Perry 
desire to develop technological “offsets” to Soviet advantages 
in mass force, building on earlier DOD-DARPA efforts driven 
by the previous director for R&E, Malcolm Currie.
• Director of Defense Research and Engineering John Foster: 
Foster was a strong supporter for DARPA’s night vision 
program and spearheaded DARPA’s initial involvement in 
UAVs.
• DARPA Director of the Tactical Technologies Office Kent 
Kresa: Kresa went to industry (Northrop) to head an Advanced 
Technology Division, where he focused on bringing precision 
strike and stealth to fruition. Subsequently, Kresa became 
CEO of Northrop-Grumman.
Because DARPA operates at the front end of the innovation process, it 
historically has required ties to senior DOD leaders to align with the 
follow-on back end of the innovation system.
34  Van Atta, Deitchman and Reed. (1991). DARPA Technical Accomplishments, Volume II, 
17-B-8.
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Doesn’t Necessarily Launch into a Free Market—DARPA embodies 
what is termed “connected R&D;”35 DARPA researchers do not simply 
throw their technology prototypes over their monastery wall, hoping 
a company’s product development and manufacturing units might 
find them. That separation of research and production uses a theory 
of “benign neglect” in the face of markets. Instead, DARPA often uses 
DOD procurement to further its advances, and it funds, as discussed 
above, creative companies that can attempt to commercialize its 
products. Thus, DARPA tries to guide its successful developments into 
commercialization, and builds portfolios of technologies to build depth 
for a technology thrust in emerging markets. It is in the business of 
creating opportunity, in some cases picking technology “winners”. In 
DARPA’s exploration of radical innovations, it is generally recognized 
that its developments are ahead of the market; the research it is 
fostering does not meet an existing market need, but instead is creating 
a capability—a new functionality36—that may (if successful) create a 
new market or application.
A military example of this dynamic of technology push rather than 
demand pull is DARPA’s sponsorship of high altitude, long endurance 
UAVs, which created new capabilities for which, at the time, there were no 
service “requirements”. In fact, when these systems, such as the Predator 
and, later, Global Hawk, were first demonstrated, the military services 
actively delayed and discouraged their transition and development. 
Similarly, DARPA’s fostering of internetted personal computing was 
ahead of any market foreseen by the incumbent computer firms, such as 
IBM and later, DEC. In developing such unanticipated new capabilities, 
it is unlikely that current market mechanisms and especially current 
firms meeting those existing markets will be the primary means to bring 
the capabilities to fruition. From a DARPA standpoint the question is 
how and in what manner should it foster the transition—and for how 
long. As the opportunity creator, DARPA has, in many instances, 
developed a new capability up to a technology demonstration and then 
found that the potential recipients—either in the military or commercial 
environments—are not ready or interested to take them further. Several 
35  See discussion of this term in Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model”, 
206–10.
36  See discussion of this functionality concept in Weiss and Bonvillian. (2009). 
Structuring an Energy Technology Revolution, 185–90.
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times DARPA has essentially backed off further support and other 
times it has supported additional research that it sees as overcoming 
the risks that impede the technology’s transitioning. However, there 
is a well understood rule that DARPA itself is not in the business of 
transitioning—it is in the business of inventing. In summary, DARPA 
does not simply throw its technologies out into the world and pray that 
markets will pick them up, it uses its ties to defense procurement and to 
emerging companies to try to align its technologies with institutions in 
the difficult back end implementation stage.
Even when it is focused on “connected R&D” and a specific 
technology, it should be noted, however, that DARPA is “all about 
competition” amongst ideas and has multiple mechanisms to identify, 
assess and evaluate alternatives and options, and will restructure or 
terminate ideas that are judged to not be panning out—especially those 
that appear not to be making a big enough difference relative to the status 
quo. This does raise an important question: who decides? At DARPA, 
as well as other research organizations, individuals often have trouble 
“letting go” of their vision, even when it isn’t working. DARPA’s main 
decision focus is the program manager, but the Office Directors and the 
Director play important roles in reviewing progress and assuring that 
programs are scrutinized. Since a PM typically only has three to five 
years on station to “make something happen”, he or she has an incentive 
to make choices based on what projects appear to have the best chance 
of success. Just recently, DARPA’s F-6 “Distributed Satellite” program 
was completely restructured with the initial contractor’s program 
halted, when the new program manager decided that the effort was not 
likely to achieve the objectives.
Ahead of the Game—there is one additional aspect that should be 
noted, since DARPA is a government agency. While there is a history 
of Congress pressing a recalcitrant military to implement innovations, 
such as aviation and the aircraft carrier, Congress has also, at times, 
played the opposite role, interfering in technology advances. DARPA, 
historically, has tried to stay ahead of Congressional interference 
and micro-management by developing coherent narratives about its 
technology approaches that show DARPA’s projects to be “ahead of the 
game”. It has worked to avoid a situation where Congress has captured 
the narrative and forced DARPA involvement. As a result, DARPA has 
been almost “earmark” free.
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Problems in Tech Paradise
It should be noted as a caveat that the above discussion is of DARPA on 
a good day; it has bad days, as well. There have been periodic problems 
at DARPA. It is in the end a human institution, and these concerns 
provide further lessons. It also faces challenges from new realities. The 
globalization of U.S. industry has created challenges for an agency charged 
with technology leadership to avoid technological surprise.37 DARPA, for 
example, is only now working on a multi-element strategy to adequately 
respond to the global erosion of the U.S. manufacturing capabilities 
and depth which will affect the abilities of the U.S. to field advanced 
technologies.38 With the imminent tightening of defense budgets, DARPA 
will face also increased challenges on how to use military procurement to 
create initial markets to transition its technologies.
In recent years, as briefly cited above, DARPA defunded a significant 
part of its university research base for advanced IT research, in turn 
affecting the strength of the DARPA IT technology community and the 
flow of outstanding university IT talent into DARPA,39 although the 
current leadership is attempting to improve this situation. For example, 
strong office directors with extended experience aiding talented PMs 
with less DARPA and DOD experience, have often been key to DARPA, 
providing in-depth technology management and leadership for shorter-
term and usually less-experienced PMs. However, it appears that 
in recent years this strong office director model has been cut back in 
favor of a strong director; while current DARPA leadership has been 
working to restore this position’s authority, it is not an easy task. The 
strong director approach also affected the ability of its PMs to act as 
advocates for their technologies—as vision enablers—a traditional key 
37  Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). “The Innovation State”, The American Interest 4/6: 69–78, at 
72–75, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2009/07/01/the-innovation-state/
38  DARPA is working to build a manufacturing technology portfolio; see 
summary of some of these elements in MIT Washington Office. (2010). “Survey 
of Federal Manufacturing Efforts”, 4–6, https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/
pdf/MIT%20Survey%20of%20Federal%20Manufacturing%20Efforts.pdf. See, 
generally, Tassey, G. (2010). “Rationales and Mechanisms for Revitalizing U.S. 
Manufacturing R&D Strategies”, Journal of Technology Transfer 35/3: 283–333, 
https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/manufacturing_
strategy_paper_0.pdf; and Pisano, G., and Shih, W. (2009). “Restoring American 
Competitiveness”, Harvard Business Review 87/7–8: 114–25, https://hbr.org/2009/07/
restoring-american-competitiveness
39  Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model”, 225–33.
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PM role important to DARPA’s capabilities. The strong director with a 
strategic approach may at times run contrary to DARPA’s tradition of 
“hire smart PMs and empower them”.
Another problem has been the hand-off between program 
managers. Demand pull from military procurement has helped keep 
DARPA work moving somewhat smoothly during transitions from one 
program manager to another. Even so, shifts in DARPA PM management 
sometimes become “disruptive” themselves, in an undesirable way. For 
example, these problems have affected DARPA’s Strategic Computing 
program and, recently, the Ultra High Performance Computing 
Program, where program continuation has not been smooth.
If military demand pull is weak—as it certainly sometimes has been, 
when DARPA prioritized technology over services (for example, with the 
arsenal ship and UAVs)—the DARPA model can suffer from too many 
stops, starts, and changes in direction. These obstacles are often the 
result of a combination of true belief and whimsy on the part of DARPA 
management, rather than careful reassessment of the technological 
frontiers, and of what direction should be taken. New leaders often have 
an instinct to make big changes even if operations are optimal so that they 
can “leave their mark”. When this occasionally happens at DARPA, there 
can be a real issue whether the culture can supersede such occasionally 
disruptive leadership, although its history as a highly flexible, small and 
intimate program, with fewer bureaucratic controls than more traditional 
R&D programs, helps it.40 Thus, what has been an overall DARPA 
strength—talented directors—can at times be a weakness.
There is another issue area, too, that requires notice: the transition 
to implementation. DARPA has worked hard to make this work, as 
discussed in many of the points above. But as a radical innovation 
organization, inevitably it is only secondarily concerned with 
transitioning the results into implementation. Some have accused 
DARPA in the past of too often being a “hobby shop” for talented PMs.
Sometimes, this transition capability has been DARPA’s greatest 
strength, and, at other times, its biggest weakness. It has been noted that, 
“if fielded disruptive capabilities are the objective, it will be insufficient 
40  Some observers counter that DARPA’s productivity generally has remained high, 
despite such concerns. See Fuchs, E. R. H. (2011). “DARPA Does Moore’s Law: The 
Case of DARPA and Optoelectronic Interconnects”, in The State of Innovation: The 
US Government’s Role in Technology Development, ed. F. Bloch and W. Keller. Boulder, 
CO: Paradigm Publishers. 133–48.
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to generate an example… [such as a proof-of-principle prototype]… 
and then rely upon the traditional DOD/Service acquisition system to 
recognize its value and implement it”.41 This problem will be further 
explored in detail in this chapter’s Section III, below.
In conclusion, the above discussion of DARPA cited the well-known 
elements of its innovation culture and focused on a number of less 
well-understood elements that have been important to its strength 
and capabilities. Both offer lessons in the energy technology sector to 
ARPA-E, which will be explored below. In addition, DARPA, like any 
human-created and run organization, is not perfect and a number of 
problems it has faced offer lessons in addressing how to best organize 
and manage ARPA-E.
II. ARPA-E—A New R&D Model for  
the Department of Energy
Replicating Basic DARPA Elements42
ARPA-E was consciously designed by Congress to apply the DARPA 
model to the new energy technology sector.43 Currently funded 
41  Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, 64.
42  The following discussion on ARPA-E derives from ongoing discussions since 
ARPA-E’s initial formation between author Bonvillian and ARPA- E’s director, its 
deputy director for operations, and one of its program managers; author Van Atta 
had similar discussions with ARPA-E officials during this period. Both authors had 
an extended discussion session with four ARPA-E program managers about the 
ARPA-E model on April 5, 2011, which was particularly helpful in developing this 
paper. Both authors have long been observers of the ARPA-E formulation process; 
both testified before the House Science and Technology Committee on the ARPA-E 
authorizing legislation, HR-364 (2007); Bonvillian, W. B. (2007). Testimony Before 
House Science and Technology Committee on ARPA-E Authorizing Legislation, 
HR-364, April 26, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg34719/
html/CHRG-110hhrg34719.htm; Van Atta, R. (2007). Testimony before House 
Science and Technology Committee on ARPA-E Authorizing legislation, HR-364, 
April 26, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg34719/html/
CHRG-110hhrg34719.htm. Bonvillian, in addition, wrote about the proposal 
(Bonvillian. (2006). “Power-Play”) which was reviewed by the Committee, and 
(together with former DARPA Deputy Director Jane Alexander and former DARPA 
General Counsel Richard L. Dunn) reviewed ARPA-E concepts for Department of 
Energy Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Steven Isakowitz and his office, over several 
weeks in February and March 2009, as the CFO’s office led the DOE effort to form 
and stand up ARPA-E within DOE.
43  See, H. R. 364 (2007). Establishing the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, 
reported by the House Committee on Science and Technology on May 23, 2007, 
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at $180 million for FY2011, it is about the size of a DARPA program 
office. It has emphasized speed—particularly, the rapid moving of 
research breakthroughs into technologies, through a process it labels 
“Envision-Engage-Evaluate-Establish-Execute”.
With $400 million received in the 2009 stimulus legislation cited 
above, it has awarded funding in six energy technology areas through 
spring 2011, which are briefly summarized below.44 These follow a 
“challenge-based, focused-program” approach modeled on DARPA 
(this was formed after an initial wide open “early harvest” funding 
opportunity noted below).
• The “Innovative Materials and Processes for Advanced 
Carbon Capture Technologies” program (IMPACCT) aims 
to develop technologies to capture 90 percent of CO2 from 
coal power plants at much higher efficiency and lower cost; 
research approaches include advanced new technologies for 
capturing and converting CO2 at power plants through a 
range of approaches, from catalysis to membrane sorption.
• ARPA-E’s “Electrofuels” initiative aims to synthesize biofuels 
using micro-organisms to convert CO2 and water into liquid 
fuels, seeking a tenfold increase in efficiency over current 
biofuel production processes.
110th Congress, 1st Sess. (as introduced in the House on Jan. 10, 2007, https://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr364/text); and America COMPETES Act. (2007). 
P.L. 110–69, 42 USC 16538, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (as amended, and signed into law 9 
August 2007), Sec. 5012. See, also, America COMPETES Act Reauthorization. (2010). 
P.L. 111–358, HR 5116, 111th Cong., 2nd Sess. (signed by President 4 January 2011), Sec. 
904, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr5116/text, with accompanying 
report, House Comm. Rep. 111–478, House Committee on Science and Technology, 
Subtitle B (re: ARPA-E, Other Transactions Authority). The conceptual origin 
for ARPA-E as a DARPA model for energy stems from the National Academies’ 
report, Rising above the Gathering Storm, at 152–58. For a discussion of some of the 
issues under consideration in the initial Congressional design of ARPA-E, see 
Bonvillian. (2007). “Will the Search for New Energy Technologies”. For an early 
description of ARPA-E’s mission and role from its first director, see Majumdar, 
A. (2010). Testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology on 
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA-E), https://www.energy.gov/sites/
prod/files/ciprod/documents/1-27-10_Final_Testimony_%28Majumdar%29.pdf
44  See ARPA-E. (2010). Program Awards (Six Areas) Through 2010. A further award 
offering was announced by Secretary Chu on 20 April 2011 for rare earths, biofuels, 
thermal storage, grid controls, and solar power electronics (Department of Energy. 
(2011). “Secretary Chu Announces $130m for Advanced Research Projects”, 20 
April).
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• The “Batteries for Electrical Energy Storage in Transportation” 
program (BEEST) seeks ultra-high-density, low cost battery 
technologies for long range, plug-in electric vehicles, aiming 
at doubling vehicle ranges and enabling a four-fold reduction 
in costs from current battery technologies. Technology 
approaches extend from advanced lithium-ion concepts, 
to over-the-horizon new battery concepts like lithium-air 
batteries and an “all-electron battery”.
• The “Agile Delivery of Electrical Power Technology” program 
(ADEPT) seeks to develop materials for advances in magnetics, 
switches and, high- density storage to improve the efficiency 
of power electronics to reduce electricity consumption by up 
to 30 percent. This is an area where the U.S. lead in advanced 
materials such as SiC and GaN-on-Si could serve as platforms 
for success in next generation (beyond Si-based) power 
electronics.
• ARPA-E’s “Grid Scale Rampable Intermittent Dispatchable 
Storage” program (GRIDS) proposes to develop new 
technologies that create widespread cost-effective grid-scale 
storage, helping to balance renewables and power supply 
fluctuations with demand. The program is aiming for new 
storage systems with efficiency and cost comparable to 
pumped-hydro. Because the energy storage R&D/technology 
community has traditionally focused on energy density, new 
constraints largely on the cost side have brought out numerous 
new ideas.
• The “Building Energy Efficiency Through Innovative 
Thermodevices” program (BEETIT) seeks to develop cooling 
technologies for new and retrofitted buildings to significantly 
increase energy efficiency. The program has goals to increase 
air conditioning efficiency by 50 percent and sharply cut 
refrigerant global warming impacts.
ARPA-E includes two DARPA veterans among its eight PMs, one a 
former DARPA PM, the other an experienced DARPA performer and 
advisor. Consistent with its legislative history, it has worked to replicate 
the DARPA approach. The discussion below lists well-known elements 
386 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
in the DARPA ruleset and reviews how ARPA-E reflects and has 
adapted that model.
ARPA-E is a flat, non-hierarchical organization, effectively with 
only two levels—eight program managers (PMs) and its director,45 Arun 
Majumdar, formerly a Berkeley professor with senior administrative 
experience in DOE’s Lawrence Berkeley Lab who has also worked 
on forming companies.46 Like DARPA, the program managers are 
“empowered”, each with strong authority and discretion to administer 
a portfolio of projects in a related energy field, from storage to biofuels 
to carbon capture and sequestration. Like DARPA, the project approval 
process is streamlined—the PMs evaluate and conceive of the research 
directions for their portfolios, then go through a critique of that 
approach with the director (and discussions with colleagues); they go 
through a similar discussion process over proposed contract awards. 
Essentially, there is only one approval box to check—the director —
who retains approval authority before the contract is awarded, which 
generally goes very quickly. ARPA-E emulates DARPA’s reputation 
for fleet-footed decision-making. Like DARPA, ARPA-E is not bound 
by the traditional research selection processes, such as peer review or 
hierarchical bureaucratic lines of authority. It operates through a strong 
PM selection process outside of peer review. Although ARPA-E uses 
strong expert reviews to guide PM decisions, there is no “peer review” 
45  ARPA-E also has a PM who is deputy director for technology, and several additional 
teams: an “operations” group supervising its contracting process, including a 
counsel (who implements ARPA-E’s unique personnel and contracting authority 
despite the very different procedures of DOE’s management bureaucracy) and 
deputy director for operations; a commercialization team (discussed below); and 
a group of fellows (typically outstanding recent university PhDs, who support 
the PMs, discussed below). But the R&D operating core of ARPA-E is very flat: its 
director and its group of PMs. Regarding this term, the original enabling statute 
uses “Project Managers”, see, America COMPETES Act. (2007). Sec. (f)(1)); the term 
“Program Directors” was substituted by America COMPETES Act Reauthorization. 
(2010). Sec. 904(f)(1)(C)(i), which amended ARPA-E’s enabling statute in 2010. 
ARPA-E Director Majumdar decided to use the term “Program Directors” to 
emphasize how empowered its portfolio managers are. However, the term program 
managers is used here to parallel the term used in DARPA because the functions 
are similar and it is a functional title which is widely understood in the technology 
community.
46  Arun Majumdar served as ARPA-E’s first director, from 2009 to 2012. After he left 
ARPA-E, he accepted positions at first Google and then Stanford University, where 
he is on the faculty at the time of this book’s publication. A biography is available 
on a Stanford University website: https://profiles.stanford.edu/arun-majumdar.
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where outside researcher peers make the actual final decisions on what 
gets funded. As at DARPA, this PM selection process generally avoids 
the conservatism and caution that often afflicts peer review, which 
tends to reject higher risk research awards if there are more than four 
applicants per grant award.
Like DARPA, the PMs use a “right-left” research model—they 
contemplate the technology breakthroughs they are seeking to emerge 
from the right end of the pipeline, then go back to the left side of the 
pipeline to look for proposals for the breakthrough research that will 
get them there. In other words, like DARPA, ARPA-E uses a challenge-
based research model—it seeks research advances that will meet 
significant technology challenges. Like DARPA, ARPA-E tends to look 
for revolutionary breakthroughs that could be transformative of a sector. 
Thus far, it has had a penchant for high-risk but potentially high-reward 
projects. ARPA-E’s design is metrics-driven and “challenge-based” 
for funding opportunities. Metrics are defined in terms of what will 
be required for cost-effective market adoption in the energy industry. 
PMs propose to the research community what will be required in terms 
of technology cost and performance for adoption and then ask this 
community to pursue this with transformative new ideas.47
Like DARPA, ARPA-E’s PMs are a highly-respected, technically-
talented group,48 carefully selected by a director who has asserted that 
there is no substitute for world-class talent. Typically, the PMs have 
business experience, usually in startups, so they generally know from 
experience in both academic research and in industry the journey from 
research to commercialization. Recognizing that the ability to hire 
strong talent quickly was a key DARPA enabler, the House Science 
47  This approach was used in some specific programs at DARPA. One specific example 
was the Global Hawk HALE UAV, which had a “firm requirement” of a fly away 
cost of $10 million per unit. Importantly, while Global Hawk is generally viewed 
as having had a major impact on U.S. military capabilities, this cost per unit was 
not met with the initial systems developed under DARPA and subsequently the 
Air Force has re-designed the Global Hawk to be a much larger and much costlier 
system (Van Atta, et al. (2003). Transformation and Transition. Volume 1, 45–49). On 
Global Hawk cost and schedule difficulties, see, also, Porter, G., et al. (2009). The 
Major Causes of Cost Growth in Defense Acquisition, P-4531, Volume II. Alexandria, 
VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 49–50, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/
a519884.pdf
48  ARPA-E PMs’ biographies are available at: http://arpa-e.energy.gov/About/Team.
aspx. The PM group includes a deputy director for technology.
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and Technology Committee, which initiated the ARPA-E authorization, 
gave ARPA-E, like DARPA, the ability to supersede the glacial civil 
service hiring process and rigid pay categories. In fact, ARPA-E’s broad 
waiver of civil service hiring authority49 may be without precedent in 
the federal government.
Like DARPA, ARPA-E’s research program is organized around the 
three- to five-year lifetime of its PMs. By statute, ARPA-E’s PMs are 
limited to three years of service (although this can be extended);50 as with 
DARPA, this means they must work to get their projects into prototype 
and implementation stages in the three or so years they are at ARPA-E. 
Thus, the project duration yardstick is the life of the PM. This means that 
ARPA-E must forego much long-term research; it must build its project 
portfolio by seeking breakthroughs that can move to prototype in—for 
science—a relatively short period. It will aim, therefore, like DARPA, at 
innovation acceleration projects that can move from idea to prototype 
in the program life of its program managers. The House Science and 
Technology Committee, mirroring DARPA, also emphasized the 
availability to ARPA-E of highly flexible contracting authority, so-called 
“other transactions authority”, which enables ARPA-E to emulate 
DARPA’s ability to quickly transact research contracts outside of the 
slow-moving federal procurement system.51 Although this authority 
49  America COMPETES Act. (2007). Sec. 5012(f)(2)(A), as amended by American 
COMPETES Act Reauthorization. (2010). Sec. 904(g)(3)(2)(A)(i) (ARPA-E civil 
service waiver). In contrast, DARPA uses Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) 
authority to hire PMs promptly (hiring can be completed in a day) from academia 
or industry, with the employee still paid through his or her former employer at the 
former salary level.
50  America COMPETES Act. (2007). Sec. 5012(f)(1)(C), as amended by American 
COMPETES Act Reauthorization. (2010). Sec. 904(g)(2)(C).
51  For DARPA’s Other Transactions Authority (OTA), see, P.L. 101–89, 10 U.S.C. 2389 
(enacted 1989); P.L. 103–60, Sec. 845. For a discussion of DARPA’s OTA authority, 
see Kaminski, P. G. (1996). Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 14 December, re: 
10 U.S.C. 2371, Section 845, Authority to Carry Out Certain Prototype Projects. 
Arlington, VA: DOD; Dunn, R. L. (2007). Acquisition Reform, the DARPA Approach, 
http://www.authorstream.com/Presentation/Burnell-34588-appe-Why-Business-
Everybody-Else-Evolution-Defense-Industry-as-Entertainment-ppt-powerpoint/; 
Dunn, R. L. (1996). “DARPA Turns to Other Transactions”, Aerospace America 34/10, 
33–37; Dunn, R. L. (1996). DARPA General Counsel Memorandum of Law, Scope 
of Section 845 Prototype Authority, 24 October; Dunn. R. L. (1995). Testimony 
of General Counsel of DARPA before the Committee on Science, U.S. House of 
Representatives on Innovations in Government Contracting Using the Authority 
to Enter into “Other Transactions” with Industry, 8 November. The Department of 
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has not yet been fully utilized, it remains promising as ARPA-E moves 
into new areas, such as prize authority, discussed below.
Like DARPA, ARPA-E is also instituting the “hybrid” model, 
providing funding support for both academic researchers and small 
companies and the “skunk works” operations of larger corporate 
R&D shops. DARPA has often tied these diverse entities into the same 
challenge portfolio and worked to convene them together periodically 
for ongoing exchanges. 
This has tended to improve the handoff from research to development, 
by combining entities from each space, easing technology transition. 
Like DARPA, ARPA-E has worked from an island/bridge model for 
connecting to its federal agency bureaucracy. For innovation entities in 
the business of setting up new technologies,52 the best model historically 
has been to put them on a protected “island” free to experiment, and 
away from contending bureaucracies—away from “the suits”.53
ARPA-E, as it was set up within DOE, has required both isolation and 
protection from rival DOE R&D agencies and the notorious bureaucratic 
culture at DOE that may battle it for funding and the independence it 
requires. From the outset, therefore, it needed a bridge back to top DOE 
leadership to assure it a place in DOE’s R&D sun—it received this from 
Energy Secretary Steven Chu, who was one of the original proponents 
of ARPA-E while serving on the National Academies’ Gathering Storm 
report, and later testified in support of ARPA-E before the House Science 
and Technology Committee in 2006.54 It helps, too, as cited above, that 
Energy received “Other Transactions Authority” in the Energy Policy Act (2005), 
Sec. 1007 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-109publ58/pdf/PLAW-
109publ58.pdf). However, it was only utilized once (GAO 2008) until the advent 
of ARPA- E, when ARPA-E used it three times in 2009 in making its initial grant 
awards. See, America COMPETES Act Reauthorization Act. (2010). House Comm. 
Rep. 111–478, of House Committee on Science and Technology, Subtitle B, (“To 
attract non-traditional performers and negotiate intellectual property agreements 
ARPA-E also uses flexible contracting mechanisms called Technology Investment 
Agreements authorized for the Department as ‘Other Transactions Authority’ in the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005”).
52  For analyses of private corporation and DOD defense S&T programs illustrating 
how successful radical innovation programs are constructed and managed in this 
manner, see Van Atta, et al. (2003). Science and Technology.
53  Bennis, W., and Biederman, P. W. (1997). Organizing Genius, The Secrets of Creative 
Collaboration. New York, NY: Basic Books, 206–07.
54  Secretary Chu also personally selected ARPA-E’s director, a Berkeley colleague 
and friend, who was his former deputy director at Lawrence Berkeley National 
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ARPA-E’s first director was a trusted technical peer and colleague 
from Secretary Chu’s Lawrence Berkeley National Lab days. On a day-
to-day basis, DOE Chief Financial Officer Steven Isakowitz oversaw 
ARPA-E’s initial stand-up in its embryonic days immediately after its 
Stimulus funding55 was passed to bring ARPA-E to life, serving as an 
early godfather. Thus, ARPA-E had a critical bridge back to leaders who 
could protect its independence and funding. It was located by DOE’s 
CFO one block from DOE’s Forrestal building in Washington, on the 
floor of an adjacent non-DOE building—this gave it a handy bridge 
back to its DOE godparents, but assured that it would have its own 
island for its own team separated from the DOE bureaucracy.
Well aware of this evolving ruleset, Energy Secretary Chu has 
remarked—consistent with DARPA’s history—that if just one in twenty 
ARPA-E projects is commercialized, the energy technology landscape 
could be transformed.56
New Elements at ARPA-E
Thus far, we have described ARPA-E as though it were a clone of 
DARPA. However, ARPA-E faces a very different technology landscape 
than DARPA. DARPA has been able to launch its technologies into 
two territories that simplified its tasks. First, it has often been able to 
place its technologies into the procurement programs of the military 
services. In this approach, the military is able to serve as the testbed 
and initial “first” market for new technologies emerging from DARPA. 
As discussed above, this isn’t automatic; it required creative work and 
senior allies, for example, for DARPA to persuade the military services to 
adopt stealth and UAV technologies. But, when effective, it greatly eases 
Laboratory. This assured a very close connection between ARPA-E and the top 
agency leadership, somewhat comparable to such noteworthy technology “bridge” 
relationships as that between, for example, Radiation Lab founder Alfred Loomis 
and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Vannevar Bush, President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s World War II science czar and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s chief 
personal aide. On Loomis, see Conant, J. (2002). Tuxedo Park: A Wall Street Tycoon 
and the Secret Palace of Science that Changed the Course of World War II. New York, 
NY: Simon & Shuster, 178–289); on Bush, see Zachary, G. P. (1999). Endless Frontier, 
Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
55  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. (2009). P.L. No: 111–15.
56  Secretary Chu has long been an ARPA-E proponent: see Chu, S. (2006). “The Case 
for ARPA-E”, Innovation 4/3, http://www.innovation-america.org/case-arpa-e
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technology transition. Second, as discussed at length above, DARPA 
also launches its technologies into civilian sectors—its keystone role in 
the IT sector is the most famous example; the Internet, VLSI computing 
and desktop computing features are among the many noteworthy IT 
technologies it supported. However, the IT revolution DARPA nurtured 
was a technology frontier, an example of “open space” technology 
launch.57
In contrast the energy sector that ARPA-E must launch into is 
occupied territory not open space—energy is already a complex, 
established “legacy” sector (CELS).58 New energy technologies have to 
perform the technology equivalent of parachuting into the Normandy 
battlefield; there is already a technology-economic-political paradigm 
that dominates the energy beachhead that must be overcome. Because it 
faces a very different launch landscape than DARPA, ARPA-E is learning 
to vary its organizational model. In addition, ARPA-E has assembled 
what is by all accounts a talented team; they have put in place their own 
ideas on how to operate their new agency, as well. Thus, ARPA-E is not 
simply replicating DARPA, it is finding and adding its own elements 
appropriate to the complex energy sector, where it concentrates, and 
to its own staff. Some of these constitute new innovation lessons 
potentially applicable to other agencies and projects. A number of 
these new elements and variations from the DARPA model, as well as 
organizational features ARPA-E is focused on, are discussed below.
a. Sharpening the Research Visioning, Selection, and Support Process
Every strong innovation organization, from research groups, to startups 
and firms, to federal research agencies, must build a strong innovation 
culture.59 Organizational cultures in the innovation space tend to lock-in 
57  As discussed in Part I of this chapter (“The DARPA Model”), the frontier was 
not entirely open; DARPA did take on the IBM mainframe model in supporting 
disruptive technologies to achieve personalized computing and the Internet. But it 
also took on a set of technologies that were not of primary interest to IBM and in 
fact were of very low priority to it compared to its mainframe computing.
58  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2009). “Taking Covered Wagons East”.
59  A working ruleset for optimal innovation organization cultures is set forth in, 
Bennis and Biederman. (1997). Organizing Genius, 196–218. A number of these 
Bennis/Biederman “rules” are (as of 2011) painted on the walls near the DARPA 
Director’s office in DARPA’s building in Arlington, VA.
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quite early in the organizational history, and, once set, patterns of 
interactions and performance tend to become engrained into the entity’s 
culture. ARPA-E, led by its director and PMs, all of whom have had 
experience in a range of innovation organizational cultures, including 
DARPA, have worked to build their own innovation culture within 
ARPA-E. While it shares many features with DARPA, as noted above, it 
has its own areas of emphasis.
ARPA-E’s director and PMs emphasize that they are working 
in what they call “the white space” of technology opportunities. 
Starting with their first research award offering,60 they assert that they 
have consciously attempted to fund higher risk projects that have the 
potential to be breakthroughs and be transformational in energy areas 
where little work previously has been undertaken. This means that 
their research awards are purposely made seeking transformations, not 
incremental advance. Comparable to the DARPA model, this approach 
has placed technology visioning at the very front of the ARPA-E’s 
research nurturing process.61
ARPA-E has implemented an interesting two-stage selection process, 
offering applicants a chance to offer feedback to the initial round of 
60  This perspective evolved from ARPA-E’s first award offering for $150 million, 
issued on 27 April 2009, which was entirely open-ended, simply seeking innovative 
new ideas for energy technologies from academic energy researchers and firms. 
While the small ARPA-E staff—the organization was just being assembled—
anticipated that they would receive only some 400 applications (assuming, as one 
ARPA-E official put it later, “Whoever heard of ARPA-E?”); instead, they received 
over 3500 applications. See, Kosinski, S. (2009). Advanced Research Projects Agency-
Energy (ARPA-E) (presentation), 8. Because it faced an overwhelming application 
volume, this forced ARPA-E to assemble a major review effort relying on scientists 
throughout DOE to assist (which aided in their subsequent DOE community 
building effort, discussed below). Because they had far too many quality 
applications for their limited initial award funding (they only made thirty-seven 
initial awards), they developed their “white space only” approach described in the 
text above, which has since become a basic agency policy approach. Realizing that 
the energy tech sector was eager for a DARPA model in energy, and that there 
was already a major “tech buzz” around ARPA-E, the agency subsequently limited 
its award offerings to particular technology sectors, discussed above in the text in 
this section, to control the number of applications and make the review process 
manageable. However, to avoid disappointing and frustrating the initial wave of 
applicants, ARPA-E created its innovative energy technology “summit”, described 
below. Thus, two of ARPA-E’s more innovative approaches—“white space”, and 
its now annual “summit”—were lessons that came out of the near-nightmare of 
managing its first open-ended initial award process.
61  Carleton, T. L. (2010). “The Value of Vision in Radical Technological Innovation”, 
PhD thesis, Stanford University, Palo Alto, http://purl.stanford.edu/mk388mb2729.
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reviews. Because ARPA-E’s director, like many researchers, had been 
personally frustrated by peer review processes—where the reviewers 
in their responses to his proposals showed limited understanding 
of the science and technology advances behind his applications—
he implemented a unique review process where his PMs allowed 
applicants to respond to their application reviews, followed by a further 
evaluation step. This “second shot” and “feedback loop” in the review 
process has several upshots: it has improved evaluations, because the 
PMs know that their conclusions will be critiqued; it has helped educate 
PMs in new technology developments; and it has resulted in a number 
of reconsiderations of applications and thus improving the overall 
ARPA-E research portfolio.
The Empowered program manager Culture—there are eight PMs at 
ARPA-E at the time of writing; there are no office directors, who serve as 
an intermediate stage at DARPA between PMs and the director. Because 
ARPA-E is roughly the size of a large DARPA office, it simply does not 
need them yet. Each PM picks his or her own inquiry areas; there is 
no overall technology plan.62 However, PMs do form macro challenges 
within the sectors they initiate with the director—for example, seeking a 
zero emission, long range electric car. PMs therefore retain the flexibility 
of not being tied to a fixed ARPA-E-wide technology strategy. PMs 
also retain a great deal of control over their research portfolios, so are 
“empowered” like DARPA PMs, although they still have to persuade the 
director to support their program decisions. Director Arun Majumdar 
has a reputation as a shrewd and intellectually adept judge and analyst. 
PMs state that he insists on “complete technical and intellectual 
honesty”; and, as one put it, he is “a cricket batsman—he knows all the 
pitches”. Thus, before a PM can select a technology project, he or she has 
to “sell” it to the director; the proposal often also has to survive rounds 
of brainstorming and vetting with PM colleagues. PMs have to have 
what they refer to as “religion”—they have a vision of where they want 
to take their portfolios, performing as vision champions, in order to sell 
their projects both inside and outside ARPA-E. Part of “religion”, then, 
is that they must work on being vision implementers. ARPA-E PMs 
62  However, ARPA-E’s enabling statute does require preparation of a technology 
“Strategic Vision Roadmap”. America COMPETES Act. (2007). Sec. 5012(g)(2), as 
amended by America COMPETES Act Reauthorization. (2010). Sec. 904(b)(2).
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expressed the view that “religion” is the single most critical PM quality, 
aside from technical excellence. To summarize, ARPA-E uses DARPA’s 
“strong program manager” model for research award selections and 
calls on its PMs to exert religious zeal in advancing selected technologies 
through the implementation stage. ARPA-E has purposely not created a 
formal personnel evaluation process for its PMs—as with DARPA, PMs 
say they are expected to “manage to results” and they are judged by 
the director and their colleagues—that is peer pressure-based on the 
outcomes, impact and results from the portfolios they select.
Additional mechanisms for talent support—ARPA-E has a fellows 
program, of five outstanding recent PhD’s who help staff each PM and fill 
out the capability of each team. This institutional mechanism apparently 
may be creating a creative process of intergenerational contact and 
mentoring within ARPA-E, further ensuring that it becomes continuous 
education environment—a key feature for creative R&D organizations. 
The new fellows also have been meeting together as a group to attempt 
to jell their own on new ideas. DARPA currently has no comparable 
group to help augment internal intellectual ferment.63 ARPA-E is also 
considering creating its own team of senior advisors—“technology 
wisemen”, in short, who spend time at ARPA-E through frequent visits 
and so contribute to the PM teams. The group would be somewhat 
analogous to DOD’s “Jasons”, a group of experienced technical experts 
brought in to advise on major technical issues and problems,64 except 
that ARPA-E’s Jasons would serve a similar function not for DOE in 
general but within an operational research agency, ARPA-E. This could 
provide a way to enable technology thought leaders from a range of 
fields to contribute to energy technology advance, pulling in new 
perspectives and new ideas.
Portfolio Approach—All ARPA-E projects are selected, as discussed 
above, to be game changers—to initiate energy breakthroughs. However, 
within that broad requirement, as PMs assemble their portfolios around 
a particular challenge area, PMs say they have found they need a “risk 
mix”. They generally include some “out there” projects that may or may 
not materialize, that are very high risk, but where the technology is so 
63  When DARPA was first stood up it had a scientific advisory board and at times 
some of its Office Directors have empaneled such groups.
64 Finkbinder, A. (2006). The Jasons. New York, NY: Viking Books.
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potentially important that, although far from implementation, these are 
well worth pursuing. But for most other portfolio technologies, the PMs 
want to see that they could be implementable in a reasonable period—
that they could reach a cost range that would facilitate entry and 
commercialization. Some PMs find they need to emphasize more early 
stage science in their portfolios than other PMs because their portfolio 
sectors require more frontier advances—so there is a mix, too, of 
portfolio balance between frontier and applied, science and technology 
emphasis. The grant approval rate varies between technology sectors, 
but (following the initial 2009 open ended offering discussed above), 
PMs indicate the rate ranges from 5 percent to 10 percent. That rate 
is likely too low for robust portfolios and will discourage some 
creative applicants; ARPA-E understands this, but is constrained by 
Congressional budget limits.
As with DARPA, ARPA-E PMs have adopted a “hands-on” 
relationship with award recipients, with whom they maintain a 
dialogue, meet at frequent intervals to support their progress and help 
surmount barriers, and, when ready, promote contacts with venture 
and commercial funding. In most research agencies, the job of the PM 
focuses on the award selection process; in ARPA-E, this is only the 
beginning. PMs view their jobs as technology enablers, helping their 
tech clients with implementation barriers.
b. Building a Community of Support
While Congress, in designing new science and technology agencies, may 
get either the substantive design or the political design right, it does not 
often get both right.65 In other words, the creation of an agency that is, 
from a public policy and substantive prospective, sound and effective 
as well as politically strong enough to survive, is a challenging policy 
design problem. ARPA-E was founded on a well-tested substantive 
model, the DARPA model; so as long as its leadership struggled to 
fulfill that complex design there was some assurance of success from a 
65  Bonvillian, W. B. (2011). “The Problem of Political Design in Federal Innovation 
Organization”, in The Science of Science Policy: A Handbook, ed. K. Fealing, J. Lane, 
J. Marburger III, and S. Shipp. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 302–26, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-1338.2011.00523.x 
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policy perspective. Although the history of DARPA clones is not always 
a positive one,66 ARPA-E’s leadership has made the ARPA-E clone a 
widely acknowledged, successful substantive one to date. However, 
ARPA-E’s political design has been a more complex problem; from the 
outset it has faced a political survival challenge. In part, this is because 
Congress, on a budget cutback tear, has not fully embraced the need for 
an energy transformation. In part, it is because it is a small new agency 
fish in a cabinet agency filled with large agency sharks constantly on the 
prowl against funding competitors and turf incursions. These include 
such longstanding major entities as the Office of Science, the applied 
agencies and the seventeen national energy laboratories. To increase its 
chances of survival, ARPA-E needed not simply to avoid conflict with 
its large neighbors but to affirmatively turn them into bureaucratic allies 
and supporters.67 Internal allies were not its only need—it also needed 
to build support outside DOE, from the energy research community it 
serves and from industry. All this had to be translated into Congressional 
support.
ARPA-E therefore has worked from the outset on building internal 
connections within DOE. The Department’s R&D is organized into 
stovepipes. The Office of Science, a traditional fundamental science-only 
agency organized on Vannevar Bush basic research lines,68 funds its own 
nest of national labs as well as university research and reports to its own 
Undersecretary. DOE’s applied agencies, including EERE, and fossil, 
electrical and nuclear offices, fund development work primarily through 
companies and report to their own Undersecretary. DOE’s organization 
thus severs research from development stages, and historically very 
few technologies cross over the walls of the two sides of the DOE 
organizational equation, between basic and applied. In theory, ARPA-E 
could serve both sides by drawing on basic ideas coming out of the 
Office of Science that could be accelerated, pushing them to prototypes, 
then building ties with EERE and the applied agencies to undertake 
handoffs for late stage development and demonstration stages. ARPA-E 
could thus serve both sides by working to be a technology connector 
66  Bonvillian. (2007). Testimony, 5–6.
67  DARPA over time has attempted to achieve internal support from other defense 
R&D agencies. See Bonvillian. (2009). “The Connected Science Model”, 220.
68  Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur’s Quadrant, Basic Science and Technological Innovation. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 
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within DOE. There are potential downsides to playing the connector 
role—in some cases at DARPA it has been seen as inconsistent with 
performing the role of transformation instigator. However, ARPA-E has 
attempted this task, and met with success in forging a working alliance 
with EERE, a much larger $2 billion a year applied agency. ARPA-E 
has EERE experts on its review teams and draws on their expertise; it 
has received strong support as well from EERE’s leadership, who are 
working with ARPA-E on the handoff process described above (see 
further discussion below).
Integration with the Office of Science (SC) is still a work in progress. 
SC very much views itself as a basic research agency, and rejects work 
on applied research, assuming it is the job of other parts of DOE manage 
those efforts. It funds a wide variety of basic physical science fields, 
aside from basic energy-related research. Managers at SC generally 
view themselves not as technology initiators but as supporters for 
the actual researchers located in SC’s national labs and in academia. 
This represents a genuine culture clash with the energy breakthrough 
mission orientation of ARPA-E PMs. 
However, some attempts have been made to connect with the forty-
six new Energy Frontier Research Centers (EFRCs) formed by SC to focus 
on energy research in promising areas;69 two of ARPA-E’s PMs report 
that they have selected one project each from EFRCs located at research 
universities. Collaboration with the national energy labs has also proven 
a challenge. Because the labs are large employers, they have tended to 
become independent political power bases.70 However, ARPA-E has 
worked to include Department of Energy national laboratories in its 
research consortia,71 hoping the laboratories will view ARPA-E not 
simply as a funding competitor, but also as a funding supporter.
Summit—ARPA-E has worked at building relations with venture 
capital firms and large and small companies, and with awardees and 
non-awardees, through two widely attended annual multi-day forums 
in the spring of 2010 and 2011.72 These two energy innovation summits 
69  Bonvillian. (2011). “The Problem of Political Design”, 315–16.
70  Ibid., 304–05.
71  America COMPETES Act. (2007). Sec. 904(e)(3) authorizes ARPA-E to fund 
“consortia… which may include federally-funded research and development 
centers” (FFRDC’s—including energy laboratories).
72  See programs for ARPA-E Energy Innovation Summits (2010, 2011).
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have become major technology showcase events in Washington, 
attracting large attendance and featuring prominent business, executive 
branch and bi-partisan Congressional leaders in speaking roles. 
ARPA-E featured its awardees at these summits as well as other strong 
applicants who did not receive awards but deserved attention. VCs 
and companies have swarmed around their technologies, building 
good will among attendees, whether they won awards or not. This 
has helped the growing field of energy technology highlight emerging 
technologies to potential private sector funders. The summits became, 
almost overnight, one of the biggest energy annual conference events 
in the nation and have played a major role in putting ARPA-E on the 
map as an innovative agency. Importantly, by highlighting new energy 
technologies of interest to many sectors and firms, the summits have 
helped in building an advanced energy technology “community” 
around ARPA-E.
Support Community—ARPA-E faced a major funding challenge 
in FY2011, where a change in political control of the House of 
Representatives and growing concerns over spiraling federal deficits 
led to cutbacks in federal agency funding. As noted, because ARPA-E 
received no funding in FY2010 (it received two years of initial funding 
in FY2009 through stimulus legislation), it needed affirmative 
legislation to survive. As a result of the goodwill that had been built in 
its first two years of operation, a community of support began to collect 
around ARPA-E to independently advocate for the agency’s future with 
Congressional committees, including venture capital firms, large and 
small firms that worked with ARPA-E, and universities, all enamored of 
its research model. Thus, a political support system is growing, separate 
and apart from ARPA-E (which can’t lobby under federal law) to back 
its efforts and continuation. It has reached a point where ARPA-E has 
received public support from some very prominent business leaders, 
including venture capital leader John Doerr of Kleiner Perkins, GE CEO 
Jeff Immelt, Microsoft’s Bill Gates, and FedEx founder Fred Smith. The 
continued growth of such a political support community could help 
assure ARPA-E’s political future.
In summary, not only has ARPA-E proven a strong substantive 
success to date from a public policy perspective, a political support base 
appears to be emerging that could help sustain it over time. ARPA-E 
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could be in a position to achieve that rare combination, an integrated 
political design model, marrying political support with sound substance.
c. Technology Implementation
ARPA-E’s director and PMs are acutely aware of their difficult task 
in launching technology into the complex, established “legacy” sector 
of energy. DOE has a four-decade history, as noted, of transitioning 
some technologies into commercial energy sectors, but comparatively 
few at a scale where they would make a real difference in U.S. energy 
consumption.73 ARPA-E has therefore taken a number of steps to assist 
in taking its technology to implementation, commercialization and 
deployment: ARPA-E PMs consider the implementation process for 
technologies they are considering; before they fund a project, they 
evaluate the technology stand-up process and how that might evolve.
Their focus is not simply on new technology; they also seek to fund 
projects where they can see a plausible pathway to implementation. 
This is aided by the fact that ARPA-E PMs generally have both 
academic and commercial sector experience. On the commercial 
side, this experience ranges from work in venture capital firms and 
companies, to participating in technology-based startup firms. This 
range of background in both academic and private sectors assists in 
understanding possible commercialization paths. However, in the 
future, it is likely that ARPA-E will need to explicitly consider, within 
its R&D program awards, efforts to drive down the costs of technologies 
it supports to a cost level where they could reach commercial entry.
“In-reach” within DOE—ARPA-E is working on building ties, as 
suggested above, with applied programs in DOE, so that these agencies 
can be ready to pick up ARPA-E projects and move them into the 
applied, later stage implementation programs they run. ARPA-E’s PMs 
have found that building relationships between PMs and both applied 
line scientists and technologists in the applied entities (particularly 
EERE, the Fossil Energy Office, and the Electricity Office) is key to this 
DOE “in-reach”. This is a bottom-up connection process.
73  National Research Council. (2001). Energy Research at DOE: Was it Worth It? Energy 
Efficiency and Fossil Energy Research 1978–2000. Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10165#toc.
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Meanwhile, from a top-down perspective, the ARPA-E Director has 
worked in parallel at building ties between his office and the leadership of 
the applied agencies at DOE. Nonetheless, the PMs believe “bottom-up” 
connections are the key to “in-reach” success—without support deep 
in the applied bureaucracies, transfers simply won’t happen, whatever 
the leadership levels agree to. For example, one ARPA-E PM went to 
DOE’s Fossil office with his leading Carbon Capture and Sequestration 
funding projects, placing three Fossil experts on his review panel for the 
selection process and involving them in oversight work and progress 
meetings. He points out that in-reach is “all relationships and people”. 
There are similar bottom up approaches to build collaborative relations 
between ARPA-E and EERE on wind and other efforts, and with the 
Office of Electricity. ARPA-E’s Director is also giving consideration 
to working top down with DOE applied agencies to create more 
formalized interagency groups around particular technology strands 
for collaboration across DOE stovepipes. The hope is that the groups 
can serve as “lead customers”, because the resources in applied agencies 
can promote later development stages.
However, the applied agencies can only take ARPA-E technologies 
so far. DARPA learned how to work with a “customer” as it tried to 
collaborate with and encourage the military services to adopt its 
technologies in their procurement programs. While, as discussed above, 
this isn’t necessarily easy, DOD has acted in many cases as the initial 
market for DARPA technologies. DOE doesn’t offer comparable internal 
“customers” for ARPA-E technology advances. The efforts to undertake 
in-reach within DOE are an attempt to improve this situation and can 
assist in moving into the proof-of-concept, prototype and demonstration 
stages. The applied offices, which largely fund development work at 
companies, can also assist ARPA-E with follow-on company support 
for continued engineering advances for ARPA-E technologies. Learning 
what it actually means to have and work with a “customer”, as DOD does 
in multiple ways, may prove a vital skill set for an effective R&D agency 
like ARPA-E, given its concern about affecting technology outcomes. A 
customer-driven approach, even in the stage of breakthrough research, 
can be an important driver in technology advance. ARPA-E’s leadership 
and PMs understand that necessity in the energy technology sector. 
This is shaping up as one of the central questions for ARPA-E’s future 
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success, explored in this chapter’s Section III, below. While DOE 
“in-reach”, discussed above, is part of the answer, another logical step 
for ARPA-E is to connect with DOD agencies potentially interested 
in ARPA-E technologies for DOD needs,74 given the latter’s depth in 
testbed capabilities and first market opportunities, which remain gaps 
in DOE’s innovation system.
ARPA-E is in fact working on building ties to DOD for testbeds and 
initial markets. DOE has executed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with DOD, but implementation is still largely at the discussion stage 
and results are still “in progress”. DOD and ARPA-E have recently 
partnered on two projects, however, in battery storage and power 
electronics, for a modular energy storage system that can rapidly charge 
and recharge, and for new ways to combine onsite renewable generation 
with microgrids for use in military installations.75
DOD’s own efforts on energy technology are just now coming 
into effect, but it is pursuing energy technology advances to meet its 
tactical and strategic needs, as well as to cut energy costs at its 500 
installations and 300,000 buildings.76 As an indication of its serious 
intent, ARPA-E has on staff a technologist with significant defense 
contractor experience, as part of the “Commercialization Team”, 
working full time on collaboration with DOD. Since the offices in DOD 
working on energy technology are in the process of connecting with 
each other, ARPA-E is helping in convening these groups across the 
services. The potential role of DOD to test and validate and to offer 
an initial market for new energy technologies is well-understood 
at ARPA-E, offsetting the fact that its home organization, DOE, 
generally does not engage in the innovation process beyond late stage 
development and prototyping support.
74  Alic, J., Sarewitz, D., Weiss, C., and Bonvillian, W. B. (2010). “A New Strategy for 
Energy Innovation”, Nature 466, 316–17, https://www.nature.com/articles/466316a; 
Bonvillian, W. B. (2011). “Time for Plan B for Climate”, Issues in Science and 
Technology 27/2: 51–58, http://www.issues.org/27.2/bonvillian.html
75  Hourihan M., and Stepp, M. (2001). “Lean, Mean and Clean: Energy Innovation 
and the Department of Defense”, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation 
(March): 1–26, http://www.itif.org/files/2011-lean-mean-clean.pdf
76  See, for example, Hourihan and Stepp. (2001). “Lean, Mean and Clean”; and 
testimony of DOD Deputy Under Secretary for Facilities and Environment Dorothy 
Robyn (Robyn, D. (2010). Testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Committee, Financial Management, Government Information 
and Federal Services Subcommittee.
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Commercialization Team—ARPA-E has assembled on staff a separate 
team working full time to promote implementation and commercial 
advances for ARPA-E technologies. These team members work with 
particular PMs on the most promising technologies emerging from their 
portfolios. ARPA-E, in effect, has added a variation to DARPA’s famous 
“Heilmeier Catechism”77 by requiring PMs and their Commercial 
Teammates to “tell me how your story will end and how will you get 
there?” The tactics this team develops in implementing technologies can 
include creating follow-on approaches for ARPA-E funded technologies 
through in-reach with DOE applied programs, connections to DOD 
testbeds and procurement, as well as connections to VCs and interested 
company collaborators, or combinations of these. Their work includes 
identifying first markets and market niches for ARPA-E technologies.
“Halo Effect”—ARPA-E is consciously taking advantage of the “halo 
effect”, where VCs and commercial firms pick up and move toward 
commercialization the technologies that are selected by ARPA-E as 
promising. In other words, the private sector views the ARPA-E project 
selection process as rigorous and sound enough that it is prepared to 
fund projects emerging from that process. ARPA-E recently announced, 
for example, that six of its early projects, which it funded at $23 million, 
subsequently received over $100 million in private sector financing.78 
This effect has been seen before at DARPA and at the Department 
of Commerce’s Advanced Technology Program (revised in 2007 as 
the Technology Investment Program). The VC or financing firm will 
perform its “due diligence” regardless, but ARPA-E’s selection helps in 
identifying and, in effect, validating, a candidate pool.
Connecting to the industry “stage-gate” process79—the stage-gate 
process is used by most major companies in some form in the management 
of their R&D and technology development. In this approach, candidate 
77  George H. Heilmeier was Director of DARPA from 1975–79. See Chapters 1, 8, and 
10 for discussions of “The Heilmeier Catechism,” a set of questions to ask about 
proposed research projects. See, generally, Heilmeier, G. H. (1991). Oral History 
Interview (by Arthur Norberg). Minneapolis, MN: Charles Babbage Institute, https://
conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/107352
78  Department of Energy. (2011). “Six ARPA-E Projects Illustrate Private Investors 
Excited About Clean Energy Innovation”, 3 February.
79  Cooper, R. G., Edgett, S. J., and Kleinschmidt, E. J. (2002). “Optimizing the Stage-
gate Process”, Research Technology Management (Industrial Research Institute, Inc.) 
45/5, https://doi.org/10.1080/08956308.2002.11671532
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technology projects are reevaluated at each stage of development, 
weeded-out and only what appear to be the most promising from a 
commercial success perspective move to the next stage. This is not a 
process ARPA-E employs; like DARPA (as discussed above), it places 
technology visioning up front in its process,80 and adopts a high-risk/
high-payoff approach to meet the technology vision. Although ARPA-
E’s is a more fluid and less rigid, vision-based approach, it has recently 
started to work with its researchers to get their technologies into a format 
and condition to survive in the industry stage-gate process. For academic 
researchers in particular, this is not a familiar process. Because most 
early generation energy technologies are component technologies, and 
will have to fit into existing systems and platforms controlled by existing 
companies,81 ARPA-E PMs are recognizing that many of the technologies 
it nurtures must slot into the stage-gate industry practice if they are going 
to link with industry. Therefore, ARPA-E is considering how to prepare 
its technologies (and technologists) to withstand this process.
Consortia encouragement—aside from stage-gate connections to 
industry, in a different kind of outreach effort, ARPA-E is building an 
additional industry connection step between the firms and academics 
that it works with and the industries they must land in: consortia 
promotion. ARPA-E tries to pave the way for acceptance of its new 
technologies at firms by working to encourage companies that work 
in similar areas to talk to each other on common problems, including 
on technology solutions that ARPA-E’s current or prospective projects 
could present. This is another facet of its community building efforts 
referenced above. For example, its PMs are working on this approach 
with groups of companies potentially interested in ARPA-E’s carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) and battery project portfolios. The 
kinds of problems discussed are not the researcher’s “secret sauce”, 
but common issues of organization and general technology advance, 
including technology needs and standards relevant to all participants—
both the researchers and the firms that may be interested in their 
emerging technologies. This approach helps prepares the ground for 
technology implementation and acceptance.
80  Carleton. (2010). “The Value of Vision”.
81  Weiss, C. and Bonvillian, W. B. (2009). Structuring an Energy Technology Revolution. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 185–90.
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Prize authority—following in DARPA’s footsteps,82 ARPA-E has 
authority (America COMPETES Act Reauthorization 2010, Sec. 904(f)) 
to offer cash prizes for meeting technology challenges and is considering 
how to use it. This could be an additional creative tool for technology 
acceleration and implementation but may require unique adaptations to 
fit the legacy energy sector.
To briefly summarize, then, ARPA-E has not only worked to replicate 
elements at DARPA, but it has attempted to build new elements in its 
innovation ruleset as it confronts unique features of the energy sector 
where its technologies must land, and of the DOE bureaucracy it must 
work with. These new elements can be grouped into three broad areas, 
as detailed above: in sharpening the research visioning, selection, and 
support process; in building a politically survivable support community; 
and in the implementing and deployment process for its technology 
advances. Organizational tools in these categories being developed 
at ARPA-E present lessons that could be relevant and useful to other 
innovation agencies.
Relevance of the Additional DARPA Features (cited above) 
for Applicability to ARPA-E
In the discussion of DARPA, above, a number of DARPA capabilities 
not generally noted in the literature to date have potential relevance 
to ARPA-E in strengthening its operations and enhancing its future 
capabilities. These are organizational options not necessarily relevant 
to ARPA-E’s current startup phase, but that it could consider as it 
continues to evolve. They may also serve as guideposts to help ARPA-E 
fill gaps and improve its performance. A series of the additional DARPA 
capabilities discussed above in this chapter’s Section I, are reviewed 
below for relevance to ARPA-E.
Multigenerational Technology Thrust—as noted, DARPA has not 
only been able to undertake individual technology projects, but to work 
over an extended period to create enduring “motifs”—generations 
82  See, for example, DARPA. (2009). Network Challenge, https://www.darpa.mil/
program/darpa-robotics-challenge; Wikipedia contributors. (2019). “DARPA 
Grand Challenge”, Wikipedia, 17 September, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
DARPA_Grand_Challenge
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of new applications within a technology thrust that have changed 
technology landscapes over an extended period. Examples, as noted, 
include its work in IT, stealth, and precision strike. The approach 
ARPA-E is now implementing of projects with a three- to five-year 
duration based on the expected “life” of its PMs, will likely require 
supplementing with a multigenerational model, because many energy 
technologies will require ongoing advances before they reach maturity 
and optimal efficiency. For example, ARPA-E understands lithium 
ion generation battery advances likely will be displaced by further 
generations, yet the three- to five-year project approach will not get 
ARPA-E to the subsequent generational battery advances without 
further work on its technology organization. ARPA-E has settled on 
a series of program portfolios which could provide a basis over time 
for thrust areas, as summarized above. However, it has avoided a 
technology strategy to date, viewing it as a limiting factor on its PMs’ 
ability to respond to technology opportunities; it may have to consider 
such an approach to manage the handoffs in the technology sectors it 
is pursuing as PMs succeed each other. Otherwise, it may not be able 
to field a multigenerational technology thrust capability to meet the 
inherently long-term challenges of most energy technologies.
Strategic Relations between Technologies—DARPA has launched 
related technologies that complement each other, which help build 
support for the commercialization or implementation of each. For 
example, its stealth technology advances complemented its precision 
strike advances, with both serving as mutual enablers. Launching bundles 
of related technologies could similarly alter the energy landscape. For 
example, new batteries coupled to biofuel advances could significantly 
enhance the energy consumption effects of hybrid vehicles, and storage 
advances are crucial enablers for enhanced renewables technologies. As 
ARPA-E builds out its technology portfolios, it could work to envision 
linked and crossover technology advances, supporting complementary 
efforts.
Confluence with an Advocate Community—DARPA created a 
broad and sizable community over time from its PM “graduates” 
and numerous award recipients in both universities and industry. 
This community was trained in the DARPA model and technology 
approaches, and in turn constituted a sizable group of change agents 
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that invaded and altered numerous technology sectors. In other words, 
DARPA has become far larger than simply its onboard staff. ARPA-E 
began on a much smaller scale than DARPA, but needs to consciously 
work to build its community to make them not only supporters for its 
continuation (see subsection II.b. (“Building a Community of Support”), 
above, for a discussion on its support community) but an allied group of 
change agents. Its technology task, because it is innovating in a legacy 
sector, may prove considerably more daunting than DARPA’s, so it 
will need over time to field an army. Its summit, discussed above in 
subsection II.b. is a useful initial organizing mechanism in this regard, 
although ARPA-E will need additional mechanisms to achieve this.
Connection to Larger Innovation Elements—DARPA has spawned 
new technologies that arose and converged with venture capital and 
entrepreneurial support and led to new economic sectors, particularly 
in IT fields. Thus, DARPA has been able to play an intermediary role 
with industry, able to make its advances reinforce sectors that support 
them, creating a mutual synergy. ARPA-E will need to consider this 
approach with the firms and sectors it collaborates with, including those 
providing capital support, as its technologies advance. It is already 
moving in this direction, as the discussion of the new elements in model 
suggest, becoming an actor connected with larger innovation efforts. It 
can play an instrumental role in these larger innovation systems, seldom 
as a sole actor, but instead as a team creator and player. The DARPA 
approach where its technologies spawned numerous IT firms which help 
effectuate its overall vision, and are linked to other supporting elements 
in DOD, offers lessons for ARPA-E. As its technologies progress, it will 
need to consider the appropriate models for this kind of confluence in 
the complex energy sector.
Takes on Incumbents—DARPA historically invaded territory 
occupied by companies or bureaucracies when it needed to foster 
technology advances. Perhaps its most famous example, as noted, 
is how, in an effort to develop new command and control systems, it 
drove desktop personal computing and the Internet to displace the 
IBM mainframe model, in a classic example of disruptive technology 
launch.83 Because energy is a CELS—a complex, established “legacy” 
sector—conflict with legacy firms with established technologies will 
83  Waldrop. (2001). The Dream Machine.
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be frequent and inevitable for APRA-E. The energy legacy sectors 
probably see this coming. The only opposition, for example, to the 
ARPA-E concept when it was proposed in the National Academies’ 
Gathering Storm report of 2006 was from the CEO of a major oil 
company.84 While DARPA faced internal bureaucratic battles to launch 
its technologies, it only occasionally faced industry conflict because 
it tended to stand up technologies in new territories rather than in 
existing legacy sectors.85 ARPA-E, however, will likely face incumbent 
technologies and firms across its technology portfolios. Accordingly, 
it will need to further build its support communities if it is to be 
successful in launching its technologies (see discussion on community 
building in subsection II.b. above). In addition, it will need to continue 
to enhance its technology implementation capabilities (subsection II.c. 
(“Technology Implementation”), above, and Section III in this chapter 
(“The Remaining Technology Implementation Challenge for DARPA 
and ARPA-E”), below).
First Adopter/Initial Market Creation Role—DARPA has frequently 
undertaken a technology insertion role; in coordination with other parts 
of DOD it has been able to create initial markets for its new technologies, 
allowing the Department to serve as first technology adopter. As 
discussed above (subsection II.c.), DOE offers no comparable first 
market for ARPA-E technologies. 
Given DOD’s interest in energy technology advances, it could serve 
as an initial market. ARPA-E will need to develop further strategies to 
find first adopters and initial markets because the lack of track records 
on costs and efficiencies constitutes a serious barrier to commercializing 
and scaling new energy technologies.
Ties to Technology Leadership—DARPA has been particularly 
effective when it is tied to senior leaders that can effectuate its 
technologies through DOD or elsewhere. ARPA-E has been effective 
to date, as discussed above, in securing a network of leaders in the 
Department, in the White House and on Capitol Hill, to support it, but 
will need to continually work to bolster its ties to energy decisionmakers 
in key places throughout the government who can help it fulfill its 
mission.
84  National Academy of Science. (2007). Rising above the Gathering Storm, 152–53.
85 Bonvillian and Weiss. (2009). “Taking Covered Wagons East”; and Weiss and 
Bonvillian. (2011). “Complex, Established ‘Legacy’ Sectors”.
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Doesn’t Necessarily Launch into a Free Market—DARPA has 
embedded itself in a connected innovation system, taking advantage of 
DOD’s ability, as noted above, to operate at all stages of innovation, 
from research, to development, to prototype, to demonstration, to 
testbed, to initial market creation. Therefore, it often has been able to 
launch technology into an integrated system—it doesn’t have to toss 
its prototype technologies over a wall hoping they will be picked up in 
the private sector, it can ready them for scaling in the private sector, or 
simply stay in military markets. While, as discussed in Section I, this 
often is not easy, DARPA has nonetheless made this work. ARPA-E 
recognizes that because it will be launching its technologies into a CELS, 
it may be able to use DOD testbed and procurement roles, as discussed 
above, to further its advances. It can also fund creative companies that 
have capability to commercialize its technologies into products, and it 
can otherwise guide its technologies into commercialization, building 
portfolios of technologies for in depth technology thrusts into emerging 
markets. It can, in addition, leverage its technologies against regulatory 
mechanisms, such as fuel economy and appliance standards, or state 
renewable portfolio standards. These, along with additional tools, will 
need to be sharpened.
Ahead of the Game—just as DARPA has tried to stay in front of 
Congressional interference and micro-management, ARPA-E has 
worked to develop coherent narratives about its technology approaches 
that show its projects to be “ahead of the game”. Like DARPA, it has 
worked to avoid a situation where Congress captures the narrative 
and forces ARPA-E involvement. In the next several years, however, 
particularly as some of its projects approach implementation stages, 
ARPA-E will need to demonstrate success and further refine its story.
In conclusion, ARPA-E presents an exciting and innovative emerging 
agency model. It has successfully incorporated the basic operating rules 
from DARPA into its own ruleset. In addition, because it must operate 
in the demanding energy sector, which is different from the sectors 
where DARPA operates, it has evolved a group of its own new rules. 
There are also useful future lessons for ARPA-E for its organization and 
strategy from a series of DARPA approaches that have not been covered 
in depth in the literature on DARPA. Finally, while ARPA-E has taken 
important steps in the back end of the energy innovation system to 
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implement technologies it nurtures, additional implementation efforts 
will be needed. This problem is discussed in detail below.
III. The Remaining Technology Implementation 
Challenge for DARPA and ARPA-E
Both DARPA and ARPA-E face a profound challenge in technology 
implementation. For DARPA, the Cold War era of major defense 
acquisition budgets is long gone, and defense “recapitalization”—the 
replacement of existing generation of aircraft, ships and land vehicles 
with new defense platforms—is evolving at a glacial pace. Finding 
homes for its evolving technologies, therefore, has increasingly become 
a difficult task for DARPA. Because technology transition was once 
a difficult, but comparatively straightforward, task for DARPA, it 
has not yet fully faced up to the implications of how complex it has 
now become. ARPA-E faces a technology transfer problem of the first 
magnitude: the U.S. has a failed history of moving technology advances 
into CELS (complex, established “legacy” sectors), including in energy. 
U.S. Presidents have been calling for energy independence for four 
decades; the situation has only gotten worse, probably an unparalleled 
U.S. record for technology failure.
The innovation system used by the defense sector has led most major 
innovation waves of the twentieth century: aviation, electronics, nuclear 
power, space, computing and the Internet.86 In the process, DOD has 
built a systems approach to its technology advances—it operates, 
as noted. at each stage of the innovation process: R&D, prototypes, 
demonstrations and testbeds, engineering and incremental advances, 
and initial market creation. At each stage, it has created institutions and 
functions that enable this systems approach.
There are essentially four of these sets of institutions and related 
functions that match the innovation stages: (1) at the breakthrough R&D 
stage, DOD uses DARPA, which supplements more traditional service 
R&D agencies; (2) at the prototype/demonstration/testbed stage, it uses 
the services, including their system of service labs (FFRDC’s); (3) at the 
engineering and incremental advances stage, for its technologies and 
86  Ruttan. (2006). Is War Necessary.
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the platforms that use them, DOD uses the services’ development and 
procurement programs, based on DOD’s “requirements” system;87 (4) 
for initial market creation, DOD uses its services-based procurement 
programs. While the handoffs between these DOD institutions and 
functions are rarely smooth, it is nonetheless a comparatively integrated 
system. DOD periodically supplements this system with efforts to 
launch technologies through civilian markets—DARPA, as noted below, 
has played a particularly important role in this approach.
An energy technology transformation is going to require a systems 
approach comparable to DOD’s. DOE now has a DARPA-equivalent 
for the breakthrough R&D stage, complementing other DOE research 
entities. How will it handle the other three innovation system stages 
it must put into place to implement its technologies? The discussion 
below first reviews in detail the challenges DARPA faces in making the 
DOD innovation system work to implement technologies it originates. 
This provides lessons for ARPA-E’s implementation challenges as well.
A. The Implementation Problem: Launch Pathways for 
DARPA and ARPA-E Through Military Procurement, 
Established Industry and the Entrepreneur/VC Model
Can ARPA-E succeed with its focus on transitioning the results of its 
research to commercial industry, in comparison to DARPA’s main 
mission of developing technology for defense capabilities? The 
information technology examples discussed in this paper demonstrate 
that DARPA, using a technology push approach, did develop a successful 
university-private sector approach for supporting these technologies. 
While DARPA faces a problem of the “valley of death” between its 
research and late stage development, there is an equally, if not more, 
daunting problem of “market launch” lurking behind it.88 DARPA has 
87  See discussion of this engineering stage at DOD in Alic, J. (2011). Defense Department 
Energy Innovation: Three Cases. Presentation at Forum on Leveraging DOD’s Energy 
Innovation Capacity, at the Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, DC, 25 May; and 
Gholz, E. (2011). How Military Innovation Works and the Role of Industry. Presentation 
at forum on Leveraging DOD’s Energy Innovation Capacity at the Bipartisan Policy 
Center, Washington, DC, 25 May (see summary at https://bipartisanpolicy.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Energy-Innovation-at-DoD.pdf).
88  The concept of “market launch” is developed in Weiss and Bonvillian. (2009). 
Structuring an Energy Technology Revolution, 14, 20, 34.
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five decades of history in attempting to launch its technology using 
primarily three pathways: military procurement, established industry, 
and a comparatively new entrepreneur/VC model that DARPA itself 
helped enable. The launch difficulties for DARPA for each of these 
pathways will be explored in detail below. Since ARPA-E is too young 
to have its technologies reach the implementation stage, there is less 
clarity over the difficulty of its market launch problems. Therefore, the 
discussion below will focus on DARPA. At the close of this discussion, 
future technology implementation issues for DARPA will be considered 
based on these launch pathway issues, followed by a discussion of how 
DARPA’s lessons can provide guidance for ARPA-E.
1. Market Launch in the Military Sector
DARPA’s main mission implementations, such as unmanned aerial 
vehicles, large-scale radars for missile defense, and standoff precision 
strike systems, were effected in a very different environment than 
commercial industry. Military procurement has enabled implementation 
of its military technologies as well providing initial markets for a number 
of technologies implemented primarily through the commercial sector. 
Importantly, even with the strong defense imperative and backing 
from high- levels in DOD for these programs, their implementation, 
as noted in this chapter’s Section II, generally was difficult, costly and 
time consuming. With only the very exceptional implementation of 
stealth technology as the F-117A, which was, as noted above, personally 
overseen by Under Secretary of Defense William Perry, most DARPA-
developed military capabilities faced difficult transitions into military 
service acquisitions. Notably, these transition problems can be attributed 
to differentiating factors in military systems compared to commercial 
products, as follows.
Major DOD systems differ substantially from most commercial 
products:
• Major DOD platforms and systems are massive undertakings 
compared to almost any other industry endeavor89
89  There are very few industry tech developments at a scale comparable to those of 
major defense systems. One recent example is the Boeing 787 Dreamliner passenger 
aircraft. Notably, that development has experienced major problems in cost and time 
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• DOD’s recapitalization rate through its procurement programs 
has been in sharp decline since the end of the Cold War. It 
builds ever few major systems and each system is likely to 
be fielded over decades and thus have to meet or respond to 
projected requirements that are difficult to ascertain and are 
likely to change in unforeseeable ways.
Commercial and DOD product development processes are 
substantially different:
• DOD systems are contracted efforts implemented by third 
parties through program offices. The program is funded based 
on front-end decision processes based on “needs” criteria and 
some assessment of feasibility prospects—but these are often 
at a high level and often with limited means to assess them 
within the contracted phase.
• In contrast, industry generally makes decisions concerning its 
own money and investments directly related to developing 
and implementing the product itself (in conjunction with 
suppliers and, potentially, outside investors).
• However, this may have changed significantly for commercial 
industry in recent years, as more of the development is based 
on outsourced subsystems and components, and even the 
development itself may have been outsourced. The distributed 
manufacturing model may have changed the connectivity 
within the firm between decision and performance and perhaps 
changed the motivations concerning resource decisions.
• At the same time, DOD contractors have also become more 
distributed and diffuse, with the concept of lead system 
to produce (it is three years late and facing on the order of $12 billion in overruns), 
some of which can be attributed to problems of transitioning and implementing 
new technologies. See, Gates, D. (2010). “Dreamliner Woes Pile Up”, Seattle Times, 
18 December, http://old.seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2013713745_
dreamliner19.html It also appears that Boeing, taking a chapter from the IT sector 
and its distributed global manufacturing model, hoped to become a global systems 
integrator to spread and reduce its aircraft development risk, since the capital costs 
mean each new plane launch is usually a “bet the company” experience. However, 
complex aero technologies have not yet proven as susceptible as IT to global 
production distribution. The complexity of managing a global sourcing network 
for the 787 has been relentlessly problematic.
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integrator and a dispersed supply chain, so there may be 
interesting lessons learned between defense and commercial 
firms as they both negotiate this new approach to enterprise 
management.
2. Market Launch Through Established Industry
Although DOD has launched many incremental advances through its 
service procurements with large firms, for the reasons discussed below, 
DARPA has had limited success launching its breakthrough advances 
into established industry.
Commercial and DOD/DARPA technology risk profiles are 
substantially different: DOD through DARPA has implemented 
technology push systems that are new and unprecedented, compared 
to industry, to achieve technological superiority with limited prior 
knowledge or experience with the proposed technology or its use.
• Several such systems have been developed by DARPA, as 
a technology push organization, with minimum to little 
explicit interest or involvement of the services, the “recipient” 
developer. Often the push for development is a “top-down” 
mandate from OSD, as noted above, or even Congress. Such 
systems—e.g., precision strike—are often developed by 
DARPA as the “innovation hub” explicitly to be disruptive 
or transformational, but their very nature makes them far 
riskier, not just from a technological perspective, but from the 
standpoint of transition and operational risk.
• However, such developments still must be implemented 
within the existing service acquisition processes, which are 
relatively cautious about taking on new capabilities beyond 
their internally developed systems.
• Often the recipient service has very different perspectives 
and interests from DARPA, the technology developer, on 
the priorities and value of the technology and its potential 
application. There are many instances in which the recipient 
service actively has opposed the technology before being 
mandated by those at higher levels in OSD to accept it, as 
was the case, as noted above, with stealth, tactical UAVs, 
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HALE UAVs, and tactical satellites. In some cases, the service 
has actually successfully fought the technology or so poorly 
implemented it that the technological capability eventually 
succumbed; examples include Discoverer II, Arsenal Ship, 
and the Aquila UAV.90
• The recipient service organization is loath to spend the 
additional resources required to “de-risk” the “revolutionary” 
concept particularly if it disrupts or counters its accepted 
operations and capabilities, and distracts resources that it sees 
as needed for these.
• Technology push systems usually offer little information to 
guide their actual use and deployment; what levels of capability 
are necessary to achieve different levels of performance are 
difficult to define or assess. Thus, “knowledge risk” might be a 
major impediment to the adoption of such radical technologies.
• While World War II and the Cold War forced DOD to innovate 
in an atmosphere of crisis, with the end of the Cold War and 
short term symmetric threats, there is a diminished sense of 
crisis, and a corresponding decline in impetus for the services 
to adopt DARPA’s transformative advances, exacerbating its 
technology implementation problems.91 This is not simply a 
military problem; the “knowledge risk” and limited sense of 
crisis are reasons why industry is usually adverse to radical 
as opposed to incremental innovation; other reasons are 
discussed below.
Industry is almost always highly constrained on investments into new 
endeavors. Within the firm there is constant competition for resources, 
thus industry generally entertains low technical risk. Firms actively 
assess risk and value in a series of spaces:
90  For a thorough case analysis of the difficulties in the U.S. Army implementation of 
tactical UAVs, see Knox, W. D. (1999). Of Gladiators and Spectators: Aquila, the Case for 
Army Acquisition Reform. Carlisle, PA: Army War College.
91  Vernon Ruttan has raised the concern that with the post-Cold War decline in impetus 
in defense innovation, the U.S. innovation system may not now be strong enough 
to launch new breakthrough technologies in either the public or the private sector 
(Ruttan, V. W. (2006). “Will Government Programs Spur the Next Breakthrough?”, 
Issues in Science and Technology 22/2: 55–61).
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• Assessment occurs between the current product, process 
development and the new endeavor. For example, Sun 
Microsystems faced a major resource crunch to maintain its 
current product competitiveness that almost prevented the 
development of the next generation SPARC work-station.92 
Current product demands dominate production investment 
decisions, with new risky products requiring external 
corporate support, which often isolates their development.
• Assessment also occurs between current product divisions 
and new divisions or enterprises needed to foster the 
new products. In an example of failed assessment, DEC, 
after stunning success in microcomputers, was not able to 
adequately access and manage the transition to desktops and 
ever more personal computing through a crisis of imagination 
and innovation organization.93
• These risk and value criteria are constantly being evaluated 
with strong prospects that a system development in industry 
will be cancelled or severely scaled back if it starts to go off 
track in any key risk dimension. This is often undertaken 
through the widely-adopted industry “stage-gate” process for 
R&D management, which constantly screens and weeds out 
potential innovations.94
• For industry, time-to-product is crucial. The space between 
market entry vs. the competition is a major criterion; there 
is a difference in being first and not being in the game. On 
the other side of this coin, there are also sometimes cost and 
learning advantages to launching improved products as first 
follower to market.
• The space between production costs and market price is also 
crucial. If new underlying technologies for products show 
92  Bertrand, H., and Van Atta, R. (1993). Technology Transfer in the Private Sector: Expert 
Interviews on Issues, Methodologies, and Problems, IDA Document D-1407. Alexandria, 
VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.
93  Schein, E. (2004). DEC is Dead, Long Live DEC—Lessons on Innovation, Technology and 
the Business Gene. San Francisco, CA: BK Berrett-Kohler Publishers.
94  Cooper, Edgett, and Kleinschmidt. (2002). “Optimizing the Stage-Gate Process”.
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signs of cost escalation and seriously erode profitability, the 
product is highly likely to be cancelled.
Industry development of technology push systems is rare and difficult 
given the above issues, as well as problems of business constraints 
on finance, time-to-product, and internal and external competition. 
Technology push developments within existing firms are usually 
incremental, with one new element or component introduced, 
rarely as a major new integrated system, and market-entry is staged 
carefully relative to “creating” demand. As Ruttan has explored, 
incremental advances usually respond to calculated market niches 
and opportunities,95 while breakthrough innovation can rely on 
few such market calculations because the transformative product is 
unanticipated and disruptive to markets. There are exceptions, but even 
Apple’s properly vaunted latest products fit this model. The iPod was 
a breakthrough combination of a good MP3 player with a new music 
access system; its iPad was handheld notebook coupled with broader 
media access, communication and computing capability. Both were 
breakthrough products because of the way they combined previously 
unmixed technologies, but they integrated mostly available and 
comparatively mature components into new forms and combinations, 
rather than introducing multiple new technologies. In addition, Apple 
also relied on distributed global manufacturing to further cut its 
production risks and to share development costs, allowing it to move 
rapidly from design to production to quickly capture market share.
Technology push developments within existing firms are usually run 
differently from the rest of the firm, with different a management structure 
and oversight, such as the “Skunk Works” approach (at Lockheed and 
for IBM’s PC desktop line), the R&D centers at such large firms such as 
IBM, GE and P&G, or through the innovation hub notion. Often, such 
developments report to headquarters and are separate from existing 
product divisions. Their transition efforts are usually accomplished 
with strong involvement from central management; while this may be a 
necessity,96 it tends to disconnect production and the new products they 
may have to produce, reducing the potential for “learning by doing”.
95  Ruttan, V. W. (2001). Technology, Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation 
Perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
96  Bennis and Biederman. (1997). Organizing Genius, 206–07.
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3. Launching Through the Entrepreneur/VC Model:  
The Role of Entrepreneurs, Startups and VCs 
Technology push developments in industry are often undertaken 
outside of existing firms by startups. Frequently, these are led by 
entrepreneurs who left existing firms or obtained technologies from 
existing firms or government research, forming startups and using 
risk capital from outside investors, usually angel investors, and then 
venture capitalists (and sometimes as corporate-sponsored “spin-
outs”). This Entrepreneurial/VC system was a U.S. model dating 
from the 1960’s and 1970’s. Through this system, the U.S. successfully 
launched the IT innovation wave (then the biotech wave), giving 
it a significant world competitive advantage and enabling one of 
the strongest economic growth periods in twentieth century U.S. 
economic history, in the 1990’s. Although many nations have envied 
this model, few have been able to stand up comparable capability. 
DARPA played a very significant role its creation because its IT 
advances coincided with its development, creating strong mutual 
synergies. This entrepreneur/VC model was the element that enabled 
DARPA to get around the profound difficulties of trying to introduce 
its innovations into established industries, with all of the complexities 
and entry problems listed above. Thus, DARPA did an end run around 
the established industrial sector in introducing IT.
However, the Entrepreneurial/VC sector has its own limits and 
requirements, too:
• Such startup ventures are subject to a different set of rules and 
practices driven by the outside investment community, with 
well-defined risk assessment and mitigation strategies and 
practices
• The risk of failure is accepted but because risks are high, the 
payoffs when successful are required to be very high.
• The investment decision is made early in development, and 
the endeavor is “given” high-level management support 
by investors to achieve transition, e.g., Scott McNeely was 
placed as CEO for Sun Microsystems by venture capital 
investor Vinod Khosla of Kleiner Perkins. Displacement of the 
418 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
initial inventor team with more experienced management is 
frequently the price startups pay for VC support.
• VC investors expect relatively quick payback, so VCs need 
to be able to move their firms to Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) within a few years of their investments. Thus, VCs 
won’t support technologies more than two or three years 
from production, and not much longer than that to projected 
profitability, which are prerequisites to launching an IPO 
and getting their investors’ money back. This worked well 
in the IT revolution, when new applications could build on 
an expanding sector as the IT innovation wave gathered 
momentum and expanded in many directions. Similarly, 
it worked in biotech, with larger pharmaceuticals ready to 
produce or buy out biotech companies once their technologies 
were in range of FDA approval. However, the entrepreneur/
VC model, with these relative short timetable requirements 
for spinning off to the IPO stage, is not readily adaptable to 
CELS. Even where DARPA sponsors new technologies that 
can lead to “open territory” innovation not limited by legacy 
incumbents, the model requires a significant emergence period 
before it will accept other technology—it took from 1969 to 
around 1992 before the Internet revolution began to scale.
Therefore, technology push developments in both established industry 
and through the entrepreneur/VC model are often undertaken using 
support and subsidies from the government to provide initial buffers 
against technology and market risks, providing early customer and 
production learning.
The above discussion has focused on DARPA, which has fifty years 
of experience trying to move its technologies into implementation. 
A major embedded point in the above discussion is that DARPA’s 
technology transition is not going to get any easier. Three DARPA launch 
pathways were identified above: launch through DOD procurement, 
through established industry, and through the entrepreneur/VC model. 
Bootstrapping its technology advances onto military procurement may 
prove more difficult for DARPA over time, as discussed. The services 
already tend to resist disruptive technologies, and this tendency may 
 41913. ARPA-E and DARPA
accelerate as budgets decline and procurements stretch out. DARPA’s 
ability to launch technologies initially through established industry 
has never been as strong because, as discussed, their economic 
constraints make them risk averse, rarely willing to embrace disruptive 
technologies. DARPA has enlisted established firms through the military 
procurement system, however, and developed important technologies 
through such entities as Lockheed’s Skunk Works and IBM’s research 
division. It has also supported advances through industry consortia, in 
semiconductors, for example. Sometimes, in its projects, it will try to tie 
smaller firms with larger ones, with the larger firms sometimes leading 
the research management, to facilitate technology scaling. However, as 
will be explored in more detail in the next section below, DOD faces a 
challenge to its overall technology leadership due to the decline of the 
defense manufacturing base, which will affect the production process as 
DARPA technologies are implemented. This makes this established firm 
sector a DARPA problem not primarily through initial launch but later 
implementation of its technologies.
The third launch pathway, through the entrepreneur/VC model, has 
always provided synergy for DARPA, particularly for the IT advances it 
has sponsored. While this model adapts well to continued IT advance, its 
comparatively short timeframe for obtaining capital, through VCs and 
IPOs, limits its abilities to support the launch of technologies into CELS. 
In addition, significant pump priming may be required for DARPA to 
launch new technologies into new unoccupied territories because while 
the entrepreneurs may be ready, their supporting VC and IPO capital 
system may take time to sell new ideas to their investors. Thus, DARPA 
faces serious constraints for implementing its technologies on each of its 
available launch pathways.
Although ARPA-E is still too young to be pushing products into 
energy markets, the DARPA launch pathways offer important lessons. 
Concerning the military procurement pathway, this offers promising 
implementation opportunities to ARPA-E, as discussed in this chapter’s 
Section II, which it is already starting to pursue. The key will be whether 
DOD’s interest continues or wanes in solving the strategic and tactical 
operating problems created by its energy dependency, and whether 
energy efficiency cost reductions and grid security needs can be achieved 
in reasonable time periods by evolving energy technologies. Concerning 
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launching technologies into established industry, ARPA-E faces all the 
challenges listed above that DARPA faces, and more. Energy is a classic 
CELS, and new technologies launched into such legacy sectors generally 
have to be able to compete on price on day one.97 Although DARPA 
could largely ignore established industry because of the inadaptability 
of breakthrough technologies to commercial constraints, because the 
established energy sector is there and itself needs to be transformed, 
ARPA-E can’t ignore it, it must confront it. If ARPA-E is to have hopes of 
achieving this very challenging entry, it must, at a minimum, incorporate 
into its R&D programs efforts to not only perform research but to drive 
down the costs to competitive levels to enable entry into the energy 
CELS. This is one of the most challenging technology tasks any U.S. 
innovation agency has faced, and there is a long history of problems 
with such efforts at DOE.
Finally, ARPA-E also faces challenges in utilizing the entrepreneur/
VC launch pathway. This is a logical pathway for ARPA-E to emphasize, 
and DARPA has done so very successfully. However, there are two 
major difficulties ahead. First, the timeframe for entrepreneurs and 
their startups, if fueled by VC and IPO capital, is probably on a much 
longer timetable for successful commercialization than for the IT or 
biotech sectors. Because energy is such an established sector, and new 
technologies correspondingly have so many barriers to overcome, 
technology entry may take a long time, well beyond the three- to five-
year timeframe VCs are organized around. Second, most new energy 
technologies are component technologies, they have to fit into existing 
systems and platforms—advanced batteries have to fit into cars, fuel 
cells into homes or commercial buildings, carbon capture technologies 
into utility systems. The established industries or sectors that control the 
platforms or systems may all too often be reluctant customers, unwilling 
to absorb the risk of accepting new technology components until they 
are fully proven and demonstrated, and costs clear. Without access to 
a strong testbed system for these demonstrations, the entrepreneur/VC 
model is unlikely to coalesce around most such technologies emerging 
from ARPA-E.
97  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2009). “Taking Covered Wagons East”.
 42113. ARPA-E and DARPA
B. The Problems of Manufacturing and Testbeds
To summarize, the technology implementation challenge faced by both 
DARPA and ARPA-E is a profound one, although different for each 
agency. DARPA can still try to use DOD as an initial market, although, 
as noted above, that is harder than in the past. It has always also tried 
alternatively to stand up its technologies in the civilian sector, where its 
success in IT is the leading example. In this “dual-use” approach, the 
civilian sectors pick up the DARPA technology and fund the ongoing 
engineering and incremental advances, as well as related applications. 
Thus, the military leverages from the civilian sector, cutting its own 
development costs and creating a range of applications that the military 
itself could never evolve. As long as DARPA is innovating in new as 
opposed to established sectors, that model, while never easy and longer 
term, can be made to work. However, DARPA needs to devote new 
attention to how its innovation can move into both military and civilian 
markets, given the underlying problem discussed above for its launch 
pathways.
For example, DOD has long relied on the strength of the U.S. 
industrial production base, which has been the world’s strongest since 
the late nineteenth century. However, China has now likely passed the 
U.S. in manufacturing output98 and the production function for U.S. 
industry is globalizing. U.S. military superiority has long relied on U.S. 
technological superiority, and its corresponding ability to implement 
and mobilize that superiority through on-shore production. That era 
may be shifting.99 Accordingly, DARPA, as suggested in this chapter’s 
98  IHS Global Insight states that in 2010, China accounted for 19.8 percent of world 
manufacturing output (in current dollars), a fraction ahead of the United States’ 
19.4 percent; China’s manufacturing sector grew 18 percent in 2010 and the 
U.S. at 12 percent; over 2008–10 China’s manufacturing sector grew at a pace 
of 20.2 percent per year, while the United States grew at 1.8 percent and Japan, 
the third largest, at 4.25 percent (IHS Global Insight. (2011). “China Passes U.S. 
in Manufacturing Output”, 14 March, http://manubiz.com/china-edges-ahead-
of-u-s-in-manufacturing-report-says). See also, Baily, M. N. (2011). “Adjusting to 
China, A Challenge to the U.S. Manufacturing Sector”, Brookings Policy Brief 179; 
and Norris, F. (2011). “As US Exports Soar, It’s Not All Soybeans”, New York Times, 
11 February, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/business/economy/12charts.
html?_r=1&src=busl
99  Van Atta, R., Lippitz, M. and Bovey, R. (2005). DOD Technology Management in a 
Global Technology Environment, IDA Paper P-4017, Alexandria, VA: Institute for 
Defense Analyses.
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Section I, above, is now looking hard at whether new manufacturing 
technologies and processes could improve U.S. production productivity 
to a point where the U.S. could retain production leadership in critical 
sectors, a key military capability.100 This, however, is inherently dual-use 
technology which would have to be implemented in the private sector. 
DARPA needs to consider, in parallel to its manufacturing R&D efforts, 
the implementation tools at DOD it could make use of, including DOD’s 
Mantech program and the Defense Production Act, along with DOD’s 
defense procurement authority.101 Manufacturing is just one of many 
technology implementation problems DARPA will face in the future, 
which may compel it to examine additional implementation models.
As noted above, ARPA-E likewise faces major implementation 
problems as it launches technologies into the energy CELS. It is 
working on, as discussed in this chapter’s Section II, above, a number 
of interesting new mechanisms to assist in this task, including: 
consideration of implementation early in its selection process; selecting 
PMs with venture or startup experience; an “in-reach” effort within 
DOE for implementation support from DOE applied agencies; forming 
its own commercialization team; working with the industry stage-gate 
process; assisting in forming industry consortia; and connecting with 
DOD for testbed and initial market creation for its technologies. While 
both DARPA and ARPA-E move technologies down the innovation 
pipeline to the prototype or small-scale demonstration stage, neither 
agency itself has the financing authority to enable initial market 
commercialization of its potentially breakthrough technologies. 
Although, as noted, DARPA can work to leverage DOD procurement 
for product introduction for military or dual-use technologies, DOE has 
no such capability for ARPA-E to leverage. While DOE has an energy 
loan guarantee program, it is not structured to finance new technologies 
without a performance track record.102
100  MIT Washington Office. (2010). “Survey of Federal Manufacturing Efforts”, 4–6, 
http://web.mit.edu/dc/Policy/MIT%20Survey%20of%20Federal%20Manufacturing 
%20Efforts.pdf
101  DOD’s Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy is playing a lead role in 
this area. See Department of Defense Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base 
Policy. (2011). “Programs”, https://www.businessdefense.gov/Programs/
102  “DOE has had a significant loan guarantee program since 2005 but did not 
issue loans until 2009. It has a mandate to ‘facilitate the introduction of new or 
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This suggests that there is an earlier stage problem, too, that ARPA-E 
faces for its energy technologies. Energy technologies are unlikely to be 
adopted by energy industries, as noted above, until their cost, reliability, 
performance and efficiency is well-proven. For example, while 40 percent 
of CO2 emissions come from the building sector, this sector is highly 
characterized by numerous locally-based firms; it is decentralized, 
undercapitalized, undertakes little R&D and is risk-adverse. It simply 
will not adopt technology advances until they are well-proven. Similar 
problems abound in other energy sectors. A testbed capability has 
been the remedy for this problem, historically. Such testbeds, then, are 
increasingly important in energy technology implementation to create 
the prerequisite demonstrations that will allow commercialization to 
proceed. This is likely not only going to be ARPA-E’s challenge. As 
entry gets more difficult for DARPA’s technologies, a similar testbed 
capability could become significant. While DOD has long developed 
testbed capacity, this is not readily connected to DARPA’s breakthrough 
technology model.
DOD has been working on exactly this problem of a connected 
handoff from R&D to testbed in two interesting energy-related programs. 
The Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program 
(SERDP), formed in 1990, is a DOD R&D program housed within the 
Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Installations and 
Environment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. DOD, EPA and 
DOE share an oversight role over the program. It is coupled to the 
Environmental Security Technology Certification Program (ESTCP), 
formed in 1995, which tests environmental and energy technologies 
emerging from SERDP and elsewhere, which are near deployment but 
require demonstration and validation through a testbed. The programs’ 
online mission statement states that SERDP and ESTCP are DOD’s 
environmental research programs,
significantly improved energy technologies with a high probability of commercial 
success in the marketplace.’ Although the program is aimed at helping move 
technologies past the initial commercialization barrier, the mandate’s language 
builds in potential contradictions. It is limited to deployment-ready projects, so it 
excludes demonstrations, and the ‘high probability of commercial success’ clause, 
perhaps due to the legacy of failed 1980s synfuels projects, significantly limits the 
risks that the program can take with innovative technologies” (Bonvillian. (2011). 
“Time for Plan B”, 58).
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… harnessing the latest science and technology to improve DOD’s 
environmental performance, reduce costs, and enhance and sustain 
mission capabilities. The Programs respond to environmental technology 
requirements that are common to all of the military Services, complementing 
the Services’ research programs. SERDP and ESTCP promote partnerships 
and collaboration among academia, industry, the military Services, and 
other Federal agencies. They are independent programs managed from 
a joint office to coordinate the full spectrum of efforts, from basic and 
applied research to field demonstration and validation.103 
In turn, once through the demonstration process, ESTCP works 
with DOD’s installations programs to enable initial deployment of 
successfully tested technologies. The director and architect of SERDP 
and ESTCP, Dr. Jeff Marqusee, has stated regarding ESTCP that, “We 
can serve as a test bed to get these technologies over the valley of 
death, and then we can be an early market. The calculation is pretty 
straightforward. If we test ten technologies, and one is highly successful, 
we can deploy that in a hundred places [through DOD] and make it 
profitable”.104 These entities amount to an interesting new model for 
the energy/environment field from DOD, explicitly and closely linking 
R&D, testbeds and initial deployment.
A review of pending energy projects by the two connected programs 
indicates work by United Technologies on methodology and tools for 
building systems on DOD installations with a 50 percent efficiency 
improvement, an air source cold climate heat pump with Purdue 
researchers, and demonstration of high gain solar for distributed energy 
needs at DOD facilities with Skyline Solar.105 ESTCP demonstration 
work in microgrids, storage, building efficiency controls is ongoing. 
Funding for a new energy testbed capability at DOD installations 
received $30 million in funding in DOD’s FY12 budget.106 A significant 
103  Department of Defense. (2011). “SERDP and ESTCP Program Information”, http://
www.serdp.org/About-SERDP-and-ESTCP
104  Comment cited in Hourihan and Stepp. (2001). “Lean, Mean and Clean”, 17. See 
also Marqusee, J. (2011). SERDP and ESTCP. Presentation at Forum on Leveraging 
DOD’s Energy Innovation Capacity at the Bipartisan Policy Center, Washington, 
DC, 25 May.
105  See program list in Department of Defense. (2011). “SERDP and ESTCP Energy and 
Water Projects.” An updated description of this effort is available at: https://www.
serdp-estcp.org/Program-Areas/Installation-Energy-and-Water
106  Robyn, D. (2011). Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, 17 March, 10–11.
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expansion of linked R&D and testbeds as well as a connection to initial 
market capability may be one answer to the implementation challenge 
ARPA-E faces.
In the long list of challenges ARPA-E faces, the problem of technology 
implementation is perhaps the most profound. This is because, to 
reemphasize the point, of the difficulty new energy technologies face not 
only with the problem of the “valley of death” in moving from research 
to late stage development, but the problem endemic to CELS of “market 
launch”—implementing technology at scale. ARPA-E has worked 
imaginatively to structure new elements into its model to address this 
problem. The approach of SERDP and ESTCP provides an interesting 
new model in the energy area for ARPA-E to consider as it focuses on 
technology implementation. Collaboration with these programs, which 
ARPA-E is actively working on, may provide a crucial new toolset.
ARPA-E is not alone in facing this implementation problem; the 
applied agencies at DOE, led by EERE, face a similar problem and the 
SERDP/ESTCP combined model of R&D-testbed-deployment offers 
an interesting new approach. DARPA, too, despite remarkable past 
successes, is not immune, as discussed above, from the implementation 
problem. With the budgetary constraints facing DOD for new systems 
development and the weakening posture of risk investments and 
venture capital in the commercial U.S. markets with the drive toward 
outsourcing and offshoring, implementation of DARPA programs 
appears to be a growing problem. DARPA also might learn lessons and 
make further uses of the SERDP/ESTCP approach. In addition, DARPA 
could consider tools such as Mantech and the Defense Production Act 
as the source of demonstration and initial deployment particularly for 
its manufacturing initiatives.
In summary, implementation presents a major challenge for both 
agencies. DARPA needs to consider its existing portfolio of implementation 
support, including ties to SERDP/ESTCP, building its manufacturing 
research efforts, and linking with Mantech and the Defense Production 
Act authority. ARPA-E has worked imaginatively on its implementation 
capabilities, but the complexity of its task requires it to consider additional 
mechanisms, including further collaboration with DOD, connecting to 
the SERDP/ESTCP model, and designing within its research projects 
efforts to drive down costs. These could be coupled to expansion of the 
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interesting new features it is working on to spur development, as well 
as adapting DARPA concepts of multi-generational technology thrust, 
connecting to larger innovation elements, strategic connections between 
technologies, further building of its support community, and expanding 
its first adopter/initial market role.
IV. Conclusion—Brief Summary of Key Points
ARPA-E offers a highly interesting new innovation institution to meet 
the profound energy technology challenge discussed in the introduction. 
Because it is explicitly modeled on DARPA, this paper has reviewed the 
noted DARPA approach in detail. Briefly citing well-known features 
of DARPA, it has explored in detail a number of important features 
that have not been well discussed in the policy literature on DARPA to 
date. These included DARPA’s ability to undertake multigenerational 
technology thrusts, the technology synergies it has been able to create 
through complementary strategic technologies, its ability to build an 
advocate community, and connections it has built to larger innovation 
elements downstream from DARPA. In addition, DARPA has been 
willing to take on incumbent technologies both within DOD and in the 
private sector. It has used ties to DOD leadership to press its advances, 
and does not necessarily launch to a free market by playing roles as first 
adopter and in initial market creation.
The paper subsequently reviewed the new ARPA-E model in detail. 
It first commented on just how ARPA-E has adopted the key elements 
of the DARPA approach. It then discussed new features ARPA-E has 
been moving toward in a series of areas, largely driven by its need to 
confront the unique and difficult demands of the complex, established 
energy sector where it operates. In the area of sharpening the research 
visioning, selection and support process, ARPA-E focuses on: the “white 
space”, where tech opportunities are not being advanced in other parts 
of the innovation system; an interesting two-stage feedback system for 
selecting technologies; encouraging its PMs to “get religion” about their 
technologies to become vision enablers; using a new fellows program 
to get access intergenerational contact and additional ideas; a portfolio 
approach that mixes ranges of technology risk; and encouraging a very 
hands-on relationship between PMs and researchers.
 42713. ARPA-E and DARPA
ARPA-E has also been making progress in building a community of 
support, important to its political survival. This includes building internal 
connections with other DOE agencies, holding a highly successful 
community-building energy technology summit, and fostering a broad 
support community. On the battlefront of technology implementation, 
ARPA-E has: encouraged consideration of the implementation process 
in the selection of technology projects; worked on “in-reach” within 
DOE to move its technologies into the applied side; created ties to DOD 
for possible test bed and initial market capability; formed an internal 
commercialization team to work with PMs to move their technologies 
into implementation; connected technologies to the industry “stage-
gate” process; encouraged industry consortia around its projects; and is 
planning to use prize authority.
In addition, the further DARPA features enumerated above 
provide potentially useful guideposts to ARPA-E as it continues to 
support innovation in the energy sector. These include DARPA’s 
multigenerational thrust, strategic relations between technologies, 
an advocate community, connections to larger innovation elements, 
coping with incumbents, seeking initial markets for its technologies, 
and further ties to leadership.
Finally, the paper closed with a discussion of the profound 
technology implementation problems on the “back end” of the 
innovation system—including demonstration, test beds, initial markets. 
The authors believe both agencies must explicitly, imaginatively 
and actively address the implementation issue. When new, radical, 
transformational technologies are seen as needed, either for national 
security, energy security, or economic security, there are sufficient 
impediments within the existing governmental organizations and 
within the existing markets that creative partnering between the 
government and private sector is required to address the downstream 
risks, while recognizing that the best means to mediate risk is through 
innovation, not stasis. We believe that the agencies need to expand 
their innovation efforts in technology implementation by developing 
further approaches for fostering downstream partnerships between 
the government and private industry.
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14. IARPA:  
A Modified DARPA Innovation Model1
William B. Bonvillian
The DARPA model for organizing innovation has now been copied 
in other U.S. agencies. This is in part because DARPA is famous for 
playing critical roles in the information technology (IT) revolution—
from support for personal computing to the Internet, as well as in stealth 
and drones. As discussed across this volume, DARPA is distinct from 
other innovation agencies around the world in its rejection of “pipeline” 
and technology “hand-off’ approaches used by most agencies. As an 
innovation organization, DARPA takes responsibility to bring about 
technological breakthroughs and nurtures them toward delivering 
final products. To do this effectively, DARPA has developed a series of 
specific organizational practices. These have, in turn, been adopted by 
DARPA clones.
The Advanced Research Project Agency-Energy (ARPA-E) was 
formed in 2009 to bring a DARPA-like approach to the challenge 
of advanced energy technologies, and is discussed in Chapter 
13. The Intelligence Advance Research Projects Agency (IARPA), 
reviewed here, began operating in 2007, bringing a DARPA model 
1  This paper contains material that originally appeared in 2018 as “DARPA and its 
ARPA-E and IARPA clones: a unique innovation organization model”, Industrial 
and Corporate Change 27/5: 897–914, https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dty026, https://
academic.oup.com/icc/article-abstract/27/5/897/5096003
© William B. Bonvillian, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.14
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to development of intelligence-related technologies. A third DARPA 
clone, the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(HSARPA) was authorized in 2002 as a DARPA-like entity in the then 
newly-formed Department of Homeland Security. However, it was not 
adequately established at the time, and much of its early staff, many 
of whom came from DARPA, left in frustration. It was not allowed 
to be a separate operating unit within the department’s science and 
technology directorate, subsumed within a more traditional budget 
and policy office. The Department’s Undersecretary for Science and 
Technology from 2009–2013 worked to reestablish HSARPA during 
the Obama Administration, however, the Trump Administration has 
since moved away from it. Because of these operational problems, this 
chapter does not attempt to evaluate it. 
Concerning IARPA, like DARPA, it operates as public sector 
intermediary, pursuing breakthrough research but also actively 
promoting its implementation. Like DARPA, it is therefore much more 
activist than the standard American R&D mission agency, acting as a 
change agent within the often conservative “legacy” sectors it serves. 
This chapter examines IARPA in more detail, comparing it to DARPA, 
and concludes by noting two structural challenges in their innovation 
systems that DARPA, ARPA-E and IARPA all face. 
The DARPA Model in the Context of Innovation Policy
DARPA was a Cold War creation, formed in direct response to 
a technological crisis. Its operating practices began without any 
significant inspiration from innovation theorists or growth economists. 
Its early program officers learned by doing. It is only recently—
some sixty years later—that innovation theory is catching up, and 
consideration is being given to where an agency like DARPA might fit 
within this theory. 
The DARPA model, however, can now be understood against 
an established policy foundation. In recent years it has been seen to 
occupy a unique place in the context of the U.S. literature on science, 
technology and innovation policy, which requires a brief explication 
here. The economic foundation for the innovation policy field is 
Robert Solow’s work positing technological and related innovation as 
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the dominant causative factor in growth.2 Paul Romer and other New 
Growth Theorists argued the importance of technological learning as 
the underpinning for Solow’s technological advance theory.3 These two 
strands led to an understanding of two basic underlying innovation 
factors—support for R&D and follow-on technological advance, and 
support for Romer’s concept of human capital engaged in research that 
lay behind that system.
Richard Nelson in turn argued the importance in understanding 
comparative innovation systems of assessing the actors in an innovation 
system and their comparative strengths.4 We can enlarge this concept 
to constitute a third direct innovation factor, innovation organization, 
which can be analyzed as a connected system of innovation institutions 
and organizations. Against these factors, particularly the organizational 
factor, the U.S. innovation system took shape. DARPA and its clones 
exemplify a unique innovation organization model within that 
innovation system that deserves explication.
In the postwar, Vannevar Bush’s highly influential “pipeline model” 
for the postwar organization of U.S. R&D agencies was a “technology 
push” or “technology supply” model, with government support 
for initial research, but with only a very limited role for government 
in moving resulting advances (particularly radical or breakthrough 
innovation) toward the marketplace. Development and the later stages 
of innovation were left to private industry. Donald Stokes (and others) 
subsequently sharply critiqued the Bush pipeline model as inherently 
disconnected, separating the government supported research actors 
from the industry development actors with few means for technology 
handoffs between them.5 Lewis Branscomb and Phillip Auerswald 
2  Solow, R. M. (2000). Growth Theory, An Exposition. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/solow-lecture.
html.
3  Romer, P. (1990). “Endogenous Technological Change”, Journal of Political Economy 
98/5: 72–102, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~promer/Endogenous.pdf
4  Nelson, R., ed. (1993). National Systems of Innovation. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 3–21, 505–23. This “innovation organization” factor is also 
elaborated on at length in Bonvillian, W., and Weiss, C. (2015). Technological 
Innovation in Legacy Sectors. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 25–27, 181–86, 
190–92, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199374519.001.0001
5  Stokes, D. E. (1997). Pasteur’s Quadrant, Basic Science and Technological Innovation. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
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articulated the “valley of death” critique: the disconnect in the U.S. 
system between research and later stage development led to system 
failures in commercialization of research results.6 This concern has 
been the major focus of U.S. science and technology policy literature for 
the past twenty years, with resulting discussions of bridging solutions 
across this valley. Of course, the pipeline model is not the only U.S. 
innovation system model. 
As detailed in Chapter 12 of this work, there are five fundamentally 
different innovation approaches that help us sort out the roles of 
DARPA and its clones. These drive the dynamics of innovation in 
different settings: the innovation pipeline, induced innovation, the 
extended pipeline, manufacturing-led innovation, and innovation 
organization.7 These provide a framework for understanding the place 
in the innovation system occupied by DARPA and IARPA, as well as 
ARPA-E. It must also be kept in mind that innovation does not happen 
entirely through an “invisible hand”; innovation introduction generally 
requires active efforts by change agents. Such agents are particularly 
critical for innovation in legacy sectors given the significant barriers 
innovation faces in these sectors. DARPA and its clones are particularly 
noteworthy as change agents, not simply research organizations.
The “pipeline” model, as noted above, has long dominated U.S. 
science and technology thinking. It pictures invention and innovation 
as flowing from investments in research—predominantly from federal 
basic research support—at the “front end” of the innovation system. 
Thus, research is dumped into one end of the innovation pipeline, 
mysterious things occur, industry picks up their development and 
new products emerge. However, most technology comes from private 
sector firms that respond to market opportunities. This constitutes 
a second model, “induced innovation”. Vernon Ruttan is the growth 
economist who discussed this as the dominant way industry innovates, 
by identifying market opportunities then innovating to fill them.8 
6  Branscomb, L., and Auerswald, P. (2002). Between Invention and Innovation, An 
Analysis of Funding for Early-State Technology Development, NIST GCR 02–841. 
Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, https://www.
nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2017/05/09/gcr02-841.pdf
7  These models are discussed at length in, Bonvillian and Weiss. (2015). Technological 
Innovation, 23–30, 181–76, which is drawn from here.
8  Ruttan, V. W. (2001). Technology Growth and Development: An Induced Innovation 
Perspective. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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Here, typically the originator—the change agent—is a firm that spots 
a market opportunity or niche that can be filled by a technology 
advance—typically an incremental not a radical technology advance. 
It is a “technology demand” or “technology pull” model—the market 
creates the demand and pull to induce the technology. The third 
model can be termed the “extended pipeline”, where certain U.S. R&D 
organizations, particularly through the Defense Department (DOD), 
and including DARPA, support moving innovations through every 
innovation stage. Because DOD could not tolerate a disconnected model 
when faced with Cold War technological demands, it developed an 
extended pipeline.9 This means support not just for front end research 
and development (R&D) but also for each successive “back-end” stage, 
from advanced prototype to demonstration, testbed, and often to initial 
market creation, where DOD will buy the first products.10 While the 
government’s support role in the pipeline model is disconnected from 
the rest of the innovation system, in this model it attempts to be deeply 
connected. Most of the major innovation waves of the past three-fourths 
of a century, have evolved from this system: aviation, nuclear power, 
electronics, space, computing and the Internet.11 The extended pipeline 
facilitates the bridging of the “valley of death” between advanced 
research and implemented technology. In general, U.S. innovation 
models in recent decades have tended to stretch their capabilities further 
down this innovation pipeline.12
The fourth model of innovation dynamics, “manufacturing-
led” innovation, describes innovations in production technologies, 
processes and products that emerge from expertise informed by 
experience in manufacturing.13 This is augmented by applied research 
9  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2015). Technological Innovation, 181–86.
10  Bonvillian, W. B., and Van Atta, R. (2011). “ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation”, The Journal of Technology Transfer 36: 469–
513, at 469, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10961-011-9223-x, https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007%2Fs10961-011-9223-x
11  Although he did not use the term “extended pipeline”, Vernon Ruttan wrote 
about the Defense role in evolving these technologies, Ruttan, V. W. (2006). Is War 
Necessary for Economic Growth? Military Procurement and Technology Development. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
12  Bonvillian, W. B. (2013). “The New Model Innovation Agencies: An Overview”, 
Science and Public Policy 41/4: 425–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/sct059, https://
academic.oup.com/spp/article-abstract/41/4/425/1607552?redirectedFrom=fulltext
13  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2015). Technological Innovation, 25, 181–85.
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and development that is integrated with the production process. It 
is typically industry-led, but with strong governmental industrial 
support. While countries like Germany, Japan, Taiwan, Korea and now 
China have organized their economies around “manufacturing-led” 
innovation systems, the U.S. in the postwar period did not. It is a major 
gap in the U.S. innovation system. This system gap is now starting to 
affect the ability of DARPA and its clones to translate their technologies 
into actual innovation. 
The fifth model, “innovation organization”, is different from the 
others.14 It calls for improving the means, methods and organization 
of innovation efforts, both on the innovation front and back ends—it 
is an organizational model. In this innovation organization model, the 
innovation system supports the full innovation spectrum, each stage 
in the innovation process. While the pipeline model supports R&D at 
the front end, and the manufacturing-led model supports the back end, 
production stage, the innovation organization model contemplates all 
stages. It goes beyond the extended pipeline model to orchestrate the 
institutional and policy changes needed to facilitate innovation not just 
for a government customer. 
Innovation policy theorists, as noted above, have long analyzed the 
gap between the “front end” of the innovation system—the research 
side, typically supported by government R&D through university 
research—and the “back end”, the late-stage development through 
implementation phases, typically a private sector domain. To solve 
this structural problem, numerous bridging mechanisms have evolved, 
often with government support. As Philip Shapira and Jan Youtie have 
noted, this requires technology diffusion approaches, and a wide range 
of institutional intermediaries.15
DARPA and its clones are not basic research agencies; they are 
public sector intermediaries as well. They work to nurture new 
technologies from breakthrough stages through applied research and 
initial development, then to pass off the technologies to entities that will 
move them into implementation. They intermediate between finding 
14  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2015). Technological Innovation, 25–27, 186.
15  Shapira, P., and Youtie, J. (2016). The Next Production Revolution and Institutions for 
Technology Diffusion. Presentation at the Conference on Smart Industry: Enabling 
the Next Production Revolution, OECD and Sweden Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation, Stockholm, 18 September.
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the breakthrough to technology implementation. As intermediaries, 
they also operate as change agents.
DARPA and IARPA are clearly mainstays of the extended pipeline 
model, able to apply acquisition budgets from their overall agencies 
to implement technologies they research. Therefore, they are reaching 
toward the unifying “innovation organization” model. This makes 
them quite different from other R&D agencies. Nonetheless, it is also 
important to note that DARPA and later IARPA are able to succeed 
because the U.S. already had a very rich and complex publicly funded 
science and technology system, including the federal labs, university-
based labs, the National Science Foundation, as well at an earlier 
time a network of quite significant private sector labs, including, of 
course, Bell Labs.16 DARPA and later IARPA could cherry pick the 
most promising technologists because there were many of them out 
there to choose from. However, when the talent supply was lacking or 
tight, DARPA helped produce more experts—its support for the early 
computer science departments, for example, proved of deep benefit to 
the emergence of the field as well as to DARPA’s many IT advances. 
ARPA-E and I-ARPA have played similar talent-intermediary roles in 
their fields. 
However, DARPA must play its intermediary role in a defense 
sector that is often profoundly conservative about technology 
advances. ARPA-E must be an intermediary in an energy sector that 
is largely averse to the entry of new technologies. And IARPA faces 
a comparably conservative intelligence world. These sectors are all 
complex, established, legacy sectors. The challenge of innovation for 
intermediaries is already difficult; the difficulty can be multiplied when 
the technology must be stood up in a legacy sector.
The IARPA Model
IARPA’s first director, Lisa Porter, named in 2008, was a former DARPA 
program manager who understood and consciously attempted to 
replicate DARPA’s strengths and “high-risk/high-payoff” approach. 
Both IARPA and DARPA hire term-limited program managers with 
16  Gertner, J. (2012). The Idea Factory, Bell Labs and the Great Age of American Innovation. 
Penguin Publishing Group: New York, N.Y.
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outstanding scientific and engineering credentials and experience.17 
Like DARPA, IARPA competitively selects new projects for funding 
using “The Heilmeier Catechism”—a set of questions to guide program 
selection.18 Like DARPA, IARPA has no lab and conducts no research 
itself, competitively awarding research contracts and grants to leading 
teams of academic and industry researchers, using strong program 
managers without peer review systems. Like DARPA, programs have 
clear goals and definite ends. Program teams are regularly evaluated 
and teams are often cut before a program ends, depending on progress. 
There also are significant differences. While DARPA supports defense 
missions, IARPA supports national intelligence missions, which can 
involve quite different technologies. Some of IARPA’s key organizational 
mechanisms to promote its innovation role are discussed below. 
1) Technology Implementation—Tournaments and Testing. According 
to its current director, Jason Matheny, many of IARPA’s 
programs are organized as tournaments in which multiple 
teams are funded in parallel to pursue the same technical 
goals, scored on a common set of metrics. This competitive 
approach has tended to produce a range of possible solutions 
and pathways. As a result, IARPA spends a large percentage 
of its budget (approximately 25 percent) on independent 
testing and evaluation. This testing stage plays such a central 
role at IARPA that it has a Chief of Testing and Evaluation, 
with contractor support, to ensure that these tests follow best 
practices in experimental design and statistical inference. 
The tournament approach and strong emphasis on testing 
constitute a different approach to technology implementation 
from DARPA and ARPA-E.
2) Empowered Program Managers. The strong program manager 
role is comparable to DARPA’s. IARPA has some twenty-five 
program managers compared to approximately one hundred 
at DARPA and fifteen at ARPA-E. Program managers must 
nurture and pitch their proposed programs and the director 
17  Much of the IARPA material below is from Jason Matheny, IARPA director, 
Personal Communication, 11 July 2017.
18  Chapters 1, 8, and 10 in this volume provide more details about “The Heilmeier 
Catechism”.
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and deputy director then move quickly to approve such 
new programs for funding. Program managers have broad 
independence to manage their programs within their approved 
budgets. They write the solicitations for proposals, they lead 
proposal reviews, and they make the decisions regarding 
program direction and evaluation. Every six months, each 
program is reviewed by the IARPA senior staff, by outside 
technical reviewers, and by transition partners, to re-evaluate 
whether continued funding is justified for all research teams, 
and for the program as a whole. Typically, at least one team 
is cut per program phase. In some cases, programs are 
discontinued. As with DARPA and ARPA-E, IARPA program 
managers have a hands-on relationship with their research 
teams. Program managers have conference calls every two 
weeks with each team, they review monthly written reports 
from each team, and have in-person meetings with each team 
every quarter, at on-site visits and PI Meetings.
According to its director, IARPA has funded research at over 500 
organizations in over a dozen countries. About one-third of IARPA’s 
funding goes to universities and colleges, about one-third to small 
firms, about one-sixth to large firms, and about one-sixth to FFRDCs 
and Government labs. In this way, its program managers have a full 
range of innovation actors to select from. The bulk of its R&D funding 
goes to research in computing, machine learning, human judgment, 
sensors, and intelligence information technology platforms.19
DARPA and ARPA-E have prided themselves on their ability to hire 
their program managers quickly, outside of traditional civil service 
hiring procedures, which helps them move fast on technology challenges. 
IARPA, however, faces a major challenge because of its lengthy timeline 
for hiring program managers. This is because its program managers 
must obtain a high-level security clearance before beginning work. This 
takes several months and, in some cases, can take more than a year. 
3) Ensuring Buy-In from Agency Customers. This intelligence 
technology focus results in organizational changes compared 
19  For a summary of current agency work, see IARPA. “Research Program, Current 
Research”, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs
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to DARPA, just as ARPA-E’s energy focus required changes. 
IARPA’s research tends to focus on key intelligence problems 
that have limited commercial markets. For example, programs 
in quantum computing and superconducting computing have 
few near-term commercial applications. Its work in natural 
language processing focuses on languages of little commercial 
interest. As a result, it has few commercial off-ramps for 
its research and focuses on technology transition directly 
to intelligence agencies. Thus, while DARPA stood up its 
computing initiatives in the private sector, and ARPA-E must 
stand up its energy initiatives in the private sector, IARPA 
must focus exclusively on government intelligence agencies 
as customers for its technologies. While this can mean a more 
assured route to technology implementation, intelligence 
is also a long-established bureaucratic sector with legacy 
features. 
There are, however, spillover opportunities over time for the private 
sector, because it has relatively open research processes. Most of 
IARPA’s research is unclassified. IARPA’s research is largely open to 
university researchers, to foreign participation, it has no publication 
restrictions, and is published in peer-reviewed journals.
IARPA’s agency-focused transition does face technology 
implementation challenges. Seventy percent of IARPA programs 
beyond their midpoint, according to its director, have achieved at 
least one technology transition to an intelligence agency. However, 
the intelligence community lacks DOD’s large industrial base and 
constellation of labs, so IARPA has to make special efforts to support 
technology transition directly with intelligence agencies. In particular, 
it has a full-time Chief of Technology Transition with contractor support 
to work with these potential government customers. This group is 
analogous to DARPA’s tech to market team.
IARPA works directly with the intelligence community to get its 
technologies implemented. It involves it agency transition partners 
in the program pitch, in proposal reviews, and in program reviews. 
Technology transition plans with the interested agency are typically 
developed during the second or third year of a program. The Chief of 
Technology Transition directly supports these efforts. IARPA’s strong 
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testing and evaluation emphasis also helps enable agency transitions 
since technologies they may be considering have been subject to, in 
effect, a validation process. There are significant lessons from these 
steps to integrate technology development with customer agencies. 
These conscious transition efforts mark IARPA as a different kind of 
R&D entity, using the extended pipeline model. 
4) Multigenerational Technology Development. Both DARPA 
and ARPA-E have faced challenges when they undertake 
multigenerational technology development. In other words, 
with term-limited program managers, once a program 
manager nurtures an area, how is it sustained after he or she 
departs, then built on and moved to the next related set of 
advances? IARPA has to deal with this problem as well. IARPA 
program managers often recruit their replacements. Contract 
employees at IARPA who support the program managers 
often serve as the institutional memory across multiple 
program managers. In a number of cases, one program may 
be organized to lay the groundwork for the next. For example, 
IARPA’s work in quantum computing has been organized 
along a set of sequential technical milestones, which can move 
from one program manager to the next. 
5) Cross Disciplinary Thinking Communities. Like DARPA and 
ARPA-E, IARPA has worked to build a “thinking community” 
around its research focus areas. However, IARPA has also 
worked to add an interesting element. Most IARPA programs 
require the formation of research teams that cross disciplines. 
In some cases, these research communities have not previously 
interacted. For example, according to its director, IARPA’s 
work on the social science of cybersecurity has brought 
together sociologists and cybersecurity experts, and its work 
in geopolitical forecasting has brought together political 
scientists and computer scientists. This multidisciplinary 
thought community, particularly across social and physical 
sciences, is an interesting IARPA feature. 
Because its technologies serve intelligence needs, it is hard to evaluate 
IARPA’s success metrics. However, IARPA-supported quantum 
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computing research was named a Science magazine Breakthrough of the 
Year in 2010.20 In 2015, IARPA was named to lead foundational research 
and development in the interagency National Strategic Computing 
Initiative, in 2014 it was made part of the interagency BRAIN Initiative 
and in 2016 it was made part of Nanotechnology-Inspired Grand 
Challenge for Future Computing.21 These are all external signals of strong 
technical capability, in addition to its 70 percent rate of transitioning 
technologies into agencies.22
To summarize, IARPA, in addition to replicating the core of the 
DARPA model brings interesting variations as well. Its “tournament” 
approach to many of its projects, where multiple teams are funded 
in parallel to pursue the same technical goals provides an interesting 
competitive approach to produce a range of possible solutions and 
pathways. It spends a large percentage of its budget on independent 
testing and evaluation under a Chief of Testing and Evaluation. This 
testing regime has tended to validate its technologies and make them 
more acceptable to its intelligence agency customers. It involves it 
agency transition partners in the research program pitch, in proposal 
reviews, and in program reviews, which has produced further customer 
buy-in, smoothing the path to technology implementation. In addition, 
its multidisciplinary approach to building a “thinking community” to 
contribute to its technology capabilities, particularly across social and 
physical sciences, is an interesting IARPA feature. All are variations 
from the basic DARPA model that merit consideration.
20  Ford, M. (2010), “Science’s Breakthrough of 2010: A Visible Quantum Device”, 
Ars Technica, 23 December, https://arstechnica.com/science/2010/12/sciences- 
breakthrough-of-2010-a-macro-scale-quantum-device/
21  See White House. (2015). “Executive Order: Creating a National Strategic Computing 
Initiative”, July 29; White House. (2014). “Fact Sheet: Over $300m in Support of the 
BRAIN Initiative”, 30 September, 5.; Whitman, L., Bryant, R., and Kalil, T. (2015)., 
“A Nanotechnology-Inspired Grand Challenge for Future Computing”, White 
House, 30 October.
22  For a useful summary of IARPA’s technology progress, see IARPA. (2018). 2018 
Year in Review. Washington DC: IARPA https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/about-
iarpa/2018-year-in-review?highlight=WyJ5ZWFyIiwieWVhcidzIiwiaW4iLCJyZXZ
pZXciLCJ5ZWFyIGluIiwieWVhciBpbiByZXZpZXciLCJpbiByZXZpZXciXQ==; and 





Two Challenges to DARPA and its Clones—
Manufacturing and Scaling up Startups
DARPA and its clones often innovate in the areas of “hard” technologies 
that must be manufactured, in addition to work in software. They 
also rely on innovative, entrepreneurial startups to bring their hard 
technology projects into implementation. Both systems are under 
challenge, and this could affect the effectiveness of the DARPA, ARPA-E 
and IARPA models.
Although there is a substantial argument that manufacturing—
particularly initial production of new technologies and complex, high 
value products—is a significant stage of the innovation system, as 
Suzanne Berger has articulated,23 U.S. innovation agencies historically 
have not organized around it. However, as noted in Chapter 12, 
other nations have developed what can be termed “manufacturing-
led” innovation systems, which is the dominant model in Germany, 
Japan, Korea, and now China.24 Emblematic of “manufacturing-led” is 
Japan’s quality manufacturing revolution of the 1970s-80s,25 Germany’s 
system of industrial support through its Fraunhofer institutes and 
apprenticeship programs,26 and lately, China’s rapid prototyping and 
scale-up capacity.27
The U.S. missed this model. In the immediate postwar period when 
it was forming most of its R&D agencies, the U.S. had the strongest 
manufacturing sector in the world, operating at a level of mass 
production efficiency that no other economies were close to. There was 
no reason to bring innovation models to production.28 Both civilian 
23  Berger, S., with the MIT Task Force on Production and Innovation. (2013). Making in 
America. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
24  Bonvillian and Weiss. (2015). Technological Innovation, 184–86. See also the discussion 
of China in, Bonvillian, W. B., and Singer, P. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing—The 
New American Innovation Policies. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 8, 45–52, https://
doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262037037.001.0001
25  Womack, J. P, Jones, D. T., and Roos, D. (1991). The Machine that Changed the World: 
The Story of Lean Production. New York, NY: Harper Perennial. See also, discussion 
of Japan in Bonvillian and Singer. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing, 37–44. 
26  Bonvillian and Singer. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing, 178–83.
27  Nahm, J., and Steinfeld, E. (2013). “Scale-Up Nation: China’s Specialization 
in Innovative Manufacturing”, World Development 54: 288–300, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.09.003 
28  Bonvillian and Singer. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing, 34–35.
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and military innovation models—pipeline and extended pipeline—
focused on broader technology development, not on technologies and 
processes for manufacturing innovation. The U.S. therefore missed 
manufacturing-led innovation, and subsequently paid a significant 
price in the decline of its manufacturing base in the early 2000s. The 
one-third manufacturing job decline from 2000–2010 turned out to 
be symptomatic of a decline in production capability. Widespread 
offshoring of manufacturing, encouraged by generations of MBAs and 
a financial sector taught to focus firms on “core competencies” and to go 
“asset light”, was also a critical factor in limiting domestic production 
capacity.29 Linda Weiss has noted the problematic future of American 
economic primacy and national security as its financialized corporations 
curtailed investment in manufacturing and related innovation.30 
Production, particularly initial production of new technologies, can be 
highly innovative, involving creative engineering, design, technology 
advances and production processes. For the DARPA model agencies 
to be cut off from these innovation system capabilities, and unable to 
rely on a strong U.S. manufacturing base for rapid prototyping and 
innovative production, spells a major potential challenge to their ability 
to develop and implement hard technologies. Although the U.S. is now 
pursuing an “advanced manufacturing” model through an innovative 
group of fourteen new advanced manufacturing institutes,31 this effort 
is still in early stages, and it is not clear it will have the political support 
to be sustained over the extended period required. 
The second challenge is that U.S. venture capital (VC) has largely 
withdrawn from support of startup firms with hard technologies that 
must be manufactured.32 VC firms are focused on software, biotech 
and services startups where they can more readily manage the scale-up 
process and timetable. Hard technologies typically require more time, risk 
29  Berger, S. (2014). “How Finance Gutted Manufacturing”, Boston Review, 1 April, 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/suzanne-berger-how-finance-gutted-manufacturing; 
and Bonvillian and Singer. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing, 117–18.
30  Weiss, L. (2014). America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 203–09.
31  Bonvillian and Singer. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing, 135–86.
32  Bonvillian and Singer. (2018). Advanced Manufacturing,187–215. These developments 
are reviewed in further detail in, Singer, P., and Bonvillian, W. B. (2017). “Innovation 
Orchards: Helping Startups Scale”, Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, 
Washington, DC, http://www2.itif.org/2017-innovation-orchards.pdf
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and capital for scale-up so increasingly fall outside the VC model. Since 
VCs dominate the scale-up process for its small, innovative companies, 
the U.S. is increasingly leaving hard technologies by the technology 
wayside. Because they leverage the private sector for implementation, 
this will affect the ability, in particular, of DARPA and ARPA-E to use 
the entrepreneurial approach they have relied on for scaling up their 
hard technologies. A new approach, termed “innovation orchards”, is 
now evolving to fill this gap. This entails creating shared technology, 
equipment and know-how rich spaces for scaling-up startups through 
advanced prototype, production design and pilot production. In effect, 
this approach attempts to substitute space for capital. However, it is 
likewise at a very early stage. In the meantime, this creates a serious 
implementation challenge for the DARPA model. 
Conclusion
DARPA, ARPA-E and IARPA share an ambitious innovation organization 
model, operating as public sector intermediaries that pursue high-risk/
high reward, breakthrough research. Importantly, they also actively 
promote its implementation. They are therefore much more activist 
than the standard American R&D mission agency, performing as 
change agents within the often conservative “legacy” sectors they 
operate within. The chapter has summarized the DARPA model and 
reviewed its variations in IARPA in detail. It placed these agencies it 
in the context of the overall U.S. innovation system—DARPA and 
IARPA are leading examples of the “extended pipeline” model, while 
ARPA-E is located within a “pipeline” model agency, trying to reach 
further down the innovation pipeline. All face the types of innovation 
barriers common to legacy sectors, which further challenge their efforts 
to implement their innovations. Despite these challenges, the DARPA 
model has proven quite dynamic; DARPA has an unparalleled record 
of technological advance, and the other two are rapidly building their 
own records. ARPA-E and IARPA show that the DARPA model is now a 
proven one in the innovation space, clearly relevant to other technology 
sectors. Therefore, the specifics of their innovation organization 
present important innovation options deserving close examination, as 
attempted here. However, because all three agencies work in significant 
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part on “hard” technologies that must be manufactured, they face two 
significant new structural challenges in the U.S. innovation system: in 
manufacturing and startup scaling. Their ability to achieve innovation 
implementation in the future in hard technology fields may depend on 
progress in addressing these two new innovation system challenges.
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15. Does NIH need a DARPA?1
Robert Cook-Deegan
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) recently celebrated the fiftieth 
anniversary of its Division of Research Grants with a symposium on 
peer review. NIH Director Harold Varmus introduced the theme of 
the day, likening competitive external peer review to democracy by 
invoking Churchill’s quip: “the worst form of government except all 
the others that have been tried”. This analogy expresses a belief in peer 
review that is widely shared among those who were in the audience. 
There are, however, a couple of problems with this analogy. First, it 
is factually incorrect. Some agencies—notably the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA; ARPA during some periods) and 
the armed services’ R&D operations—have demonstrated that other 
methods work quite well, arguably as well as or better than those used 
at NIH. Second, comparing peer review to democracy implies a false 
dichotomy. A country cannot be at once a democracy and a dictatorship, 
but an agency can simultaneously use both peer review and other 
mechanisms to support R&D; indeed, several defense R&D agencies do 
just that.
The chief alternatives to competitive peer review are formula 
funding methods, based on political, historical, or performance factors, 
and what might be called the DARPA model, in which staff experts 
decide how to distribute research funds. Formula funding would 
1  Originally published as Cook-Deegan, R. (1997). “Does NIH Need a DARPA?”, 
Issues in Science and Technology 13/2, https://issues.org/cookde/
© Robert Cook-Deegan, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0184.15
454 The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies
surely reduce transaction costs and could provide a stable flow of 
support to good researchers. The price of reducing transaction costs 
through formula funding, however, is the loss of expert judgment about 
innovative promise. The desire to invest in such promise, as opposed to 
past performance alone, is a major reason that agencies have come to 
rely on outside expert advice. But the DARPA approach is also a way to 
foster innovation.
DARPA’s effectiveness depends on expert staff, clear mission, 
focused effort, and lean management. DARPA’s main function is to 
quickly exploit new inventions, ideas, and concepts with potential 
military utility. Its eighty or so program managers distribute between 
$2 billion and $2.5 billion annually and are supervised by a half-dozen 
office directors, who in turn report to the DARPA director. Thus, only one 
management layer exists between the DARPA director and the program 
managers. The entire DARPA staff is roughly comparable in size to that 
responsible for administering extramural funds for the National Human 
Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) or one of the smaller NIH institutes 
that expends between $100 million and $200 million.
DARPA managers are hired for their expertise, often from industry 
or academia, and typically serve for four years or less. Each handle 
from $10 million to $50 million of research funding per year, of which 
at least 20 percent is intended for new investments. The money for 
new programs is a direct result of DARPA’s ruthless willingness to 
kill programs that are not meeting expectations. Success results from a 
long-term strategy pursued by highly expert staff who are given great 
discretion to manage substantial funding commitments. Those staff 
members are held accountable for the results produced by the programs 
they fund, in quarterly reviews and detailed annual assessments by the 
DARPA director.
In DARPA culture, managers are self-avowed scientific and 
technological fanatics. Their base skill is recognizing talent that is 
relevant to defense needs and providing funds for its expression. 
The institutional ethos is described as “80 decision makers linked 
by a travel office”, which emphasizes its highly interactive (and, at 
times, intrusive) style. It is ironic that within one of the world’s most 
notorious bureaucracies, the Department of Defense, resides a tribe of 
rambunctious technological entrepreneurs.
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Created by the Eisenhower administration in the wake of the 
Soviet launch of Sputnik, DARPA played a crucial early role in the 
development of computer time-sharing, interactive computing, space 
launch vehicles, satellite surveillance, lasers, stealth technology, 
and many other technological innovations. Its twenty-five-year-old 
Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO) is DARPA’s best-
known program outside defense technologies. IPTO spawned the first 
departments of computer science, bolstered an academic base for large-
scale integrated chip design at a time when that foundation was eroding 
perilously, and created the prototype for today’s Internet. It is safe to 
say that many computing activities we take for granted in the 1990s, 
such as e-mail, computer graphics, interactive computing, alternative 
chip architectures, and networking, can be traced to DARPA funding 
decisions made in the 1960s and 1970s.
Biomedical Success
This period has also been a time of remarkable progress in biomedical 
research, and NIH has played a central role. NIH funding accounts 
for almost 30 percent of the world’s biomedical research literature, 
compared to about 40 percent from other U.S. sources and about 30 
percent from all foreign sources. The volume and excellence of U.S. 
biomedical research, as well as the innovative power of industries 
dependent on such research (such as pharmaceuticals, medical devices, 
and biotechnology), can largely be attributed to NIH and its system of 
peer review.
But is peer review the only way to achieve success in this 
field? In materials science, telecommunications, space, lasers, and 
microelectronics—other fields in which the United States is the world 
leader—the nation’s advantages in R&D arguably derive as much from 
mission-oriented agency-directed research and technology development 
as from peer-reviewed science. In many fields of engineering, 
mathematics, and physical sciences, the National Science Foundation’s 
(NSF) base of peer-reviewed grants is complemented by other agencies’ 
dynamic portfolio of mission-related science and technology, much of 
which is funded outside of peer review.
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Many of these fields do seem more like engineering than pure science, 
and some people assume that DARPA’s funding procedures are suited 
to technology with definite aims but not to science. Experience suggests 
otherwise, however. Packet switching for electronic communication, 
computer time-sharing, integrated large-scale chip design, and 
networking were as conceptually “basic” when DARPA was funding 
them as most molecular biological experiments are today. Nothing was 
there except a notion that computers could be made to do things they 
had never done before. When NSF and NIH both frowned upon funding 
work on neural networks, Leon Cooper received funding thanks to the 
judgment of a program manager at the Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
which uses a mix of peer review and DARPA-like funding mechanisms. 
ONR also led the way toward single-atom chemistry, “squeezed” states 
of light, and acoustics—all fields with a heavy dose of basic science.
Another reason to consider the DARPA approach is its lower 
transaction costs. Administrative review costs at NIH or NSF rise 
arithmetically with the number of applications. External costs, 
however, rise much faster as the percentage of proposals that are 
funded falls. If half of all proposals result in funding, which was the 
case at NIH several decades ago, one unfunded grant proposal is 
prepared for each one funded. When success rates fall to one in five 
or six, as they have in several areas, four or five proposals are wasted 
for everyone funded. Preparing a grant proposal is a substantial effort, 
and the total external costs for all applicants may approach or even 
exceed the amount awarded to the successful one. Physicist Leo Szilard 
once noted that, at some point in a competitive grant system, applying 
for grants would consume all of a scientist’s time, leaving none for 
research. With 15- to 20-percent success rates, a “Szilard point” (where 
waste exceeds benefit) is no longer a frivolous speculation, but a real 
possibility. Whereas NIH extramural administrators spend most of 
their time crafting rules for competition and then selecting among 
applicants, DARPA staff spend most of their time keeping abreast 
of their fields and camping in sparsely populated outposts along the 
technological and scientific frontiers.
Many scientists and engineers fear that grant competition has pushed 
peer review well past its power to distinguish the truly outstanding 
from the merely excellent. The least painful solution to this problem, 
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at least for the scientists and engineers seeking funds, is more money 
for grants, so that more are funded, the success rate rises, the relative 
external costs fall, and reviewers need only separate the good from 
the excellent. To relieve the tension in the peer review system would 
require at least a doubling of federal research support in combination 
with a “birth control” policy to stem the growth of the applicant pool. 
Although NIH enjoys stalwart bipartisan support, a budget increase of 
this magnitude is unlikely; and even if budgets grow, the applicant pool 
may well grow faster, if history is any guide.
Although important, budget constraints and administrative 
inefficiency are not the most compelling reasons to experiment with 
DARPA-like funding mechanisms. The most serious threat to science 
under the peer review system is conservatism—the safe squeezing out 
the novel. A look at the history of NIH involvement in DNA sequencing 
illustrates how a DARPA-like mechanism might prove more effective 
than external, prospective peer review. In 1981, Leroy Hood and his 
colleagues at Caltech applied for NIH (and NSF) funding to support 
their efforts to automate DNA sequencing. They were turned down. 
Fortunately, the Weingart Institute supported the initial work that 
became the foundation for what is now the dominant DNA sequencing 
instrument on the market. By 1984, progress was sufficient to garner 
NSF funds that led to a prototype instrument two years later. In 
1989, the newly created National Human Genome Research Institute 
(NHGRI) at NIH held a peer-reviewed competition for large-scale DNA 
sequencing. It took roughly a year to frame and announce this effort and 
another year to review the proposals and make final funding decisions, 
which is a long time in a fast-moving field. NHGRI wound up funding 
a proposal to use decade-old technology and an army of graduate 
students but rejected proposals by J. Craig Venter and Leroy Hood to do 
automated sequencing. Venter went on to found the privately funded 
Institute for Genomic Research, which has successfully sequenced the 
entire genomes of three microorganisms and has conducted many other 
successful sequencing efforts; Hood’s groups, first at Caltech and then 
at the University of Washington, went on to sequence the T cell receptor 
region, which is among the largest contiguously sequenced expanses 
of human DNA. Meanwhile, the army of graduate students has yet to 
complete its sequencing of the bacterium Escherichia coli. The point is 
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not that the study section bet wrong—any research funding must be 
fault-tolerant and take risks-but that it bet on old technology over new.
NIH and NSF have long struggled with the tendency toward 
conservatism in peer review. NSF has set aside small grants for 
exploratory research that is subject only to expeditious staff review. 
With NSF’s tradition of grant managers rotating into and out of their 
fields in academia, this is similar in spirit to DARPA, although the dollar 
amounts are generally too small to fund more than pilot projects. NSF 
has a good idea, but there is no reason to believe that innovative projects 
are always small. Besides, requiring that innovation prove itself early 
with small grants may lead to premature declarations of failure and 
force investigators to write a follow-up grant at the same time as they 
have only a few months’ funding to do the pilot work. At NIH, some 
study sections set aside specific grants or are given the option of selecting 
one or a few especially novel proposals for special consideration. But 
this does not avoid the inefficiencies of the group process and of grant 
proposal preparation, and it ultimately amounts to a few groups doing 
sporadically what individual experts might do better.
A Small Dose of DARPA
A DARPA-like funding mechanism cannot cover the same breadth of 
science and technology as NIH or NSF. Even if a pilot test of a DARPA-
like program is a success, it still should be considered as an alternative 
for a few select programs only. Much of the most important work 
supported by NIH and NSF is conducted through tens of thousands 
of relatively small grants. Innovation bubbles up in unexpected places 
thanks to the flexibility of the grant mechanism, which leaves funds 
largely under the control of investigators. NIH handles 45,000 grant 
applications per year. It would be folly to adopt DARPA’s methods for 
so many small projects covering enormous areas of science. The DARPA 
system cannot scale up easily, because its effectiveness depends on a 
flat bureaucracy and strong direct accountability from manager to 
agency director. The DARPA process is best suited to force scientific 
and technical progress in critical areas and to accomplish tasks when 
a new technology is promising but not yet proven. It is not suited to 
sustaining the bulk of scientific research.
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DARPA-like pilot projects might be tried first by one or a few NIH 
institutes or center directors working with their respective councils to 
foster specific fields or to develop needed technical capacities. If NIH 
were to experiment with a DARPA-like mechanism, it should focus on 
areas that are ripe for such experimentation, such as:
An emerging technological capacity that would be widely beneficial 
if successfully developed,
• An advance promising a major leap, not an incremental 
improvement,
• A capacity whose development requires substantial sustained 
funding,
• A field or technique that is unlikely to be developed by 
ongoing academic efforts or within industrial firms,
• An emerging scientific field or technical area that lacks a 
natural disciplinary base, or
• A promising new field populated by only a few individuals.
NIH has amply demonstrated its agility and excellence, maintaining 
scientific quality and administering a credible and effective process for 
allocating funds. That solid base of peer-reviewed science should be not 
be chipped and fragmented. The edifice could benefit from a new wing, 
however, that poses little danger to its foundations. One or two institute 
directors could hire some rising stars and make them responsible for 
moving their fields ahead rapidly. After four or five years, the results of 
NIH’s “DARPA corps” could be compared to the record of peer review 
groups in similar areas.
Testing a DARPA mechanism within NIH is not a call to end peer 
review as we know it, or even a substantial fraction of it. But neither 
is the generally excellent track record of NIH and NSF any proof that 
a DARPA-like mechanism can’t improve the system. In the 1960s, C. 
Jackson Grayson wrote a classic work on oil drilling that demonstrated 
why a long-term diversified strategy is important for success when 
confronting uncertainty. Peer review is best regarded as a way to 
contend with moderate uncertainty, but it is not a good way to decide 
where to wildcat. DARPA’s methods seem better suited to that, and 
some wildcatting is a good idea.





16. Lessons from DARPA’s 
Experience
Richard Van Atta, Patrick Windham  
and William B. Bonvillian
DARPA has been considered unique in having successfully promoted 
transformative innovation for more than six decades. Its ability to do 
so is based on several key features, which have been elaborated in the 
chapters of this book. It should be noted that these features have varied in 
emphasis over the years. Not all of these features existed when DARPA 
was created—indeed they evolved as the agency evolved. DARPA 
initially began with little explicit structure, organizational architecture, 
or management processes. It was largely ad hoc. Its first programs were 
large collections of projects aimed to tackle various aspects of the three 
Presidential issues it was given as its first assignments: (1) get the U.S. 
into space; (2) missile defense; (3) nuclear test detection. These were large, 
umbrella tasks for which there was no well-defined path—they were all 
highly exploratory and required multiple approaches. Soon after it was 
established, DARPA took on another area of research—Project AGILE, 
which was to provide technical support to counterinsurgency in Vietnam. 
This began a decade-long on-going program which in many ways, in 
retrospect, had features contradictory to almost all of those identified by 
the chapters in this book. AGILE also was an ignominious failure. This 
failure could be due to the fact that it was trying to develop technical 
solutions to intrinsically political problems. But it was also due to the fact 
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is it was run without any of the discipline and clear management focus 
that have become associated with DARPA programs. There is perhaps 
an important lesson here: just being ambitious and taking on a major 
problem, such as “counterinsurgency” is not enough—it is necessary to 
bound that problem and apply well-founded management principles.
Important Features
In this Conclusion, we want to highlight some of the most important of 
these features:
Ambitious technical goals. DARPA focuses on high-risk, high-
potential projects. Moreover, it is not simply a research agency. Its focus 
and goal is to create and demonstrate new significant technologies and 
systems. DARPA works on both basic technologies and components 
and on prototype systems that use these advanced technologies to 
demonstrate new and valuable equipment, processes, and other 
systems. It therefore both helps to create new technologies and applies 
them in useful and novel ways.
Organizational independence. DARPA takes on problems that are 
beyond or outside those of other defense organizations. One way this has 
been phrased is that if there is a defined “requirement” for something—
that is, there is a known approach for accomplishing a specific 
objective—then it is not a job for DARPA. The Defense Department 
chartered DARPA to focus on new technologies and approaches, not 
incrementally improve on what exists.
Freedom from bureaucratic procedures. Moreover, the agency is 
free of day-to-day bureaucratic interference from other parts of the 
Defense Department. It can move quickly, without having to check with 
outside organizations or committees. While the Director and the Office 
Directors may take overall direction from the Secretary of Defense and 
some other high-level OSD executives, this is almost entirely focused on 
stating defense priorities and not how to do the research itself.
Highly-talented managers and a lean management structure. 
DARPA focuses on some of the hardest and most important technical 
problems in the U.S., and will succeed only if both DARPA and the R&D 
performers DARPA funds are among the very best technical people in 
the country. The agency hires excellent program managers and then 
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lets them propose programs, run competitions, select R&D performers, 
and work with those performers. The agency has only two layers of 
management above the program manager: the office director and 
deputy and the agency director and deputy. Moreover, these managers 
are themselves technical experts and can make informed technical 
judgments quickly.
Temporary R&D teams. DARPA does not have its own internal 
laboratory and instead funds outside R&D performers, usually for 
projects that last three to five years. As a result, the agency has great 
flexibility. If progress is strong in a particular program area, DARPA can 
extend funding over several generations of programs. If a program fails, 
then it is terminated and funds are used for other work. In addition, 
once a new technology is created and demonstrated, DARPA can move 
into other, newer areas.
A technically-sophisticated and well-funded customer. The Defense 
Department is a sophisticated customer, which makes technology transfer 
practical. Moreover, DARPA is most successful when senior Defense 
Department officials not only support the agency’s independence, but 
also work to transfer its new technologies to the military services.
Continuous management, not post hoc evaluation. Because DARPA 
program managers are themselves technical experts, they can quickly 
judge whether R&D projects are succeeding or not and, equally important, 
can work with R&D performers to change projects when surprises and 
changes inevitably occur. DARPA therefore has a process of continuous 
learning. And if a project fails even after changes, then it is terminated. 
DARPA does not perform post hoc assessments of its research program 
as is done by many other government research organizations. In this 
sense it is run more like a business where the “evaluation” is in results, 
recognizing that not all its projects will succeed.
A credible process for accountability. R&D quality and agency 
accountability are ensured by picking an excellent director and excellent 
program managers, by this process of continuous evaluation, and by 
having oversight (but not heavy paperwork) from senior government 
officials. There is no need for supervision by committees, outside 
evaluations and audits, or other bureaucratic steps that would actually 
slow down the agency’s work.
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An effective political design. DARPA has built strong, enduring 
political support based on its performance, and therefore has had stable 
budgets and continuing independence. It has this support because it 
performs a vital mission (keeping the U.S. military technologically 
advanced), focuses on long-term challenges and opportunities facing 
the Defense Department, does not threaten the budgets of other 
DOD agencies, has won the respect and support of the U.S. technical 
community, and has credible procedures for tracking program progress 
and maintaining quality.
The chapters in this book present greater detail on these features 
and also other aspects of its management and operations that are seen 
as useful for it to fulfill its special mission. Some of these mechanisms 
have been introduced to assure that DARPA does not get bogged down 
in stultifying bureaucratic processes that inhibit its flexibility and 
adaptability. We have emphasized that a key feature is the ability to 
bring on technically expert program managers for explicit, short term 
appointments. Another feature is the ability to quickly undertake, but 
also if needed, quickly cancel specific projects. To make these feasible, 
DARPA uses flexible hiring and contracting authorities.
Creating New Technical Communities
By funding multi-disciplinary teams that both compete and cooperate 
with each other, DARPA often helps create new technical communities 
and new academic fields. Examples over the years include materials 
science and engineering, computer science, and, more recently, artificial 
intelligence, autonomous systems, and synthetic biology/engineering 
biology. In fact, one can argue that DARPA actually makes two very 
important contributions: it not only helps create and demonstrate new 
technologies, but also helps create important new technical communities.
These researchers then can perform additional R&D, teach students, 
and contribute further ideas to DARPA, as well as commercialize the 
technologies. Indeed, DARPA-funded communities are a primary means 
for transitioning the newly developed technologies to the military and 
to commercial companies.
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DARPA and the Future
DARPA has existed for over sixty years and has had massive impacts on 
many areas of defense capabilities. It has also produced much broader, 
revolutionary advances in information technologies, microelectronics, 
materials, and other areas, that have had profound economic and 
societal impacts. DARPA has garnered a reputation as the innovation 
icon—often pointed to as the most successful U.S. innovation agent. 
DARPA has changed over time in response to the changing security, 
technological and governmental landscapes.
DARPA’s higher-risk, longer-term R&D agenda distinguishes it 
from other defense R&D organizations. Perhaps the most important 
effect of DARPA’s work is to change people’s minds as to what is 
possible. DARPA’s sixty-year history reveals an institution driven by a 
constant imperative to create novel, high-payoff capabilities by pushing 
the frontiers of knowledge. DARPA has many of the same features as 
its research. DARPA began as an experiment aimed at overcoming 
the usual incremental processes of technology development. Like 
the research it is chartered to develop, DARPA consistently has been 
purposively “disruptive” and “transformational”. Over the decades, 
there have been various efforts to tone down DARPA, make its research 
more compatible and integrated into the rest of DOD R&D, and have 
it focus more heavily on nearer term, more incremental applications—
that is, to shift its focus away from disruptive possibilities.
Additionally, there have been efforts to broaden its charter into 
prototyping systems beyond the proof-of-concept demonstrations 
DARPA traditionally has carried out. However, with strong internal 
leadership, both within DARPA and in the OSD, as well as with support 
from Congress, DARPA has been able to perform a truly unique role for 
six decades. It has been, and continues to be, DOD’s “Chief Innovation 
Agency”, pushing the frontiers of what is possible for the benefit of 
national security and the nation.
DARPA remains an impressive “opportunity farm”. For example, 
DARPA helped move “artificial intelligence” (AI) from an inchoate 
notion with almost no technological underpinnings into pervasive 
capabilities affecting our everyday lives and supporting real-time 
military operational decision-making. It is now pursuing similar 
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advances in cognitive computing and robotics. It is pursuing fundamental 
advances in materials such as biomaterials, and accelerated materials 
development. The Agency has revolutionized the realm of distributed 
sensing. Among many current DARPA research topics that populate the 
opportunity farm are heterogeneous electronics, engineering biology, 
agile access to space, and hypersonic systems.
Looking to the future, the question is not whether DARPA can 
still pursue new change-state prospects. The question is this: how can 
DARPA and the Department of Defense identify and focus on what these 
should be in the changing geopolitical and technological environments? 
DARPA has been adroit in addressing emerging technological 
prospects—but, in today’s world, it has to be yet more focused on where 
it can have leverage, as others are investing, often massively, in the very 
technologies that DARPA initially championed.
With global investments in robotics, AI, synthetic biology, quantum 
computing, and advanced materials, on what should DARPA focus? 
From a military applications perspective, what should DARPA do to 
harness and promote the potential use of such emerging technologies 
into defense uses? To what needs, as opposed to today’s defined 
requirements, should DARPA seek to employ these technologies? 
Crucially how should DOD achieve the fruition of these efforts?
Today DARPA faces new challenges that raise a key issue concerning 
its future success—the ability to draw upon extraordinary technical talent 
for program managers. The commercial high-tech sector, particularly 
in such areas as information technology, autonomous systems, 
advanced biology—areas in which DARPA is focused—is aggressively 
spending vast sums and hiring the very best. These firms attract this 
talent with high salaries, relatively unfettered work environments, in 
locations far from Washington, DC, with foreign nationals making up 
a growing proportion. Moreover, many leading tech companies are 
now outside of the U.S., in Asia and Europe. Thus, there is greater 
competition for technical talent and greater competition worldwide in 
advanced technologies. Even as DARPA now must confront a tougher 
recruiting context that it has in the past, it still presents prospective 
program managers unique opportunities to affect the future that few 
other organizations can offer. These talent dynamics are crucial to 
understanding today’s DARPA and its ongoing mission to identify, 
demonstrate and develop the technologies of the future.
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These questions emphasize a crucial point—DARPA does not 
succeed by itself. Its success resides in the opportunities it creates that 
others bring into fruition. Thus, its success must build upon the larger 
U.S. innovation infrastructure. That innovation ecosystem has changed 
fundamentally over the past twenty-five years. For DARPA research 
to be successful, it must eventually culminate in transition, whether 
in an operational military capability or a new field of technology that 
expands frontiers for decades. DARPA itself is not responsible for 
executing transitions, but it depends on effective transition paths being 
there. These paths need to be better understood, and other stakeholders, 
beyond DARPA, need to support the measures that foster transition—
whether within DOD or within industry. Some worry that military 
transition mechanisms within the DOD have eroded. In the broader 
commercial economy, transition paths have become more uncertain 
and diffuse. For DARPA to continue to have transformative impacts, it 
must exist within an economic and policy environment that encourages 
implementation. These are critical technology policy concerns that 
the U.S. must address to ensure that DARPA can continue to deliver 
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